All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
* [PATCH 0/2] libpcre: 2 CVE fixes
@ 2017-08-30  0:48 Robert Yang
  2017-08-30  0:48 ` [PATCH 1/2] libpcre2: Fix CVE-2017-8786 Robert Yang
  2017-08-30  0:48 ` [PATCH 2/2] libpcre2: Fix CVE-2017-7186 Robert Yang
  0 siblings, 2 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Robert Yang @ 2017-08-30  0:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: openembedded-core

The following changes since commit 2454019844c762613a2c78ed7f7f2d30960c0bfd:

  libsdl: Move PACKAGECONFIG options from meta-mingw (2017-08-29 12:08:24 +0100)

are available in the git repository at:

  git://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib rbt/pcre
  http://cgit.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib/log/?h=rbt/pcre

Robert Yang (2):
  libpcre2: Fix CVE-2017-8786
  libpcre2: Fix CVE-2017-7186

 .../libpcre/libpcre2/libpcre2-CVE-2017-7186.patch  | 96 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 .../libpcre/libpcre2/libpcre2-CVE-2017-8786.patch  | 93 +++++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2_10.23.bb     |  2 +
 3 files changed, 191 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2/libpcre2-CVE-2017-7186.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2/libpcre2-CVE-2017-8786.patch

-- 
2.10.2



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 1/2] libpcre2: Fix CVE-2017-8786
  2017-08-30  0:48 [PATCH 0/2] libpcre: 2 CVE fixes Robert Yang
@ 2017-08-30  0:48 ` Robert Yang
  2017-08-30  0:48 ` [PATCH 2/2] libpcre2: Fix CVE-2017-7186 Robert Yang
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Robert Yang @ 2017-08-30  0:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: openembedded-core

The pcre2test.c in PCRE2 10.23 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of
service (heap-based buffer overflow) or possibly have unspecified other impact
via a crafted regular expression.

Signed-off-by: Robert Yang <liezhi.yang@windriver.com>
---
 .../libpcre/libpcre2/libpcre2-CVE-2017-8786.patch  | 93 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2_10.23.bb     |  1 +
 2 files changed, 94 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2/libpcre2-CVE-2017-8786.patch

diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2/libpcre2-CVE-2017-8786.patch b/meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2/libpcre2-CVE-2017-8786.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eafafc1f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2/libpcre2-CVE-2017-8786.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+libpcre2-10.23: Fix CVE-2017-8786
+
+The pcre2test.c in PCRE2 10.23 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of
+service (heap-based buffer overflow) or possibly have unspecified other impact
+via a crafted regular expression.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://vcs.pcre.org/pcre2/code/trunk/src/pcre2test.c?r1=692&r2=697&view=patch]
+CVE: CVE-2017-8786
+
+Signed-off-by: Robert Yang <liezhi.yang@windriver.com>
+
+--- trunk/src/pcre2test.c  2017/03/21 16:18:54 692
++++ trunk/src/pcre2test.c  2017/03/21 18:36:13 697
+@@ -1017,9 +1017,9 @@
+   if (test_mode == PCRE8_MODE) \
+     r = pcre2_get_error_message_8(a,G(b,8),G(G(b,8),_size)); \
+   else if (test_mode == PCRE16_MODE) \
+-    r = pcre2_get_error_message_16(a,G(b,16),G(G(b,16),_size)); \
++    r = pcre2_get_error_message_16(a,G(b,16),G(G(b,16),_size/2)); \
+   else \
+-    r = pcre2_get_error_message_32(a,G(b,32),G(G(b,32),_size))
++    r = pcre2_get_error_message_32(a,G(b,32),G(G(b,32),_size/4))
+ 
+ #define PCRE2_GET_OVECTOR_COUNT(a,b) \
+   if (test_mode == PCRE8_MODE) \
+@@ -1399,6 +1399,9 @@
+ 
+ /* ----- Common macros for two-mode cases ----- */
+ 
++#define BYTEONE (BITONE/8)
++#define BYTETWO (BITTWO/8)
++
+ #define CASTFLD(t,a,b) \
+   ((test_mode == G(G(PCRE,BITONE),_MODE))? (t)(G(a,BITONE)->b) : \
+     (t)(G(a,BITTWO)->b))
+@@ -1481,9 +1484,9 @@
+ 
+ #define PCRE2_GET_ERROR_MESSAGE(r,a,b) \
+   if (test_mode == G(G(PCRE,BITONE),_MODE)) \
+-    r = G(pcre2_get_error_message_,BITONE)(a,G(b,BITONE),G(G(b,BITONE),_size)); \
++    r = G(pcre2_get_error_message_,BITONE)(a,G(b,BITONE),G(G(b,BITONE),_size/BYTEONE)); \
+   else \
+-    r = G(pcre2_get_error_message_,BITTWO)(a,G(b,BITTWO),G(G(b,BITTWO),_size))
++    r = G(pcre2_get_error_message_,BITTWO)(a,G(b,BITTWO),G(G(b,BITTWO),_size/BYTETWO))
+ 
+ #define PCRE2_GET_OVECTOR_COUNT(a,b) \
+   if (test_mode == G(G(PCRE,BITONE),_MODE)) \
+@@ -1904,7 +1907,7 @@
+ #define PCRE2_DFA_MATCH(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i,j) \
+   a = pcre2_dfa_match_16(G(b,16),(PCRE2_SPTR16)c,d,e,f,G(g,16),h,i,j)
+ #define PCRE2_GET_ERROR_MESSAGE(r,a,b) \
+-  r = pcre2_get_error_message_16(a,G(b,16),G(G(b,16),_size))
++  r = pcre2_get_error_message_16(a,G(b,16),G(G(b,16),_size/2))
+ #define PCRE2_GET_OVECTOR_COUNT(a,b) a = pcre2_get_ovector_count_16(G(b,16))
+ #define PCRE2_GET_STARTCHAR(a,b) a = pcre2_get_startchar_16(G(b,16))
+ #define PCRE2_JIT_COMPILE(r,a,b) r = pcre2_jit_compile_16(G(a,16),b)
+@@ -2000,7 +2003,7 @@
+ #define PCRE2_DFA_MATCH(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i,j) \
+   a = pcre2_dfa_match_32(G(b,32),(PCRE2_SPTR32)c,d,e,f,G(g,32),h,i,j)
+ #define PCRE2_GET_ERROR_MESSAGE(r,a,b) \
+-  r = pcre2_get_error_message_32(a,G(b,32),G(G(b,32),_size))
++  r = pcre2_get_error_message_32(a,G(b,32),G(G(b,32),_size/4))
+ #define PCRE2_GET_OVECTOR_COUNT(a,b) a = pcre2_get_ovector_count_32(G(b,32))
+ #define PCRE2_GET_STARTCHAR(a,b) a = pcre2_get_startchar_32(G(b,32))
+ #define PCRE2_JIT_COMPILE(r,a,b) r = pcre2_jit_compile_32(G(a,32),b)
+@@ -2889,7 +2892,7 @@
+   {
+   if (pbuffer32 != NULL) free(pbuffer32);
+   pbuffer32_size = 4*len + 4;
+-  if (pbuffer32_size < 256) pbuffer32_size = 256;
++  if (pbuffer32_size < 512) pbuffer32_size = 512;
+   pbuffer32 = (uint32_t *)malloc(pbuffer32_size);
+   if (pbuffer32 == NULL)
+     {
+@@ -7600,7 +7603,8 @@
+   int errcode;
+   char *endptr;
+ 
+-/* Ensure the relevant non-8-bit buffer is available. */
++/* Ensure the relevant non-8-bit buffer is available. Ensure that it is at 
++least 128 code units, because it is used for retrieving error messages. */
+ 
+ #ifdef SUPPORT_PCRE2_16
+   if (test_mode == PCRE16_MODE)
+@@ -7620,7 +7624,7 @@
+ #ifdef SUPPORT_PCRE2_32
+   if (test_mode == PCRE32_MODE)
+     {
+-    pbuffer32_size = 256;
++    pbuffer32_size = 512;
+     pbuffer32 = (uint32_t *)malloc(pbuffer32_size);
+     if (pbuffer32 == NULL)
+       {
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2_10.23.bb b/meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2_10.23.bb
index 794d973..63f8d51 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2_10.23.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2_10.23.bb
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENCE;md5=3de34df49e1fe3c3b59a08dff214488b"
 
 SRC_URI = "https://ftp.pcre.org/pub/pcre/pcre2-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
            file://pcre-cross.patch \
+           file://libpcre2-CVE-2017-8786.patch \
 "
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "b2cd00ca7e24049040099b0a46bb3649"
-- 
2.10.2



^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 2/2] libpcre2: Fix CVE-2017-7186
  2017-08-30  0:48 [PATCH 0/2] libpcre: 2 CVE fixes Robert Yang
  2017-08-30  0:48 ` [PATCH 1/2] libpcre2: Fix CVE-2017-8786 Robert Yang
@ 2017-08-30  0:48 ` Robert Yang
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Robert Yang @ 2017-08-30  0:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: openembedded-core

A fuzz on libpcre1 through the pcretest utility revealed an invalid read in the
library. For who is interested in a detailed description of the bug, will
follow a feedback from upstream:

This was a genuine bug in the 32-bit library. Thanks for finding it. The crash
was caused by trying to find a Unicode property for a code value greater than
0x10ffff, the Unicode maximum, when running in non-UTF mode (where character
values can be up to 0xffffffff).

Signed-off-by: Robert Yang <liezhi.yang@windriver.com>
---
 .../libpcre/libpcre2/libpcre2-CVE-2017-7186.patch  | 96 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2_10.23.bb     |  1 +
 2 files changed, 97 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2/libpcre2-CVE-2017-7186.patch

diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2/libpcre2-CVE-2017-7186.patch b/meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2/libpcre2-CVE-2017-7186.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bfa3bfe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2/libpcre2-CVE-2017-7186.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+libpcre2-10.23: Fix CVE-2017-7186
+
+A fuzz on libpcre1 through the pcretest utility revealed an invalid read in the
+library. For who is interested in a detailed description of the bug, will
+follow a feedback from upstream:
+
+This was a genuine bug in the 32-bit library. Thanks for finding it. The crash
+was caused by trying to find a Unicode property for a code value greater than
+0x10ffff, the Unicode maximum, when running in non-UTF mode (where character
+values can be up to 0xffffffff).
+
+The complete ASan output:
+
+# pcretest -32 -d $FILE
+==14788==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x7f1bbffed4df (pc 0x7f1bbee3fe6b bp 0x7fff8b50d8c0 sp 0x7fff8b50d3a0 T0)
+==14788==The signal is caused by a READ memory access.
+    #0 0x7f1bbee3fe6a in match /tmp/portage/dev-libs/libpcre-8.40/work/pcre-8.40/pcre_exec.c:5473:18
+    #1 0x7f1bbee09226 in pcre32_exec /tmp/portage/dev-libs/libpcre-8.40/work/pcre-8.40/pcre_exec.c:6936:8
+    #2 0x527d6c in main /tmp/portage/dev-libs/libpcre-8.40/work/pcre-8.40/pcretest.c:5218:9
+    #3 0x7f1bbddd678f in __libc_start_main /tmp/portage/sys-libs/glibc-2.23-r3/work/glibc-2.23/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:289
+    #4 0x41b438 in _init (/usr/bin/pcretest+0x41b438)
+
+AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info.
+SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV /tmp/portage/dev-libs/libpcre-8.40/work/pcre-8.40/pcre_exec.c:5473:18 in match
+==14788==ABORTING
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://vcs.pcre.org/pcre2/code/trunk/src/pcre2_ucd.c?view=patch&r1=316&r2=670&sortby=date \
+                        https://vcs.pcre.org/pcre2/code/trunk/src/pcre2_internal.h?view=patch&r1=600&r2=670&sortby=date]
+CVE: CVE-2017-7186
+
+Signed-off-by: Robert Yang <liezhi.yang@windriver.com>
+
+--- trunk/src/pcre2_ucd.c  2015/07/17 15:44:51 316
++++ trunk/src/pcre2_ucd.c  2017/02/24 18:25:32 670
+@@ -41,6 +41,20 @@
+ 
+ const char *PRIV(unicode_version) = "8.0.0";
+ 
++/* If the 32-bit library is run in non-32-bit mode, character values
++greater than 0x10ffff may be encountered. For these we set up a
++special record. */
++
++#if PCRE2_CODE_UNIT_WIDTH == 32
++const ucd_record PRIV(dummy_ucd_record)[] = {{
++  ucp_Common,    /* script */
++  ucp_Cn,        /* type unassigned */
++  ucp_gbOther,   /* grapheme break property */
++  0,             /* case set */
++  0,             /* other case */
++  }};
++#endif
++
+ /* When recompiling tables with a new Unicode version, please check the
+ types in this structure definition from pcre2_internal.h (the actual
+ field names will be different):
+--- trunk/src/pcre2_internal.h 2016/11/19 12:46:24 600
++++ trunk/src/pcre2_internal.h 2017/02/24 18:25:32 670
+@@ -1774,10 +1774,17 @@
+ /* UCD access macros */
+ 
+ #define UCD_BLOCK_SIZE 128
+-#define GET_UCD(ch) (PRIV(ucd_records) + \
++#define REAL_GET_UCD(ch) (PRIV(ucd_records) + \
+         PRIV(ucd_stage2)[PRIV(ucd_stage1)[(int)(ch) / UCD_BLOCK_SIZE] * \
+         UCD_BLOCK_SIZE + (int)(ch) % UCD_BLOCK_SIZE])
+ 
++#if PCRE2_CODE_UNIT_WIDTH == 32
++#define GET_UCD(ch) ((ch > MAX_UTF_CODE_POINT)? \
++  PRIV(dummy_ucd_record) : REAL_GET_UCD(ch))
++#else
++#define GET_UCD(ch) REAL_GET_UCD(ch)
++#endif
++
+ #define UCD_CHARTYPE(ch)    GET_UCD(ch)->chartype
+ #define UCD_SCRIPT(ch)      GET_UCD(ch)->script
+ #define UCD_CATEGORY(ch)    PRIV(ucp_gentype)[UCD_CHARTYPE(ch)]
+@@ -1834,6 +1841,9 @@
+ #define _pcre2_default_compile_context PCRE2_SUFFIX(_pcre2_default_compile_context_)
+ #define _pcre2_default_match_context   PCRE2_SUFFIX(_pcre2_default_match_context_)
+ #define _pcre2_default_tables          PCRE2_SUFFIX(_pcre2_default_tables_)
++#if PCRE2_CODE_UNIT_WIDTH == 32
++#define _pcre2_dummy_ucd_record        PCRE2_SUFFIX(_pcre2_dummy_ucd_record_)
++#endif
+ #define _pcre2_hspace_list             PCRE2_SUFFIX(_pcre2_hspace_list_)
+ #define _pcre2_vspace_list             PCRE2_SUFFIX(_pcre2_vspace_list_)
+ #define _pcre2_ucd_caseless_sets       PCRE2_SUFFIX(_pcre2_ucd_caseless_sets_)
+@@ -1858,6 +1868,9 @@
+ extern const uint32_t                  PRIV(vspace_list)[];
+ extern const uint32_t                  PRIV(ucd_caseless_sets)[];
+ extern const ucd_record                PRIV(ucd_records)[];
++#if PCRE2_CODE_UNIT_WIDTH == 32
++extern const ucd_record                PRIV(dummy_ucd_record)[];
++#endif
+ extern const uint8_t                   PRIV(ucd_stage1)[];
+ extern const uint16_t                  PRIV(ucd_stage2)[];
+ extern const uint32_t                  PRIV(ucp_gbtable)[];
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2_10.23.bb b/meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2_10.23.bb
index 63f8d51..ca2b028 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2_10.23.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2_10.23.bb
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENCE;md5=3de34df49e1fe3c3b59a08dff214488b"
 SRC_URI = "https://ftp.pcre.org/pub/pcre/pcre2-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
            file://pcre-cross.patch \
            file://libpcre2-CVE-2017-8786.patch \
+           file://libpcre2-CVE-2017-7186.patch \
 "
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "b2cd00ca7e24049040099b0a46bb3649"
-- 
2.10.2



^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2017-08-30  0:48 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2017-08-30  0:48 [PATCH 0/2] libpcre: 2 CVE fixes Robert Yang
2017-08-30  0:48 ` [PATCH 1/2] libpcre2: Fix CVE-2017-8786 Robert Yang
2017-08-30  0:48 ` [PATCH 2/2] libpcre2: Fix CVE-2017-7186 Robert Yang

This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.