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From: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	"joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com"
	<joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
	Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>,
	Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org"
	<intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org>,
	"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org" 
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	"selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
	"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
	"linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org>,
	oprofile-list@lists.sf.net,
	"linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-man@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 02/12] perf/core: open access to the core for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
Date: Wed, 19 Feb 2020 06:22:19 +1100 (AEDT)	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.21.2002190622060.10165@namei.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <e68be109-7174-2c9e-11a9-9770a6316834@linux.intel.com>

On Mon, 17 Feb 2020, Alexey Budankov wrote:

> 
> Open access to monitoring of kernel code, cpus, tracepoints and
> namespaces data for a CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the
> access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of
> CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials
> and makes operation more secure.
> 
> CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance
> monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39
> principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states
> that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g.,
> capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only
> for the time that such privileges are actually required)
> 
> For backward compatibility reasons access to perf_events subsystem
> remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN
> usage for secure perf_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to
> CAP_PERFMON capability.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>


Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>


-- 
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org,
	"linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	"joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com"
	<joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>,
	Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>,
	Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>,
	oprofile-list@lists.sf.net, Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>,
	"selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
	"intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org"
	<intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org>,
	Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
	"linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 02/12] perf/core: open access to the core for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
Date: Wed, 19 Feb 2020 06:22:19 +1100 (AEDT)	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.21.2002190622060.10165@namei.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <e68be109-7174-2c9e-11a9-9770a6316834@linux.intel.com>

On Mon, 17 Feb 2020, Alexey Budankov wrote:

> 
> Open access to monitoring of kernel code, cpus, tracepoints and
> namespaces data for a CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the
> access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of
> CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials
> and makes operation more secure.
> 
> CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance
> monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39
> principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states
> that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g.,
> capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only
> for the time that such privileges are actually required)
> 
> For backward compatibility reasons access to perf_events subsystem
> remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN
> usage for secure perf_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to
> CAP_PERFMON capability.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>


Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>


-- 
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org,
	"linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	"joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com"
	<joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>,
	Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>,
	Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>,
	oprofile-list@lists.sf.net, Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>,
	"selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
	"intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org"
	<intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org>,
	Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
	"linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 02/12] perf/core: open access to the core for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
Date: Wed, 19 Feb 2020 06:22:19 +1100 (AEDT)	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.21.2002190622060.10165@namei.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <e68be109-7174-2c9e-11a9-9770a6316834@linux.intel.com>

On Mon, 17 Feb 2020, Alexey Budankov wrote:

> 
> Open access to monitoring of kernel code, cpus, tracepoints and
> namespaces data for a CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the
> access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of
> CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials
> and makes operation more secure.
> 
> CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance
> monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39
> principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states
> that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g.,
> capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only
> for the time that such privileges are actually required)
> 
> For backward compatibility reasons access to perf_events subsystem
> remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN
> usage for secure perf_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to
> CAP_PERFMON capability.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>


Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>


-- 
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>


_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org,
	"linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>,
	Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>,
	Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>,
	oprofile-list@lists.sf.net, Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>,
	"selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
	"intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org"
	<intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org>,
	Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
	"linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>
Subject: Re: [Intel-gfx] [PATCH v7 02/12] perf/core: open access to the core for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
Date: Wed, 19 Feb 2020 06:22:19 +1100 (AEDT)	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.21.2002190622060.10165@namei.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <e68be109-7174-2c9e-11a9-9770a6316834@linux.intel.com>

On Mon, 17 Feb 2020, Alexey Budankov wrote:

> 
> Open access to monitoring of kernel code, cpus, tracepoints and
> namespaces data for a CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the
> access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of
> CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials
> and makes operation more secure.
> 
> CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance
> monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39
> principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states
> that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g.,
> capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only
> for the time that such privileges are actually required)
> 
> For backward compatibility reasons access to perf_events subsystem
> remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN
> usage for secure perf_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to
> CAP_PERFMON capability.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>


Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>


-- 
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>

_______________________________________________
Intel-gfx mailing list
Intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/intel-gfx

  reply	other threads:[~2020-02-18 19:23 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 118+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-02-17  8:02 [PATCH v7 00/12] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability Alexey Budankov
2020-02-17  8:02 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-02-17  8:02 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-17  8:02 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-17  8:06 ` [PATCH v7 01/12] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space Alexey Budankov
2020-02-17  8:06   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-02-17  8:06   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-17  8:06   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-18 18:22   ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-18 18:22     ` [Intel-gfx] " Stephen Smalley
2020-02-18 18:22     ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-18 18:22     ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-18 19:21   ` James Morris
2020-02-18 19:21     ` [Intel-gfx] " James Morris
2020-02-18 19:21     ` James Morris
2020-02-18 19:21     ` James Morris
2020-02-19  7:54     ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-19  7:54       ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-02-19  7:54       ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-19  7:54       ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-17  8:06 ` [PATCH v7 02/12] perf/core: open access to the core for CAP_PERFMON privileged process Alexey Budankov
2020-02-17  8:06   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-02-17  8:06   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-17  8:06   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-18 19:22   ` James Morris [this message]
2020-02-18 19:22     ` [Intel-gfx] " James Morris
2020-02-18 19:22     ` James Morris
2020-02-18 19:22     ` James Morris
2020-02-17  8:07 ` [PATCH v7 03/12] perf/core: open access to probes " Alexey Budankov
2020-02-17  8:07   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-02-17  8:07   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-17  8:07   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-18 19:22   ` James Morris
2020-02-18 19:22     ` [Intel-gfx] " James Morris
2020-02-18 19:22     ` James Morris
2020-02-18 19:22     ` James Morris
2020-02-17  8:08 ` [PATCH v7 04/12] perf tool: extend Perf tool with CAP_PERFMON capability support Alexey Budankov
2020-02-17  8:08   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-02-17  8:08   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-17  8:08   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-18 19:24   ` James Morris
2020-02-18 19:24     ` [Intel-gfx] " James Morris
2020-02-18 19:24     ` James Morris
2020-02-18 19:24     ` James Morris
2020-02-17  8:08 ` [PATCH v7 05/12] drm/i915/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process Alexey Budankov
2020-02-17  8:08   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-02-17  8:08   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-17  8:08   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-18 19:25   ` James Morris
2020-02-18 19:25     ` [Intel-gfx] " James Morris
2020-02-18 19:25     ` James Morris
2020-02-18 19:25     ` James Morris
2020-02-17  8:09 ` [PATCH v7 06/12] trace/bpf_trace: " Alexey Budankov
2020-02-17  8:09   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-02-17  8:09   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-17  8:09   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-18 19:25   ` James Morris
2020-02-18 19:25     ` [Intel-gfx] " James Morris
2020-02-18 19:25     ` James Morris
2020-02-18 19:25     ` James Morris
2020-02-17  8:10 ` [PATCH v7 07/12] powerpc/perf: " Alexey Budankov
2020-02-17  8:10   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-02-17  8:10   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-17  8:10   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-18 19:28   ` James Morris
2020-02-18 19:28     ` [Intel-gfx] " James Morris
2020-02-18 19:28     ` James Morris
2020-02-18 19:28     ` James Morris
2020-02-17  8:10 ` [PATCH v7 08/12] parisc/perf: " Alexey Budankov
2020-02-17  8:10   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-02-17  8:10   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-17  8:10   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-18 19:29   ` James Morris
2020-02-18 19:29     ` [Intel-gfx] " James Morris
2020-02-18 19:29     ` James Morris
2020-02-18 19:29     ` James Morris
2020-02-17  8:11 ` [PATCH v7 09/12] drivers/perf: " Alexey Budankov
2020-02-17  8:11   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-02-17  8:11   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-17  8:11   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-18 19:43   ` James Morris
2020-02-18 19:43     ` [Intel-gfx] " James Morris
2020-02-18 19:43     ` James Morris
2020-02-18 19:43     ` James Morris
2020-02-17  8:12 ` [PATCH v7 10/12] drivers/oprofile: " Alexey Budankov
2020-02-17  8:12   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-02-17  8:12   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-17  8:12   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-18 19:44   ` James Morris
2020-02-18 19:44     ` [Intel-gfx] " James Morris
2020-02-18 19:44     ` James Morris
2020-02-18 19:44     ` James Morris
2020-02-17  8:12 ` [PATCH v7 11/12] doc/admin-guide: update perf-security.rst with CAP_PERFMON information Alexey Budankov
2020-02-17  8:12   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-02-17  8:12   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-17  8:12   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-17  8:13 ` [PATCH v7 12/12] doc/admin-guide: update kernel.rst " Alexey Budankov
2020-02-17  8:13   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-02-17  8:13   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-17  8:13   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-17 12:02 ` [Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.CHECKPATCH: warning for Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability (rev4) Patchwork
2020-02-17 15:08 ` [Intel-gfx] ✓ Fi.CI.BAT: success " Patchwork
2020-02-25  9:55 ` [PATCH v7 00/12] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability Alexey Budankov
2020-02-25  9:55   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-02-25  9:55   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-25  9:55   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-03-02  0:19   ` [Intel-gfx] " Serge Hallyn
2020-03-02  0:19     ` Serge Hallyn
2020-03-02  0:19     ` Serge Hallyn
2020-03-02  0:19     ` Serge Hallyn
2020-03-02 19:44     ` James Morris
2020-03-02 19:44       ` James Morris
2020-03-02 19:44       ` James Morris
2020-03-02 19:44       ` James Morris
2020-03-26 23:28     ` James Morris
2020-03-26 23:28       ` James Morris
2020-03-26 23:28       ` James Morris
2020-03-26 23:28       ` James Morris

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