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From: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
To: "Yang, Weijiang" <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
Cc: <seanjc@google.com>, <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	<peterz@infradead.org>, <john.allen@amd.com>,
	<kvm@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	<rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>, <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 08/19] KVM:x86: Report KVM supported CET MSRs as to-be-saved
Date: Fri, 4 Aug 2023 13:51:33 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZMyR5Ztfjd9EMgIR@chao-email> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <83d767df-c9ef-1bee-40c0-2360598aafa8@intel.com>

On Fri, Aug 04, 2023 at 11:13:36AM +0800, Yang, Weijiang wrote:
>> > @@ -7214,6 +7217,13 @@ static void kvm_probe_msr_to_save(u32 msr_index)
>> > 		if (!kvm_caps.supported_xss)
>> > 			return;
>> > 		break;
>> > +	case MSR_IA32_U_CET:
>> > +	case MSR_IA32_S_CET:
>> > +	case MSR_KVM_GUEST_SSP:
>> > +	case MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP ... MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB:
>> > +		if (!kvm_is_cet_supported())
>> shall we consider the case where IBT is supported while SS isn't
>> (e.g., in L1 guest)?
>Yes, but userspace should be able to access SHSTK MSRs even only IBT is exposed to guest so
>far as KVM can support SHSTK MSRs.

Why should userspace be allowed to access SHSTK MSRs in this case? L1 may not
even enumerate SHSTK (qemu removes -shstk explicitly but keeps IBT), how KVM in
L1 can allow its userspace to do that?

>> > +static inline bool kvm_is_cet_supported(void)
>> > +{
>> > +	return (kvm_caps.supported_xss & CET_XSTATE_MASK) == CET_XSTATE_MASK;
>> why not just check if SHSTK or IBT is supported explicitly, i.e.,
>> 
>> 	return kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) ||
>> 	       kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT);
>> 
>> this is straightforward. And strictly speaking, the support of a feature and
>> the support of managing a feature's state via XSAVE(S) are two different things.x
>I think using exiting check implies two things:
>1. Platform/KVM can support CET features.
>2. CET user mode MSRs are backed by host thus are guaranteed to be valid.
>i.e., the purpose is to check guest CET dependencies instead of features' availability.

When KVM claims a feature is supported, it should ensure all its dependencies are
met. that's, KVM's support of a feature also imples all dependencies are met.
Function-wise, the two approaches have no difference. I just think checking
KVM's support of SHSTK/IBT is more clear because the function name is
kvm_is_cet_supported() rather than e.g., kvm_is_cet_state_managed_by_xsave().

>
>kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) || kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT)
>
>only tells at least one of the CET features is supported by KVM.
>
>> then patch 16 has no need to do
>> 
>> +	/*
>> +	 * If SHSTK and IBT are not available in KVM, clear CET user bit in
>> +	 * kvm_caps.supported_xss so that kvm_is_cet__supported() returns
>> +	 * false when called.
>> +	 */
>> +	if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) &&
>> +	    !kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT))
>> +		kvm_caps.supported_xss &= ~CET_XSTATE_MASK;
>

  reply	other threads:[~2023-08-04  5:52 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 82+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-08-03  4:27 [PATCH v5 00/19] Enable CET Virtualization Yang Weijiang
2023-08-03  4:27 ` [PATCH v5 01/19] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPU feature flags for shadow stacks Yang Weijiang
2023-08-03  4:27 ` [PATCH v5 02/19] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Yang Weijiang
2023-08-03  4:27 ` [PATCH v5 03/19] KVM:x86: Report XSS as to-be-saved if there are supported features Yang Weijiang
2023-08-03  4:27 ` [PATCH v5 04/19] KVM:x86: Refresh CPUID on write to guest MSR_IA32_XSS Yang Weijiang
2023-08-04 16:02   ` Sean Christopherson
2023-08-04 21:43     ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-08-09  3:11       ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-08 14:20     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-04 18:27   ` Sean Christopherson
2023-08-07  6:55     ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-08-09  8:56     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-10  0:01       ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-08-10  1:12         ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-03  4:27 ` [PATCH v5 05/19] KVM:x86: Initialize kvm_caps.supported_xss Yang Weijiang
2023-08-04 18:45   ` Sean Christopherson
2023-08-08 15:08     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-03  4:27 ` [PATCH v5 06/19] KVM:x86: Load guest FPU state when access XSAVE-managed MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-08-03  4:27 ` [PATCH v5 07/19] KVM:x86: Add fault checks for guest CR4.CET setting Yang Weijiang
2023-08-03  9:07   ` Chao Gao
2023-08-03  4:27 ` [PATCH v5 08/19] KVM:x86: Report KVM supported CET MSRs as to-be-saved Yang Weijiang
2023-08-03 10:39   ` Chao Gao
2023-08-04  3:13     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-04  5:51       ` Chao Gao [this message]
2023-08-04 18:51         ` Sean Christopherson
2023-08-04 22:01           ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-08-08 15:16           ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-06  8:54         ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-04 18:55   ` Sean Christopherson
2023-08-08 15:26     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-04 21:47   ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-08-09  3:14     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-03  4:27 ` [PATCH v5 09/19] KVM:x86: Make guest supervisor states as non-XSAVE managed Yang Weijiang
2023-08-03 11:15   ` Chao Gao
2023-08-04  3:26     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-04 20:45       ` Sean Christopherson
2023-08-04 20:59         ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-04 21:32         ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-08-09  2:51           ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-09  2:39         ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-10  9:29         ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-10 14:29           ` Dave Hansen
2023-08-10 15:15             ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-08-10 15:37               ` Sean Christopherson
2023-08-11  3:03               ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-28 21:00               ` Dave Hansen
2023-08-29  7:05                 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-03  4:27 ` [PATCH v5 10/19] KVM:VMX: Introduce CET VMCS fields and control bits Yang Weijiang
2023-08-03  4:27 ` [PATCH v5 11/19] KVM:VMX: Emulate read and write to CET MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-08-04  5:14   ` Chao Gao
2023-08-04 21:27     ` Sean Christopherson
2023-08-04 21:45       ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-08-04 22:21         ` Sean Christopherson
2023-08-07  7:03           ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-08-06  8:44       ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-07  7:00         ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-08-04  8:28   ` Chao Gao
2023-08-09  7:12     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-04 21:40   ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-08-09  3:05     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-03  4:27 ` [PATCH v5 12/19] KVM:x86: Save and reload SSP to/from SMRAM Yang Weijiang
2023-08-04  7:53   ` Chao Gao
2023-08-04 15:25     ` Sean Christopherson
2023-08-06  9:14       ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-03  4:27 ` [PATCH v5 13/19] KVM:VMX: Set up interception for CET MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-08-04  8:16   ` Chao Gao
2023-08-06  9:22     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-07  1:16       ` Chao Gao
2023-08-09  6:11         ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-03  4:27 ` [PATCH v5 14/19] KVM:VMX: Set host constant supervisor states to VMCS fields Yang Weijiang
2023-08-04  8:23   ` Chao Gao
2023-08-03  4:27 ` [PATCH v5 15/19] KVM:x86: Optimize CET supervisor SSP save/reload Yang Weijiang
2023-08-04  8:43   ` Chao Gao
2023-08-09  9:00     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-03  4:27 ` [PATCH v5 16/19] KVM:x86: Enable CET virtualization for VMX and advertise to userspace Yang Weijiang
2023-08-03  4:27 ` [PATCH v5 17/19] KVM:x86: Enable guest CET supervisor xstate bit support Yang Weijiang
2023-08-04 22:02   ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-08-09  6:07     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-03  4:27 ` [PATCH v5 18/19] KVM:nVMX: Refine error code injection to nested VM Yang Weijiang
2023-08-04 21:38   ` Sean Christopherson
2023-08-09  3:00     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-03  4:27 ` [PATCH v5 19/19] KVM:nVMX: Enable CET support for " Yang Weijiang

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