* [thud 01/12] oeqa/selftest/context: ensure log directory exists
2019-10-10 15:49 [thud 00/12] Thud pull request Armin Kuster
@ 2019-10-10 15:49 ` Armin Kuster
2019-10-10 15:49 ` [thud 02/12] qemu: Fix 4 CVEs Armin Kuster
` (10 subsequent siblings)
11 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Armin Kuster @ 2019-10-10 15:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: openembedded-core
From: Chen Qi <Qi.Chen@windriver.com>
Ensure log directory exists to avoid the following error.
FileNotFoundError: [Errno 2] No such file or directory: '/.../build-selftest/tmp/log/oe-selftest-results-20181207043431.log'
Signed-off-by: Chen Qi <Qi.Chen@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>
---
meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/context.py | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/context.py b/meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/context.py
index c521290..c56e53d 100644
--- a/meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/context.py
+++ b/meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/context.py
@@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ class OESelftestTestContextExecutor(OETestContextExecutor):
logdir = os.environ.get("BUILDDIR")
if 'LOG_DIR' in bbvars:
logdir = bbvars['LOG_DIR']
+ bb.utils.mkdirhier(logdir)
args.output_log = logdir + '/%s-results-%s.log' % (self.name, args.test_start_time)
super(OESelftestTestContextExecutor, self)._process_args(logger, args)
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread* [thud 02/12] qemu: Fix 4 CVEs
2019-10-10 15:49 [thud 00/12] Thud pull request Armin Kuster
2019-10-10 15:49 ` [thud 01/12] oeqa/selftest/context: ensure log directory exists Armin Kuster
@ 2019-10-10 15:49 ` Armin Kuster
2019-10-10 15:49 ` [thud 03/12] elfutils: CVE fix for elfutils Armin Kuster
` (9 subsequent siblings)
11 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Armin Kuster @ 2019-10-10 15:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: openembedded-core
From: Dan Tran <dantran@microsoft.com>
Fixes CVE-2018-18954, CVE-2019-3812, CVE-2019-6778, and CVE-2019-8934.
Also deleted duplicated patch and cleanup.
Signed-off-by: Dan Tran <dantran@microsoft.com>
[fixup for thud-next]
Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>
---
.../qemu/qemu/CVE-2018-10839.patch | 2 +-
.../qemu/qemu/CVE-2018-17958.patch | 52 -----
.../qemu/qemu/CVE-2018-18954.patch | 50 +++++
.../recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2019-3812.patch | 39 ++++
.../recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2019-6778.patch | 41 ++++
.../recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2019-8934.patch | 215 +++++++++++++++++++++
meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu_3.0.0.bb | 6 +-
7 files changed, 351 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-)
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2018-17958.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2018-18954.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2019-3812.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2019-6778.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2019-8934.patch
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2018-10839.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2018-10839.patch
index 7e1e442..81607c9 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2018-10839.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2018-10839.patch
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commitdiff
;h=fdc89e90fac40c5ca2686733df17b6423fb8d8fb#patch1]
-CVE: CVE-2018-10839
+CVE: CVE-2018-10839 CVE-2018-17958
Signed-off-by: Changqing Li <changqing.li@windriver.com>
---
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2018-17958.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2018-17958.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index af40ff2..0000000
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2018-17958.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
-From 06e88ca78d056ea4de885e3a1496805179dc47bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Changqing Li <changqing.li@windriver.com>
-Date: Mon, 15 Oct 2018 16:33:04 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH] ne2000: fix possible out of bound access in ne2000_receive
-
-In ne2000_receive(), we try to assign size_ to size which converts
-from size_t to integer. This will cause troubles when size_ is greater
-INT_MAX, this will lead a negative value in size and it can then pass
-the check of size < MIN_BUF_SIZE which may lead out of bound access of
-for both buf and buf1.
-
-Fixing by converting the type of size to size_t.
-
-CC: address@hidden
-Reported-by: Daniel Shapira <address@hidden>
-Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <address@hidden>
-Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <address@hidden>
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport [https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2018-09/msg03273.html]
-
-CVE: CVE-2018-17958
-
-Signed-off-by: Changqing Li <changqing.li@windriver.com>
----
- hw/net/ne2000.c | 4 ++--
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/net/ne2000.c b/hw/net/ne2000.c
-index 07d79e3..869518e 100644
---- a/hw/net/ne2000.c
-+++ b/hw/net/ne2000.c
-@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ static int ne2000_buffer_full(NE2000State *s)
- ssize_t ne2000_receive(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, size_t size_)
- {
- NE2000State *s = qemu_get_nic_opaque(nc);
-- int size = size_;
-+ size_t size = size_;
- uint8_t *p;
- unsigned int total_len, next, avail, len, index, mcast_idx;
- uint8_t buf1[60];
-@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ ssize_t ne2000_receive(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, size_t size_)
- { 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff };
-
- #if defined(DEBUG_NE2000)
-- printf("NE2000: received len=%d\n", size);
-+ printf("NE2000: received len=%zu\n", size);
- #endif
-
- if (s->cmd & E8390_STOP || ne2000_buffer_full(s))
---
-2.7.4
-
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2018-18954.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2018-18954.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9fe1364
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2018-18954.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+From 3c9fd43da473a324f6cc7a0d3db58f651a2d262c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2018 18:03:58 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] ppc/pnv: check size before data buffer access
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+While performing PowerNV memory r/w operations, the access length
+'sz' could exceed the data[4] buffer size. Add check to avoid OOB
+access.
+
+Reported-by: Moguofang <moguofang@huawei.com>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Reviewed-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org>
+Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
+
+CVE: CVE-2018-18954
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+[https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=d07945e78eb6b593cd17a4640c1fc9eb35e3245d]
+
+Signed-off-by: Dan Tran <dantran@microsoft.com>
+---
+ hw/ppc/pnv_lpc.c | 8 +++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/ppc/pnv_lpc.c b/hw/ppc/pnv_lpc.c
+index d7721320a2..172a915cfc 100644
+--- a/hw/ppc/pnv_lpc.c
++++ b/hw/ppc/pnv_lpc.c
+@@ -155,9 +155,15 @@ static void pnv_lpc_do_eccb(PnvLpcController *lpc, uint64_t cmd)
+ /* XXX Check for magic bits at the top, addr size etc... */
+ unsigned int sz = (cmd & ECCB_CTL_SZ_MASK) >> ECCB_CTL_SZ_LSH;
+ uint32_t opb_addr = cmd & ECCB_CTL_ADDR_MASK;
+- uint8_t data[4];
++ uint8_t data[8];
+ bool success;
+
++ if (sz > sizeof(data)) {
++ qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
++ "ECCB: invalid operation at @0x%08x size %d\n", opb_addr, sz);
++ return;
++ }
++
+ if (cmd & ECCB_CTL_READ) {
+ success = opb_read(lpc, opb_addr, data, sz);
+ if (success) {
+--
+2.22.0.vfs.1.1.57.gbaf16c8
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2019-3812.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2019-3812.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0e11ad2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2019-3812.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+From b664d9d003d1a98642dcfb8e6fceef6dbf3d52d8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 8 Jan 2019 11:23:01 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] i2c-ddc: fix oob read
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Suggested-by: Michael Hanselmann <public@hansmi.ch>
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Michael Hanselmann <public@hansmi.ch>
+Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
+Message-id: 20190108102301.1957-1-kraxel@redhat.com
+
+CVE: CVE-2019-3812
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+[https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=b05b267840515730dbf6753495d5b7bd8b04ad1c]
+
+Signed-off-by: Dan Tran <dantran@microsoft.com>
+---
+ hw/i2c/i2c-ddc.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/i2c/i2c-ddc.c b/hw/i2c/i2c-ddc.c
+index bec0c91e2d..89e659288e 100644
+--- a/hw/i2c/i2c-ddc.c
++++ b/hw/i2c/i2c-ddc.c
+@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ static int i2c_ddc_rx(I2CSlave *i2c)
+ I2CDDCState *s = I2CDDC(i2c);
+
+ int value;
+- value = s->edid_blob[s->reg];
++ value = s->edid_blob[s->reg % sizeof(s->edid_blob)];
+ s->reg++;
+ return value;
+ }
+--
+2.22.0.vfs.1.1.57.gbaf16c8
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2019-6778.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2019-6778.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5b14596
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2019-6778.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+From b6c0fa3b435375918714e107b22de2ef13a41c26 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Sun, 13 Jan 2019 23:29:48 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] slirp: check data length while emulating ident function
+
+While emulating identification protocol, tcp_emu() does not check
+available space in the 'sc_rcv->sb_data' buffer. It could lead to
+heap buffer overflow issue. Add check to avoid it.
+
+Reported-by: Kira <864786842@qq.com>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Signed-off-by: Samuel Thibault <samuel.thibault@ens-lyon.org>
+
+CVE: CVE-2019-6778
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+[https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=a7104eda7dab99d0cdbd3595c211864cba415905]
+
+Signed-off-by: Dan Tran <dantran@microsoft.com>
+---
+ slirp/tcp_subr.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/slirp/tcp_subr.c b/slirp/tcp_subr.c
+index 8d0f94b75f..7277aadfdf 100644
+--- a/slirp/tcp_subr.c
++++ b/slirp/tcp_subr.c
+@@ -640,6 +640,11 @@ tcp_emu(struct socket *so, struct mbuf *m)
+ socklen_t addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
+ struct sbuf *so_rcv = &so->so_rcv;
+
++ if (m->m_len > so_rcv->sb_datalen
++ - (so_rcv->sb_wptr - so_rcv->sb_data)) {
++ return 1;
++ }
++
+ memcpy(so_rcv->sb_wptr, m->m_data, m->m_len);
+ so_rcv->sb_wptr += m->m_len;
+ so_rcv->sb_rptr += m->m_len;
+--
+2.22.0.vfs.1.1.57.gbaf16c8
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2019-8934.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2019-8934.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..db3201c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2019-8934.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
+From 13e153f01b4f2a3e199202b34a247d83c176f21a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Mon, 18 Feb 2019 23:43:49 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] ppc: add host-serial and host-model machine attributes
+ (CVE-2019-8934)
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+On ppc hosts, hypervisor shares following system attributes
+
+ - /proc/device-tree/system-id
+ - /proc/device-tree/model
+
+with a guest. This could lead to information leakage and misuse.[*]
+Add machine attributes to control such system information exposure
+to a guest.
+
+[*] https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/OSSN/OSSN-0028
+
+Reported-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
+Fix-suggested-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Message-Id: <20190218181349.23885-1-ppandit@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
+
+CVE: CVE-2019-8934
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+[https://github.com/qemu/qemu/commit/27461d69a0f108dea756419251acc3ea65198f1b]
+
+Signed-off-by: Dan Tran <dantran@microsoft.com>
+---
+ hw/ppc/spapr.c | 128 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
+ include/hw/ppc/spapr.h | 2 +
+ 2 files changed, 123 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/ppc/spapr.c b/hw/ppc/spapr.c
+index 421b2dd09b..069d678ee0 100644
+--- a/hw/ppc/spapr.c
++++ b/hw/ppc/spapr.c
+@@ -1266,13 +1266,30 @@ static void *spapr_build_fdt(sPAPRMachineState *spapr,
+ * Add info to guest to indentify which host is it being run on
+ * and what is the uuid of the guest
+ */
+- if (kvmppc_get_host_model(&buf)) {
+- _FDT(fdt_setprop_string(fdt, 0, "host-model", buf));
+- g_free(buf);
++ if (spapr->host_model && !g_str_equal(spapr->host_model, "none")) {
++ if (g_str_equal(spapr->host_model, "passthrough")) {
++ /* -M host-model=passthrough */
++ if (kvmppc_get_host_model(&buf)) {
++ _FDT(fdt_setprop_string(fdt, 0, "host-model", buf));
++ g_free(buf);
++ }
++ } else {
++ /* -M host-model=<user-string> */
++ _FDT(fdt_setprop_string(fdt, 0, "host-model", spapr->host_model));
++ }
+ }
+- if (kvmppc_get_host_serial(&buf)) {
+- _FDT(fdt_setprop_string(fdt, 0, "host-serial", buf));
+- g_free(buf);
++
++ if (spapr->host_serial && !g_str_equal(spapr->host_serial, "none")) {
++ if (g_str_equal(spapr->host_serial, "passthrough")) {
++ /* -M host-serial=passthrough */
++ if (kvmppc_get_host_serial(&buf)) {
++ _FDT(fdt_setprop_string(fdt, 0, "host-serial", buf));
++ g_free(buf);
++ }
++ } else {
++ /* -M host-serial=<user-string> */
++ _FDT(fdt_setprop_string(fdt, 0, "host-serial", spapr->host_serial));
++ }
+ }
+
+ buf = qemu_uuid_unparse_strdup(&qemu_uuid);
+@@ -3027,6 +3044,73 @@ static void spapr_set_vsmt(Object *obj, Visitor *v, const char *name,
+ visit_type_uint32(v, name, (uint32_t *)opaque, errp);
+ }
+
++static char *spapr_get_ic_mode(Object *obj, Error **errp)
++{
++ sPAPRMachineState *spapr = SPAPR_MACHINE(obj);
++
++ if (spapr->irq == &spapr_irq_xics_legacy) {
++ return g_strdup("legacy");
++ } else if (spapr->irq == &spapr_irq_xics) {
++ return g_strdup("xics");
++ } else if (spapr->irq == &spapr_irq_xive) {
++ return g_strdup("xive");
++ } else if (spapr->irq == &spapr_irq_dual) {
++ return g_strdup("dual");
++ }
++ g_assert_not_reached();
++}
++
++static void spapr_set_ic_mode(Object *obj, const char *value, Error **errp)
++{
++ sPAPRMachineState *spapr = SPAPR_MACHINE(obj);
++
++ if (SPAPR_MACHINE_GET_CLASS(spapr)->legacy_irq_allocation) {
++ error_setg(errp, "This machine only uses the legacy XICS backend, don't pass ic-mode");
++ return;
++ }
++
++ /* The legacy IRQ backend can not be set */
++ if (strcmp(value, "xics") == 0) {
++ spapr->irq = &spapr_irq_xics;
++ } else if (strcmp(value, "xive") == 0) {
++ spapr->irq = &spapr_irq_xive;
++ } else if (strcmp(value, "dual") == 0) {
++ spapr->irq = &spapr_irq_dual;
++ } else {
++ error_setg(errp, "Bad value for \"ic-mode\" property");
++ }
++}
++
++static char *spapr_get_host_model(Object *obj, Error **errp)
++{
++ sPAPRMachineState *spapr = SPAPR_MACHINE(obj);
++
++ return g_strdup(spapr->host_model);
++}
++
++static void spapr_set_host_model(Object *obj, const char *value, Error **errp)
++{
++ sPAPRMachineState *spapr = SPAPR_MACHINE(obj);
++
++ g_free(spapr->host_model);
++ spapr->host_model = g_strdup(value);
++}
++
++static char *spapr_get_host_serial(Object *obj, Error **errp)
++{
++ sPAPRMachineState *spapr = SPAPR_MACHINE(obj);
++
++ return g_strdup(spapr->host_serial);
++}
++
++static void spapr_set_host_serial(Object *obj, const char *value, Error **errp)
++{
++ sPAPRMachineState *spapr = SPAPR_MACHINE(obj);
++
++ g_free(spapr->host_serial);
++ spapr->host_serial = g_strdup(value);
++}
++
+ static void spapr_instance_init(Object *obj)
+ {
+ sPAPRMachineState *spapr = SPAPR_MACHINE(obj);
+@@ -3063,6 +3147,25 @@ static void spapr_instance_init(Object *obj)
+ " the host's SMT mode", &error_abort);
+ object_property_add_bool(obj, "vfio-no-msix-emulation",
+ spapr_get_msix_emulation, NULL, NULL);
++
++ /* The machine class defines the default interrupt controller mode */
++ spapr->irq = smc->irq;
++ object_property_add_str(obj, "ic-mode", spapr_get_ic_mode,
++ spapr_set_ic_mode, NULL);
++ object_property_set_description(obj, "ic-mode",
++ "Specifies the interrupt controller mode (xics, xive, dual)",
++ NULL);
++
++ object_property_add_str(obj, "host-model",
++ spapr_get_host_model, spapr_set_host_model,
++ &error_abort);
++ object_property_set_description(obj, "host-model",
++ "Set host's model-id to use - none|passthrough|string", &error_abort);
++ object_property_add_str(obj, "host-serial",
++ spapr_get_host_serial, spapr_set_host_serial,
++ &error_abort);
++ object_property_set_description(obj, "host-serial",
++ "Set host's system-id to use - none|passthrough|string", &error_abort);
+ }
+
+ static void spapr_machine_finalizefn(Object *obj)
+@@ -4067,7 +4170,18 @@ static void spapr_machine_3_0_instance_options(MachineState *machine)
+
+ static void spapr_machine_3_0_class_options(MachineClass *mc)
+ {
+- /* Defaults for the latest behaviour inherited from the base class */
++ sPAPRMachineClass *smc = SPAPR_MACHINE_CLASS(mc);
++ static GlobalProperty compat[] = {
++ { TYPE_SPAPR_MACHINE, "host-model", "passthrough" },
++ { TYPE_SPAPR_MACHINE, "host-serial", "passthrough" },
++ };
++
++ spapr_machine_4_0_class_options(mc);
++ compat_props_add(mc->compat_props, hw_compat_3_1, hw_compat_3_1_len);
++ compat_props_add(mc->compat_props, compat, G_N_ELEMENTS(compat));
++
++ mc->default_cpu_type = POWERPC_CPU_TYPE_NAME("power8_v2.0");
++ smc->update_dt_enabled = false;
+ }
+
+ DEFINE_SPAPR_MACHINE(3_0, "3.0", true);
+diff --git a/include/hw/ppc/spapr.h b/include/hw/ppc/spapr.h
+index 7e5de1a6fd..4c69a55374 100644
+--- a/include/hw/ppc/spapr.h
++++ b/include/hw/ppc/spapr.h
+@@ -165,6 +165,8 @@ struct sPAPRMachineState {
+
+ /*< public >*/
+ char *kvm_type;
++ char *host_model;
++ char *host_serial;
+
+ const char *icp_type;
+
+--
+2.22.0.vfs.1.1.57.gbaf16c8
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu_3.0.0.bb b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu_3.0.0.bb
index f02e312..6c3049b 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu_3.0.0.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu_3.0.0.bb
@@ -21,8 +21,8 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.qemu.org/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.xz \
file://0009-apic-fixup-fallthrough-to-PIC.patch \
file://0010-linux-user-Fix-webkitgtk-hangs-on-32-bit-x86-target.patch \
file://0011-Revert-linux-user-fix-mmap-munmap-mprotect-mremap-sh.patch \
+ file://CVE-2018-10839.patch\
file://CVE-2018-15746.patch \
- file://CVE-2018-17958.patch \
file://CVE-2018-17962.patch \
file://CVE-2018-17963.patch \
file://CVE-2018-16867.patch \
@@ -36,6 +36,10 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.qemu.org/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.xz \
file://CVE-2018-20815_p2.patch \
file://CVE-2019-9824.patch \
file://0014-linux-user-fix-to-handle-variably-sized-SIOCGSTAMP-w.patch \
+ file://CVE-2018-18954.patch \
+ file://CVE-2019-3812.patch \
+ file://CVE-2019-6778.patch \
+ file://CVE-2019-8934.patch \
"
UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "qemu-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)\.tar"
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread* [thud 03/12] elfutils: CVE fix for elfutils
2019-10-10 15:49 [thud 00/12] Thud pull request Armin Kuster
2019-10-10 15:49 ` [thud 01/12] oeqa/selftest/context: ensure log directory exists Armin Kuster
2019-10-10 15:49 ` [thud 02/12] qemu: Fix 4 CVEs Armin Kuster
@ 2019-10-10 15:49 ` Armin Kuster
2019-10-10 15:49 ` [thud 04/12] unzip: fix CVE-2019-13232 Armin Kuster
` (8 subsequent siblings)
11 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Armin Kuster @ 2019-10-10 15:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: openembedded-core
From: Shubham Agrawal <shuagr@microsoft.com>
CVE: CVE-2019-7664.patch
CVE: CVE-2019-7665.patch
Sign off: Shubham Agrawal <shuagr@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>
---
meta/recipes-devtools/elfutils/elfutils_0.175.bb | 2 +
.../elfutils/files/CVE-2019-7664.patch | 65 +++++++++
.../elfutils/files/CVE-2019-7665.patch | 154 +++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 221 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/elfutils/files/CVE-2019-7664.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/elfutils/files/CVE-2019-7665.patch
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/elfutils/elfutils_0.175.bb b/meta/recipes-devtools/elfutils/elfutils_0.175.bb
index e94a48e..862a9b6 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/elfutils/elfutils_0.175.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/elfutils/elfutils_0.175.bb
@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ SRC_URI = "https://sourceware.org/elfutils/ftp/${PV}/${BP}.tar.bz2 \
file://CVE-2019-7150.patch \
file://CVE-2019-7146_p1.patch \
file://CVE-2019-7146_p2.patch \
+ file://CVE-2019-7664.patch \
+ file://CVE-2019-7665.patch \
"
SRC_URI_append_libc-musl = " file://0008-build-Provide-alternatives-for-glibc-assumptions-hel.patch"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/elfutils/files/CVE-2019-7664.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/elfutils/files/CVE-2019-7664.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e55dc5a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/elfutils/files/CVE-2019-7664.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+From 3ed05376e7b2c96c1d6eb24d2842cc25b79a4f07 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mark Wielaard <mark@klomp.org>
+Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 12:25:57 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE: CVE-2019-7664
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+libelf: Correct overflow check in note_xlate.
+
+We want to make sure the note_len doesn't overflow and becomes shorter
+than the note header. But the namesz and descsz checks got the note header
+size wrong). Replace the wrong constant (8) with a sizeof cvt_Nhdr (12).
+
+https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=24084
+
+Signed-off-by: Mark Wielaard <mark@klomp.org>
+Signed-off-by: Ubuntu <lisa@shuagr-yocto-build.mdn4q2lr1oauhmizmzsslly3ad.xx.internal.cloudapp.net>
+---
+ libelf/ChangeLog | 13 +++++++++++++
+ libelf/note_xlate.h | 4 ++--
+ 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/libelf/ChangeLog b/libelf/ChangeLog
+index 68c4fbd..892e6e7 100644
+--- a/libelf/ChangeLog
++++ b/libelf/ChangeLog
+@@ -1,3 +1,16 @@
++<<<<<<< HEAD
++=======
++2019-01-16 Mark Wielaard <mark@klomp.org>
++
++ * note_xlate.h (elf_cvt_note): Check n_namesz and n_descsz don't
++ overflow note_len into note header.
++
++2018-11-17 Mark Wielaard <mark@klomp.org>
++
++ * elf32_updatefile.c (updatemmap): Make sure to call convert
++ function on a properly aligned destination.
++
++>>>>>>> e65d91d... libelf: Correct overflow check in note_xlate.
+ 2018-11-16 Mark Wielaard <mark@klomp.org>
+
+ * libebl.h (__elf32_msize): Mark with const attribute.
+diff --git a/libelf/note_xlate.h b/libelf/note_xlate.h
+index 9bdc3e2..bc9950f 100644
+--- a/libelf/note_xlate.h
++++ b/libelf/note_xlate.h
+@@ -46,13 +46,13 @@ elf_cvt_note (void *dest, const void *src, size_t len, int encode,
+ /* desc needs to be aligned. */
+ note_len += n->n_namesz;
+ note_len = nhdr8 ? NOTE_ALIGN8 (note_len) : NOTE_ALIGN4 (note_len);
+- if (note_len > len || note_len < 8)
++ if (note_len > len || note_len < sizeof *n)
+ break;
+
+ /* data as a whole needs to be aligned. */
+ note_len += n->n_descsz;
+ note_len = nhdr8 ? NOTE_ALIGN8 (note_len) : NOTE_ALIGN4 (note_len);
+- if (note_len > len || note_len < 8)
++ if (note_len > len || note_len < sizeof *n)
+ break;
+
+ /* Copy or skip the note data. */
+--
+2.7.4
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/elfutils/files/CVE-2019-7665.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/elfutils/files/CVE-2019-7665.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a1bb309
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/elfutils/files/CVE-2019-7665.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+From 4323d46c4a369b614aa1f574805860b3434552df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mark Wielaard <mark@klomp.org>
+Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 15:41:31 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE: CVE-2019-7665
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+Sign off: Shubham Agrawal <shuagr@microsoft.com>
+
+libebl: Check NT_PLATFORM core notes contain a zero terminated string.
+
+Most strings in core notes are fixed size. But NT_PLATFORM contains just
+a variable length string. Check that it is actually zero terminated
+before passing to readelf to print.
+
+https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=24089
+
+Signed-off-by: Mark Wielaard <mark@klomp.org>
+Signed-off-by: Ubuntu <lisa@shuagr-yocto-build.mdn4q2lr1oauhmizmzsslly3ad.xx.internal.cloudapp.net>
+---
+ libdwfl/linux-core-attach.c | 9 +++++----
+ libebl/eblcorenote.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++--------------------
+ libebl/libebl.h | 3 ++-
+ src/readelf.c | 2 +-
+ 4 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/libdwfl/linux-core-attach.c b/libdwfl/linux-core-attach.c
+index 6c99b9e..c0f1b0d 100644
+--- a/libdwfl/linux-core-attach.c
++++ b/libdwfl/linux-core-attach.c
+@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ core_next_thread (Dwfl *dwfl __attribute__ ((unused)), void *dwfl_arg,
+ const Ebl_Register_Location *reglocs;
+ size_t nitems;
+ const Ebl_Core_Item *items;
+- if (! ebl_core_note (core_arg->ebl, &nhdr, name,
++ if (! ebl_core_note (core_arg->ebl, &nhdr, name, desc,
+ ®s_offset, &nregloc, ®locs, &nitems, &items))
+ {
+ /* This note may be just not recognized, skip it. */
+@@ -191,8 +191,9 @@ core_set_initial_registers (Dwfl_Thread *thread, void *thread_arg_voidp)
+ const Ebl_Register_Location *reglocs;
+ size_t nitems;
+ const Ebl_Core_Item *items;
+- int core_note_err = ebl_core_note (core_arg->ebl, &nhdr, name, ®s_offset,
+- &nregloc, ®locs, &nitems, &items);
++ int core_note_err = ebl_core_note (core_arg->ebl, &nhdr, name, desc,
++ ®s_offset, &nregloc, ®locs,
++ &nitems, &items);
+ /* __libdwfl_attach_state_for_core already verified the note is there. */
+ assert (core_note_err != 0);
+ assert (nhdr.n_type == NT_PRSTATUS);
+@@ -383,7 +384,7 @@ dwfl_core_file_attach (Dwfl *dwfl, Elf *core)
+ const Ebl_Register_Location *reglocs;
+ size_t nitems;
+ const Ebl_Core_Item *items;
+- if (! ebl_core_note (ebl, &nhdr, name,
++ if (! ebl_core_note (ebl, &nhdr, name, desc,
+ ®s_offset, &nregloc, ®locs, &nitems, &items))
+ {
+ /* This note may be just not recognized, skip it. */
+diff --git a/libebl/eblcorenote.c b/libebl/eblcorenote.c
+index 783f981..7fab397 100644
+--- a/libebl/eblcorenote.c
++++ b/libebl/eblcorenote.c
+@@ -36,11 +36,13 @@
+ #include <inttypes.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <stddef.h>
++#include <string.h>
+ #include <libeblP.h>
+
+
+ int
+ ebl_core_note (Ebl *ebl, const GElf_Nhdr *nhdr, const char *name,
++ const char *desc,
+ GElf_Word *regs_offset, size_t *nregloc,
+ const Ebl_Register_Location **reglocs, size_t *nitems,
+ const Ebl_Core_Item **items)
+@@ -51,28 +53,25 @@ ebl_core_note (Ebl *ebl, const GElf_Nhdr *nhdr, const char *name,
+ {
+ /* The machine specific function did not know this type. */
+
+- *regs_offset = 0;
+- *nregloc = 0;
+- *reglocs = NULL;
+- switch (nhdr->n_type)
++ /* NT_PLATFORM is kind of special since it needs a zero terminated
++ string (other notes often have a fixed size string). */
++ static const Ebl_Core_Item platform[] =
+ {
+-#define ITEMS(type, table) \
+- case type: \
+- *items = table; \
+- *nitems = sizeof table / sizeof table[0]; \
+- result = 1; \
+- break
++ {
++ .name = "Platform",
++ .type = ELF_T_BYTE, .count = 0, .format = 's'
++ }
++ };
+
+- static const Ebl_Core_Item platform[] =
+- {
+- {
+- .name = "Platform",
+- .type = ELF_T_BYTE, .count = 0, .format = 's'
+- }
+- };
+- ITEMS (NT_PLATFORM, platform);
+-
+-#undef ITEMS
++ if (nhdr->n_type == NT_PLATFORM
++ && memchr (desc, '\0', nhdr->n_descsz) != NULL)
++ {
++ *regs_offset = 0;
++ *nregloc = 0;
++ *reglocs = NULL;
++ *items = platform;
++ *nitems = 1;
++ result = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+diff --git a/libebl/libebl.h b/libebl/libebl.h
+index ca9b9fe..24922eb 100644
+--- a/libebl/libebl.h
++++ b/libebl/libebl.h
+@@ -319,7 +319,8 @@ typedef struct
+
+ /* Describe the format of a core file note with the given header and NAME.
+ NAME is not guaranteed terminated, it's NHDR->n_namesz raw bytes. */
+-extern int ebl_core_note (Ebl *ebl, const GElf_Nhdr *nhdr, const char *name,
++extern int ebl_core_note (Ebl *ebl, const GElf_Nhdr *nhdr,
++ const char *name, const char *desc,
+ GElf_Word *regs_offset, size_t *nregloc,
+ const Ebl_Register_Location **reglocs,
+ size_t *nitems, const Ebl_Core_Item **items)
+diff --git a/src/readelf.c b/src/readelf.c
+index 3a73710..71651e0 100644
+--- a/src/readelf.c
++++ b/src/readelf.c
+@@ -12153,7 +12153,7 @@ handle_core_note (Ebl *ebl, const GElf_Nhdr *nhdr,
+ size_t nitems;
+ const Ebl_Core_Item *items;
+
+- if (! ebl_core_note (ebl, nhdr, name,
++ if (! ebl_core_note (ebl, nhdr, name, desc,
+ ®s_offset, &nregloc, ®locs, &nitems, &items))
+ return;
+
+--
+2.7.4
+
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread* [thud 04/12] unzip: fix CVE-2019-13232
2019-10-10 15:49 [thud 00/12] Thud pull request Armin Kuster
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2019-10-10 15:49 ` [thud 03/12] elfutils: CVE fix for elfutils Armin Kuster
@ 2019-10-10 15:49 ` Armin Kuster
2019-10-10 15:49 ` [thud 05/12] json-c: Don't --enable-rdrand Armin Kuster
` (7 subsequent siblings)
11 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Armin Kuster @ 2019-10-10 15:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: openembedded-core
From: Dan Tran <dantran@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Tran <dantran@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>
---
.../unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p1.patch | 33 ++
.../unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p2.patch | 356 +++++++++++++++++++++
.../unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p3.patch | 121 +++++++
meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip_6.0.bb | 3 +
4 files changed, 513 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p1.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p2.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p3.patch
diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p1.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p1.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d485a1b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p1.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From 080d52c3c9416c731f637f9c6e003961ef43f079 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mark Adler <madler@alumni.caltech.edu>
+Date: Mon, 27 May 2019 08:20:32 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 1/3] Fix bug in undefer_input() that misplaced the input
+ state.
+
+CVE: CVE-2019-13232
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+[https://github.com/madler/unzip/commit/41beb477c5744bc396fa1162ee0c14218ec12213]
+
+Signed-off-by: Dan Tran <dantran@microsoft.com>
+---
+ fileio.c | 4 +++-
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/fileio.c b/fileio.c
+index 7605a29..14460f3 100644
+--- a/fileio.c
++++ b/fileio.c
+@@ -532,8 +532,10 @@ void undefer_input(__G)
+ * This condition was checked when G.incnt_leftover was set > 0 in
+ * defer_leftover_input(), and it is NOT allowed to touch G.csize
+ * before calling undefer_input() when (G.incnt_leftover > 0)
+- * (single exception: see read_byte()'s "G.csize <= 0" handling) !!
++ * (single exception: see readbyte()'s "G.csize <= 0" handling) !!
+ */
++ if (G.csize < 0L)
++ G.csize = 0L;
+ G.incnt = G.incnt_leftover + (int)G.csize;
+ G.inptr = G.inptr_leftover - (int)G.csize;
+ G.incnt_leftover = 0;
+--
+2.22.0.vfs.1.1.57.gbaf16c8
diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p2.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p2.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..41037a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p2.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,356 @@
+From 1aae47fa8935654a84403768f32c03ecbb1be470 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mark Adler <madler@alumni.caltech.edu>
+Date: Tue, 11 Jun 2019 22:01:18 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 2/3] Detect and reject a zip bomb using overlapped entries.
+
+This detects an invalid zip file that has at least one entry that
+overlaps with another entry or with the central directory to the
+end of the file. A Fifield zip bomb uses overlapped local entries
+to vastly increase the potential inflation ratio. Such an invalid
+zip file is rejected.
+
+See https://www.bamsoftware.com/hacks/zipbomb/ for David Fifield's
+analysis, construction, and examples of such zip bombs.
+
+The detection maintains a list of covered spans of the zip files
+so far, where the central directory to the end of the file and any
+bytes preceding the first entry at zip file offset zero are
+considered covered initially. Then as each entry is decompressed
+or tested, it is considered covered. When a new entry is about to
+be processed, its initial offset is checked to see if it is
+contained by a covered span. If so, the zip file is rejected as
+invalid.
+
+This commit depends on a preceding commit: "Fix bug in
+undefer_input() that misplaced the input state."
+
+CVE: CVE-2019-13232
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+[https://github.com/madler/unzip/commit/47b3ceae397d21bf822bc2ac73052a4b1daf8e1c]
+
+Signed-off-by: Dan Tran <dantran@microsoft.com>
+---
+ extract.c | 190 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ globals.c | 1 +
+ globals.h | 3 +
+ process.c | 10 +++
+ unzip.h | 1 +
+ 5 files changed, 204 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/extract.c b/extract.c
+index 24db2a8..2bb72ba 100644
+--- a/extract.c
++++ b/extract.c
+@@ -321,6 +321,125 @@ static ZCONST char Far UnsupportedExtraField[] =
+ "\nerror: unsupported extra-field compression type (%u)--skipping\n";
+ static ZCONST char Far BadExtraFieldCRC[] =
+ "error [%s]: bad extra-field CRC %08lx (should be %08lx)\n";
++static ZCONST char Far NotEnoughMemCover[] =
++ "error: not enough memory for bomb detection\n";
++static ZCONST char Far OverlappedComponents[] =
++ "error: invalid zip file with overlapped components (possible zip bomb)\n";
++
++
++
++
++
++/* A growable list of spans. */
++typedef zoff_t bound_t;
++typedef struct {
++ bound_t beg; /* start of the span */
++ bound_t end; /* one past the end of the span */
++} span_t;
++typedef struct {
++ span_t *span; /* allocated, distinct, and sorted list of spans */
++ size_t num; /* number of spans in the list */
++ size_t max; /* allocated number of spans (num <= max) */
++} cover_t;
++
++/*
++ * Return the index of the first span in cover whose beg is greater than val.
++ * If there is no such span, then cover->num is returned.
++ */
++static size_t cover_find(cover, val)
++ cover_t *cover;
++ bound_t val;
++{
++ size_t lo = 0, hi = cover->num;
++ while (lo < hi) {
++ size_t mid = (lo + hi) >> 1;
++ if (val < cover->span[mid].beg)
++ hi = mid;
++ else
++ lo = mid + 1;
++ }
++ return hi;
++}
++
++/* Return true if val lies within any one of the spans in cover. */
++static int cover_within(cover, val)
++ cover_t *cover;
++ bound_t val;
++{
++ size_t pos = cover_find(cover, val);
++ return pos > 0 && val < cover->span[pos - 1].end;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Add a new span to the list, but only if the new span does not overlap any
++ * spans already in the list. The new span covers the values beg..end-1. beg
++ * must be less than end.
++ *
++ * Keep the list sorted and merge adjacent spans. Grow the allocated space for
++ * the list as needed. On success, 0 is returned. If the new span overlaps any
++ * existing spans, then 1 is returned and the new span is not added to the
++ * list. If the new span is invalid because beg is greater than or equal to
++ * end, then -1 is returned. If the list needs to be grown but the memory
++ * allocation fails, then -2 is returned.
++ */
++static int cover_add(cover, beg, end)
++ cover_t *cover;
++ bound_t beg;
++ bound_t end;
++{
++ size_t pos;
++ int prec, foll;
++
++ if (beg >= end)
++ /* The new span is invalid. */
++ return -1;
++
++ /* Find where the new span should go, and make sure that it does not
++ overlap with any existing spans. */
++ pos = cover_find(cover, beg);
++ if ((pos > 0 && beg < cover->span[pos - 1].end) ||
++ (pos < cover->num && end > cover->span[pos].beg))
++ return 1;
++
++ /* Check for adjacencies. */
++ prec = pos > 0 && beg == cover->span[pos - 1].end;
++ foll = pos < cover->num && end == cover->span[pos].beg;
++ if (prec && foll) {
++ /* The new span connects the preceding and following spans. Merge the
++ following span into the preceding span, and delete the following
++ span. */
++ cover->span[pos - 1].end = cover->span[pos].end;
++ cover->num--;
++ memmove(cover->span + pos, cover->span + pos + 1,
++ (cover->num - pos) * sizeof(span_t));
++ }
++ else if (prec)
++ /* The new span is adjacent only to the preceding span. Extend the end
++ of the preceding span. */
++ cover->span[pos - 1].end = end;
++ else if (foll)
++ /* The new span is adjacent only to the following span. Extend the
++ beginning of the following span. */
++ cover->span[pos].beg = beg;
++ else {
++ /* The new span has gaps between both the preceding and the following
++ spans. Assure that there is room and insert the span. */
++ if (cover->num == cover->max) {
++ size_t max = cover->max == 0 ? 16 : cover->max << 1;
++ span_t *span = realloc(cover->span, max * sizeof(span_t));
++ if (span == NULL)
++ return -2;
++ cover->span = span;
++ cover->max = max;
++ }
++ memmove(cover->span + pos + 1, cover->span + pos,
++ (cover->num - pos) * sizeof(span_t));
++ cover->num++;
++ cover->span[pos].beg = beg;
++ cover->span[pos].end = end;
++ }
++ return 0;
++}
+
+
+
+@@ -376,6 +495,29 @@ int extract_or_test_files(__G) /* return PK-type error code */
+ }
+ #endif /* !SFX || SFX_EXDIR */
+
++ /* One more: initialize cover structure for bomb detection. Start with a
++ span that covers the central directory though the end of the file. */
++ if (G.cover == NULL) {
++ G.cover = malloc(sizeof(cover_t));
++ if (G.cover == NULL) {
++ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
++ LoadFarString(NotEnoughMemCover)));
++ return PK_MEM;
++ }
++ ((cover_t *)G.cover)->span = NULL;
++ ((cover_t *)G.cover)->max = 0;
++ }
++ ((cover_t *)G.cover)->num = 0;
++ if ((G.extra_bytes != 0 &&
++ cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, 0, G.extra_bytes) != 0) ||
++ cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover,
++ G.extra_bytes + G.ecrec.offset_start_central_directory,
++ G.ziplen) != 0) {
++ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
++ LoadFarString(NotEnoughMemCover)));
++ return PK_MEM;
++ }
++
+ /*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ The basic idea of this function is as follows. Since the central di-
+ rectory lies at the end of the zipfile and the member files lie at the
+@@ -593,7 +735,8 @@ int extract_or_test_files(__G) /* return PK-type error code */
+ if (error > error_in_archive)
+ error_in_archive = error;
+ /* ...and keep going (unless disk full or user break) */
+- if (G.disk_full > 1 || error_in_archive == IZ_CTRLC) {
++ if (G.disk_full > 1 || error_in_archive == IZ_CTRLC ||
++ error == PK_BOMB) {
+ /* clear reached_end to signal premature stop ... */
+ reached_end = FALSE;
+ /* ... and cancel scanning the central directory */
+@@ -1062,6 +1205,11 @@ static int extract_or_test_entrylist(__G__ numchunk,
+
+ /* seek_zipf(__G__ pInfo->offset); */
+ request = G.pInfo->offset + G.extra_bytes;
++ if (cover_within((cover_t *)G.cover, request)) {
++ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
++ LoadFarString(OverlappedComponents)));
++ return PK_BOMB;
++ }
+ inbuf_offset = request % INBUFSIZ;
+ bufstart = request - inbuf_offset;
+
+@@ -1593,6 +1741,18 @@ reprompt:
+ return IZ_CTRLC; /* cancel operation by user request */
+ }
+ #endif
++ error = cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, request,
++ G.cur_zipfile_bufstart + (G.inptr - G.inbuf));
++ if (error < 0) {
++ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
++ LoadFarString(NotEnoughMemCover)));
++ return PK_MEM;
++ }
++ if (error != 0) {
++ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
++ LoadFarString(OverlappedComponents)));
++ return PK_BOMB;
++ }
+ #ifdef MACOS /* MacOS is no preemptive OS, thus call event-handling by hand */
+ UserStop();
+ #endif
+@@ -1994,6 +2154,34 @@ static int extract_or_test_member(__G) /* return PK-type error code */
+ }
+
+ undefer_input(__G);
++
++ if ((G.lrec.general_purpose_bit_flag & 8) != 0) {
++ /* skip over data descriptor (harder than it sounds, due to signature
++ * ambiguity)
++ */
++# define SIG 0x08074b50
++# define LOW 0xffffffff
++ uch buf[12];
++ unsigned shy = 12 - readbuf((char *)buf, 12);
++ ulg crc = shy ? 0 : makelong(buf);
++ ulg clen = shy ? 0 : makelong(buf + 4);
++ ulg ulen = shy ? 0 : makelong(buf + 8); /* or high clen if ZIP64 */
++ if (crc == SIG && /* if not SIG, no signature */
++ (G.lrec.crc32 != SIG || /* if not SIG, have signature */
++ (clen == SIG && /* if not SIG, no signature */
++ ((G.lrec.csize & LOW) != SIG || /* if not SIG, have signature */
++ (ulen == SIG && /* if not SIG, no signature */
++ (G.zip64 ? G.lrec.csize >> 32 : G.lrec.ucsize) != SIG
++ /* if not SIG, have signature */
++ )))))
++ /* skip four more bytes to account for signature */
++ shy += 4 - readbuf((char *)buf, 4);
++ if (G.zip64)
++ shy += 8 - readbuf((char *)buf, 8); /* skip eight more for ZIP64 */
++ if (shy)
++ error = PK_ERR;
++ }
++
+ return error;
+
+ } /* end function extract_or_test_member() */
+diff --git a/globals.c b/globals.c
+index fa8cca5..1e0f608 100644
+--- a/globals.c
++++ b/globals.c
+@@ -181,6 +181,7 @@ Uz_Globs *globalsCtor()
+ # if (!defined(NO_TIMESTAMPS))
+ uO.D_flag=1; /* default to '-D', no restoration of dir timestamps */
+ # endif
++ G.cover = NULL; /* not allocated yet */
+ #endif
+
+ uO.lflag=(-1);
+diff --git a/globals.h b/globals.h
+index 11b7215..2bdcdeb 100644
+--- a/globals.h
++++ b/globals.h
+@@ -260,12 +260,15 @@ typedef struct Globals {
+ ecdir_rec ecrec; /* used in unzip.c, extract.c */
+ z_stat statbuf; /* used by main, mapname, check_for_newer */
+
++ int zip64; /* true if Zip64 info in extra field */
++
+ int mem_mode;
+ uch *outbufptr; /* extract.c static */
+ ulg outsize; /* extract.c static */
+ int reported_backslash; /* extract.c static */
+ int disk_full;
+ int newfile;
++ void **cover; /* used in extract.c for bomb detection */
+
+ int didCRlast; /* fileio static */
+ ulg numlines; /* fileio static: number of lines printed */
+diff --git a/process.c b/process.c
+index a3c1a4d..208619c 100644
+--- a/process.c
++++ b/process.c
+@@ -637,6 +637,13 @@ void free_G_buffers(__G) /* releases all memory allocated in global vars */
+ }
+ #endif
+
++ /* Free the cover span list and the cover structure. */
++ if (G.cover != NULL) {
++ free(*(G.cover));
++ free(G.cover);
++ G.cover = NULL;
++ }
++
+ } /* end function free_G_buffers() */
+
+
+@@ -1905,6 +1912,7 @@ int getZip64Data(__G__ ef_buf, ef_len)
+
+ #define Z64FLGS 0xffff
+ #define Z64FLGL 0xffffffff
++ G.zip64 = FALSE;
+
+ if (ef_len == 0 || ef_buf == NULL)
+ return PK_COOL;
+@@ -1964,6 +1972,8 @@ int getZip64Data(__G__ ef_buf, ef_len)
+ G.crec.disk_number_start = (zuvl_t)makelong(offset + ef_buf);
+ offset += 4;
+ }
++
++ G.zip64 = TRUE;
+ #if 0
+ break; /* Expect only one EF_PKSZ64 block. */
+ #endif /* 0 */
+diff --git a/unzip.h b/unzip.h
+index 5b2a326..ed24a5b 100644
+--- a/unzip.h
++++ b/unzip.h
+@@ -645,6 +645,7 @@ typedef struct _Uzp_cdir_Rec {
+ #define PK_NOZIP 9 /* zipfile not found */
+ #define PK_PARAM 10 /* bad or illegal parameters specified */
+ #define PK_FIND 11 /* no files found */
++#define PK_BOMB 12 /* likely zip bomb */
+ #define PK_DISK 50 /* disk full */
+ #define PK_EOF 51 /* unexpected EOF */
+
+--
+2.22.0.vfs.1.1.57.gbaf16c8
diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p3.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p3.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fd26fdd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p3.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+From be88aa4811af47ca06d8b7dcda294f899eba70ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mark Adler <madler@alumni.caltech.edu>
+Date: Thu, 25 Jul 2019 20:43:17 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 3/3] Do not raise a zip bomb alert for a misplaced central
+ directory.
+
+There is a zip-like file in the Firefox distribution, omni.ja,
+which is a zip container with the central directory placed at the
+start of the file instead of after the local entries as required
+by the zip standard. This commit marks the actual location of the
+central directory, as well as the end of central directory records,
+as disallowed locations. This now permits such containers to not
+raise a zip bomb alert, where in fact there are no overlaps.
+
+CVE: CVE-2019-13232
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+[https://github.com/madler/unzip/commit/6d351831be705cc26d897db44f878a978f4138fc]
+
+Signed-off-by: Dan Tran <dantran@microsoft.com>
+---
+ extract.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++------
+ process.c | 6 ++++++
+ unzpriv.h | 10 ++++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/extract.c b/extract.c
+index 2bb72ba..a9dcca8 100644
+--- a/extract.c
++++ b/extract.c
+@@ -495,8 +495,11 @@ int extract_or_test_files(__G) /* return PK-type error code */
+ }
+ #endif /* !SFX || SFX_EXDIR */
+
+- /* One more: initialize cover structure for bomb detection. Start with a
+- span that covers the central directory though the end of the file. */
++ /* One more: initialize cover structure for bomb detection. Start with
++ spans that cover any extra bytes at the start, the central directory,
++ the end of central directory record (including the Zip64 end of central
++ directory locator, if present), and the Zip64 end of central directory
++ record, if present. */
+ if (G.cover == NULL) {
+ G.cover = malloc(sizeof(cover_t));
+ if (G.cover == NULL) {
+@@ -508,15 +511,25 @@ int extract_or_test_files(__G) /* return PK-type error code */
+ ((cover_t *)G.cover)->max = 0;
+ }
+ ((cover_t *)G.cover)->num = 0;
+- if ((G.extra_bytes != 0 &&
+- cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, 0, G.extra_bytes) != 0) ||
+- cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover,
++ if (cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover,
+ G.extra_bytes + G.ecrec.offset_start_central_directory,
+- G.ziplen) != 0) {
++ G.extra_bytes + G.ecrec.offset_start_central_directory +
++ G.ecrec.size_central_directory) != 0) {
+ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
+ LoadFarString(NotEnoughMemCover)));
+ return PK_MEM;
+ }
++ if ((G.extra_bytes != 0 &&
++ cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, 0, G.extra_bytes) != 0) ||
++ (G.ecrec.have_ecr64 &&
++ cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, G.ecrec.ec64_start,
++ G.ecrec.ec64_end) != 0) ||
++ cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, G.ecrec.ec_start,
++ G.ecrec.ec_end) != 0) {
++ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
++ LoadFarString(OverlappedComponents)));
++ return PK_BOMB;
++ }
+
+ /*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ The basic idea of this function is as follows. Since the central di-
+diff --git a/process.c b/process.c
+index 208619c..5f8f6c6 100644
+--- a/process.c
++++ b/process.c
+@@ -1408,6 +1408,10 @@ static int find_ecrec64(__G__ searchlen) /* return PK-class error */
+
+ /* Now, we are (almost) sure that we have a Zip64 archive. */
+ G.ecrec.have_ecr64 = 1;
++ G.ecrec.ec_start -= ECLOC64_SIZE+4;
++ G.ecrec.ec64_start = ecrec64_start_offset;
++ G.ecrec.ec64_end = ecrec64_start_offset +
++ 12 + makeint64(&byterec[ECREC64_LENGTH]);
+
+ /* Update the "end-of-central-dir offset" for later checks. */
+ G.real_ecrec_offset = ecrec64_start_offset;
+@@ -1542,6 +1546,8 @@ static int find_ecrec(__G__ searchlen) /* return PK-class error */
+ makelong(&byterec[OFFSET_START_CENTRAL_DIRECTORY]);
+ G.ecrec.zipfile_comment_length =
+ makeword(&byterec[ZIPFILE_COMMENT_LENGTH]);
++ G.ecrec.ec_start = G.real_ecrec_offset;
++ G.ecrec.ec_end = G.ecrec.ec_start + 22 + G.ecrec.zipfile_comment_length;
+
+ /* Now, we have to read the archive comment, BEFORE the file pointer
+ is moved away backwards to seek for a Zip64 ECLOC64 structure.
+diff --git a/unzpriv.h b/unzpriv.h
+index c8d3eab..5e177c7 100644
+--- a/unzpriv.h
++++ b/unzpriv.h
+@@ -2185,6 +2185,16 @@ typedef struct VMStimbuf {
+ int have_ecr64; /* valid Zip64 ecdir-record exists */
+ int is_zip64_archive; /* Zip64 ecdir-record is mandatory */
+ ush zipfile_comment_length;
++ zusz_t ec_start, ec_end; /* offsets of start and end of the
++ end of central directory record,
++ including if present the Zip64
++ end of central directory locator,
++ which immediately precedes the
++ end of central directory record */
++ zusz_t ec64_start, ec64_end; /* if have_ecr64 is true, then these
++ are the offsets of the start and
++ end of the Zip64 end of central
++ directory record */
+ } ecdir_rec;
+
+
+--
+2.22.0.vfs.1.1.57.gbaf16c8
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip_6.0.bb b/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip_6.0.bb
index daba722..464d73d 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip_6.0.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip_6.0.bb
@@ -22,6 +22,9 @@ SRC_URI = "${SOURCEFORGE_MIRROR}/infozip/UnZip%206.x%20%28latest%29/UnZip%206.0/
file://symlink.patch \
file://0001-unzip-fix-CVE-2018-1000035.patch \
file://CVE-2018-18384.patch \
+ file://CVE-2019-13232_p1.patch \
+ file://CVE-2019-13232_p2.patch \
+ file://CVE-2019-13232_p3.patch \
"
UPSTREAM_VERSION_UNKNOWN = "1"
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread* [thud 05/12] json-c: Don't --enable-rdrand
2019-10-10 15:49 [thud 00/12] Thud pull request Armin Kuster
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2019-10-10 15:49 ` [thud 04/12] unzip: fix CVE-2019-13232 Armin Kuster
@ 2019-10-10 15:49 ` Armin Kuster
2019-10-10 15:49 ` [thud 06/12] perl: Fix CVE-2018-18311 to 18314 Armin Kuster
` (6 subsequent siblings)
11 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Armin Kuster @ 2019-10-10 15:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: openembedded-core
From: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
In recent years AMD CPUs have had various problems with RDRAND
giving either non-random data or no result at all, which is
problematic if either build or target machine has a CPU with
this problem.
The fallback is /dev/urandom, and I'd trust the kernel here.
--enable-rdrand was added in an upgrade to a new upstream
version without mentioning any reason.
[YOCTO #13534]
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>
---
meta/recipes-devtools/json-c/json-c_0.13.1.bb | 2 --
1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/json-c/json-c_0.13.1.bb b/meta/recipes-devtools/json-c/json-c_0.13.1.bb
index 5b10e68..e6a3899 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/json-c/json-c_0.13.1.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/json-c/json-c_0.13.1.bb
@@ -20,8 +20,6 @@ RPROVIDES_${PN} = "libjson"
inherit autotools
-EXTRA_OECONF = "--enable-rdrand"
-
do_configure_prepend() {
# Clean up autoconf cruft that should not be in the tarball
rm -f ${S}/config.status
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread* [thud 06/12] perl: Fix CVE-2018-18311 to 18314
2019-10-10 15:49 [thud 00/12] Thud pull request Armin Kuster
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2019-10-10 15:49 ` [thud 05/12] json-c: Don't --enable-rdrand Armin Kuster
@ 2019-10-10 15:49 ` Armin Kuster
2019-10-10 15:49 ` [thud 07/12] sqlite3: Security fix for CVE-2019-8457 Armin Kuster
` (5 subsequent siblings)
11 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Armin Kuster @ 2019-10-10 15:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: openembedded-core
From: Dan Tran <dantran@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Tran <dantran@microsoft.com>
[Perl before 5.26.3 and 5.28.x before 5.28.1]
Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>
---
.../perl/perl/CVE-2018-18311.patch | 183 ++++++++++++++
.../perl/perl/CVE-2018-18312.patch | Bin 0 -> 2125 bytes
.../perl/perl/CVE-2018-18313.patch | 60 +++++
.../perl/perl/CVE-2018-18314.patch | 271 +++++++++++++++++++++
meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl_5.24.4.bb | 4 +
5 files changed, 518 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl/CVE-2018-18311.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl/CVE-2018-18312.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl/CVE-2018-18313.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl/CVE-2018-18314.patch
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl/CVE-2018-18311.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl/CVE-2018-18311.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ba8cf15
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl/CVE-2018-18311.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
+From 4706b65d7c835c0bb219db160fbcdbcd98efab2d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: David Mitchell <davem@iabyn.com>
+Date: Fri, 29 Jun 2018 13:37:03 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Perl_my_setenv(); handle integer wrap
+
+RT #133204
+
+Wean this function off int/I32 and onto UV/Size_t.
+Also, replace all malloc-ish calls with a wrapper that does
+overflow checks,
+
+In particular, it was doing (nlen + vlen + 2) which could wrap when
+the combined length of the environment variable name and value
+exceeded around 0x7fffffff.
+
+The wrapper check function is probably overkill, but belt and braces...
+
+NB this function has several variant parts, #ifdef'ed by platform
+type; I have blindly changed the parts that aren't compiled under linux.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 34716e2a6ee2af96078d62b065b7785c001194be)
+
+CVE: CVE-2018-18311
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+[https://perl5.git.perl.org/perl.git/commit/5737d31aac51360cc1eb412ef059e36147c9d6d6]
+
+Signed-off-by: Dan Tran <dantran@microsoft.com>
+---
+ util.c | 76 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
+ 1 file changed, 53 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/util.c b/util.c
+index 7c3d271f51..27f4eddf3b 100644
+--- a/util.c
++++ b/util.c
+@@ -2160,8 +2160,40 @@ Perl_new_warnings_bitfield(pTHX_ STRLEN *buffer, const char *const bits,
+ *(s+(nlen+1+vlen)) = '\0'
+
+ #ifdef USE_ENVIRON_ARRAY
+- /* VMS' my_setenv() is in vms.c */
++
++/* small wrapper for use by Perl_my_setenv that mallocs, or reallocs if
++ * 'current' is non-null, with up to three sizes that are added together.
++ * It handles integer overflow.
++ */
++static char *
++S_env_alloc(void *current, Size_t l1, Size_t l2, Size_t l3, Size_t size)
++{
++ void *p;
++ Size_t sl, l = l1 + l2;
++
++ if (l < l2)
++ goto panic;
++ l += l3;
++ if (l < l3)
++ goto panic;
++ sl = l * size;
++ if (sl < l)
++ goto panic;
++
++ p = current
++ ? safesysrealloc(current, sl)
++ : safesysmalloc(sl);
++ if (p)
++ return (char*)p;
++
++ panic:
++ croak_memory_wrap();
++}
++
++
++/* VMS' my_setenv() is in vms.c */
+ #if !defined(WIN32) && !defined(NETWARE)
++
+ void
+ Perl_my_setenv(pTHX_ const char *nam, const char *val)
+ {
+@@ -2177,28 +2209,27 @@ Perl_my_setenv(pTHX_ const char *nam, const char *val)
+ #ifndef PERL_USE_SAFE_PUTENV
+ if (!PL_use_safe_putenv) {
+ /* most putenv()s leak, so we manipulate environ directly */
+- I32 i;
+- const I32 len = strlen(nam);
+- int nlen, vlen;
++ UV i;
++ Size_t vlen, nlen = strlen(nam);
+
+ /* where does it go? */
+ for (i = 0; environ[i]; i++) {
+- if (strnEQ(environ[i],nam,len) && environ[i][len] == '=')
++ if (strnEQ(environ[i], nam, nlen) && environ[i][nlen] == '=')
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (environ == PL_origenviron) { /* need we copy environment? */
+- I32 j;
+- I32 max;
++ UV j, max;
+ char **tmpenv;
+
+ max = i;
+ while (environ[max])
+ max++;
+- tmpenv = (char**)safesysmalloc((max+2) * sizeof(char*));
++ /* XXX shouldn't that be max+1 rather than max+2 ??? - DAPM */
++ tmpenv = (char**)S_env_alloc(NULL, max, 2, 0, sizeof(char*));
+ for (j=0; j<max; j++) { /* copy environment */
+- const int len = strlen(environ[j]);
+- tmpenv[j] = (char*)safesysmalloc((len+1)*sizeof(char));
++ const Size_t len = strlen(environ[j]);
++ tmpenv[j] = S_env_alloc(NULL, len, 1, 0, 1);
+ Copy(environ[j], tmpenv[j], len+1, char);
+ }
+ tmpenv[max] = NULL;
+@@ -2217,15 +2248,15 @@ Perl_my_setenv(pTHX_ const char *nam, const char *val)
+ #endif
+ }
+ if (!environ[i]) { /* does not exist yet */
+- environ = (char**)safesysrealloc(environ, (i+2) * sizeof(char*));
++ environ = (char**)S_env_alloc(environ, i, 2, 0, sizeof(char*));
+ environ[i+1] = NULL; /* make sure it's null terminated */
+ }
+ else
+ safesysfree(environ[i]);
+- nlen = strlen(nam);
++
+ vlen = strlen(val);
+
+- environ[i] = (char*)safesysmalloc((nlen+vlen+2) * sizeof(char));
++ environ[i] = S_env_alloc(NULL, nlen, vlen, 2, 1);
+ /* all that work just for this */
+ my_setenv_format(environ[i], nam, nlen, val, vlen);
+ } else {
+@@ -2250,22 +2281,21 @@ Perl_my_setenv(pTHX_ const char *nam, const char *val)
+ if (environ) /* old glibc can crash with null environ */
+ (void)unsetenv(nam);
+ } else {
+- const int nlen = strlen(nam);
+- const int vlen = strlen(val);
+- char * const new_env =
+- (char*)safesysmalloc((nlen + vlen + 2) * sizeof(char));
++ const Size_t nlen = strlen(nam);
++ const Size_t vlen = strlen(val);
++ char * const new_env = S_env_alloc(NULL, nlen, vlen, 2, 1);
+ my_setenv_format(new_env, nam, nlen, val, vlen);
+ (void)putenv(new_env);
+ }
+ # else /* ! HAS_UNSETENV */
+ char *new_env;
+- const int nlen = strlen(nam);
+- int vlen;
++ const Size_t nlen = strlen(nam);
++ Size_t vlen;
+ if (!val) {
+ val = "";
+ }
+ vlen = strlen(val);
+- new_env = (char*)safesysmalloc((nlen + vlen + 2) * sizeof(char));
++ new_env = S_env_alloc(NULL, nlen, vlen, 2, 1);
+ /* all that work just for this */
+ my_setenv_format(new_env, nam, nlen, val, vlen);
+ (void)putenv(new_env);
+@@ -2288,14 +2318,14 @@ Perl_my_setenv(pTHX_ const char *nam, const char *val)
+ {
+ dVAR;
+ char *envstr;
+- const int nlen = strlen(nam);
+- int vlen;
++ const Size_t nlen = strlen(nam);
++ Size_t vlen;
+
+ if (!val) {
+ val = "";
+ }
+ vlen = strlen(val);
+- Newx(envstr, nlen+vlen+2, char);
++ envstr = S_env_alloc(NULL, nlen, vlen, 2, 1);
+ my_setenv_format(envstr, nam, nlen, val, vlen);
+ (void)PerlEnv_putenv(envstr);
+ Safefree(envstr);
+--
+2.22.0.vfs.1.1.57.gbaf16c8
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl/CVE-2018-18312.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl/CVE-2018-18312.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1c3426542d7907ed0e5ab34621589bc3bbc5612d
GIT binary patch
literal 2125
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zzMAx*PoYR)vD*C>djW4{TZ12mg8G4o<CuHC$k>WUl%#&RBHo1i0SWmko%lZd(l&4=
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literal 0
HcmV?d00001
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl/CVE-2018-18313.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl/CVE-2018-18313.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..540aa07
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl/CVE-2018-18313.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+From 3458f6115ca8e8d11779948c12b7e1cc5803358c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Karl Williamson <khw@cpan.org>
+Date: Sat, 25 Mar 2017 15:00:22 -0600
+Subject: [PATCH 2/3] regcomp.c: Convert some strchr to memchr
+
+This allows things to work properly in the face of embedded NULs.
+See the branch merge message for more information.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 43b2f4ef399e2fd7240b4eeb0658686ad95f8e62)
+
+CVE: CVE-2018-18313
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+[https://perl5.git.perl.org/perl.git/commit/c1c28ce6ba90ee05aa96b11ad551a6063680f3b9]
+
+Signed-off-by: Dan Tran <dantran@microsoft.com>
+---
+ regcomp.c | 13 ++++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/regcomp.c b/regcomp.c
+index 00d26d9290..2688979882 100644
+--- a/regcomp.c
++++ b/regcomp.c
+@@ -11783,8 +11783,9 @@ S_grok_bslash_N(pTHX_ RExC_state_t *pRExC_state,
+
+ RExC_parse++; /* Skip past the '{' */
+
+- if (! (endbrace = strchr(RExC_parse, '}')) /* no trailing brace */
+- || ! (endbrace == RExC_parse /* nothing between the {} */
++ endbrace = (char *) memchr(RExC_parse, '}', RExC_end - RExC_parse);
++ if ((! endbrace) /* no trailing brace */
++ || ! (endbrace == RExC_parse /* nothing between the {} */
+ || (endbrace - RExC_parse >= 2 /* U+ (bad hex is checked... */
+ && strnEQ(RExC_parse, "U+", 2)))) /* ... below for a better
+ error msg) */
+@@ -12483,9 +12484,11 @@ S_regatom(pTHX_ RExC_state_t *pRExC_state, I32 *flagp, U32 depth)
+ else {
+ STRLEN length;
+ char name = *RExC_parse;
+- char * endbrace;
++ char * endbrace = NULL;
+ RExC_parse += 2;
+- endbrace = strchr(RExC_parse, '}');
++ if (RExC_parse < RExC_end) {
++ endbrace = (char *) memchr(RExC_parse, '}', RExC_end - RExC_parse);
++ }
+
+ if (! endbrace) {
+ vFAIL2("Missing right brace on \\%c{}", name);
+@@ -15939,7 +15942,7 @@ S_regclass(pTHX_ RExC_state_t *pRExC_state, I32 *flagp, U32 depth,
+ vFAIL2("Empty \\%c", (U8)value);
+ if (*RExC_parse == '{') {
+ const U8 c = (U8)value;
+- e = strchr(RExC_parse, '}');
++ e = (char *) memchr(RExC_parse, '}', RExC_end - RExC_parse);
+ if (!e) {
+ RExC_parse++;
+ vFAIL2("Missing right brace on \\%c{}", c);
+--
+2.22.0.vfs.1.1.57.gbaf16c8
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl/CVE-2018-18314.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl/CVE-2018-18314.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e84e7bc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl/CVE-2018-18314.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,271 @@
+From 6a2d07f43ae7cfcb2eb30cf39751f2f7fed7ecc1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Yves Orton <demerphq@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 26 Jun 2017 13:19:55 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 3/3] fix #131649 - extended charclass can trigger assert
+
+The extended charclass parser makes some assumptions during the
+first pass which are only true on well structured input, and it
+does not properly catch various errors. later on the code assumes
+that things the first pass will let through are valid, when in
+fact they should trigger errors.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 19a498a461d7c81ae3507c450953d1148efecf4f)
+
+CVE: CVE-2018-18314
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+[https://perl5.git.perl.org/perl.git/commit/dabe076af345ab4512ea80245b4e4cd7ec0996cd]
+
+Signed-off-by: Dan Tran <dantran@microsoft.com>
+---
+ pod/perldiag.pod | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ pod/perlrecharclass.pod | 4 ++--
+ regcomp.c | 23 +++++++++++++----------
+ t/lib/warnings/regcomp | 6 +++---
+ t/re/reg_mesg.t | 29 ++++++++++++++++-------------
+ t/re/regex_sets.t | 6 +++---
+ 6 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/pod/perldiag.pod b/pod/perldiag.pod
+index 737d3633f6..644b814008 100644
+--- a/pod/perldiag.pod
++++ b/pod/perldiag.pod
+@@ -5777,7 +5777,7 @@ yourself.
+ a perl4 interpreter, especially if the next 2 tokens are "use strict"
+ or "my $var" or "our $var".
+
+-=item Syntax error in (?[...]) in regex m/%s/
++=item Syntax error in (?[...]) in regex; marked by <-- HERE in m/%s/
+
+ (F) Perl could not figure out what you meant inside this construct; this
+ notifies you that it is giving up trying.
+@@ -6153,6 +6153,31 @@ for example,
+ (F) The unexec() routine failed for some reason. See your local FSF
+ representative, who probably put it there in the first place.
+
++=item Unexpected ']' with no following ')' in (?[... in regex; marked by <-- HERE in m/%s/
++
++(F) While parsing an extended character class a ']' character was encountered
++at a point in the definition where the only legal use of ']' is to close the
++character class definition as part of a '])', you may have forgotten the close
++paren, or otherwise confused the parser.
++
++=item Expecting close paren for nested extended charclass in regex; marked by <-- HERE in m/%s/
++
++(F) While parsing a nested extended character class like:
++
++ (?[ ... (?flags:(?[ ... ])) ... ])
++ ^
++
++we expected to see a close paren ')' (marked by ^) but did not.
++
++=item Expecting close paren for wrapper for nested extended charclass in regex; marked by <-- HERE in m/%s/
++
++(F) While parsing a nested extended character class like:
++
++ (?[ ... (?flags:(?[ ... ])) ... ])
++ ^
++
++we expected to see a close paren ')' (marked by ^) but did not.
++
+ =item Unexpected binary operator '%c' with no preceding operand in regex;
+ marked by S<<-- HERE> in m/%s/
+
+diff --git a/pod/perlrecharclass.pod b/pod/perlrecharclass.pod
+index 89f4a7ef3f..a557cc0384 100644
+--- a/pod/perlrecharclass.pod
++++ b/pod/perlrecharclass.pod
+@@ -1101,8 +1101,8 @@ hence both of the following work:
+ Any contained POSIX character classes, including things like C<\w> and C<\D>
+ respect the C<E<sol>a> (and C<E<sol>aa>) modifiers.
+
+-C<< (?[ ]) >> is a regex-compile-time construct. Any attempt to use
+-something which isn't knowable at the time the containing regular
++Note that C<< (?[ ]) >> is a regex-compile-time construct. Any attempt
++to use something which isn't knowable at the time the containing regular
+ expression is compiled is a fatal error. In practice, this means
+ just three limitations:
+
+diff --git a/regcomp.c b/regcomp.c
+index 2688979882..cb8409ed27 100644
+--- a/regcomp.c
++++ b/regcomp.c
+@@ -14609,8 +14609,9 @@ S_handle_regex_sets(pTHX_ RExC_state_t *pRExC_state, SV** return_invlist,
+ TRUE /* Force /x */ );
+
+ switch (*RExC_parse) {
+- case '?':
+- if (RExC_parse[1] == '[') depth++, RExC_parse++;
++ case '(':
++ if (RExC_parse[1] == '?' && RExC_parse[2] == '[')
++ depth++, RExC_parse+=2;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ default:
+ break;
+@@ -14667,9 +14668,9 @@ S_handle_regex_sets(pTHX_ RExC_state_t *pRExC_state, SV** return_invlist,
+ }
+
+ case ']':
+- if (depth--) break;
+- RExC_parse++;
+- if (*RExC_parse == ')') {
++ if (RExC_parse[1] == ')') {
++ RExC_parse++;
++ if (depth--) break;
+ node = reganode(pRExC_state, ANYOF, 0);
+ RExC_size += ANYOF_SKIP;
+ nextchar(pRExC_state);
+@@ -14681,20 +14682,20 @@ S_handle_regex_sets(pTHX_ RExC_state_t *pRExC_state, SV** return_invlist,
+
+ return node;
+ }
+- goto no_close;
++ RExC_parse++;
++ vFAIL("Unexpected ']' with no following ')' in (?[...");
+ }
+
+ RExC_parse += UTF ? UTF8SKIP(RExC_parse) : 1;
+ }
+
+- no_close:
+ /* We output the messages even if warnings are off, because we'll fail
+ * the very next thing, and these give a likely diagnosis for that */
+ if (posix_warnings && av_tindex_nomg(posix_warnings) >= 0) {
+ output_or_return_posix_warnings(pRExC_state, posix_warnings, NULL);
+ }
+
+- FAIL("Syntax error in (?[...])");
++ vFAIL("Syntax error in (?[...])");
+ }
+
+ /* Pass 2 only after this. */
+@@ -14868,12 +14869,14 @@ redo_curchar:
+ * inversion list, and RExC_parse points to the trailing
+ * ']'; the next character should be the ')' */
+ RExC_parse++;
+- assert(UCHARAT(RExC_parse) == ')');
++ if (UCHARAT(RExC_parse) != ')')
++ vFAIL("Expecting close paren for nested extended charclass");
+
+ /* Then the ')' matching the original '(' handled by this
+ * case: statement */
+ RExC_parse++;
+- assert(UCHARAT(RExC_parse) == ')');
++ if (UCHARAT(RExC_parse) != ')')
++ vFAIL("Expecting close paren for wrapper for nested extended charclass");
+
+ RExC_flags = save_flags;
+ goto handle_operand;
+diff --git a/t/lib/warnings/regcomp b/t/lib/warnings/regcomp
+index 08cb27b00f..367276d0fc 100644
+--- a/t/lib/warnings/regcomp
++++ b/t/lib/warnings/regcomp
+@@ -59,21 +59,21 @@ Unmatched [ in regex; marked by <-- HERE in m/abc[ <-- HERE fi[.00./ at - line
+ qr/(?[[[:word]]])/;
+ EXPECT
+ Assuming NOT a POSIX class since there is no terminating ':' in regex; marked by <-- HERE in m/(?[[[:word <-- HERE ]]])/ at - line 2.
+-syntax error in (?[...]) in regex m/(?[[[:word]]])/ at - line 2.
++Unexpected ']' with no following ')' in (?[... in regex; marked by <-- HERE in m/(?[[[:word]] <-- HERE ])/ at - line 2.
+ ########
+ # NAME qr/(?[ [[:digit: ])/
+ # OPTION fatal
+ qr/(?[[[:digit: ])/;
+ EXPECT
+ Assuming NOT a POSIX class since no blanks are allowed in one in regex; marked by <-- HERE in m/(?[[[:digit: ] <-- HERE )/ at - line 2.
+-syntax error in (?[...]) in regex m/(?[[[:digit: ])/ at - line 2.
++syntax error in (?[...]) in regex; marked by <-- HERE in m/(?[[[:digit: ]) <-- HERE / at - line 2.
+ ########
+ # NAME qr/(?[ [:digit: ])/
+ # OPTION fatal
+ qr/(?[[:digit: ])/
+ EXPECT
+ Assuming NOT a POSIX class since no blanks are allowed in one in regex; marked by <-- HERE in m/(?[[:digit: ] <-- HERE )/ at - line 2.
+-syntax error in (?[...]) in regex m/(?[[:digit: ])/ at - line 2.
++syntax error in (?[...]) in regex; marked by <-- HERE in m/(?[[:digit: ]) <-- HERE / at - line 2.
+ ########
+ # NAME [perl #126141]
+ # OPTION fatal
+diff --git a/t/re/reg_mesg.t b/t/re/reg_mesg.t
+index 658397ac27..08a3688e1d 100644
+--- a/t/re/reg_mesg.t
++++ b/t/re/reg_mesg.t
+@@ -202,8 +202,9 @@ my @death =
+ '/\b{gc}/' => "'gc' is an unknown bound type {#} m/\\b{gc{#}}/",
+ '/\B{gc}/' => "'gc' is an unknown bound type {#} m/\\B{gc{#}}/",
+
+- '/(?[[[::]]])/' => "Syntax error in (?[...]) in regex m/(?[[[::]]])/",
+- '/(?[[[:w:]]])/' => "Syntax error in (?[...]) in regex m/(?[[[:w:]]])/",
++
++ '/(?[[[::]]])/' => "Unexpected ']' with no following ')' in (?[... {#} m/(?[[[::]]{#}])/",
++ '/(?[[[:w:]]])/' => "Unexpected ']' with no following ')' in (?[... {#} m/(?[[[:w:]]{#}])/",
+ '/(?[[:w:]])/' => "",
+ '/[][[:alpha:]]' => "", # [perl #127581]
+ '/([.].*)[.]/' => "", # [perl #127582]
+@@ -227,11 +228,12 @@ my @death =
+ '/(?[ \p{foo} ])/' => 'Can\'t find Unicode property definition "foo" {#} m/(?[ \p{foo}{#} ])/',
+ '/(?[ \p{ foo = bar } ])/' => 'Can\'t find Unicode property definition "foo = bar" {#} m/(?[ \p{ foo = bar }{#} ])/',
+ '/(?[ \8 ])/' => 'Unrecognized escape \8 in character class {#} m/(?[ \8{#} ])/',
+- '/(?[ \t ]/' => 'Syntax error in (?[...]) in regex m/(?[ \t ]/',
+- '/(?[ [ \t ]/' => 'Syntax error in (?[...]) in regex m/(?[ [ \t ]/',
+- '/(?[ \t ] ]/' => 'Syntax error in (?[...]) in regex m/(?[ \t ] ]/',
+- '/(?[ [ ] ]/' => 'Syntax error in (?[...]) in regex m/(?[ [ ] ]/',
+- '/(?[ \t + \e # This was supposed to be a comment ])/' => 'Syntax error in (?[...]) in regex m/(?[ \t + \e # This was supposed to be a comment ])/',
++ '/(?[ \t ]/' => "Unexpected ']' with no following ')' in (?[... {#} m/(?[ \\t ]{#}/",
++ '/(?[ [ \t ]/' => "Syntax error in (?[...]) {#} m/(?[ [ \\t ]{#}/",
++ '/(?[ \t ] ]/' => "Unexpected ']' with no following ')' in (?[... {#} m/(?[ \\t ]{#} ]/",
++ '/(?[ [ ] ]/' => "Syntax error in (?[...]) {#} m/(?[ [ ] ]{#}/",
++ '/(?[ \t + \e # This was supposed to be a comment ])/' =>
++ "Syntax error in (?[...]) {#} m/(?[ \\t + \\e # This was supposed to be a comment ]){#}/",
+ '/(?[ ])/' => 'Incomplete expression within \'(?[ ])\' {#} m/(?[ {#}])/',
+ 'm/(?[[a-\d]])/' => 'False [] range "a-\d" {#} m/(?[[a-\d{#}]])/',
+ 'm/(?[[\w-x]])/' => 'False [] range "\w-" {#} m/(?[[\w-{#}x]])/',
+@@ -410,10 +412,10 @@ my @death_utf8 = mark_as_utf8(
+
+ '/ネ\p{}ネ/' => 'Empty \p{} {#} m/ネ\p{{#}}ネ/',
+
+- '/ネ(?[[[:ネ]]])ネ/' => "Syntax error in (?[...]) in regex m/ネ(?[[[:ネ]]])ネ/",
+- '/ネ(?[[[:ネ: ])ネ/' => "Syntax error in (?[...]) in regex m/ネ(?[[[:ネ: ])ネ/",
+- '/ネ(?[[[::]]])ネ/' => "Syntax error in (?[...]) in regex m/ネ(?[[[::]]])ネ/",
+- '/ネ(?[[[:ネ:]]])ネ/' => "Syntax error in (?[...]) in regex m/ネ(?[[[:ネ:]]])ネ/",
++ '/ネ(?[[[:ネ]]])ネ/' => "Unexpected ']' with no following ')' in (?[... {#} m/ネ(?[[[:ネ]]{#}])ネ/",
++ '/ネ(?[[[:ネ: ])ネ/' => "Syntax error in (?[...]) {#} m/ネ(?[[[:ネ: ])ネ{#}/",
++ '/ネ(?[[[::]]])ネ/' => "Unexpected ']' with no following ')' in (?[... {#} m/ネ(?[[[::]]{#}])ネ/",
++ '/ネ(?[[[:ネ:]]])ネ/' => "Unexpected ']' with no following ')' in (?[... {#} m/ネ(?[[[:ネ:]]{#}])ネ/",
+ '/ネ(?[[:ネ:]])ネ/' => "",
+ '/ネ(?[ネ])ネ/' => 'Unexpected character {#} m/ネ(?[ネ{#}])ネ/',
+ '/ネ(?[ + [ネ] ])/' => 'Unexpected binary operator \'+\' with no preceding operand {#} m/ネ(?[ +{#} [ネ] ])/',
+@@ -426,8 +428,9 @@ my @death_utf8 = mark_as_utf8(
+ '/(?[ \x{ネ} ])ネ/' => 'Non-hex character {#} m/(?[ \x{ネ{#}} ])ネ/',
+ '/(?[ \p{ネ} ])/' => 'Can\'t find Unicode property definition "ネ" {#} m/(?[ \p{ネ}{#} ])/',
+ '/(?[ \p{ ネ = bar } ])/' => 'Can\'t find Unicode property definition "ネ = bar" {#} m/(?[ \p{ ネ = bar }{#} ])/',
+- '/ネ(?[ \t ]/' => 'Syntax error in (?[...]) in regex m/ネ(?[ \t ]/',
+- '/(?[ \t + \e # ネ This was supposed to be a comment ])/' => 'Syntax error in (?[...]) in regex m/(?[ \t + \e # ネ This was supposed to be a comment ])/',
++ '/ネ(?[ \t ]/' => "Unexpected ']' with no following ')' in (?[... {#} m/ネ(?[ \\t ]{#}/",
++ '/(?[ \t + \e # ネ This was supposed to be a comment ])/' =>
++ "Syntax error in (?[...]) {#} m/(?[ \\t + \\e # ネ This was supposed to be a comment ]){#}/",
+ 'm/(*ネ)ネ/' => q<Unknown verb pattern 'ネ' {#} m/(*ネ){#}ネ/>,
+ '/\cネ/' => "Character following \"\\c\" must be printable ASCII",
+ '/\b{ネ}/' => "'ネ' is an unknown bound type {#} m/\\b{ネ{#}}/",
+diff --git a/t/re/regex_sets.t b/t/re/regex_sets.t
+index 92875677be..60a126ba3c 100644
+--- a/t/re/regex_sets.t
++++ b/t/re/regex_sets.t
+@@ -157,13 +157,13 @@ for my $char ("٠", "٥", "٩") {
+ eval { $_ = '/(?[(\c]) /'; qr/$_/ };
+ like($@, qr/^Syntax error/, '/(?[(\c]) / should not panic');
+ eval { $_ = '(?[\c#]' . "\n])"; qr/$_/ };
+- like($@, qr/^Syntax error/, '/(?[(\c]) / should not panic');
++ like($@, qr/^Unexpected/, '/(?[(\c]) / should not panic');
+ eval { $_ = '(?[(\c])'; qr/$_/ };
+ like($@, qr/^Syntax error/, '/(?[(\c])/ should be a syntax error');
+ eval { $_ = '(?[(\c]) ]\b'; qr/$_/ };
+- like($@, qr/^Syntax error/, '/(?[(\c]) ]\b/ should be a syntax error');
++ like($@, qr/^Unexpected/, '/(?[(\c]) ]\b/ should be a syntax error');
+ eval { $_ = '(?[\c[]](])'; qr/$_/ };
+- like($@, qr/^Syntax error/, '/(?[\c[]](])/ should be a syntax error');
++ like($@, qr/^Unexpected/, '/(?[\c[]](])/ should be a syntax error');
+ like("\c#", qr/(?[\c#])/, '\c# should match itself');
+ like("\c[", qr/(?[\c[])/, '\c[ should match itself');
+ like("\c\ ", qr/(?[\c\])/, '\c\ should match itself');
+--
+2.22.0.vfs.1.1.57.gbaf16c8
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl_5.24.4.bb b/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl_5.24.4.bb
index a644970..2f27749 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl_5.24.4.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl_5.24.4.bb
@@ -65,6 +65,10 @@ SRC_URI += " \
file://perl-5.26.1-guard_old_libcrypt_fix.patch \
file://CVE-2018-12015.patch \
file://0001-ExtUtils-MM_Unix.pm-fix-race-issues.patch \
+ file://CVE-2018-18311.patch \
+ file://CVE-2018-18312.patch \
+ file://CVE-2018-18313.patch \
+ file://CVE-2018-18314.patch \
"
# Fix test case issues
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread* [thud 07/12] sqlite3: Security fix for CVE-2019-8457
2019-10-10 15:49 [thud 00/12] Thud pull request Armin Kuster
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2019-10-10 15:49 ` [thud 06/12] perl: Fix CVE-2018-18311 to 18314 Armin Kuster
@ 2019-10-10 15:49 ` Armin Kuster
2019-10-10 15:49 ` [thud 08/12] wget: Security fixes CVE-2018-20483 Armin Kuster
` (4 subsequent siblings)
11 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Armin Kuster @ 2019-10-10 15:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: openembedded-core
From: Shubham Agrawal <shuagr@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Shubham Agrawal <shuagr@microsoft.com>
[Cleaned up patch]
Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>
---
.../sqlite/files/CVE-2019-8457.patch | 126 +++++++++++++++++++++
meta/recipes-support/sqlite/sqlite3_3.23.1.bb | 1 +
2 files changed, 127 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/sqlite/files/CVE-2019-8457.patch
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/sqlite/files/CVE-2019-8457.patch b/meta/recipes-support/sqlite/files/CVE-2019-8457.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5883774
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/sqlite/files/CVE-2019-8457.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+From fbf2392644f0ae4282fa4583c9bb67260995d983 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Shubham Agrawal <shuagr@microsoft.com>
+Date: Mon, 23 Sep 2019 20:58:47 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] sqlite: fix for CVE-2019-8457
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2019-8457
+Signed-off-by: Shubham Agrawal <shuagr@microsoft.com>
+---
+ sqlite3.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
+ 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/sqlite3.c b/sqlite3.c
+index 00513d4..5c8c7f4 100644
+--- a/sqlite3.c
++++ b/sqlite3.c
+@@ -172325,6 +172325,33 @@
+ }
+
+
++/* Allocate and initialize a new dynamic string object */
++StrAccum *sqlite3_str_new(sqlite3 *db){
++ StrAccum *p = sqlite3DbMallocRaw(db, sizeof(*p));
++ if( p ){
++ sqlite3StrAccumInit(p, db, 0, 0, SQLITE_MAX_LENGTH);
++ }
++ return p;
++}
++
++/* Finalize a string created using sqlite3_str_new().
++*/
++
++char *sqlite3_str_finish(StrAccum *p){
++ char *z;
++ if( p ){
++ z = sqlite3StrAccumFinish(p);
++ sqlite3DbFree(p->db, p);
++ }else{
++ z = 0;
++ }
++ return z;
++}
++/* Return any error code associated with p */
++int sqlite3_str_errcode(StrAccum *p){
++ return p ? p->accError : SQLITE_NOMEM;
++}
++
+ /*
+ ** Implementation of a scalar function that decodes r-tree nodes to
+ ** human readable strings. This can be used for debugging and analysis.
+@@ -172342,49 +172369,53 @@
+ ** <num-dimension>*2 coordinates.
+ */
+ static void rtreenode(sqlite3_context *ctx, int nArg, sqlite3_value **apArg){
+- char *zText = 0;
++
+ RtreeNode node;
+ Rtree tree;
+ int ii;
++ int nData;
++ int errCode;
++ StrAccum *pOut;
+
+ UNUSED_PARAMETER(nArg);
+ memset(&node, 0, sizeof(RtreeNode));
+ memset(&tree, 0, sizeof(Rtree));
+ tree.nDim = (u8)sqlite3_value_int(apArg[0]);
++ if( tree.nDim<1 || tree.nDim>5 ) return;
+ tree.nDim2 = tree.nDim*2;
+ tree.nBytesPerCell = 8 + 8 * tree.nDim;
+ node.zData = (u8 *)sqlite3_value_blob(apArg[1]);
++ nData = sqlite3_value_bytes(apArg[1]);
++ if( nData<4 ) return;
++ if( nData<NCELL(&node)*tree.nBytesPerCell ) return;
+
++ pOut = sqlite3_str_new(0);
+ for(ii=0; ii<NCELL(&node); ii++){
+- char zCell[512];
+- int nCell = 0;
++
++
+ RtreeCell cell;
+ int jj;
+
+ nodeGetCell(&tree, &node, ii, &cell);
+- sqlite3_snprintf(512-nCell,&zCell[nCell],"%lld", cell.iRowid);
+- nCell = (int)strlen(zCell);
++ if( ii>0 ) sqlite3StrAccumAppend(pOut, " ", 1);
++ sqlite3XPrintf(pOut, "{%lld", cell.iRowid);
++
+ for(jj=0; jj<tree.nDim2; jj++){
+ #ifndef SQLITE_RTREE_INT_ONLY
+- sqlite3_snprintf(512-nCell,&zCell[nCell], " %g",
+- (double)cell.aCoord[jj].f);
++
++ sqlite3XPrintf(pOut, " %g", (double)cell.aCoord[jj].f);
+ #else
+- sqlite3_snprintf(512-nCell,&zCell[nCell], " %d",
+- cell.aCoord[jj].i);
++
++ sqlite3XPrintf(pOut, " %d", cell.aCoord[jj].i);
+ #endif
+- nCell = (int)strlen(zCell);
+- }
+
+- if( zText ){
+- char *zTextNew = sqlite3_mprintf("%s {%s}", zText, zCell);
+- sqlite3_free(zText);
+- zText = zTextNew;
+- }else{
+- zText = sqlite3_mprintf("{%s}", zCell);
+ }
++ sqlite3StrAccumAppend(pOut, "}", 1);
+ }
+-
+- sqlite3_result_text(ctx, zText, -1, sqlite3_free);
++
++ errCode = sqlite3_str_errcode(pOut);
++ sqlite3_result_text(ctx, sqlite3_str_finish(pOut), -1, sqlite3_free);
++ sqlite3_result_error_code(ctx, errCode);
+ }
+
+ /* This routine implements an SQL function that returns the "depth" parameter
+--
+2.7.4
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/sqlite/sqlite3_3.23.1.bb b/meta/recipes-support/sqlite/sqlite3_3.23.1.bb
index d214ea1..7df61cd 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/sqlite/sqlite3_3.23.1.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/sqlite/sqlite3_3.23.1.bb
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ SRC_URI = "\
http://www.sqlite.org/2018/sqlite-autoconf-${SQLITE_PV}.tar.gz \
file://CVE-2018-20505.patch \
file://CVE-2018-20506.patch \
+ file://CVE-2019-8457.patch \
"
SRC_URI[md5sum] = "99a51b40a66872872a91c92f6d0134fa"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "92842b283e5e744eff5da29ed3c69391de7368fccc4d0ee6bf62490ce555ef25"
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread* [thud 08/12] wget: Security fixes CVE-2018-20483
2019-10-10 15:49 [thud 00/12] Thud pull request Armin Kuster
` (6 preceding siblings ...)
2019-10-10 15:49 ` [thud 07/12] sqlite3: Security fix for CVE-2019-8457 Armin Kuster
@ 2019-10-10 15:49 ` Armin Kuster
2019-10-10 15:49 ` [thud 09/12] qemu: fix build issue on new hosts with glibc 2.30 Armin Kuster
` (3 subsequent siblings)
11 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Armin Kuster @ 2019-10-10 15:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: openembedded-core
From: Andrii Bordunov via Openembedded-core <openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org>
Source: http://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/wget.git/
Type: Security Fix
Disposition: Backport from http://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/wget.git/
Description:
Fixes CVE-2018-20483
Signed-off-by: Aviraj CJ <acj@cisco.com>
[Affects Wget before 1.20.1]
Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>
---
.../wget/wget/CVE-2018-20483_p1.patch | 73 ++++++++++++
.../wget/wget/CVE-2018-20483_p2.patch | 127 +++++++++++++++++++++
meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget_1.19.5.bb | 2 +
3 files changed, 202 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget/CVE-2018-20483_p1.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget/CVE-2018-20483_p2.patch
diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget/CVE-2018-20483_p1.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget/CVE-2018-20483_p1.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cbc4a12
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget/CVE-2018-20483_p1.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+From 6c5471e4834aebd7359d88b760b087136473bac8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Tim=20R=C3=BChsen?= <tim.ruehsen@gmx.de>
+Date: Wed, 26 Dec 2018 13:51:48 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] Don't use extended attributes (--xattr) by default
+
+* src/init.c (defaults): Set enable_xattr to false by default
+* src/main.c (print_help): Reverse option logic of --xattr
+* doc/wget.texi: Add description for --xattr
+
+Users may not be aware that the origin URL and Referer are saved
+including credentials, and possibly access tokens within
+the urls.
+
+CVE: CVE-2018-20483 patch 1
+Upstream-Status: Backport [http://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/wget.git/commit/?id=c125d24762962d91050d925fbbd9e6f30b2302f8]
+Signed-off-by: Aviraj CJ <acj@cisco.com>
+---
+ doc/wget.texi | 8 ++++++++
+ src/init.c | 4 ----
+ src/main.c | 2 +-
+ 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/doc/wget.texi b/doc/wget.texi
+index eaf6b380..3f9d7c1c 100644
+--- a/doc/wget.texi
++++ b/doc/wget.texi
+@@ -540,6 +540,14 @@ right NUMBER.
+ Set preferred location for Metalink resources. This has effect if multiple
+ resources with same priority are available.
+
++@cindex xattr
++@item --xattr
++Enable use of file system's extended attributes to save the
++original URL and the Referer HTTP header value if used.
++
++Be aware that the URL might contain private information like
++access tokens or credentials.
++
+
+ @cindex force html
+ @item -F
+diff --git a/src/init.c b/src/init.c
+index eb81ab47..800970c5 100644
+--- a/src/init.c
++++ b/src/init.c
+@@ -509,11 +509,7 @@ defaults (void)
+ opt.hsts = true;
+ #endif
+
+-#ifdef ENABLE_XATTR
+- opt.enable_xattr = true;
+-#else
+ opt.enable_xattr = false;
+-#endif
+ }
+
+ /* Return the user's home directory (strdup-ed), or NULL if none is
+diff --git a/src/main.c b/src/main.c
+index 81db9319..6ac1621b 100644
+--- a/src/main.c
++++ b/src/main.c
+@@ -754,7 +754,7 @@ Download:\n"),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef ENABLE_XATTR
+ N_("\
+- --no-xattr turn off storage of metadata in extended file attributes\n"),
++ --xattr turn on storage of metadata in extended file attributes\n"),
+ #endif
+ "\n",
+
+--
+2.19.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget/CVE-2018-20483_p2.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget/CVE-2018-20483_p2.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..72ce8a0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget/CVE-2018-20483_p2.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+From 5a4ee4f3c07cc5dc7ef5f7244fcf51fd2fa3bc67 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Tim=20R=C3=BChsen?= <tim.ruehsen@gmx.de>
+Date: Wed, 26 Dec 2018 14:38:18 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Don't save user/pw with --xattr
+
+Also the Referer info is reduced to scheme+host+port.
+
+* src/ftp.c (getftp): Change params of set_file_metadata()
+* src/http.c (gethttp): Change params of set_file_metadata()
+* src/xattr.c (set_file_metadata): Remove user/password from origin URL,
+ reduce Referer value to scheme/host/port.
+* src/xattr.h: Change prototype of set_file_metadata()
+
+CVE: CVE-2018-20483 patch 2
+Upstream-Status: Backport [http://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/wget.git/commit/?id=3cdfb594cf75f11cdbb9702ac5e856c332ccacfa]
+Signed-off-by: Aviraj CJ <acj@cisco.com>
+---
+ src/ftp.c | 2 +-
+ src/http.c | 4 ++--
+ src/xattr.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++----
+ src/xattr.h | 3 ++-
+ 4 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/ftp.c b/src/ftp.c
+index 69148936..db8a6267 100644
+--- a/src/ftp.c
++++ b/src/ftp.c
+@@ -1580,7 +1580,7 @@ Error in server response, closing control connection.\n"));
+
+ #ifdef ENABLE_XATTR
+ if (opt.enable_xattr)
+- set_file_metadata (u->url, NULL, fp);
++ set_file_metadata (u, NULL, fp);
+ #endif
+
+ fd_close (local_sock);
+diff --git a/src/http.c b/src/http.c
+index 77bdbbed..472c328f 100644
+--- a/src/http.c
++++ b/src/http.c
+@@ -4120,9 +4120,9 @@ gethttp (const struct url *u, struct url *original_url, struct http_stat *hs,
+ if (opt.enable_xattr)
+ {
+ if (original_url != u)
+- set_file_metadata (u->url, original_url->url, fp);
++ set_file_metadata (u, original_url, fp);
+ else
+- set_file_metadata (u->url, NULL, fp);
++ set_file_metadata (u, NULL, fp);
+ }
+ #endif
+
+diff --git a/src/xattr.c b/src/xattr.c
+index 66524226..0f20fadf 100644
+--- a/src/xattr.c
++++ b/src/xattr.c
+@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
+ #include <string.h>
+
+ #include "log.h"
++#include "utils.h"
+ #include "xattr.h"
+
+ #ifdef USE_XATTR
+@@ -57,7 +58,7 @@ write_xattr_metadata (const char *name, const char *value, FILE *fp)
+ #endif /* USE_XATTR */
+
+ int
+-set_file_metadata (const char *origin_url, const char *referrer_url, FILE *fp)
++set_file_metadata (const struct url *origin_url, const struct url *referrer_url, FILE *fp)
+ {
+ /* Save metadata about where the file came from (requested, final URLs) to
+ * user POSIX Extended Attributes of retrieved file.
+@@ -67,13 +68,28 @@ set_file_metadata (const char *origin_url, const char *referrer_url, FILE *fp)
+ * [http://0pointer.de/lennart/projects/mod_mime_xattr/].
+ */
+ int retval = -1;
++ char *value;
+
+ if (!origin_url || !fp)
+ return retval;
+
+- retval = write_xattr_metadata ("user.xdg.origin.url", escnonprint_uri (origin_url), fp);
+- if ((!retval) && referrer_url)
+- retval = write_xattr_metadata ("user.xdg.referrer.url", escnonprint_uri (referrer_url), fp);
++ value = url_string (origin_url, URL_AUTH_HIDE);
++ retval = write_xattr_metadata ("user.xdg.origin.url", escnonprint_uri (value), fp);
++ xfree (value);
++
++ if (!retval && referrer_url)
++ {
++ struct url u;
++
++ memset(&u, 0, sizeof(u));
++ u.scheme = referrer_url->scheme;
++ u.host = referrer_url->host;
++ u.port = referrer_url->port;
++
++ value = url_string (&u, 0);
++ retval = write_xattr_metadata ("user.xdg.referrer.url", escnonprint_uri (value), fp);
++ xfree (value);
++ }
+
+ return retval;
+ }
+diff --git a/src/xattr.h b/src/xattr.h
+index 10f3ed11..40c7a8d3 100644
+--- a/src/xattr.h
++++ b/src/xattr.h
+@@ -16,12 +16,13 @@
+ along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. */
+
+ #include <stdio.h>
++#include <url.h>
+
+ #ifndef _XATTR_H
+ #define _XATTR_H
+
+ /* Store metadata name/value attributes against fp. */
+-int set_file_metadata (const char *origin_url, const char *referrer_url, FILE *fp);
++int set_file_metadata (const struct url *origin_url, const struct url *referrer_url, FILE *fp);
+
+ #if defined(__linux)
+ /* libc on Linux has fsetxattr (5 arguments). */
+--
+2.19.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget_1.19.5.bb b/meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget_1.19.5.bb
index 920b74d..a53844b 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget_1.19.5.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget_1.19.5.bb
@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/wget/wget-${PV}.tar.gz \
file://0001-Unset-need_charset_alias-when-building-for-musl.patch \
file://0002-improve-reproducibility.patch \
file://CVE-2019-5953.patch \
+ file://CVE-2018-20483_p1.patch \
+ file://CVE-2018-20483_p2.patch \
"
SRC_URI[md5sum] = "2db6f03d655041f82eb64b8c8a1fa7da"
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread* [thud 09/12] qemu: fix build issue on new hosts with glibc 2.30
2019-10-10 15:49 [thud 00/12] Thud pull request Armin Kuster
` (7 preceding siblings ...)
2019-10-10 15:49 ` [thud 08/12] wget: Security fixes CVE-2018-20483 Armin Kuster
@ 2019-10-10 15:49 ` Armin Kuster
2019-10-10 15:49 ` [thud 10/12] libgpg-error: Fix build with gawk 5.x Armin Kuster
` (2 subsequent siblings)
11 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Armin Kuster @ 2019-10-10 15:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: openembedded-core
This fixes the following error:
TOPDIR/tmp/work/x86_64-linux/qemu-native/3.1.0-r0/qemu-3.1.0/linux-user/syscall.c:254:16: error: static declaration of ‘gettid’ follows non-static declaration
254 | _syscall0(int, gettid)
| ^~~~~~
TOPDIR/tmp/work/x86_64-linux/qemu-native/3.1.0-r0/qemu-3.1.0/linux-user/syscall.c:185:13: note: in definition of macro ‘_syscall0’
185 | static type name (void) \
| ^~~~
In file included from /usr/include/unistd.h:1170,
from TOPDIR/tmp/work/x86_64-linux/qemu-native/3.1.0-r0/qemu-3.1.0/include/qemu/osdep.h:90,
from TOPDIR/tmp/work/x86_64-linux/qemu-native/3.1.0-r0/qemu-3.1.0/linux-user/syscall.c:20:
/usr/include/bits/unistd_ext.h:34:16: note: previous declaration of ‘gettid’ was here
34 | extern __pid_t gettid (void) __THROW;
| ^~~~~~
Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>
---
...nux-user-assume-__NR_gettid-always-exists.patch | 49 +++++++++++
...rename-gettid-to-sys_gettid-to-avoid-clas.patch | 95 ++++++++++++++++++++++
meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu_3.0.0.bb | 2 +
3 files changed, 146 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/0001-linux-user-assume-__NR_gettid-always-exists.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/0001-linux-user-rename-gettid-to-sys_gettid-to-avoid-clas.patch
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/0001-linux-user-assume-__NR_gettid-always-exists.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/0001-linux-user-assume-__NR_gettid-always-exists.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..767b200
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/0001-linux-user-assume-__NR_gettid-always-exists.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+From 184943d827ce09375284e6fbb9fd5eeb9e369529 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Daniel=20P=2E=20Berrang=C3=A9?= <berrange@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 16:18:41 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] linux-user: assume __NR_gettid always exists
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+The gettid syscall was introduced in Linux 2.4.11. This is old enough
+that we can assume it always exists and thus not bother with the
+conditional backcompat logic.
+
+Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
+Reviewed-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
+Message-Id: <20190320161842.13908-2-berrange@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+dependancy patch for fix
+
+Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>
+
+---
+
+
+ linux-user/syscall.c | 8 --------
+ 1 file changed, 8 deletions(-)
+
+Index: qemu-3.0.0/linux-user/syscall.c
+===================================================================
+--- qemu-3.0.0.orig/linux-user/syscall.c
++++ qemu-3.0.0/linux-user/syscall.c
+@@ -251,15 +251,7 @@ static type name (type1 arg1,type2 arg2,
+ #define TARGET_NR__llseek TARGET_NR_llseek
+ #endif
+
+-#ifdef __NR_gettid
+ _syscall0(int, gettid)
+-#else
+-/* This is a replacement for the host gettid() and must return a host
+- errno. */
+-static int gettid(void) {
+- return -ENOSYS;
+-}
+-#endif
+
+ /* For the 64-bit guest on 32-bit host case we must emulate
+ * getdents using getdents64, because otherwise the host
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/0001-linux-user-rename-gettid-to-sys_gettid-to-avoid-clas.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/0001-linux-user-rename-gettid-to-sys_gettid-to-avoid-clas.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ab3b71d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/0001-linux-user-rename-gettid-to-sys_gettid-to-avoid-clas.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+From 71ba74f67eaca21b0cc9d96f534ad3b9a7161400 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Daniel=20P=2E=20Berrang=C3=A9?= <berrange@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 16:18:42 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] linux-user: rename gettid() to sys_gettid() to avoid clash
+ with glibc
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+The glibc-2.29.9000-6.fc31.x86_64 package finally includes the gettid()
+function as part of unistd.h when __USE_GNU is defined. This clashes
+with linux-user code which unconditionally defines this function name
+itself.
+
+/home/berrange/src/virt/qemu/linux-user/syscall.c:253:16: error: static declaration of ‘gettid’ follows non-static declaration
+ 253 | _syscall0(int, gettid)
+ | ^~~~~~
+/home/berrange/src/virt/qemu/linux-user/syscall.c:184:13: note: in definition of macro ‘_syscall0’
+ 184 | static type name (void) \
+ | ^~~~
+In file included from /usr/include/unistd.h:1170,
+ from /home/berrange/src/virt/qemu/include/qemu/osdep.h:107,
+ from /home/berrange/src/virt/qemu/linux-user/syscall.c:20:
+/usr/include/bits/unistd_ext.h:34:16: note: previous declaration of ‘gettid’ was here
+ 34 | extern __pid_t gettid (void) __THROW;
+ | ^~~~~~
+ CC aarch64-linux-user/linux-user/signal.o
+make[1]: *** [/home/berrange/src/virt/qemu/rules.mak:69: linux-user/syscall.o] Error 1
+make[1]: *** Waiting for unfinished jobs....
+make: *** [Makefile:449: subdir-aarch64-linux-user] Error 2
+
+While we could make our definition conditional and rely on glibc's impl,
+this patch simply renames our definition to sys_gettid() which is a
+common pattern in this file.
+
+Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
+Reviewed-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
+Message-Id: <20190320161842.13908-3-berrange@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
+
+Upstream-status: Backport
+
+Fixes issue found on tumbleweed-ty-1
+Yocto bug: https://bugzilla.yoctoproject.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13577
+Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>
+
+---
+ linux-user/syscall.c | 11 ++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+Index: qemu-3.0.0/linux-user/syscall.c
+===================================================================
+--- qemu-3.0.0.orig/linux-user/syscall.c
++++ qemu-3.0.0/linux-user/syscall.c
+@@ -251,7 +251,8 @@ static type name (type1 arg1,type2 arg2,
+ #define TARGET_NR__llseek TARGET_NR_llseek
+ #endif
+
+-_syscall0(int, gettid)
++#define __NR_sys_gettid __NR_gettid
++_syscall0(int, sys_gettid)
+
+ /* For the 64-bit guest on 32-bit host case we must emulate
+ * getdents using getdents64, because otherwise the host
+@@ -6483,7 +6484,7 @@ static void *clone_func(void *arg)
+ cpu = ENV_GET_CPU(env);
+ thread_cpu = cpu;
+ ts = (TaskState *)cpu->opaque;
+- info->tid = gettid();
++ info->tid = sys_gettid();
+ task_settid(ts);
+ if (info->child_tidptr)
+ put_user_u32(info->tid, info->child_tidptr);
+@@ -6628,9 +6629,9 @@ static int do_fork(CPUArchState *env, un
+ mapping. We can't repeat the spinlock hack used above because
+ the child process gets its own copy of the lock. */
+ if (flags & CLONE_CHILD_SETTID)
+- put_user_u32(gettid(), child_tidptr);
++ put_user_u32(sys_gettid(), child_tidptr);
+ if (flags & CLONE_PARENT_SETTID)
+- put_user_u32(gettid(), parent_tidptr);
++ put_user_u32(sys_gettid(), parent_tidptr);
+ ts = (TaskState *)cpu->opaque;
+ if (flags & CLONE_SETTLS)
+ cpu_set_tls (env, newtls);
+@@ -11876,7 +11877,7 @@ abi_long do_syscall(void *cpu_env, int n
+ break;
+ #endif
+ case TARGET_NR_gettid:
+- ret = get_errno(gettid());
++ ret = get_errno(sys_gettid());
+ break;
+ #ifdef TARGET_NR_readahead
+ case TARGET_NR_readahead:
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu_3.0.0.bb b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu_3.0.0.bb
index 6c3049b..e483aca 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu_3.0.0.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu_3.0.0.bb
@@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.qemu.org/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.xz \
file://CVE-2019-3812.patch \
file://CVE-2019-6778.patch \
file://CVE-2019-8934.patch \
+ file://0001-linux-user-assume-__NR_gettid-always-exists.patch \
+ file://0001-linux-user-rename-gettid-to-sys_gettid-to-avoid-clas.patch \
"
UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "qemu-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)\.tar"
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread* [thud 10/12] libgpg-error: Fix build with gawk 5.x
2019-10-10 15:49 [thud 00/12] Thud pull request Armin Kuster
` (8 preceding siblings ...)
2019-10-10 15:49 ` [thud 09/12] qemu: fix build issue on new hosts with glibc 2.30 Armin Kuster
@ 2019-10-10 15:49 ` Armin Kuster
2019-10-10 15:49 ` [thud 11/12] gnupg: Do not apply -Woverride-init guard for gcc >= 9 Armin Kuster
2019-10-10 15:49 ` [thud 12/12] uninative: Update to 2.7 release Armin Kuster
11 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Armin Kuster @ 2019-10-10 15:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: openembedded-core
From: Sean Nyekjaer <sean@geanix.com>
Based on poky master, but for version 1.35
Signed-off-by: Sean Nyekjaer <sean@geanix.com>
Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>
[backported to thud
yocto# 13580]
Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>
---
.../libgpg-error-1.35-gawk5-support.patch | 161 +++++++++++++++++++++
.../libgpg-error/libgpg-error_1.32.bb | 1 +
2 files changed, 162 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libgpg-error/libgpg-error/libgpg-error-1.35-gawk5-support.patch
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libgpg-error/libgpg-error/libgpg-error-1.35-gawk5-support.patch b/meta/recipes-support/libgpg-error/libgpg-error/libgpg-error-1.35-gawk5-support.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dc3d558
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libgpg-error/libgpg-error/libgpg-error-1.35-gawk5-support.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://dev.gnupg.org/T4459]
+Signed-off-by: Sean Nyekjaer <sean@geanix.com>
+
+From 37069826e497d6af01e3e48fe5d2220ae7f85449 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
+Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 15:10:44 +0900
+Subject: [PATCH] awk: Prepare for Gawk 5.0.
+
+* src/Makefile.am: Use pkg_namespace (instead of namespace).
+* src/mkerrnos.awk: Likewise.
+* lang/cl/mkerrcodes.awk: Don't escape # in regexp.
+* src/mkerrcodes.awk, src/mkerrcodes1.awk, src/mkerrcodes2.awk: Ditto.
+
+--
+
+In Gawk 5.0, regexp routines are replaced by Gnulib implementation,
+which only allows escaping specific characters.
+
+GnuPG-bug-id: 4459
+Reported-by: Marius Schamschula
+Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
+---
+ lang/cl/mkerrcodes.awk | 2 +-
+ src/Makefile.am | 2 +-
+ src/mkerrcodes.awk | 2 +-
+ src/mkerrcodes1.awk | 2 +-
+ src/mkerrcodes2.awk | 2 +-
+ src/mkerrnos.awk | 2 +-
+ src/mkstrtable.awk | 10 +++++-----
+ 7 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lang/cl/mkerrcodes.awk b/lang/cl/mkerrcodes.awk
+index ae29043..9a1fc18 100644
+--- a/lang/cl/mkerrcodes.awk
++++ b/lang/cl/mkerrcodes.awk
+@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ header {
+ }
+
+ !header {
+- sub (/\#.+/, "");
++ sub (/#.+/, "");
+ sub (/[ ]+$/, ""); # Strip trailing space and tab characters.
+
+ if (/^$/)
+diff --git a/src/Makefile.am b/src/Makefile.am
+index 42998e4..0ceac9f 100644
+--- a/src/Makefile.am
++++ b/src/Makefile.am
+@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ code-from-errno.h: mkerrcodes Makefile
+
+ errnos-sym.h: Makefile mkstrtable.awk errnos.in
+ $(AWK) -f $(srcdir)/mkstrtable.awk -v textidx=2 -v nogettext=1 \
+- -v prefix=GPG_ERR_ -v namespace=errnos_ \
++ -v prefix=GPG_ERR_ -v pkg_namespace=errnos_ \
+ $(srcdir)/errnos.in >$@
+
+
+diff --git a/src/mkerrcodes.awk b/src/mkerrcodes.awk
+index 46d436c..e9c857c 100644
+--- a/src/mkerrcodes.awk
++++ b/src/mkerrcodes.awk
+@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ header {
+ }
+
+ !header {
+- sub (/\#.+/, "");
++ sub (/#.+/, "");
+ sub (/[ ]+$/, ""); # Strip trailing space and tab characters.
+
+ if (/^$/)
+diff --git a/src/mkerrcodes1.awk b/src/mkerrcodes1.awk
+index a771a73..4578e29 100644
+--- a/src/mkerrcodes1.awk
++++ b/src/mkerrcodes1.awk
+@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ header {
+ }
+
+ !header {
+- sub (/\#.+/, "");
++ sub (/#.+/, "");
+ sub (/[ ]+$/, ""); # Strip trailing space and tab characters.
+
+ if (/^$/)
+diff --git a/src/mkerrcodes2.awk b/src/mkerrcodes2.awk
+index ea58503..188f7a4 100644
+--- a/src/mkerrcodes2.awk
++++ b/src/mkerrcodes2.awk
+@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ header {
+ }
+
+ !header {
+- sub (/\#.+/, "");
++ sub (/#.+/, "");
+ sub (/[ ]+$/, ""); # Strip trailing space and tab characters.
+
+ if (/^$/)
+diff --git a/src/mkerrnos.awk b/src/mkerrnos.awk
+index f79df66..15b1aad 100644
+--- a/src/mkerrnos.awk
++++ b/src/mkerrnos.awk
+@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ header {
+ }
+
+ !header {
+- sub (/\#.+/, "");
++ sub (/#.+/, "");
+ sub (/[ ]+$/, ""); # Strip trailing space and tab characters.
+
+ if (/^$/)
+diff --git a/src/mkstrtable.awk b/src/mkstrtable.awk
+index c9de9c1..285e45f 100644
+--- a/src/mkstrtable.awk
++++ b/src/mkstrtable.awk
+@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@
+ #
+ # The variable prefix can be used to prepend a string to each message.
+ #
+-# The variable namespace can be used to prepend a string to each
++# The variable pkg_namespace can be used to prepend a string to each
+ # variable and macro name.
+
+ BEGIN {
+@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ header {
+ print "/* The purpose of this complex string table is to produce";
+ print " optimal code with a minimum of relocations. */";
+ print "";
+- print "static const char " namespace "msgstr[] = ";
++ print "static const char " pkg_namespace "msgstr[] = ";
+ header = 0;
+ }
+ else
+@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ header {
+ }
+
+ !header {
+- sub (/\#.+/, "");
++ sub (/#.+/, "");
+ sub (/[ ]+$/, ""); # Strip trailing space and tab characters.
+
+ if (/^$/)
+@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ END {
+ else
+ print " gettext_noop (\"" last_msgstr "\");";
+ print "";
+- print "static const int " namespace "msgidx[] =";
++ print "static const int " pkg_namespace "msgidx[] =";
+ print " {";
+ for (i = 0; i < coded_msgs; i++)
+ print " " pos[i] ",";
+@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ END {
+ print " };";
+ print "";
+ print "static GPG_ERR_INLINE int";
+- print namespace "msgidxof (int code)";
++ print pkg_namespace "msgidxof (int code)";
+ print "{";
+ print " return (0 ? 0";
+
+--
+2.23.0
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libgpg-error/libgpg-error_1.32.bb b/meta/recipes-support/libgpg-error/libgpg-error_1.32.bb
index e552001..52ae11a 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/libgpg-error/libgpg-error_1.32.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libgpg-error/libgpg-error_1.32.bb
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNUPG_MIRROR}/libgpg-error/libgpg-error-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
file://pkgconfig.patch \
file://0001-syscfg-Support-ARC-CPUs-and-simplify-aliasing-table.patch \
file://0002-syscfg-Add-support-for-arc-unknown-linux-gnu.patch \
+ file://libgpg-error-1.35-gawk5-support.patch \
"
SRC_URI[md5sum] = "ef3d928a5a453fa701ecc3bb22be1c64"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "c345c5e73cc2332f8d50db84a2280abfb1d8f6d4f1858b9daa30404db44540ca"
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread* [thud 11/12] gnupg: Do not apply -Woverride-init guard for gcc >= 9
2019-10-10 15:49 [thud 00/12] Thud pull request Armin Kuster
` (9 preceding siblings ...)
2019-10-10 15:49 ` [thud 10/12] libgpg-error: Fix build with gawk 5.x Armin Kuster
@ 2019-10-10 15:49 ` Armin Kuster
2019-10-10 15:49 ` [thud 12/12] uninative: Update to 2.7 release Armin Kuster
11 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Armin Kuster @ 2019-10-10 15:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: openembedded-core
From: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>
---
...1-Woverride-init-is-not-needed-with-gcc-9.patch | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++
...c-use-a-custom-value-for-the-location-of-.patch | 6 ++---
meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg/relocate.patch | 2 +-
meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg_2.2.12.bb | 3 ++-
4 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg/0001-Woverride-init-is-not-needed-with-gcc-9.patch
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg/0001-Woverride-init-is-not-needed-with-gcc-9.patch b/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg/0001-Woverride-init-is-not-needed-with-gcc-9.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4a280f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg/0001-Woverride-init-is-not-needed-with-gcc-9.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+From 0df5800cc2e720aad883a517f7d24a9722fe5845 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 20 Dec 2018 17:37:48 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] Woverride-init is not needed with gcc 9
+
+Fixes
+| ../../gnupg-2.2.12/dirmngr/dns.h:525:16: error: lvalue required as
+unary '&' operand |
+525 | dns_rr_i_init(&dns_quietinit((struct dns_rr_i){ 0, __VA_ARGS__
+}), (P))
+
+Upstream-Status: Pending
+
+Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
+---
+ dirmngr/dns.h | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/dirmngr/dns.h b/dirmngr/dns.h
+index 30d0b45..98fe412 100644
+--- a/dirmngr/dns.h
++++ b/dirmngr/dns.h
+@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ DNS_PUBLIC int *dns_debug_p(void);
+
+ #define dns_quietinit(...) \
+ DNS_PRAGMA_PUSH DNS_PRAGMA_QUIET __VA_ARGS__ DNS_PRAGMA_POP
+-#elif (__GNUC__ == 4 && __GNUC_MINOR__ >= 6) || __GNUC__ > 4
++#elif (__GNUC__ == 4 && __GNUC_MINOR__ >= 6) || (__GNUC__ > 4 && __GNUC__ < 9)
+ #define DNS_PRAGMA_PUSH _Pragma("GCC diagnostic push")
+ #define DNS_PRAGMA_QUIET _Pragma("GCC diagnostic ignored \"-Woverride-init\"")
+ #define DNS_PRAGMA_POP _Pragma("GCC diagnostic pop")
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg/0001-configure.ac-use-a-custom-value-for-the-location-of-.patch b/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg/0001-configure.ac-use-a-custom-value-for-the-location-of-.patch
index 3f1c3ab..c43ecdf 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg/0001-configure.ac-use-a-custom-value-for-the-location-of-.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg/0001-configure.ac-use-a-custom-value-for-the-location-of-.patch
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-From 8eb4d25c25a1c1323797d94e0727a3e42b7f3287 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From c69c3a49f3295179c247db5ceb3ef8952928a724 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alexander Kanavin <alex.kanavin@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2018 18:00:21 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] configure.ac: use a custom value for the location of
@@ -14,10 +14,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Alexander Kanavin <alex.kanavin@gmail.com>
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
-index 4d66af9..b9ef235 100644
+index 919ab31..cd58fdb 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
-@@ -1848,7 +1848,7 @@ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(GPGCONF_DISP_NAME, "GPGConf",
+@@ -1855,7 +1855,7 @@ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(GPGCONF_DISP_NAME, "GPGConf",
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(GPGTAR_NAME, "gpgtar", [The name of the gpgtar tool])
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg/relocate.patch b/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg/relocate.patch
index c494ef8..1a5ea4a 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg/relocate.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg/relocate.patch
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-From f9fc214b0bf2f67b515ca8a5333f39c497d1b518 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 6d31b04d7a75f1d73c3518bf043b5b0a2dc40cb1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com>
Date: Wed, 19 Sep 2018 14:44:40 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Allow the environment to override where gnupg looks for its
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg_2.2.12.bb b/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg_2.2.12.bb
index 1f381c2..a02c66a 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg_2.2.12.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg_2.2.12.bb
@@ -14,7 +14,8 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNUPG_MIRROR}/${BPN}/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
file://0002-use-pkgconfig-instead-of-npth-config.patch \
file://0003-dirmngr-uses-libgpg-error.patch \
file://0004-autogen.sh-fix-find-version-for-beta-checking.patch \
- "
+ file://0001-Woverride-init-is-not-needed-with-gcc-9.patch \
+ "
SRC_URI_append_class-native = " file://0001-configure.ac-use-a-custom-value-for-the-location-of-.patch \
file://relocate.patch"
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread* [thud 12/12] uninative: Update to 2.7 release
2019-10-10 15:49 [thud 00/12] Thud pull request Armin Kuster
` (10 preceding siblings ...)
2019-10-10 15:49 ` [thud 11/12] gnupg: Do not apply -Woverride-init guard for gcc >= 9 Armin Kuster
@ 2019-10-10 15:49 ` Armin Kuster
11 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Armin Kuster @ 2019-10-10 15:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: openembedded-core
From: Michael Halstead <mhalstead@linuxfoundation.org>
The 2.7 release updates glibc to version 2.30. Recently added to openSUSE
Tumbleweed and needed for Fedora Core 31.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halstead <mhalstead@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>
---
meta/conf/distro/include/yocto-uninative.inc | 10 +++++-----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/meta/conf/distro/include/yocto-uninative.inc b/meta/conf/distro/include/yocto-uninative.inc
index df24346..ad75d3e 100644
--- a/meta/conf/distro/include/yocto-uninative.inc
+++ b/meta/conf/distro/include/yocto-uninative.inc
@@ -6,9 +6,9 @@
# to the distro running on the build machine.
#
-UNINATIVE_MAXGLIBCVERSION = "2.29"
+UNINATIVE_MAXGLIBCVERSION = "2.30"
-UNINATIVE_URL ?= "http://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/uninative/2.6/"
-UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM[aarch64] ?= "a37118fc8b423f48146120707b81dd15017512c3e8ef9e6ca2cb3a033f4f4046"
-UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM[i686] ?= "3234fc3ded810225071f23a0e9a99f4f8c2480059945a848eff076ce78122ade"
-UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM[x86_64] ?= "133387753a9acf3e1b788103c59fac91e968e2ee331d7a4b9498e926ada7be57"
+UNINATIVE_URL ?= "http://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/uninative/2.7/"
+UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM[aarch64] ?= "e76a45886ee8a0b3904b761c17ac8ff91edf9811ee455f1832d10763ba794dfc"
+UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM[i686] ?= "810d027dfb1c7675226afbcec07808770516c969ee7378f6d8240281083f8924"
+UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM[x86_64] ?= "9498d8bba047499999a7310ac2576d0796461184965351a56f6d32c888a1f216"
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread
* [thud 06/12] perl: Fix CVE-2018-18311 to 18314
2019-10-08 15:26 [thud 00/12] patch review Armin Kuster
@ 2019-10-08 15:26 ` Armin Kuster
0 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Armin Kuster @ 2019-10-08 15:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: openembedded-core
From: Dan Tran <dantran@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Tran <dantran@microsoft.com>
[Perl before 5.26.3 and 5.28.x before 5.28.1]
Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>
---
.../perl/perl/CVE-2018-18311.patch | 183 ++++++++++++++
.../perl/perl/CVE-2018-18312.patch | Bin 0 -> 2125 bytes
.../perl/perl/CVE-2018-18313.patch | 60 +++++
.../perl/perl/CVE-2018-18314.patch | 271 +++++++++++++++++++++
meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl_5.24.4.bb | 4 +
5 files changed, 518 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl/CVE-2018-18311.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl/CVE-2018-18312.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl/CVE-2018-18313.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl/CVE-2018-18314.patch
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl/CVE-2018-18311.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl/CVE-2018-18311.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ba8cf15
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl/CVE-2018-18311.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
+From 4706b65d7c835c0bb219db160fbcdbcd98efab2d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: David Mitchell <davem@iabyn.com>
+Date: Fri, 29 Jun 2018 13:37:03 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Perl_my_setenv(); handle integer wrap
+
+RT #133204
+
+Wean this function off int/I32 and onto UV/Size_t.
+Also, replace all malloc-ish calls with a wrapper that does
+overflow checks,
+
+In particular, it was doing (nlen + vlen + 2) which could wrap when
+the combined length of the environment variable name and value
+exceeded around 0x7fffffff.
+
+The wrapper check function is probably overkill, but belt and braces...
+
+NB this function has several variant parts, #ifdef'ed by platform
+type; I have blindly changed the parts that aren't compiled under linux.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 34716e2a6ee2af96078d62b065b7785c001194be)
+
+CVE: CVE-2018-18311
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+[https://perl5.git.perl.org/perl.git/commit/5737d31aac51360cc1eb412ef059e36147c9d6d6]
+
+Signed-off-by: Dan Tran <dantran@microsoft.com>
+---
+ util.c | 76 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
+ 1 file changed, 53 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/util.c b/util.c
+index 7c3d271f51..27f4eddf3b 100644
+--- a/util.c
++++ b/util.c
+@@ -2160,8 +2160,40 @@ Perl_new_warnings_bitfield(pTHX_ STRLEN *buffer, const char *const bits,
+ *(s+(nlen+1+vlen)) = '\0'
+
+ #ifdef USE_ENVIRON_ARRAY
+- /* VMS' my_setenv() is in vms.c */
++
++/* small wrapper for use by Perl_my_setenv that mallocs, or reallocs if
++ * 'current' is non-null, with up to three sizes that are added together.
++ * It handles integer overflow.
++ */
++static char *
++S_env_alloc(void *current, Size_t l1, Size_t l2, Size_t l3, Size_t size)
++{
++ void *p;
++ Size_t sl, l = l1 + l2;
++
++ if (l < l2)
++ goto panic;
++ l += l3;
++ if (l < l3)
++ goto panic;
++ sl = l * size;
++ if (sl < l)
++ goto panic;
++
++ p = current
++ ? safesysrealloc(current, sl)
++ : safesysmalloc(sl);
++ if (p)
++ return (char*)p;
++
++ panic:
++ croak_memory_wrap();
++}
++
++
++/* VMS' my_setenv() is in vms.c */
+ #if !defined(WIN32) && !defined(NETWARE)
++
+ void
+ Perl_my_setenv(pTHX_ const char *nam, const char *val)
+ {
+@@ -2177,28 +2209,27 @@ Perl_my_setenv(pTHX_ const char *nam, const char *val)
+ #ifndef PERL_USE_SAFE_PUTENV
+ if (!PL_use_safe_putenv) {
+ /* most putenv()s leak, so we manipulate environ directly */
+- I32 i;
+- const I32 len = strlen(nam);
+- int nlen, vlen;
++ UV i;
++ Size_t vlen, nlen = strlen(nam);
+
+ /* where does it go? */
+ for (i = 0; environ[i]; i++) {
+- if (strnEQ(environ[i],nam,len) && environ[i][len] == '=')
++ if (strnEQ(environ[i], nam, nlen) && environ[i][nlen] == '=')
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (environ == PL_origenviron) { /* need we copy environment? */
+- I32 j;
+- I32 max;
++ UV j, max;
+ char **tmpenv;
+
+ max = i;
+ while (environ[max])
+ max++;
+- tmpenv = (char**)safesysmalloc((max+2) * sizeof(char*));
++ /* XXX shouldn't that be max+1 rather than max+2 ??? - DAPM */
++ tmpenv = (char**)S_env_alloc(NULL, max, 2, 0, sizeof(char*));
+ for (j=0; j<max; j++) { /* copy environment */
+- const int len = strlen(environ[j]);
+- tmpenv[j] = (char*)safesysmalloc((len+1)*sizeof(char));
++ const Size_t len = strlen(environ[j]);
++ tmpenv[j] = S_env_alloc(NULL, len, 1, 0, 1);
+ Copy(environ[j], tmpenv[j], len+1, char);
+ }
+ tmpenv[max] = NULL;
+@@ -2217,15 +2248,15 @@ Perl_my_setenv(pTHX_ const char *nam, const char *val)
+ #endif
+ }
+ if (!environ[i]) { /* does not exist yet */
+- environ = (char**)safesysrealloc(environ, (i+2) * sizeof(char*));
++ environ = (char**)S_env_alloc(environ, i, 2, 0, sizeof(char*));
+ environ[i+1] = NULL; /* make sure it's null terminated */
+ }
+ else
+ safesysfree(environ[i]);
+- nlen = strlen(nam);
++
+ vlen = strlen(val);
+
+- environ[i] = (char*)safesysmalloc((nlen+vlen+2) * sizeof(char));
++ environ[i] = S_env_alloc(NULL, nlen, vlen, 2, 1);
+ /* all that work just for this */
+ my_setenv_format(environ[i], nam, nlen, val, vlen);
+ } else {
+@@ -2250,22 +2281,21 @@ Perl_my_setenv(pTHX_ const char *nam, const char *val)
+ if (environ) /* old glibc can crash with null environ */
+ (void)unsetenv(nam);
+ } else {
+- const int nlen = strlen(nam);
+- const int vlen = strlen(val);
+- char * const new_env =
+- (char*)safesysmalloc((nlen + vlen + 2) * sizeof(char));
++ const Size_t nlen = strlen(nam);
++ const Size_t vlen = strlen(val);
++ char * const new_env = S_env_alloc(NULL, nlen, vlen, 2, 1);
+ my_setenv_format(new_env, nam, nlen, val, vlen);
+ (void)putenv(new_env);
+ }
+ # else /* ! HAS_UNSETENV */
+ char *new_env;
+- const int nlen = strlen(nam);
+- int vlen;
++ const Size_t nlen = strlen(nam);
++ Size_t vlen;
+ if (!val) {
+ val = "";
+ }
+ vlen = strlen(val);
+- new_env = (char*)safesysmalloc((nlen + vlen + 2) * sizeof(char));
++ new_env = S_env_alloc(NULL, nlen, vlen, 2, 1);
+ /* all that work just for this */
+ my_setenv_format(new_env, nam, nlen, val, vlen);
+ (void)putenv(new_env);
+@@ -2288,14 +2318,14 @@ Perl_my_setenv(pTHX_ const char *nam, const char *val)
+ {
+ dVAR;
+ char *envstr;
+- const int nlen = strlen(nam);
+- int vlen;
++ const Size_t nlen = strlen(nam);
++ Size_t vlen;
+
+ if (!val) {
+ val = "";
+ }
+ vlen = strlen(val);
+- Newx(envstr, nlen+vlen+2, char);
++ envstr = S_env_alloc(NULL, nlen, vlen, 2, 1);
+ my_setenv_format(envstr, nam, nlen, val, vlen);
+ (void)PerlEnv_putenv(envstr);
+ Safefree(envstr);
+--
+2.22.0.vfs.1.1.57.gbaf16c8
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl/CVE-2018-18312.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl/CVE-2018-18312.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1c3426542d7907ed0e5ab34621589bc3bbc5612d
GIT binary patch
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literal 0
HcmV?d00001
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl/CVE-2018-18313.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl/CVE-2018-18313.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..540aa07
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl/CVE-2018-18313.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+From 3458f6115ca8e8d11779948c12b7e1cc5803358c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Karl Williamson <khw@cpan.org>
+Date: Sat, 25 Mar 2017 15:00:22 -0600
+Subject: [PATCH 2/3] regcomp.c: Convert some strchr to memchr
+
+This allows things to work properly in the face of embedded NULs.
+See the branch merge message for more information.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 43b2f4ef399e2fd7240b4eeb0658686ad95f8e62)
+
+CVE: CVE-2018-18313
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+[https://perl5.git.perl.org/perl.git/commit/c1c28ce6ba90ee05aa96b11ad551a6063680f3b9]
+
+Signed-off-by: Dan Tran <dantran@microsoft.com>
+---
+ regcomp.c | 13 ++++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/regcomp.c b/regcomp.c
+index 00d26d9290..2688979882 100644
+--- a/regcomp.c
++++ b/regcomp.c
+@@ -11783,8 +11783,9 @@ S_grok_bslash_N(pTHX_ RExC_state_t *pRExC_state,
+
+ RExC_parse++; /* Skip past the '{' */
+
+- if (! (endbrace = strchr(RExC_parse, '}')) /* no trailing brace */
+- || ! (endbrace == RExC_parse /* nothing between the {} */
++ endbrace = (char *) memchr(RExC_parse, '}', RExC_end - RExC_parse);
++ if ((! endbrace) /* no trailing brace */
++ || ! (endbrace == RExC_parse /* nothing between the {} */
+ || (endbrace - RExC_parse >= 2 /* U+ (bad hex is checked... */
+ && strnEQ(RExC_parse, "U+", 2)))) /* ... below for a better
+ error msg) */
+@@ -12483,9 +12484,11 @@ S_regatom(pTHX_ RExC_state_t *pRExC_state, I32 *flagp, U32 depth)
+ else {
+ STRLEN length;
+ char name = *RExC_parse;
+- char * endbrace;
++ char * endbrace = NULL;
+ RExC_parse += 2;
+- endbrace = strchr(RExC_parse, '}');
++ if (RExC_parse < RExC_end) {
++ endbrace = (char *) memchr(RExC_parse, '}', RExC_end - RExC_parse);
++ }
+
+ if (! endbrace) {
+ vFAIL2("Missing right brace on \\%c{}", name);
+@@ -15939,7 +15942,7 @@ S_regclass(pTHX_ RExC_state_t *pRExC_state, I32 *flagp, U32 depth,
+ vFAIL2("Empty \\%c", (U8)value);
+ if (*RExC_parse == '{') {
+ const U8 c = (U8)value;
+- e = strchr(RExC_parse, '}');
++ e = (char *) memchr(RExC_parse, '}', RExC_end - RExC_parse);
+ if (!e) {
+ RExC_parse++;
+ vFAIL2("Missing right brace on \\%c{}", c);
+--
+2.22.0.vfs.1.1.57.gbaf16c8
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl/CVE-2018-18314.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl/CVE-2018-18314.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e84e7bc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl/CVE-2018-18314.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,271 @@
+From 6a2d07f43ae7cfcb2eb30cf39751f2f7fed7ecc1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Yves Orton <demerphq@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 26 Jun 2017 13:19:55 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 3/3] fix #131649 - extended charclass can trigger assert
+
+The extended charclass parser makes some assumptions during the
+first pass which are only true on well structured input, and it
+does not properly catch various errors. later on the code assumes
+that things the first pass will let through are valid, when in
+fact they should trigger errors.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 19a498a461d7c81ae3507c450953d1148efecf4f)
+
+CVE: CVE-2018-18314
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+[https://perl5.git.perl.org/perl.git/commit/dabe076af345ab4512ea80245b4e4cd7ec0996cd]
+
+Signed-off-by: Dan Tran <dantran@microsoft.com>
+---
+ pod/perldiag.pod | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ pod/perlrecharclass.pod | 4 ++--
+ regcomp.c | 23 +++++++++++++----------
+ t/lib/warnings/regcomp | 6 +++---
+ t/re/reg_mesg.t | 29 ++++++++++++++++-------------
+ t/re/regex_sets.t | 6 +++---
+ 6 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/pod/perldiag.pod b/pod/perldiag.pod
+index 737d3633f6..644b814008 100644
+--- a/pod/perldiag.pod
++++ b/pod/perldiag.pod
+@@ -5777,7 +5777,7 @@ yourself.
+ a perl4 interpreter, especially if the next 2 tokens are "use strict"
+ or "my $var" or "our $var".
+
+-=item Syntax error in (?[...]) in regex m/%s/
++=item Syntax error in (?[...]) in regex; marked by <-- HERE in m/%s/
+
+ (F) Perl could not figure out what you meant inside this construct; this
+ notifies you that it is giving up trying.
+@@ -6153,6 +6153,31 @@ for example,
+ (F) The unexec() routine failed for some reason. See your local FSF
+ representative, who probably put it there in the first place.
+
++=item Unexpected ']' with no following ')' in (?[... in regex; marked by <-- HERE in m/%s/
++
++(F) While parsing an extended character class a ']' character was encountered
++at a point in the definition where the only legal use of ']' is to close the
++character class definition as part of a '])', you may have forgotten the close
++paren, or otherwise confused the parser.
++
++=item Expecting close paren for nested extended charclass in regex; marked by <-- HERE in m/%s/
++
++(F) While parsing a nested extended character class like:
++
++ (?[ ... (?flags:(?[ ... ])) ... ])
++ ^
++
++we expected to see a close paren ')' (marked by ^) but did not.
++
++=item Expecting close paren for wrapper for nested extended charclass in regex; marked by <-- HERE in m/%s/
++
++(F) While parsing a nested extended character class like:
++
++ (?[ ... (?flags:(?[ ... ])) ... ])
++ ^
++
++we expected to see a close paren ')' (marked by ^) but did not.
++
+ =item Unexpected binary operator '%c' with no preceding operand in regex;
+ marked by S<<-- HERE> in m/%s/
+
+diff --git a/pod/perlrecharclass.pod b/pod/perlrecharclass.pod
+index 89f4a7ef3f..a557cc0384 100644
+--- a/pod/perlrecharclass.pod
++++ b/pod/perlrecharclass.pod
+@@ -1101,8 +1101,8 @@ hence both of the following work:
+ Any contained POSIX character classes, including things like C<\w> and C<\D>
+ respect the C<E<sol>a> (and C<E<sol>aa>) modifiers.
+
+-C<< (?[ ]) >> is a regex-compile-time construct. Any attempt to use
+-something which isn't knowable at the time the containing regular
++Note that C<< (?[ ]) >> is a regex-compile-time construct. Any attempt
++to use something which isn't knowable at the time the containing regular
+ expression is compiled is a fatal error. In practice, this means
+ just three limitations:
+
+diff --git a/regcomp.c b/regcomp.c
+index 2688979882..cb8409ed27 100644
+--- a/regcomp.c
++++ b/regcomp.c
+@@ -14609,8 +14609,9 @@ S_handle_regex_sets(pTHX_ RExC_state_t *pRExC_state, SV** return_invlist,
+ TRUE /* Force /x */ );
+
+ switch (*RExC_parse) {
+- case '?':
+- if (RExC_parse[1] == '[') depth++, RExC_parse++;
++ case '(':
++ if (RExC_parse[1] == '?' && RExC_parse[2] == '[')
++ depth++, RExC_parse+=2;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ default:
+ break;
+@@ -14667,9 +14668,9 @@ S_handle_regex_sets(pTHX_ RExC_state_t *pRExC_state, SV** return_invlist,
+ }
+
+ case ']':
+- if (depth--) break;
+- RExC_parse++;
+- if (*RExC_parse == ')') {
++ if (RExC_parse[1] == ')') {
++ RExC_parse++;
++ if (depth--) break;
+ node = reganode(pRExC_state, ANYOF, 0);
+ RExC_size += ANYOF_SKIP;
+ nextchar(pRExC_state);
+@@ -14681,20 +14682,20 @@ S_handle_regex_sets(pTHX_ RExC_state_t *pRExC_state, SV** return_invlist,
+
+ return node;
+ }
+- goto no_close;
++ RExC_parse++;
++ vFAIL("Unexpected ']' with no following ')' in (?[...");
+ }
+
+ RExC_parse += UTF ? UTF8SKIP(RExC_parse) : 1;
+ }
+
+- no_close:
+ /* We output the messages even if warnings are off, because we'll fail
+ * the very next thing, and these give a likely diagnosis for that */
+ if (posix_warnings && av_tindex_nomg(posix_warnings) >= 0) {
+ output_or_return_posix_warnings(pRExC_state, posix_warnings, NULL);
+ }
+
+- FAIL("Syntax error in (?[...])");
++ vFAIL("Syntax error in (?[...])");
+ }
+
+ /* Pass 2 only after this. */
+@@ -14868,12 +14869,14 @@ redo_curchar:
+ * inversion list, and RExC_parse points to the trailing
+ * ']'; the next character should be the ')' */
+ RExC_parse++;
+- assert(UCHARAT(RExC_parse) == ')');
++ if (UCHARAT(RExC_parse) != ')')
++ vFAIL("Expecting close paren for nested extended charclass");
+
+ /* Then the ')' matching the original '(' handled by this
+ * case: statement */
+ RExC_parse++;
+- assert(UCHARAT(RExC_parse) == ')');
++ if (UCHARAT(RExC_parse) != ')')
++ vFAIL("Expecting close paren for wrapper for nested extended charclass");
+
+ RExC_flags = save_flags;
+ goto handle_operand;
+diff --git a/t/lib/warnings/regcomp b/t/lib/warnings/regcomp
+index 08cb27b00f..367276d0fc 100644
+--- a/t/lib/warnings/regcomp
++++ b/t/lib/warnings/regcomp
+@@ -59,21 +59,21 @@ Unmatched [ in regex; marked by <-- HERE in m/abc[ <-- HERE fi[.00./ at - line
+ qr/(?[[[:word]]])/;
+ EXPECT
+ Assuming NOT a POSIX class since there is no terminating ':' in regex; marked by <-- HERE in m/(?[[[:word <-- HERE ]]])/ at - line 2.
+-syntax error in (?[...]) in regex m/(?[[[:word]]])/ at - line 2.
++Unexpected ']' with no following ')' in (?[... in regex; marked by <-- HERE in m/(?[[[:word]] <-- HERE ])/ at - line 2.
+ ########
+ # NAME qr/(?[ [[:digit: ])/
+ # OPTION fatal
+ qr/(?[[[:digit: ])/;
+ EXPECT
+ Assuming NOT a POSIX class since no blanks are allowed in one in regex; marked by <-- HERE in m/(?[[[:digit: ] <-- HERE )/ at - line 2.
+-syntax error in (?[...]) in regex m/(?[[[:digit: ])/ at - line 2.
++syntax error in (?[...]) in regex; marked by <-- HERE in m/(?[[[:digit: ]) <-- HERE / at - line 2.
+ ########
+ # NAME qr/(?[ [:digit: ])/
+ # OPTION fatal
+ qr/(?[[:digit: ])/
+ EXPECT
+ Assuming NOT a POSIX class since no blanks are allowed in one in regex; marked by <-- HERE in m/(?[[:digit: ] <-- HERE )/ at - line 2.
+-syntax error in (?[...]) in regex m/(?[[:digit: ])/ at - line 2.
++syntax error in (?[...]) in regex; marked by <-- HERE in m/(?[[:digit: ]) <-- HERE / at - line 2.
+ ########
+ # NAME [perl #126141]
+ # OPTION fatal
+diff --git a/t/re/reg_mesg.t b/t/re/reg_mesg.t
+index 658397ac27..08a3688e1d 100644
+--- a/t/re/reg_mesg.t
++++ b/t/re/reg_mesg.t
+@@ -202,8 +202,9 @@ my @death =
+ '/\b{gc}/' => "'gc' is an unknown bound type {#} m/\\b{gc{#}}/",
+ '/\B{gc}/' => "'gc' is an unknown bound type {#} m/\\B{gc{#}}/",
+
+- '/(?[[[::]]])/' => "Syntax error in (?[...]) in regex m/(?[[[::]]])/",
+- '/(?[[[:w:]]])/' => "Syntax error in (?[...]) in regex m/(?[[[:w:]]])/",
++
++ '/(?[[[::]]])/' => "Unexpected ']' with no following ')' in (?[... {#} m/(?[[[::]]{#}])/",
++ '/(?[[[:w:]]])/' => "Unexpected ']' with no following ')' in (?[... {#} m/(?[[[:w:]]{#}])/",
+ '/(?[[:w:]])/' => "",
+ '/[][[:alpha:]]' => "", # [perl #127581]
+ '/([.].*)[.]/' => "", # [perl #127582]
+@@ -227,11 +228,12 @@ my @death =
+ '/(?[ \p{foo} ])/' => 'Can\'t find Unicode property definition "foo" {#} m/(?[ \p{foo}{#} ])/',
+ '/(?[ \p{ foo = bar } ])/' => 'Can\'t find Unicode property definition "foo = bar" {#} m/(?[ \p{ foo = bar }{#} ])/',
+ '/(?[ \8 ])/' => 'Unrecognized escape \8 in character class {#} m/(?[ \8{#} ])/',
+- '/(?[ \t ]/' => 'Syntax error in (?[...]) in regex m/(?[ \t ]/',
+- '/(?[ [ \t ]/' => 'Syntax error in (?[...]) in regex m/(?[ [ \t ]/',
+- '/(?[ \t ] ]/' => 'Syntax error in (?[...]) in regex m/(?[ \t ] ]/',
+- '/(?[ [ ] ]/' => 'Syntax error in (?[...]) in regex m/(?[ [ ] ]/',
+- '/(?[ \t + \e # This was supposed to be a comment ])/' => 'Syntax error in (?[...]) in regex m/(?[ \t + \e # This was supposed to be a comment ])/',
++ '/(?[ \t ]/' => "Unexpected ']' with no following ')' in (?[... {#} m/(?[ \\t ]{#}/",
++ '/(?[ [ \t ]/' => "Syntax error in (?[...]) {#} m/(?[ [ \\t ]{#}/",
++ '/(?[ \t ] ]/' => "Unexpected ']' with no following ')' in (?[... {#} m/(?[ \\t ]{#} ]/",
++ '/(?[ [ ] ]/' => "Syntax error in (?[...]) {#} m/(?[ [ ] ]{#}/",
++ '/(?[ \t + \e # This was supposed to be a comment ])/' =>
++ "Syntax error in (?[...]) {#} m/(?[ \\t + \\e # This was supposed to be a comment ]){#}/",
+ '/(?[ ])/' => 'Incomplete expression within \'(?[ ])\' {#} m/(?[ {#}])/',
+ 'm/(?[[a-\d]])/' => 'False [] range "a-\d" {#} m/(?[[a-\d{#}]])/',
+ 'm/(?[[\w-x]])/' => 'False [] range "\w-" {#} m/(?[[\w-{#}x]])/',
+@@ -410,10 +412,10 @@ my @death_utf8 = mark_as_utf8(
+
+ '/ネ\p{}ネ/' => 'Empty \p{} {#} m/ネ\p{{#}}ネ/',
+
+- '/ネ(?[[[:ネ]]])ネ/' => "Syntax error in (?[...]) in regex m/ネ(?[[[:ネ]]])ネ/",
+- '/ネ(?[[[:ネ: ])ネ/' => "Syntax error in (?[...]) in regex m/ネ(?[[[:ネ: ])ネ/",
+- '/ネ(?[[[::]]])ネ/' => "Syntax error in (?[...]) in regex m/ネ(?[[[::]]])ネ/",
+- '/ネ(?[[[:ネ:]]])ネ/' => "Syntax error in (?[...]) in regex m/ネ(?[[[:ネ:]]])ネ/",
++ '/ネ(?[[[:ネ]]])ネ/' => "Unexpected ']' with no following ')' in (?[... {#} m/ネ(?[[[:ネ]]{#}])ネ/",
++ '/ネ(?[[[:ネ: ])ネ/' => "Syntax error in (?[...]) {#} m/ネ(?[[[:ネ: ])ネ{#}/",
++ '/ネ(?[[[::]]])ネ/' => "Unexpected ']' with no following ')' in (?[... {#} m/ネ(?[[[::]]{#}])ネ/",
++ '/ネ(?[[[:ネ:]]])ネ/' => "Unexpected ']' with no following ')' in (?[... {#} m/ネ(?[[[:ネ:]]{#}])ネ/",
+ '/ネ(?[[:ネ:]])ネ/' => "",
+ '/ネ(?[ネ])ネ/' => 'Unexpected character {#} m/ネ(?[ネ{#}])ネ/',
+ '/ネ(?[ + [ネ] ])/' => 'Unexpected binary operator \'+\' with no preceding operand {#} m/ネ(?[ +{#} [ネ] ])/',
+@@ -426,8 +428,9 @@ my @death_utf8 = mark_as_utf8(
+ '/(?[ \x{ネ} ])ネ/' => 'Non-hex character {#} m/(?[ \x{ネ{#}} ])ネ/',
+ '/(?[ \p{ネ} ])/' => 'Can\'t find Unicode property definition "ネ" {#} m/(?[ \p{ネ}{#} ])/',
+ '/(?[ \p{ ネ = bar } ])/' => 'Can\'t find Unicode property definition "ネ = bar" {#} m/(?[ \p{ ネ = bar }{#} ])/',
+- '/ネ(?[ \t ]/' => 'Syntax error in (?[...]) in regex m/ネ(?[ \t ]/',
+- '/(?[ \t + \e # ネ This was supposed to be a comment ])/' => 'Syntax error in (?[...]) in regex m/(?[ \t + \e # ネ This was supposed to be a comment ])/',
++ '/ネ(?[ \t ]/' => "Unexpected ']' with no following ')' in (?[... {#} m/ネ(?[ \\t ]{#}/",
++ '/(?[ \t + \e # ネ This was supposed to be a comment ])/' =>
++ "Syntax error in (?[...]) {#} m/(?[ \\t + \\e # ネ This was supposed to be a comment ]){#}/",
+ 'm/(*ネ)ネ/' => q<Unknown verb pattern 'ネ' {#} m/(*ネ){#}ネ/>,
+ '/\cネ/' => "Character following \"\\c\" must be printable ASCII",
+ '/\b{ネ}/' => "'ネ' is an unknown bound type {#} m/\\b{ネ{#}}/",
+diff --git a/t/re/regex_sets.t b/t/re/regex_sets.t
+index 92875677be..60a126ba3c 100644
+--- a/t/re/regex_sets.t
++++ b/t/re/regex_sets.t
+@@ -157,13 +157,13 @@ for my $char ("٠", "٥", "٩") {
+ eval { $_ = '/(?[(\c]) /'; qr/$_/ };
+ like($@, qr/^Syntax error/, '/(?[(\c]) / should not panic');
+ eval { $_ = '(?[\c#]' . "\n])"; qr/$_/ };
+- like($@, qr/^Syntax error/, '/(?[(\c]) / should not panic');
++ like($@, qr/^Unexpected/, '/(?[(\c]) / should not panic');
+ eval { $_ = '(?[(\c])'; qr/$_/ };
+ like($@, qr/^Syntax error/, '/(?[(\c])/ should be a syntax error');
+ eval { $_ = '(?[(\c]) ]\b'; qr/$_/ };
+- like($@, qr/^Syntax error/, '/(?[(\c]) ]\b/ should be a syntax error');
++ like($@, qr/^Unexpected/, '/(?[(\c]) ]\b/ should be a syntax error');
+ eval { $_ = '(?[\c[]](])'; qr/$_/ };
+- like($@, qr/^Syntax error/, '/(?[\c[]](])/ should be a syntax error');
++ like($@, qr/^Unexpected/, '/(?[\c[]](])/ should be a syntax error');
+ like("\c#", qr/(?[\c#])/, '\c# should match itself');
+ like("\c[", qr/(?[\c[])/, '\c[ should match itself');
+ like("\c\ ", qr/(?[\c\])/, '\c\ should match itself');
+--
+2.22.0.vfs.1.1.57.gbaf16c8
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl_5.24.4.bb b/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl_5.24.4.bb
index a644970..2f27749 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl_5.24.4.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl_5.24.4.bb
@@ -65,6 +65,10 @@ SRC_URI += " \
file://perl-5.26.1-guard_old_libcrypt_fix.patch \
file://CVE-2018-12015.patch \
file://0001-ExtUtils-MM_Unix.pm-fix-race-issues.patch \
+ file://CVE-2018-18311.patch \
+ file://CVE-2018-18312.patch \
+ file://CVE-2018-18313.patch \
+ file://CVE-2018-18314.patch \
"
# Fix test case issues
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread