Re: [PATCH 1/2] x86/random: Retry on RDSEED failure

["Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>]

On Wed, Jan 31, 2024 at 03:45:06PM +0100, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> On Wed, Jan 31, 2024 at 09:07:56AM -0500, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
> > What about simply treating boot-time initialization of the /dev/random
> > state as special.  That is, on x86, if the hardware promises that
> > RDSEED or RDRAND is available, we use them to initialization our RNG
> > state at boot.  On bare metal, there can't be anyone else trying to
> > exhaust the on-chip RNG's entropy supply, so if RDSEED or RDRAND
> > aren't working available --- panic, since the hardware is clearly
> > busted.
> 
> This is the first thing I suggested here: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAHmME9qsfOdOEHHw_MOBmt6YAtncbbqP9LPK2dRjuOp1CrHzRA@mail.gmail.com/
> 
> But Elena found this dissatisfying because we still can't guarantee new
> material later.
> 
> > On a guest OS, if confidential compute is enabled, and if RDSEED and
> > RDRAND don't work after N retries, and we know CC is enabled, panic,
> > since the kernel can't provide the promised security gaurantees, and
> > the CC developers and users are cordially invited to sharpen their
> > pitchforks and to send their tender regards to the Intel RNG
> > engineers.
> 
> Yea, maybe bubbling the RDRAND DoS up to another DoS in the CoCo case is
> a good tradeoff that will produce the right pitchforkers without
> breaking anything real.

One problem, though, is userspace can DoS the kernel's use of RDRAND.
So probably infinitely retrying in CoCo environments is better than
panicing/warning, since ostensibly a kthread will eventually succeed.

Maybe, though, the Intel platform just simply isn't ready for CoCo, and
marketing got a little bit ahead of the tech?

Jason