From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
To: speck@linutronix.de
Subject: [MODERATED] Re: [PATCH v5 1/8] L1TFv4 6
Date: Thu, 24 May 2018 10:00:40 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <b1426589-9a50-6f06-57df-a0d536d680bd@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180524152609.GO4486@tassilo.jf.intel.com>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 620 bytes --]
On 05/24/2018 08:26 AM, speck for Andi Kleen wrote:
> A sets the GPA 1 PA 2 PTE to PROT_NONE to bypass the EPT remapping
> and gets read access to the underlying physical page. Which
> in this case points to PA 2, so it can read process B's data,
> if it happened to be in L1.
So this is entirely about a 32-bit PAE guest being able to provide
guest-process->guest-process isolation?
This is the part I don't understand. Shouldn't the PROT_NONE
mitigations have already been applied to the PTEs? That mitigation
should keep them from being exploited to read other guest process's data.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-05-24 17:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-05-23 21:51 [MODERATED] [PATCH v5 0/8] L1TFv4 5 Andi Kleen
2018-05-23 21:51 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v5 1/8] L1TFv4 6 Andi Kleen
2018-05-23 21:51 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v5 2/8] L1TFv4 7 Andi Kleen
2018-05-23 21:51 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v5 3/8] L1TFv4 2 Andi Kleen
2018-05-23 21:51 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v5 4/8] L1TFv4 8 Andi Kleen
2018-05-23 21:51 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v5 5/8] L1TFv4 0 Andi Kleen
2018-05-23 21:51 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v5 6/8] L1TFv4 4 Andi Kleen
2018-05-23 21:51 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v5 7/8] L1TFv4 3 Andi Kleen
2018-05-23 21:51 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v5 8/8] L1TFv4 1 Andi Kleen
[not found] ` <20180523215658.63CAB61104@crypto-ml.lab.linutronix.de>
2018-05-23 22:22 ` [MODERATED] Re: [PATCH v5 5/8] L1TFv4 0 Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <20180523215726.A931B61157@crypto-ml.lab.linutronix.de>
2018-05-23 22:50 ` [MODERATED] Re: [PATCH v5 8/8] L1TFv4 1 Dave Hansen
[not found] ` <20180523215737.7C50E61169@crypto-ml.lab.linutronix.de>
2018-05-23 23:15 ` [MODERATED] Re: [PATCH v5 1/8] L1TFv4 6 Dave Hansen
2018-05-23 23:52 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-05-24 9:09 ` Michal Hocko
2018-05-24 15:26 ` Andi Kleen
2018-05-24 17:00 ` Dave Hansen [this message]
[not found] ` <20180523215136.EB16B610ED@crypto-ml.lab.linutronix.de>
2018-05-24 3:34 ` [MODERATED] Re: [PATCH v5 4/8] L1TFv4 8 Josh Poimboeuf
[not found] ` <20180523215651.BFF82610ED@crypto-ml.lab.linutronix.de>
2018-05-24 4:04 ` [MODERATED] Re: [PATCH v5 6/8] L1TFv4 4 Josh Poimboeuf
2018-05-24 13:35 ` Andi Kleen
2018-05-24 15:45 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-05-24 16:53 ` Andi Kleen
2018-05-24 17:53 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-05-24 20:32 ` Andi Kleen
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