[PATCH] docs: features/qemu-depriv formatting fixes

* [PATCH] docs: features/qemu-depriv formatting fixes
@ 2019-02-07 15:09 George Dunlap
  2019-02-07 15:10 ` Andrew Cooper
  2019-02-07 16:19 ` Juergen Gross
  0 siblings, 2 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: George Dunlap @ 2019-02-07 15:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: xen-devel
  Cc: Juergen Gross, Stefano Stabellini, Wei Liu, Konrad Wilk,
	Andrew Cooper, Tim Deegan, George Dunlap, Julien Grall,
	Jan Beulich, Ian Jackson

Need a space between the paragraph and the list so pandoc knows it's a
list.

Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
---
Release justification:
 - "Bug" in docs (incorrect HTML output generated)

CC: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@citrix.com>
CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
CC: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
CC: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
CC: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
CC: Konrad Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
CC: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
CC: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
CC: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
---
 docs/features/qemu-deprivilege.pandoc | 14 ++++++++------
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/docs/features/qemu-deprivilege.pandoc b/docs/features/qemu-deprivilege.pandoc
index cfe528b1d3..4ef119c821 100644
--- a/docs/features/qemu-deprivilege.pandoc
+++ b/docs/features/qemu-deprivilege.pandoc
@@ -109,15 +109,17 @@ See docs/design/qemu-deprivilege.md for technical details.
 # Limitations
 
 The following features still need to be implemented:
- * Inserting a new cdrom while the guest is running (xl cdrom-insert)
- * Support for qdisk backends
+
+* Inserting a new cdrom while the guest is running (xl cdrom-insert)
+* Support for qdisk backends
 
 A number of restrictions still need to be implemented.  A compromised
 device model may be able to do the following:
- * Delay or exploit weaknesses in the toolstack
- * Launch "fork bombs" or other resource exhaustion attacks
- * Make network connections on the management network
- * Break out of the restrictions after migration
+
+* Delay or exploit weaknesses in the toolstack
+* Launch "fork bombs" or other resource exhaustion attacks
+* Make network connections on the management network
+* Break out of the restrictions after migration
 
 Additionally, getting PCI passthrough to work securely would require a
 significant rework of how passthrough works at the moment.  It may be
-- 
2.20.1


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