* [Buildroot] [PATCH 1/2] toolchain/wrapper: display options leading to a paranoid failure
@ 2016-08-17 14:42 Yann E. MORIN
2016-08-17 14:42 ` [Buildroot] [PATCH 2/2] toolchain/wrapper: extend paranoid check to -isystem Yann E. MORIN
2016-08-24 1:09 ` [Buildroot] [PATCH 1/2] toolchain/wrapper: display options leading to a paranoid failure Arnout Vandecappelle
0 siblings, 2 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Yann E. MORIN @ 2016-08-17 14:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: buildroot
Current, we only display the path that causes the paranoid failure. This
is sufficient, as we can fail only for -I and -L options, and it is thus
easy to infer from the path, which option is the culprit.
However, we're soon to add a new test for the -isystem option, and then
when a failure occurs, we would not know whether it was because of -I or
-isystem. Being able to differentiate both can be hugely useful to
track down the root cause for the unsafe path.
Make the check_unsafe_path() function accept a variable number of
arguments as a NULL-terminated list, to contain the offending options.
Signed-off-by: "Yann E. MORIN" <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
Cc: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
Cc: Arnout Vandecappelle <arnout@mind.be>
---
toolchain/toolchain-wrapper.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/toolchain/toolchain-wrapper.c b/toolchain/toolchain-wrapper.c
index 887058f..b8b3cbe 100644
--- a/toolchain/toolchain-wrapper.c
+++ b/toolchain/toolchain-wrapper.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
#ifdef BR_CCACHE
static char ccache_path[PATH_MAX];
@@ -80,8 +81,10 @@ static char *predef_args[] = {
#endif
};
-static void check_unsafe_path(const char *path, int paranoid)
+static void check_unsafe_path(const char *path, int paranoid, ...)
{
+ va_list ap;
+ int once;
char **c;
static char *unsafe_paths[] = {
"/lib", "/usr/include", "/usr/lib", "/usr/local/include", "/usr/local/lib", NULL,
@@ -92,6 +95,21 @@ static void check_unsafe_path(const char *path, int paranoid)
fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s: unsafe header/library path used in cross-compilation: '%s'\n",
program_invocation_short_name,
paranoid ? "ERROR" : "WARNING", path);
+ va_start(ap, paranoid);
+ once=1;
+ while(1) {
+ char *s = va_arg(ap, char*);
+ if(!s)
+ break;
+ if(once)
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: options causing the issue:",
+ program_invocation_short_name);
+ once = 0;
+ fprintf(stderr, " '%s'", s);
+ }
+ if(!once)
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ va_end(ap);
if (paranoid)
exit(1);
continue;
@@ -237,9 +255,9 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
i++;
if (i == argc)
continue;
- check_unsafe_path(argv[i], paranoid);
+ check_unsafe_path(argv[i], paranoid, argv[i-1], argv[i], NULL);
} else {
- check_unsafe_path(argv[i] + 2, paranoid);
+ check_unsafe_path(argv[i] + 2, paranoid, argv[i], NULL);
}
}
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* [Buildroot] [PATCH 2/2] toolchain/wrapper: extend paranoid check to -isystem
2016-08-17 14:42 [Buildroot] [PATCH 1/2] toolchain/wrapper: display options leading to a paranoid failure Yann E. MORIN
@ 2016-08-17 14:42 ` Yann E. MORIN
2016-08-24 1:18 ` Arnout Vandecappelle
2016-08-24 1:09 ` [Buildroot] [PATCH 1/2] toolchain/wrapper: display options leading to a paranoid failure Arnout Vandecappelle
1 sibling, 1 reply; 9+ messages in thread
From: Yann E. MORIN @ 2016-08-17 14:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: buildroot
Some packages, like libbsd, use -isystem flags to provide so-called
overrides to the system include files. In this particular case, this
is used in a .pc file, then used by antoher package; pkgconf does not
mangle this path; and eventually that other package ends up using
/usr/include/bsd to search for headers.
Our current toolchain wrapper is limited to looking fo -I and -L, so
the paranoid check does not kick in.
Extend the paranoid check to also look for the -isystem option.
Signed-off-by: "Yann E. MORIN" <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
Cc: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
Cc: Arnout Vandecappelle <arnout@mind.be>
---
toolchain/toolchain-wrapper.c | 18 ++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/toolchain/toolchain-wrapper.c b/toolchain/toolchain-wrapper.c
index b8b3cbe..8a9c3b3 100644
--- a/toolchain/toolchain-wrapper.c
+++ b/toolchain/toolchain-wrapper.c
@@ -241,17 +241,19 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
/* Check for unsafe library and header paths */
for (i = 1; i < argc; i++) {
- /* Skip options that do not start with -I and -L */
- if (strncmp(argv[i], "-I", 2) && strncmp(argv[i], "-L", 2))
+ /* Skip options that do not start with -I, -isystem or -L */
+ if ( strncmp(argv[i], "-I", 2)
+ && strncmp(argv[i], "-L", 2)
+ && strcmp(argv[i], "-isystem"))
continue;
- /* We handle two cases: first the case where -I/-L and
- * the path are separated by one space and therefore
- * visible as two separate options, and then the case
- * where they are stuck together forming one single
- * option.
+ /* We handle two cases: first the case where -I/-L/-isystem
+ * and the path are separated by one space and therefore
+ * visible as two separate options, and then the case where
+ * they are stuck together forming one single option.
+ * -isystem is necessarily in the first case.
*/
- if (argv[i][2] == '\0') {
+ if (argv[i][2] == '\0' || argv[i][1] == 'i') {
i++;
if (i == argc)
continue;
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* [Buildroot] [PATCH 1/2] toolchain/wrapper: display options leading to a paranoid failure
2016-08-17 14:42 [Buildroot] [PATCH 1/2] toolchain/wrapper: display options leading to a paranoid failure Yann E. MORIN
2016-08-17 14:42 ` [Buildroot] [PATCH 2/2] toolchain/wrapper: extend paranoid check to -isystem Yann E. MORIN
@ 2016-08-24 1:09 ` Arnout Vandecappelle
1 sibling, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Arnout Vandecappelle @ 2016-08-24 1:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: buildroot
On 17-08-16 16:42, Yann E. MORIN wrote:
> Current, we only display the path that causes the paranoid failure. This
> is sufficient, as we can fail only for -I and -L options, and it is thus
> easy to infer from the path, which option is the culprit.
>
> However, we're soon to add a new test for the -isystem option, and then
> when a failure occurs, we would not know whether it was because of -I or
> -isystem. Being able to differentiate both can be hugely useful to
> track down the root cause for the unsafe path.
>
> Make the check_unsafe_path() function accept a variable number of
> arguments as a NULL-terminated list, to contain the offending options.
>
> Signed-off-by: "Yann E. MORIN" <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
> Cc: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
> Cc: Arnout Vandecappelle <arnout@mind.be>
> ---
> toolchain/toolchain-wrapper.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++---
> 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/toolchain/toolchain-wrapper.c b/toolchain/toolchain-wrapper.c
> index 887058f..b8b3cbe 100644
> --- a/toolchain/toolchain-wrapper.c
> +++ b/toolchain/toolchain-wrapper.c
> @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
> #include <unistd.h>
> #include <stdlib.h>
> #include <errno.h>
> +#include <stdarg.h>
>
> #ifdef BR_CCACHE
> static char ccache_path[PATH_MAX];
> @@ -80,8 +81,10 @@ static char *predef_args[] = {
> #endif
> };
>
> -static void check_unsafe_path(const char *path, int paranoid)
> +static void check_unsafe_path(const char *path, int paranoid, ...)
I'm not very happy with using varargs for such a simple case. How about:
static void check_unsafe_path(const char *arg, const char *path,
int paranoid, bool arg_includes_path)
...
> {
> + va_list ap;
> + int once;
> char **c;
> static char *unsafe_paths[] = {
> "/lib", "/usr/include", "/usr/lib", "/usr/local/include", "/usr/local/lib", NULL,
> @@ -92,6 +95,21 @@ static void check_unsafe_path(const char *path, int paranoid)
> fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s: unsafe header/library path used in cross-compilation: '%s'\n",
> program_invocation_short_name,
> paranoid ? "ERROR" : "WARNING", path);
and here:
fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s: unsafe header/library path used in
cross-compilation: '%s%s%s'\n",
program_invocation_short_name,
paranoid ? "ERROR" : "WARNING",
arg,
arg_includes_path ? "" : " ",
arg_includes_path ? "" : path);
> + va_start(ap, paranoid);
> + once=1;
> + while(1) {
> + char *s = va_arg(ap, char*);
> + if(!s)
> + break;
> + if(once)
> + fprintf(stderr, "%s: options causing the issue:",
> + program_invocation_short_name);
> + once = 0;
> + fprintf(stderr, " '%s'", s);
> + }
> + if(!once)
> + fprintf(stderr, "\n");
> + va_end(ap);
> if (paranoid)
> exit(1);
> continue;
> @@ -237,9 +255,9 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
> i++;
> if (i == argc)
> continue;
> - check_unsafe_path(argv[i], paranoid);
> + check_unsafe_path(argv[i], paranoid, argv[i-1], argv[i], NULL);
check_unsafe_path(argv[i-1], argv[i], paranoid, false);
> } else {
> - check_unsafe_path(argv[i] + 2, paranoid);
> + check_unsafe_path(argv[i] + 2, paranoid, argv[i], NULL);
check_unsafe_path(argv[i], argv[i] + 2, paranoid, true);
Regards,
Arnout
> }
> }
>
>
--
Arnout Vandecappelle arnout at mind be
Senior Embedded Software Architect +32-16-286500
Essensium/Mind http://www.mind.be
G.Geenslaan 9, 3001 Leuven, Belgium BE 872 984 063 RPR Leuven
LinkedIn profile: http://www.linkedin.com/in/arnoutvandecappelle
GPG fingerprint: 7493 020B C7E3 8618 8DEC 222C 82EB F404 F9AC 0DDF
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* [Buildroot] [PATCH 2/2] toolchain/wrapper: extend paranoid check to -isystem
2016-08-17 14:42 ` [Buildroot] [PATCH 2/2] toolchain/wrapper: extend paranoid check to -isystem Yann E. MORIN
@ 2016-08-24 1:18 ` Arnout Vandecappelle
2016-08-24 14:12 ` Yann E. MORIN
0 siblings, 1 reply; 9+ messages in thread
From: Arnout Vandecappelle @ 2016-08-24 1:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: buildroot
On 17-08-16 16:42, Yann E. MORIN wrote:
> Some packages, like libbsd, use -isystem flags to provide so-called
> overrides to the system include files. In this particular case, this
> is used in a .pc file, then used by antoher package; pkgconf does not
> mangle this path; and eventually that other package ends up using
> /usr/include/bsd to search for headers.
>
> Our current toolchain wrapper is limited to looking fo -I and -L, so
> the paranoid check does not kick in.
>
> Extend the paranoid check to also look for the -isystem option.
While we're at it: -idirafter, -iprefix, -iwithprefix, -iwithprefixbefore,
-isysroot, -imultilib, -iquote.
And then there is -B, but if someone passes that, it's really broken :-) And
--sysroot, also interesting if that is passed. But I guess these things are
going a bit too far.
>
> Signed-off-by: "Yann E. MORIN" <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
> Cc: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
> Cc: Arnout Vandecappelle <arnout@mind.be>
> ---
> toolchain/toolchain-wrapper.c | 18 ++++++++++--------
> 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/toolchain/toolchain-wrapper.c b/toolchain/toolchain-wrapper.c
> index b8b3cbe..8a9c3b3 100644
> --- a/toolchain/toolchain-wrapper.c
> +++ b/toolchain/toolchain-wrapper.c
> @@ -241,17 +241,19 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
> /* Check for unsafe library and header paths */
> for (i = 1; i < argc; i++) {
>
> - /* Skip options that do not start with -I and -L */
> - if (strncmp(argv[i], "-I", 2) && strncmp(argv[i], "-L", 2))
> + /* Skip options that do not start with -I, -isystem or -L */
> + if ( strncmp(argv[i], "-I", 2)
> + && strncmp(argv[i], "-L", 2)
> + && strcmp(argv[i], "-isystem"))
> continue;
>
> - /* We handle two cases: first the case where -I/-L and
> - * the path are separated by one space and therefore
> - * visible as two separate options, and then the case
> - * where they are stuck together forming one single
> - * option.
> + /* We handle two cases: first the case where -I/-L/-isystem
> + * and the path are separated by one space and therefore
> + * visible as two separate options, and then the case where
> + * they are stuck together forming one single option.
> + * -isystem is necessarily in the first case.
Unfortunately, that's not true. You can pass something like -isystemfoo and it
will add ./foo to the search path. Ain't gcc fun... I'll leave it as an exercise
to the reader to handle that case :-P
Regards,
Arnout
> */
> - if (argv[i][2] == '\0') {
> + if (argv[i][2] == '\0' || argv[i][1] == 'i') {
> i++;
> if (i == argc)
> continue;
>
--
Arnout Vandecappelle arnout at mind be
Senior Embedded Software Architect +32-16-286500
Essensium/Mind http://www.mind.be
G.Geenslaan 9, 3001 Leuven, Belgium BE 872 984 063 RPR Leuven
LinkedIn profile: http://www.linkedin.com/in/arnoutvandecappelle
GPG fingerprint: 7493 020B C7E3 8618 8DEC 222C 82EB F404 F9AC 0DDF
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* [Buildroot] [PATCH 2/2] toolchain/wrapper: extend paranoid check to -isystem
2016-08-24 1:18 ` Arnout Vandecappelle
@ 2016-08-24 14:12 ` Yann E. MORIN
2016-08-24 15:23 ` Arnout Vandecappelle
0 siblings, 1 reply; 9+ messages in thread
From: Yann E. MORIN @ 2016-08-24 14:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: buildroot
Arnout, All,
On 2016-08-24 03:18 +0200, Arnout Vandecappelle spake thusly:
> On 17-08-16 16:42, Yann E. MORIN wrote:
> > Some packages, like libbsd, use -isystem flags to provide so-called
> > overrides to the system include files. In this particular case, this
> > is used in a .pc file, then used by antoher package; pkgconf does not
> > mangle this path; and eventually that other package ends up using
> > /usr/include/bsd to search for headers.
> >
> > Our current toolchain wrapper is limited to looking fo -I and -L, so
> > the paranoid check does not kick in.
> >
> > Extend the paranoid check to also look for the -isystem option.
>
> While we're at it: -idirafter, -iprefix, -iwithprefix, -iwithprefixbefore,
> -isysroot, -imultilib, -iquote.
Did you meant we should handle all of them now? Are were you listing
them for the future, when we encoutner issues with any if them?
> And then there is -B, but if someone passes that, it's really broken :-) And
> --sysroot, also interesting if that is passed. But I guess these things are
> going a bit too far.
--sysroot is even more fun, as it can be written: --sysroot=dir , so
we'd need to take care of this as well...
Lotta fun in sight! ;-)
> > Signed-off-by: "Yann E. MORIN" <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
> > Cc: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
> > Cc: Arnout Vandecappelle <arnout@mind.be>
> > ---
> > toolchain/toolchain-wrapper.c | 18 ++++++++++--------
> > 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/toolchain/toolchain-wrapper.c b/toolchain/toolchain-wrapper.c
> > index b8b3cbe..8a9c3b3 100644
> > --- a/toolchain/toolchain-wrapper.c
> > +++ b/toolchain/toolchain-wrapper.c
> > @@ -241,17 +241,19 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
> > /* Check for unsafe library and header paths */
> > for (i = 1; i < argc; i++) {
> >
> > - /* Skip options that do not start with -I and -L */
> > - if (strncmp(argv[i], "-I", 2) && strncmp(argv[i], "-L", 2))
> > + /* Skip options that do not start with -I, -isystem or -L */
> > + if ( strncmp(argv[i], "-I", 2)
> > + && strncmp(argv[i], "-L", 2)
> > + && strcmp(argv[i], "-isystem"))
> > continue;
> >
> > - /* We handle two cases: first the case where -I/-L and
> > - * the path are separated by one space and therefore
> > - * visible as two separate options, and then the case
> > - * where they are stuck together forming one single
> > - * option.
> > + /* We handle two cases: first the case where -I/-L/-isystem
> > + * and the path are separated by one space and therefore
> > + * visible as two separate options, and then the case where
> > + * they are stuck together forming one single option.
> > + * -isystem is necessarily in the first case.
>
> Unfortunately, that's not true. You can pass something like -isystemfoo and it
> will add ./foo to the search path. Ain't gcc fun... I'll leave it as an exercise
> to the reader to handle that case :-P
I think we should not care too much about this, should we? In the end,
this would not be an unsafe path...
But I think my next iteration should cover all your comments (as well as
on the previous patch).
Thanks! ;-)
Regards,
Yann E. MORIN.
--
.-----------------.--------------------.------------------.--------------------.
| Yann E. MORIN | Real-Time Embedded | /"\ ASCII RIBBON | Erics' conspiracy: |
| +33 662 376 056 | Software Designer | \ / CAMPAIGN | ___ |
| +33 223 225 172 `------------.-------: X AGAINST | \e/ There is no |
| http://ymorin.is-a-geek.org/ | _/*\_ | / \ HTML MAIL | v conspiracy. |
'------------------------------^-------^------------------^--------------------'
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* [Buildroot] [PATCH 2/2] toolchain/wrapper: extend paranoid check to -isystem
2016-08-24 14:12 ` Yann E. MORIN
@ 2016-08-24 15:23 ` Arnout Vandecappelle
0 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Arnout Vandecappelle @ 2016-08-24 15:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: buildroot
On 24-08-16 16:12, Yann E. MORIN wrote:
> Arnout, All,
>
> On 2016-08-24 03:18 +0200, Arnout Vandecappelle spake thusly:
>> On 17-08-16 16:42, Yann E. MORIN wrote:
>>> Some packages, like libbsd, use -isystem flags to provide so-called
>>> overrides to the system include files. In this particular case, this
>>> is used in a .pc file, then used by antoher package; pkgconf does not
>>> mangle this path; and eventually that other package ends up using
>>> /usr/include/bsd to search for headers.
>>>
>>> Our current toolchain wrapper is limited to looking fo -I and -L, so
>>> the paranoid check does not kick in.
>>>
>>> Extend the paranoid check to also look for the -isystem option.
>>
>> While we're at it: -idirafter, -iprefix, -iwithprefix, -iwithprefixbefore,
>> -isysroot, -imultilib, -iquote.
>
> Did you meant we should handle all of them now? Are were you listing
> them for the future, when we encoutner issues with any if them?
I think it doesn't hurt to include these now. Though the prefix ones are a bit
iffy (you could pass -iprefix /usr/ -iwithprefix lib and this wouldn't be
captured by the paranoid check). But certainly -idirafter and -iquote should be
handled now IMHO.
>
>> And then there is -B, but if someone passes that, it's really broken :-) And
>> --sysroot, also interesting if that is passed. But I guess these things are
>> going a bit too far.
>
> --sysroot is even more fun, as it can be written: --sysroot=dir , so
> we'd need to take care of this as well...
Well, anything that is passing --sysroot is doing really crazy shit so chances
are our paranoid check is wrong anyway, so let's ignore that one.
>
> Lotta fun in sight! ;-)
>
>>> Signed-off-by: "Yann E. MORIN" <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
>>> Cc: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
>>> Cc: Arnout Vandecappelle <arnout@mind.be>
>>> ---
>>> toolchain/toolchain-wrapper.c | 18 ++++++++++--------
>>> 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/toolchain/toolchain-wrapper.c b/toolchain/toolchain-wrapper.c
>>> index b8b3cbe..8a9c3b3 100644
>>> --- a/toolchain/toolchain-wrapper.c
>>> +++ b/toolchain/toolchain-wrapper.c
>>> @@ -241,17 +241,19 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
>>> /* Check for unsafe library and header paths */
>>> for (i = 1; i < argc; i++) {
>>>
>>> - /* Skip options that do not start with -I and -L */
>>> - if (strncmp(argv[i], "-I", 2) && strncmp(argv[i], "-L", 2))
>>> + /* Skip options that do not start with -I, -isystem or -L */
>>> + if ( strncmp(argv[i], "-I", 2)
>>> + && strncmp(argv[i], "-L", 2)
>>> + && strcmp(argv[i], "-isystem"))
>>> continue;
>>>
>>> - /* We handle two cases: first the case where -I/-L and
>>> - * the path are separated by one space and therefore
>>> - * visible as two separate options, and then the case
>>> - * where they are stuck together forming one single
>>> - * option.
>>> + /* We handle two cases: first the case where -I/-L/-isystem
>>> + * and the path are separated by one space and therefore
>>> + * visible as two separate options, and then the case where
>>> + * they are stuck together forming one single option.
>>> + * -isystem is necessarily in the first case.
>>
>> Unfortunately, that's not true. You can pass something like -isystemfoo and it
>> will add ./foo to the search path. Ain't gcc fun... I'll leave it as an exercise
>> to the reader to handle that case :-P
>
> I think we should not care too much about this, should we? In the end,
> this would not be an unsafe path...
I gave -isystemfoo as an example because it looks so funny. but
-isystem/usr/lib is possible as well.
Fortunately, your v2 handles that!
Regards,
Arnout
>
> But I think my next iteration should cover all your comments (as well as
> on the previous patch).
>
> Thanks! ;-)
>
> Regards,
> Yann E. MORIN.
>
--
Arnout Vandecappelle arnout at mind be
Senior Embedded Software Architect +32-16-286500
Essensium/Mind http://www.mind.be
G.Geenslaan 9, 3001 Leuven, Belgium BE 872 984 063 RPR Leuven
LinkedIn profile: http://www.linkedin.com/in/arnoutvandecappelle
GPG fingerprint: 7493 020B C7E3 8618 8DEC 222C 82EB F404 F9AC 0DDF
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* [Buildroot] [PATCH 1/2] toolchain/wrapper: display options leading to a paranoid failure
2016-08-24 14:36 ` Thomas Petazzoni
@ 2016-08-24 14:54 ` Yann E. MORIN
0 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Yann E. MORIN @ 2016-08-24 14:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: buildroot
Thomas, All,
On 2016-08-24 16:36 +0200, Thomas Petazzoni spake thusly:
> On Wed, 24 Aug 2016 16:19:29 +0200, Yann E. MORIN wrote:
> > Current, we only display the path that causes the paranoid failure. This
> > is sufficient, as we can fail only for -I and -L options, and it is thus
> > easy to infer from the path, which option is the culprit.
> >
> > However, we're soon to add a new test for the -isystem option, and then
> > when a failure occurs, we would not know whether it was because of -I or
> > -isystem. Being able to differentiate both can be hugely useful to
> > track down the root cause for the unsafe path.
> >
> > Add two new arguments to the check_unsafe_path() function: one with the
> > current-or-previous argument, one to specify whether it has the path in
> > it or not. Print that in the error message, instead of just the path.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: "Yann E. MORIN" <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
> > Cc: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
> > Cc: Arnout Vandecappelle <arnout@mind.be>
>
> Seems like a good feature addition.
>
> > -static void check_unsafe_path(const char *path, int paranoid)
> > +static void check_unsafe_path(const char *arg,
> > + const char *path,
> > + int paranoid,
> > + int arg_has_path)
> > {
> > + va_list ap;
> > + int once;
>
> Those variables are not needed I believe.
Dang. Stray variables from v1... Removed now!
> > char **c;
> > static char *unsafe_paths[] = {
> > "/lib", "/usr/include", "/usr/lib", "/usr/local/include", "/usr/local/lib", NULL,
> > @@ -89,9 +94,15 @@ static void check_unsafe_path(const char *path, int paranoid)
> >
> > for (c = unsafe_paths; *c != NULL; c++) {
> > if (!strncmp(path, *c, strlen(*c))) {
> > - fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s: unsafe header/library path used in cross-compilation: '%s'\n",
> > + fprintf(stderr,
> > + "%s: %s: "
> > + "unsafe header/library path used in cross-compilation:"
> > + " '%s%s%s'\n",
>
> I'm not a big fan of splitting the format string.
Me neither, but the line was really overly long...
(And that's why I don;t like TABs and settign them to 8; 4 spaces ought
to be enough for everyone...)
> What about inverting
> the if() test in order to reduce the indentation level of the error
> case?
Done.
> for (c = unsafe_paths; *c != NULL; c++) {
> if (strncmp(path, *c, strlen(*c)))
> continue;
> fprintf(stderr,
> "%s: %s: unsafe header/library path used in cross-compilation: '%s%s%s'\n",
> ....
> }
>
> > program_invocation_short_name,
> > - paranoid ? "ERROR" : "WARNING", path);
> > + paranoid ? "ERROR" : "WARNING",
> > + arg,
> > + arg_has_path ? "" : "' '",
> > + arg_has_path ? "" : path);
>
> I find this arg_has_path thing a bit tricky: in some cases "arg" will
> be just the argument, in some cases it is followed by the path. But I
> couldn't find a simple and nice alternate solution, so it's probably
> good as-is.
I'll add a bit of documentation to the function, so that it's more
obvious what it is doing. Still tricky, but better explained! ;-)
I've also already added a comment about the "' '" trick, too.
Regards,
Yann E. MORIN.
> Thanks!
>
> Thomas
> --
> Thomas Petazzoni, CTO, Free Electrons
> Embedded Linux and Kernel engineering
> http://free-electrons.com
--
.-----------------.--------------------.------------------.--------------------.
| Yann E. MORIN | Real-Time Embedded | /"\ ASCII RIBBON | Erics' conspiracy: |
| +33 662 376 056 | Software Designer | \ / CAMPAIGN | ___ |
| +33 223 225 172 `------------.-------: X AGAINST | \e/ There is no |
| http://ymorin.is-a-geek.org/ | _/*\_ | / \ HTML MAIL | v conspiracy. |
'------------------------------^-------^------------------^--------------------'
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* [Buildroot] [PATCH 1/2] toolchain/wrapper: display options leading to a paranoid failure
2016-08-24 14:19 Yann E. MORIN
@ 2016-08-24 14:36 ` Thomas Petazzoni
2016-08-24 14:54 ` Yann E. MORIN
0 siblings, 1 reply; 9+ messages in thread
From: Thomas Petazzoni @ 2016-08-24 14:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: buildroot
Hello,
On Wed, 24 Aug 2016 16:19:29 +0200, Yann E. MORIN wrote:
> Current, we only display the path that causes the paranoid failure. This
> is sufficient, as we can fail only for -I and -L options, and it is thus
> easy to infer from the path, which option is the culprit.
>
> However, we're soon to add a new test for the -isystem option, and then
> when a failure occurs, we would not know whether it was because of -I or
> -isystem. Being able to differentiate both can be hugely useful to
> track down the root cause for the unsafe path.
>
> Add two new arguments to the check_unsafe_path() function: one with the
> current-or-previous argument, one to specify whether it has the path in
> it or not. Print that in the error message, instead of just the path.
>
> Signed-off-by: "Yann E. MORIN" <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
> Cc: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
> Cc: Arnout Vandecappelle <arnout@mind.be>
Seems like a good feature addition.
> -static void check_unsafe_path(const char *path, int paranoid)
> +static void check_unsafe_path(const char *arg,
> + const char *path,
> + int paranoid,
> + int arg_has_path)
> {
> + va_list ap;
> + int once;
Those variables are not needed I believe.
> char **c;
> static char *unsafe_paths[] = {
> "/lib", "/usr/include", "/usr/lib", "/usr/local/include", "/usr/local/lib", NULL,
> @@ -89,9 +94,15 @@ static void check_unsafe_path(const char *path, int paranoid)
>
> for (c = unsafe_paths; *c != NULL; c++) {
> if (!strncmp(path, *c, strlen(*c))) {
> - fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s: unsafe header/library path used in cross-compilation: '%s'\n",
> + fprintf(stderr,
> + "%s: %s: "
> + "unsafe header/library path used in cross-compilation:"
> + " '%s%s%s'\n",
I'm not a big fan of splitting the format string. What about inverting
the if() test in order to reduce the indentation level of the error
case?
for (c = unsafe_paths; *c != NULL; c++) {
if (strncmp(path, *c, strlen(*c)))
continue;
fprintf(stderr,
"%s: %s: unsafe header/library path used in cross-compilation: '%s%s%s'\n",
....
}
> program_invocation_short_name,
> - paranoid ? "ERROR" : "WARNING", path);
> + paranoid ? "ERROR" : "WARNING",
> + arg,
> + arg_has_path ? "" : "' '",
> + arg_has_path ? "" : path);
I find this arg_has_path thing a bit tricky: in some cases "arg" will
be just the argument, in some cases it is followed by the path. But I
couldn't find a simple and nice alternate solution, so it's probably
good as-is.
Thanks!
Thomas
--
Thomas Petazzoni, CTO, Free Electrons
Embedded Linux and Kernel engineering
http://free-electrons.com
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* [Buildroot] [PATCH 1/2] toolchain/wrapper: display options leading to a paranoid failure
@ 2016-08-24 14:19 Yann E. MORIN
2016-08-24 14:36 ` Thomas Petazzoni
0 siblings, 1 reply; 9+ messages in thread
From: Yann E. MORIN @ 2016-08-24 14:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: buildroot
Current, we only display the path that causes the paranoid failure. This
is sufficient, as we can fail only for -I and -L options, and it is thus
easy to infer from the path, which option is the culprit.
However, we're soon to add a new test for the -isystem option, and then
when a failure occurs, we would not know whether it was because of -I or
-isystem. Being able to differentiate both can be hugely useful to
track down the root cause for the unsafe path.
Add two new arguments to the check_unsafe_path() function: one with the
current-or-previous argument, one to specify whether it has the path in
it or not. Print that in the error message, instead of just the path.
Signed-off-by: "Yann E. MORIN" <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
Cc: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
Cc: Arnout Vandecappelle <arnout@mind.be>
---
Changes v1 -> v2;
- don't use a variadic function; use explicit argumetns (Arnout)
- print it on a single line (Arnout)
---
toolchain/toolchain-wrapper.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/toolchain/toolchain-wrapper.c b/toolchain/toolchain-wrapper.c
index 887058f..edade43 100644
--- a/toolchain/toolchain-wrapper.c
+++ b/toolchain/toolchain-wrapper.c
@@ -80,8 +80,13 @@ static char *predef_args[] = {
#endif
};
-static void check_unsafe_path(const char *path, int paranoid)
+static void check_unsafe_path(const char *arg,
+ const char *path,
+ int paranoid,
+ int arg_has_path)
{
+ va_list ap;
+ int once;
char **c;
static char *unsafe_paths[] = {
"/lib", "/usr/include", "/usr/lib", "/usr/local/include", "/usr/local/lib", NULL,
@@ -89,9 +94,15 @@ static void check_unsafe_path(const char *path, int paranoid)
for (c = unsafe_paths; *c != NULL; c++) {
if (!strncmp(path, *c, strlen(*c))) {
- fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s: unsafe header/library path used in cross-compilation: '%s'\n",
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "%s: %s: "
+ "unsafe header/library path used in cross-compilation:"
+ " '%s%s%s'\n",
program_invocation_short_name,
- paranoid ? "ERROR" : "WARNING", path);
+ paranoid ? "ERROR" : "WARNING",
+ arg,
+ arg_has_path ? "" : "' '",
+ arg_has_path ? "" : path);
if (paranoid)
exit(1);
continue;
@@ -237,9 +248,9 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
i++;
if (i == argc)
continue;
- check_unsafe_path(argv[i], paranoid);
+ check_unsafe_path(argv[i-1], argv[i], paranoid, 0);
} else {
- check_unsafe_path(argv[i] + 2, paranoid);
+ check_unsafe_path(argv[i], argv[i] + 2, paranoid, 1);
}
}
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2016-08-24 15:23 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2016-08-17 14:42 [Buildroot] [PATCH 1/2] toolchain/wrapper: display options leading to a paranoid failure Yann E. MORIN
2016-08-17 14:42 ` [Buildroot] [PATCH 2/2] toolchain/wrapper: extend paranoid check to -isystem Yann E. MORIN
2016-08-24 1:18 ` Arnout Vandecappelle
2016-08-24 14:12 ` Yann E. MORIN
2016-08-24 15:23 ` Arnout Vandecappelle
2016-08-24 1:09 ` [Buildroot] [PATCH 1/2] toolchain/wrapper: display options leading to a paranoid failure Arnout Vandecappelle
2016-08-24 14:19 Yann E. MORIN
2016-08-24 14:36 ` Thomas Petazzoni
2016-08-24 14:54 ` Yann E. MORIN
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