From: Alex Shi <alex.shi@linaro.org>
To: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
stable@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/45] arm Spectre fix backport review for LTS 4.9
Date: Fri, 2 Mar 2018 17:02:32 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <c96bc4d8-25b8-684b-83f6-7d6c6c0fea4b@linaro.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180301164630.GB23321@kroah.com>
On 03/02/2018 12:46 AM, Greg KH wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 01, 2018 at 08:53:37PM +0800, Alex Shi wrote:
>> Hi All,
>>
>> Resent without non-upstream patches.
>>
>> This backport patchset fixed the spectre issue, it's original branch:
>> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux.git/log/?h=kpti
>> A few dependency or fixingpatches are also picked up, if they are necessary
>> and no functional changes.
>>
>> No bug found from kernelci.org and lkft testing. It also could be gotten from:
>>
>> git://git.linaro.org/kernel/linux-linaro-stable.git v4.9-spectre-upstream-only
>
> Also, how did you test, what platforms did you test, and did you test
> that this actually did fix the spectre issue on your platforms? If so,
> what test did you use?
>
On the kernelci, there are 18 kinds of platoforms with different
configure tested booting, detailed info is here:
https://kernelci.org/boot/all/job/lsk/branch/linux-linaro-lsk-v4.9-test/kernel/lsk-v4.9-17.03-4844-g6f782cff6edb/
I also tested the qemu boot on hikey620. and normal boot on
hikey620/db410c/junor2. The other testing include the LKFT testing which
is reported by email, same as test for LTS. None of testing show
regressions.
As testing the spectre bug fix, that's a good question. I also asked
this question to original patch authors, like Marc. They said they just
figure out these patches could block spectre or meltdown issue. From my
side, I just reproduced the process internal spectre. But all fix on arm
can not resolve the user space internal spectre. It can block from user
to kernel or kernel to user spectre according the code purose. So I
believe these patch could do their job. And arm cpu would drop the
spectre branches if it has 20+ 'nop' instructions...
Regards
Alex
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: alex.shi@linaro.org (Alex Shi)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH 00/45] arm Spectre fix backport review for LTS 4.9
Date: Fri, 2 Mar 2018 17:02:32 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <c96bc4d8-25b8-684b-83f6-7d6c6c0fea4b@linaro.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180301164630.GB23321@kroah.com>
On 03/02/2018 12:46 AM, Greg KH wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 01, 2018 at 08:53:37PM +0800, Alex Shi wrote:
>> Hi All,
>>
>> Resent without non-upstream patches.
>>
>> This backport patchset fixed the spectre issue, it's original branch:
>> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux.git/log/?h=kpti
>> A few dependency or fixingpatches are also picked up, if they are necessary
>> and no functional changes.
>>
>> No bug found from kernelci.org and lkft testing. It also could be gotten from:
>>
>> git://git.linaro.org/kernel/linux-linaro-stable.git v4.9-spectre-upstream-only
>
> Also, how did you test, what platforms did you test, and did you test
> that this actually did fix the spectre issue on your platforms? If so,
> what test did you use?
>
On the kernelci, there are 18 kinds of platoforms with different
configure tested booting, detailed info is here:
https://kernelci.org/boot/all/job/lsk/branch/linux-linaro-lsk-v4.9-test/kernel/lsk-v4.9-17.03-4844-g6f782cff6edb/
I also tested the qemu boot on hikey620. and normal boot on
hikey620/db410c/junor2. The other testing include the LKFT testing which
is reported by email, same as test for LTS. None of testing show
regressions.
As testing the spectre bug fix, that's a good question. I also asked
this question to original patch authors, like Marc. They said they just
figure out these patches could block spectre or meltdown issue. From my
side, I just reproduced the process internal spectre. But all fix on arm
can not resolve the user space internal spectre. It can block from user
to kernel or kernel to user spectre according the code purose. So I
believe these patch could do their job. And arm cpu would drop the
spectre branches if it has 20+ 'nop' instructions...
Regards
Alex
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-03-02 9:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 119+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-03-01 12:53 [PATCH 00/45] arm Spectre fix backport review for LTS 4.9 Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:53 ` Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:53 ` [PATCH 01/45] mm: Introduce lm_alias Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:53 ` Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:53 ` [PATCH 02/45] arm64: alternatives: apply boot time fixups via the linear mapping Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:53 ` Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:53 ` [PATCH 03/45] arm64: barrier: Add CSDB macros to control data-value prediction Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:53 ` Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:53 ` [PATCH 04/45] arm64: Implement array_index_mask_nospec() Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:53 ` Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:53 ` [PATCH 05/45] arm64: move TASK_* definitions to <asm/processor.h> Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:53 ` Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:53 ` [PATCH 06/45] arm64: Factor out PAN enabling/disabling into separate uaccess_* macros Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:53 ` Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:53 ` [PATCH 07/45] arm64: Factor out TTBR0_EL1 post-update workaround into a specific asm macro Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:53 ` Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:53 ` [PATCH 08/45] arm64: uaccess: consistently check object sizes Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:53 ` Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:53 ` [PATCH 09/45] arm64: Make USER_DS an inclusive limit Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:53 ` Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:53 ` [PATCH 10/45] arm64: Use pointer masking to limit uaccess speculation Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:53 ` Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:53 ` [PATCH 11/45] arm64: syscallno is secretly an int, make it official Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:53 ` Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:53 ` [PATCH 12/45] arm64: entry: Ensure branch through syscall table is bounded under speculation Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:53 ` Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:53 ` [PATCH 13/45] arm64: uaccess: Prevent speculative use of the current addr_limit Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:53 ` Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:53 ` [PATCH 14/45] arm64: uaccess: Don't bother eliding access_ok checks in __{get, put}_user Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:53 ` Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:53 ` [PATCH 15/45] arm64: uaccess: Mask __user pointers for __arch_{clear, copy_*}_user Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:53 ` Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:53 ` [PATCH 16/45] arm64: futex: Mask __user pointers prior to dereference Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:53 ` Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:53 ` [PATCH 17/45] drivers/firmware: Expose psci_get_version through psci_ops structure Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:53 ` Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:53 ` [PATCH 18/45] arm64: cpufeature: __this_cpu_has_cap() shouldn't stop early Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:53 ` Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:53 ` [PATCH 19/45] arm64: cpu_errata: Allow an erratum to be match for all revisions of a core Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:53 ` Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:53 ` [PATCH 20/45] arm64: Run enable method for errata work arounds on late CPUs Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:53 ` Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:53 ` [PATCH 21/45] arm64: cpufeature: Pass capability structure to ->enable callback Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:53 ` Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:53 ` [PATCH 22/45] arm64: Move post_ttbr_update_workaround to C code Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:53 ` Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:54 ` [PATCH 23/45] arm64: Add skeleton to harden the branch predictor against aliasing attacks Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:54 ` Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:54 ` [PATCH 24/45] arm64: Move BP hardening to check_and_switch_context Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:54 ` Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:54 ` [PATCH 25/45] arm64: KVM: Use per-CPU vector when BP hardening is enabled Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:54 ` Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:54 ` [PATCH 26/45] arm64: entry: Apply BP hardening for high-priority synchronous exceptions Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:54 ` Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:54 ` [PATCH 27/45] arm64: entry: Apply BP hardening for suspicious interrupts from EL0 Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:54 ` Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:54 ` [PATCH 28/45] arm64: cputype: Add missing MIDR values for Cortex-A72 and Cortex-A75 Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:54 ` Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:54 ` [PATCH 29/45] arm64: Implement branch predictor hardening for affected Cortex-A CPUs Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:54 ` Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:54 ` [PATCH 30/45] arm64: KVM: Increment PC after handling an SMC trap Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:54 ` Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:54 ` [PATCH 31/45] arm/arm64: KVM: Consolidate the PSCI include files Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:54 ` Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:54 ` [PATCH 32/45] arm/arm64: KVM: Add PSCI_VERSION helper Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:54 ` Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:54 ` [PATCH 33/45] arm/arm64: KVM: Add smccc accessors to PSCI code Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:54 ` Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:54 ` [PATCH 34/45] arm/arm64: KVM: Implement PSCI 1.0 support Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:54 ` Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:54 ` [PATCH 35/45] arm/arm64: KVM: Advertise SMCCC v1.1 Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:54 ` Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:54 ` [PATCH 36/45] arm64: KVM: Make PSCI_VERSION a fast path Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:54 ` Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:54 ` [PATCH 37/45] arm/arm64: KVM: Turn kvm_psci_version into a static inline Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:54 ` Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:54 ` [PATCH 38/45] arm64: KVM: Report SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 BP hardening support Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:54 ` Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:54 ` [PATCH 39/45] arm64: KVM: Add SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 fast handling Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:54 ` Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:54 ` [PATCH 40/45] firmware/psci: Expose PSCI conduit Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:54 ` Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:54 ` [PATCH 41/45] firmware/psci: Expose SMCCC version through psci_ops Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:54 ` Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:54 ` [PATCH 42/45] arm/arm64: smccc: Make function identifiers an unsigned quantity Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:54 ` Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:54 ` [PATCH 43/45] arm/arm64: smccc: Implement SMCCC v1.1 inline primitive Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:54 ` Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:54 ` [PATCH 44/45] arm64: Add ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 BP hardening support Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:54 ` Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:54 ` [PATCH 45/45] arm64: Kill PSCI_GET_VERSION as a variant-2 workaround Alex Shi
2018-03-01 12:54 ` Alex Shi
2018-03-01 16:45 ` [PATCH 00/45] arm Spectre fix backport review for LTS 4.9 Greg KH
2018-03-01 16:45 ` Greg KH
2018-03-02 7:26 ` Alex Shi
2018-03-02 7:26 ` Alex Shi
2018-03-01 16:46 ` Greg KH
2018-03-01 16:46 ` Greg KH
2018-03-02 9:02 ` Alex Shi [this message]
2018-03-02 9:02 ` Alex Shi
2018-03-02 10:29 ` Marc Zyngier
2018-03-02 10:29 ` Marc Zyngier
2018-03-03 0:52 ` Alex Shi
2018-03-03 0:52 ` Alex Shi
2018-03-02 10:30 ` Will Deacon
2018-03-02 10:30 ` Will Deacon
2018-03-03 0:54 ` Alex Shi
2018-03-03 0:54 ` Alex Shi
2018-03-08 12:27 ` Pavel Machek
2018-03-08 12:27 ` Pavel Machek
2018-03-08 13:21 ` Pali Rohár
2018-03-08 13:21 ` Pali Rohár
2018-03-08 13:33 ` Ivaylo Dimitrov
2018-03-08 13:33 ` Ivaylo Dimitrov
2018-03-08 13:33 ` Ivaylo Dimitrov
2018-03-08 13:35 ` Marc Zyngier
2018-03-08 13:35 ` Marc Zyngier
2018-03-08 17:01 ` Pali Rohár
2018-03-08 17:01 ` Pali Rohár
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