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From: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
To: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: "Benjamin Gaignard" <benjamin.gaignard@linaro.org>,
	"Sandeep Patil" <sspatil@google.com>,
	driverdevel <devel@driverdev.osuosl.org>,
	"Greg Kroah-Hartman" <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	"Arve Hjønnevåg" <arve@android.com>,
	"dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org"
	<dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org>,
	"Linux Kernel Mailing List" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Riley Andrews" <riandrews@android.com>,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
	"Sumit Semwal" <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>,
	"Dan Carpenter" <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 2/2] staging: ion: create one device entry per heap
Date: Mon, 9 Oct 2017 17:10:37 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <dda39ec7-e1d7-8a11-2470-271cb7ba66e7@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171009220858.zwbguqkamzmswqcq@sirena.co.uk>

On 10/09/2017 03:08 PM, Mark Brown wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 09, 2017 at 02:25:47PM -0700, Laura Abbott wrote:
> 
>> Anyway, to move this forward I think we need to see a proof of concept
>> of using selinux to protect access to specific heaps.
> 
> Aren't Unix permissions enough with separate files or am I
> misunderstanding what you're looking to see a proof of concept for?
> 

The goal is to be able to restrict heap access to certain services
and selinux groups on Android so straight unix permissions aren't
sufficient.

Thanks,
Laura

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
To: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: driverdevel <devel@driverdev.osuosl.org>,
	"Sandeep Patil" <sspatil@google.com>,
	"Greg Kroah-Hartman" <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	"Linux Kernel Mailing List" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org"
	<dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org>,
	"Arve Hjønnevåg" <arve@android.com>,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
	"Riley Andrews" <riandrews@android.com>,
	"Dan Carpenter" <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 2/2] staging: ion: create one device entry per heap
Date: Mon, 9 Oct 2017 17:10:37 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <dda39ec7-e1d7-8a11-2470-271cb7ba66e7@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171009220858.zwbguqkamzmswqcq@sirena.co.uk>

On 10/09/2017 03:08 PM, Mark Brown wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 09, 2017 at 02:25:47PM -0700, Laura Abbott wrote:
> 
>> Anyway, to move this forward I think we need to see a proof of concept
>> of using selinux to protect access to specific heaps.
> 
> Aren't Unix permissions enough with separate files or am I
> misunderstanding what you're looking to see a proof of concept for?
> 

The goal is to be able to restrict heap access to certain services
and selinux groups on Android so straight unix permissions aren't
sufficient.

Thanks,
Laura
_______________________________________________
dri-devel mailing list
dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org
https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/dri-devel

  reply	other threads:[~2017-10-10  0:10 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-09-27 13:20 [PATCH v5 0/2] staging: ion: get one device per heap Benjamin Gaignard
2017-09-27 13:20 ` Benjamin Gaignard
2017-09-27 13:20 ` [PATCH v5 1/2] staging: ion: simplify ioctl args checking function Benjamin Gaignard
2017-09-27 13:20   ` Benjamin Gaignard
2017-10-09  9:21   ` Benjamin Gaignard
2017-10-09  9:21     ` Benjamin Gaignard
2017-10-09 16:45     ` Laura Abbott
2017-09-27 13:20 ` [PATCH v5 2/2] staging: ion: create one device entry per heap Benjamin Gaignard
2017-09-27 13:20   ` Benjamin Gaignard
2017-10-02 18:07   ` Laura Abbott
2017-10-02 18:07     ` Laura Abbott
2017-10-03 16:48     ` Mark Brown
2017-10-03 16:48       ` Mark Brown
2017-10-03 21:42       ` Laura Abbott
2017-10-03 23:08         ` Sandeep Patil
2017-10-03 23:08           ` Sandeep Patil
2017-10-03 23:37           ` Laura Abbott
2017-10-03 23:37             ` Laura Abbott
2017-10-04 10:17           ` Mark Brown
2017-10-04 10:17             ` Mark Brown
2017-10-05 13:06             ` Benjamin Gaignard
2017-10-05 13:06               ` Benjamin Gaignard
2017-10-09 21:25               ` Laura Abbott
2017-10-09 22:08                 ` Mark Brown
2017-10-10  0:10                   ` Laura Abbott [this message]
2017-10-10  0:10                     ` Laura Abbott
2017-10-10  9:11                     ` Mark Brown
2017-10-16 22:09                       ` Laura Abbott
2017-10-16 22:09                         ` Laura Abbott
2017-10-17 12:39                         ` Benjamin Gaignard
2017-10-17 12:39                           ` Benjamin Gaignard
2017-10-18 20:07   ` Laura Abbott
2017-10-18 20:07     ` Laura Abbott
2017-10-23 15:19     ` Benjamin Gaignard
2017-10-23 15:19       ` Benjamin Gaignard

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