[PATCH v2] usbip: vhci_sysfs: fix potential Spectre v1

[PATCH v2] usbip: vhci_sysfs: fix potential Spectre v1

[Gustavo A. R. Silva]

pdev_nr and rhport can be controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:238 detach_store() warn: potential spectre issue 'vhcis'
drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:328 attach_store() warn: potential spectre issue 'vhcis'
drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:338 attach_store() warn: potential spectre issue 'vhci->vhci_hcd_ss->vdev'
drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:340 attach_store() warn: potential spectre issue 'vhci->vhci_hcd_hs->vdev'

Fix this by sanitizing pdev_nr and rhport before using them to index
vhcis and vhci->vhci_hcd_ss->vdev respectively.

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
---
Changes in v2:
 - Place the barriers into valid_port.

 drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c b/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c
index 4880838..69db0c9 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c
@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@
 #include <linux/platform_device.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
+
 #include "usbip_common.h"
 #include "vhci.h"
 
@@ -211,10 +213,14 @@ static int valid_port(__u32 pdev_nr, __u32 rhport)
 		pr_err("pdev %u\n", pdev_nr);
 		return 0;
 	}
+	pdev_nr = array_index_nospec(pdev_nr, vhci_num_controllers);
+
 	if (rhport >= VHCI_HC_PORTS) {
 		pr_err("rhport %u\n", rhport);
 		return 0;
 	}
+	rhport = array_index_nospec(rhport, VHCI_HC_PORTS);
+
 	return 1;
 }
 
-- 
2.7.4

[v2] usbip: vhci_sysfs: fix potential Spectre v1

[Gustavo A. R. Silva]

pdev_nr and rhport can be controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:238 detach_store() warn: potential spectre issue 'vhcis'
drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:328 attach_store() warn: potential spectre issue 'vhcis'
drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:338 attach_store() warn: potential spectre issue 'vhci->vhci_hcd_ss->vdev'
drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:340 attach_store() warn: potential spectre issue 'vhci->vhci_hcd_hs->vdev'

Fix this by sanitizing pdev_nr and rhport before using them to index
vhcis and vhci->vhci_hcd_ss->vdev respectively.

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
---
Changes in v2:
 - Place the barriers into valid_port.

 drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c b/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c
index 4880838..69db0c9 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c
@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@
 #include <linux/platform_device.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
+
 #include "usbip_common.h"
 #include "vhci.h"
 
@@ -211,10 +213,14 @@ static int valid_port(__u32 pdev_nr, __u32 rhport)
 		pr_err("pdev %u\n", pdev_nr);
 		return 0;
 	}
+	pdev_nr = array_index_nospec(pdev_nr, vhci_num_controllers);
+
 	if (rhport >= VHCI_HC_PORTS) {
 		pr_err("rhport %u\n", rhport);
 		return 0;
 	}
+	rhport = array_index_nospec(rhport, VHCI_HC_PORTS);
+
 	return 1;
 }
 

Re: [PATCH v2] usbip: vhci_sysfs: fix potential Spectre v1

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

On Thu, May 17, 2018 at 03:16:28PM -0500, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote:
> pdev_nr and rhport can be controlled by user-space, hence leading to
> a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
> 
> This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
> drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:238 detach_store() warn: potential spectre issue 'vhcis'
> drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:328 attach_store() warn: potential spectre issue 'vhcis'
> drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:338 attach_store() warn: potential spectre issue 'vhci->vhci_hcd_ss->vdev'
> drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:340 attach_store() warn: potential spectre issue 'vhci->vhci_hcd_hs->vdev'
> 
> Fix this by sanitizing pdev_nr and rhport before using them to index
> vhcis and vhci->vhci_hcd_ss->vdev respectively.
> 
> Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
> to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
> completed with a dependent load/store [1].
> 
> [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
> 
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
> ---
> Changes in v2:
>  - Place the barriers into valid_port.

Thanks for the change.  I'll wait for Shuah's ack/review before queueing
this up just as she knows that codebase much better than anyone else.

thanks,

greg k-h

[v2] usbip: vhci_sysfs: fix potential Spectre v1

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

On Thu, May 17, 2018 at 03:16:28PM -0500, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote:
> pdev_nr and rhport can be controlled by user-space, hence leading to
> a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
> 
> This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
> drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:238 detach_store() warn: potential spectre issue 'vhcis'
> drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:328 attach_store() warn: potential spectre issue 'vhcis'
> drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:338 attach_store() warn: potential spectre issue 'vhci->vhci_hcd_ss->vdev'
> drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:340 attach_store() warn: potential spectre issue 'vhci->vhci_hcd_hs->vdev'
> 
> Fix this by sanitizing pdev_nr and rhport before using them to index
> vhcis and vhci->vhci_hcd_ss->vdev respectively.
> 
> Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
> to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
> completed with a dependent load/store [1].
> 
> [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
> 
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
> ---
> Changes in v2:
>  - Place the barriers into valid_port.

Thanks for the change.  I'll wait for Shuah's ack/review before queueing
this up just as she knows that codebase much better than anyone else.

thanks,

greg k-h
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Re: [PATCH v2] usbip: vhci_sysfs: fix potential Spectre v1

[Shuah Khan]

On 05/18/2018 07:47 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> On Thu, May 17, 2018 at 03:16:28PM -0500, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote:
>> pdev_nr and rhport can be controlled by user-space, hence leading to
>> a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
>>
>> This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
>> drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:238 detach_store() warn: potential spectre issue 'vhcis'
>> drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:328 attach_store() warn: potential spectre issue 'vhcis'
>> drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:338 attach_store() warn: potential spectre issue 'vhci->vhci_hcd_ss->vdev'
>> drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:340 attach_store() warn: potential spectre issue 'vhci->vhci_hcd_hs->vdev'
>>
>> Fix this by sanitizing pdev_nr and rhport before using them to index
>> vhcis and vhci->vhci_hcd_ss->vdev respectively.
>>
>> Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
>> to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
>> completed with a dependent load/store [1].
>>
>> [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
>>
>> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
>> Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
>> ---
>> Changes in v2:
>>  - Place the barriers into valid_port.

attach_store() doesn't call valid_port() - can you make the change to
have attach_store() call valid_port() to protect that code path.

> 
> Thanks for the change.  I'll wait for Shuah's ack/review before queueing
> this up just as she knows that codebase much better than anyone else.
> > 

thanks,
-- Shuah

[v2] usbip: vhci_sysfs: fix potential Spectre v1

[Shuah Khan]

On 05/18/2018 07:47 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> On Thu, May 17, 2018 at 03:16:28PM -0500, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote:
>> pdev_nr and rhport can be controlled by user-space, hence leading to
>> a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
>>
>> This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
>> drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:238 detach_store() warn: potential spectre issue 'vhcis'
>> drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:328 attach_store() warn: potential spectre issue 'vhcis'
>> drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:338 attach_store() warn: potential spectre issue 'vhci->vhci_hcd_ss->vdev'
>> drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:340 attach_store() warn: potential spectre issue 'vhci->vhci_hcd_hs->vdev'
>>
>> Fix this by sanitizing pdev_nr and rhport before using them to index
>> vhcis and vhci->vhci_hcd_ss->vdev respectively.
>>
>> Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
>> to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
>> completed with a dependent load/store [1].
>>
>> [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
>>
>> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
>> Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
>> ---
>> Changes in v2:
>>  - Place the barriers into valid_port.

attach_store() doesn't call valid_port() - can you make the change to
have attach_store() call valid_port() to protect that code path.

> 
> Thanks for the change.  I'll wait for Shuah's ack/review before queueing
> this up just as she knows that codebase much better than anyone else.
> > 

thanks,
-- Shuah
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Re: [PATCH v2] usbip: vhci_sysfs: fix potential Spectre v1

[Gustavo A. R. Silva]

On 05/18/2018 11:06 AM, Shuah Khan wrote:
> On 05/18/2018 07:47 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
>> On Thu, May 17, 2018 at 03:16:28PM -0500, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote:
>>> pdev_nr and rhport can be controlled by user-space, hence leading to
>>> a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
>>>
>>> This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
>>> drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:238 detach_store() warn: potential spectre issue 'vhcis'
>>> drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:328 attach_store() warn: potential spectre issue 'vhcis'
>>> drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:338 attach_store() warn: potential spectre issue 'vhci->vhci_hcd_ss->vdev'
>>> drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:340 attach_store() warn: potential spectre issue 'vhci->vhci_hcd_hs->vdev'
>>>
>>> Fix this by sanitizing pdev_nr and rhport before using them to index
>>> vhcis and vhci->vhci_hcd_ss->vdev respectively.
>>>
>>> Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
>>> to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
>>> completed with a dependent load/store [1].
>>>
>>> [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
>>>
>>> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
>>> Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
>>> ---
>>> Changes in v2:
>>>   - Place the barriers into valid_port.
>  
> attach_store() doesn't call valid_port() - can you make the change to
> have attach_store() call valid_port() to protect that code path.
> 
>>
>> Thanks for the change.  I'll wait for Shuah's ack/review before queueing
>> this up just as she knows that codebase much better than anyone else.
>>>
> 

Greg,

I've been talking with Dan Williams (intel) about this kind of issues 
[1] and it seems my original assumptions are correct. Hence, this patch 
is not useful and, in order to actually prevent speculation here we 
would need to pass the address of pdev_nr and rhport into valid_port, 
otherwise there may be speculation at drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:235:

         if (!valid_port(pdev_nr, rhport))
                 return -EINVAL;

         hcd = platform_get_drvdata(vhcis[pdev_nr].pdev);


[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152668152509103&w=2

Thanks
--
Gustavo

[v2] usbip: vhci_sysfs: fix potential Spectre v1

[Gustavo A. R. Silva]

On 05/18/2018 11:06 AM, Shuah Khan wrote:
> On 05/18/2018 07:47 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
>> On Thu, May 17, 2018 at 03:16:28PM -0500, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote:
>>> pdev_nr and rhport can be controlled by user-space, hence leading to
>>> a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
>>>
>>> This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
>>> drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:238 detach_store() warn: potential spectre issue 'vhcis'
>>> drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:328 attach_store() warn: potential spectre issue 'vhcis'
>>> drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:338 attach_store() warn: potential spectre issue 'vhci->vhci_hcd_ss->vdev'
>>> drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:340 attach_store() warn: potential spectre issue 'vhci->vhci_hcd_hs->vdev'
>>>
>>> Fix this by sanitizing pdev_nr and rhport before using them to index
>>> vhcis and vhci->vhci_hcd_ss->vdev respectively.
>>>
>>> Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
>>> to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
>>> completed with a dependent load/store [1].
>>>
>>> [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
>>>
>>> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
>>> Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
>>> ---
>>> Changes in v2:
>>>   - Place the barriers into valid_port.
>  
> attach_store() doesn't call valid_port() - can you make the change to
> have attach_store() call valid_port() to protect that code path.
> 
>>
>> Thanks for the change.  I'll wait for Shuah's ack/review before queueing
>> this up just as she knows that codebase much better than anyone else.
>>>
> 

Greg,

I've been talking with Dan Williams (intel) about this kind of issues 
[1] and it seems my original assumptions are correct. Hence, this patch 
is not useful and, in order to actually prevent speculation here we 
would need to pass the address of pdev_nr and rhport into valid_port, 
otherwise there may be speculation at drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:235:

         if (!valid_port(pdev_nr, rhport))
                 return -EINVAL;

         hcd = platform_get_drvdata(vhcis[pdev_nr].pdev);


[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152668152509103&w=2

Thanks
---
Gustavo
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Re: [PATCH v2] usbip: vhci_sysfs: fix potential Spectre v1

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

On Fri, May 18, 2018 at 05:27:22PM -0500, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote:
> 
> 
> On 05/18/2018 11:06 AM, Shuah Khan wrote:
> > On 05/18/2018 07:47 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > > On Thu, May 17, 2018 at 03:16:28PM -0500, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote:
> > > > pdev_nr and rhport can be controlled by user-space, hence leading to
> > > > a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
> > > > 
> > > > This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
> > > > drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:238 detach_store() warn: potential spectre issue 'vhcis'
> > > > drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:328 attach_store() warn: potential spectre issue 'vhcis'
> > > > drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:338 attach_store() warn: potential spectre issue 'vhci->vhci_hcd_ss->vdev'
> > > > drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:340 attach_store() warn: potential spectre issue 'vhci->vhci_hcd_hs->vdev'
> > > > 
> > > > Fix this by sanitizing pdev_nr and rhport before using them to index
> > > > vhcis and vhci->vhci_hcd_ss->vdev respectively.
> > > > 
> > > > Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
> > > > to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
> > > > completed with a dependent load/store [1].
> > > > 
> > > > [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
> > > > 
> > > > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> > > > Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
> > > > ---
> > > > Changes in v2:
> > > >   - Place the barriers into valid_port.
> > attach_store() doesn't call valid_port() - can you make the change to
> > have attach_store() call valid_port() to protect that code path.
> > 
> > > 
> > > Thanks for the change.  I'll wait for Shuah's ack/review before queueing
> > > this up just as she knows that codebase much better than anyone else.
> > > > 
> > 
> 
> Greg,
> 
> I've been talking with Dan Williams (intel) about this kind of issues [1]
> and it seems my original assumptions are correct. Hence, this patch is not
> useful and, in order to actually prevent speculation here we would need to
> pass the address of pdev_nr and rhport into valid_port, otherwise there may
> be speculation at drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:235:
> 
>         if (!valid_port(pdev_nr, rhport))
>                 return -EINVAL;
> 
>         hcd = platform_get_drvdata(vhcis[pdev_nr].pdev);

Ah, yes, sorry, you do need to pass the address through, my mistake
completely.  But the location for the checking is still the right place
to do it, so I was half-right :)

thanks

greg k-h

[v2] usbip: vhci_sysfs: fix potential Spectre v1

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

On Fri, May 18, 2018 at 05:27:22PM -0500, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote:
> 
> 
> On 05/18/2018 11:06 AM, Shuah Khan wrote:
> > On 05/18/2018 07:47 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > > On Thu, May 17, 2018 at 03:16:28PM -0500, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote:
> > > > pdev_nr and rhport can be controlled by user-space, hence leading to
> > > > a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
> > > > 
> > > > This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
> > > > drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:238 detach_store() warn: potential spectre issue 'vhcis'
> > > > drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:328 attach_store() warn: potential spectre issue 'vhcis'
> > > > drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:338 attach_store() warn: potential spectre issue 'vhci->vhci_hcd_ss->vdev'
> > > > drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:340 attach_store() warn: potential spectre issue 'vhci->vhci_hcd_hs->vdev'
> > > > 
> > > > Fix this by sanitizing pdev_nr and rhport before using them to index
> > > > vhcis and vhci->vhci_hcd_ss->vdev respectively.
> > > > 
> > > > Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
> > > > to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
> > > > completed with a dependent load/store [1].
> > > > 
> > > > [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
> > > > 
> > > > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> > > > Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
> > > > ---
> > > > Changes in v2:
> > > >   - Place the barriers into valid_port.
> > attach_store() doesn't call valid_port() - can you make the change to
> > have attach_store() call valid_port() to protect that code path.
> > 
> > > 
> > > Thanks for the change.  I'll wait for Shuah's ack/review before queueing
> > > this up just as she knows that codebase much better than anyone else.
> > > > 
> > 
> 
> Greg,
> 
> I've been talking with Dan Williams (intel) about this kind of issues [1]
> and it seems my original assumptions are correct. Hence, this patch is not
> useful and, in order to actually prevent speculation here we would need to
> pass the address of pdev_nr and rhport into valid_port, otherwise there may
> be speculation at drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:235:
> 
>         if (!valid_port(pdev_nr, rhport))
>                 return -EINVAL;
> 
>         hcd = platform_get_drvdata(vhcis[pdev_nr].pdev);

Ah, yes, sorry, you do need to pass the address through, my mistake
completely.  But the location for the checking is still the right place
to do it, so I was half-right :)

thanks

greg k-h
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Re: [PATCH v2] usbip: vhci_sysfs: fix potential Spectre v1

[Gustavo A. R. Silva]

On 05/19/2018 02:04 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
>>
>> Greg,
>>
>> I've been talking with Dan Williams (intel) about this kind of issues [1]
>> and it seems my original assumptions are correct. Hence, this patch is not
>> useful and, in order to actually prevent speculation here we would need to
>> pass the address of pdev_nr and rhport into valid_port, otherwise there may
>> be speculation at drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:235:
>>
>>          if (!valid_port(pdev_nr, rhport))
>>                  return -EINVAL;
>>
>>          hcd = platform_get_drvdata(vhcis[pdev_nr].pdev);
> 
> Ah, yes, sorry, you do need to pass the address through, my mistake
> completely.  But the location for the checking is still the right place
> to do it, so I was half-right :)
> 

Yep. And that totally make sense.

I already sent v3:

https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152669243313887&w=2

Thanks!
--
Gustavo

[v2] usbip: vhci_sysfs: fix potential Spectre v1

[Gustavo A. R. Silva]

On 05/19/2018 02:04 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
>>
>> Greg,
>>
>> I've been talking with Dan Williams (intel) about this kind of issues [1]
>> and it seems my original assumptions are correct. Hence, this patch is not
>> useful and, in order to actually prevent speculation here we would need to
>> pass the address of pdev_nr and rhport into valid_port, otherwise there may
>> be speculation at drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:235:
>>
>>          if (!valid_port(pdev_nr, rhport))
>>                  return -EINVAL;
>>
>>          hcd = platform_get_drvdata(vhcis[pdev_nr].pdev);
> 
> Ah, yes, sorry, you do need to pass the address through, my mistake
> completely.  But the location for the checking is still the right place
> to do it, so I was half-right :)
> 

Yep. And that totally make sense.

I already sent v3:

https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152669243313887&w=2

Thanks!
---
Gustavo



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