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* [PATCH V4] tools/libxc, xen/x86: Added xc_set_mem_access_multi()
@ 2016-09-07  9:12 Razvan Cojocaru
  2016-09-07 14:36 ` Tamas K Lengyel
                   ` (4 more replies)
  0 siblings, 5 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Razvan Cojocaru @ 2016-09-07  9:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: xen-devel
  Cc: sstabellini, wei.liu2, Razvan Cojocaru, george.dunlap,
	andrew.cooper3, ian.jackson, julien.grall, tamas, jbeulich

Currently it is only possible to set mem_access restrictions only for
a contiguous range of GFNs (or, as a particular case, for a single GFN).
This patch introduces a new libxc function taking an array of GFNs.
The alternative would be to set each page in turn, using a userspace-HV
roundtrip for each call, and triggering a TLB flush per page set.

Signed-off-by: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>

---
Changes since V3:
 - Fixed ARM compilation (replaced ENOTSUP with EOPNOTSUPP, which is
   #defined in the in-tree errno.h). The multi code remains
   unimplemented for ARM (it depends on " [RFC 21/22] xen/arm: p2m:
   Re-implement p2m_set_mem_access using p2m_{set, get}_entry", and
   Julien Grall has gracefully accepted to defer implementation
   until after both patches go in).
 - Reordered the xen/guest_access.h #include in p2m.c.
 - Now passing a gfn_t to set_mem_access() instead of unsigned long.
 - Removed the p2m prefix from p2m_xenmem_access_to_p2m_access().
 - Switched from bool_t to bool.
 - Moved the XENMEM_access_op case up with the other do-nothing
   XENMEM_* cases.
---
 tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h |   9 +++
 tools/libxc/xc_mem_access.c   |  38 +++++++++++
 xen/arch/arm/p2m.c            |  10 +++
 xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c         | 150 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
 xen/common/compat/memory.c    |  23 +++++--
 xen/common/mem_access.c       |  11 ++++
 xen/include/public/memory.h   |  14 +++-
 xen/include/xen/p2m-common.h  |   6 ++
 xen/include/xlat.lst          |   2 +-
 9 files changed, 224 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h b/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h
index 560ce7b..5e685a6 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h
+++ b/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h
@@ -2126,6 +2126,15 @@ int xc_set_mem_access(xc_interface *xch, domid_t domain_id,
                       uint32_t nr);
 
 /*
+ * Set an array of pages to their respective access in the access array.
+ * The nr parameter specifies the size of the pages and access arrays.
+ * The same allowed access types as for xc_set_mem_access() apply.
+ */
+int xc_set_mem_access_multi(xc_interface *xch, domid_t domain_id,
+                            uint8_t *access, uint64_t *pages,
+                            uint32_t nr);
+
+/*
  * Gets the mem access for the given page (returned in access on success)
  */
 int xc_get_mem_access(xc_interface *xch, domid_t domain_id,
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_mem_access.c b/tools/libxc/xc_mem_access.c
index eee088c..9536635 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_mem_access.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_mem_access.c
@@ -41,6 +41,44 @@ int xc_set_mem_access(xc_interface *xch,
     return do_memory_op(xch, XENMEM_access_op, &mao, sizeof(mao));
 }
 
+int xc_set_mem_access_multi(xc_interface *xch,
+                            domid_t domain_id,
+                            uint8_t *access,
+                            uint64_t *pages,
+                            uint32_t nr)
+{
+    DECLARE_HYPERCALL_BOUNCE(access, nr, XC_HYPERCALL_BUFFER_BOUNCE_IN);
+    DECLARE_HYPERCALL_BOUNCE(pages, nr * sizeof(uint64_t),
+                             XC_HYPERCALL_BUFFER_BOUNCE_IN);
+    int rc;
+
+    xen_mem_access_op_t mao =
+    {
+        .op       = XENMEM_access_op_set_access_multi,
+        .domid    = domain_id,
+        .access   = XENMEM_access_default + 1, /* Invalid value */
+        .pfn      = ~0UL, /* Invalid GFN */
+        .nr       = nr,
+    };
+
+    if ( xc_hypercall_bounce_pre(xch, pages) ||
+         xc_hypercall_bounce_pre(xch, access) )
+    {
+        PERROR("Could not bounce memory for XENMEM_access_op_set_access_multi");
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    set_xen_guest_handle(mao.pfn_list, pages);
+    set_xen_guest_handle(mao.access_list, access);
+
+    rc = do_memory_op(xch, XENMEM_access_op, &mao, sizeof(mao));
+
+    xc_hypercall_bounce_post(xch, access);
+    xc_hypercall_bounce_post(xch, pages);
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
 int xc_get_mem_access(xc_interface *xch,
                       domid_t domain_id,
                       uint64_t pfn,
diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c b/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
index b648a9d..5c5049f 100644
--- a/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
+++ b/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
@@ -1836,6 +1836,16 @@ long p2m_set_mem_access(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn, uint32_t nr,
     return 0;
 }
 
+long p2m_set_mem_access_multi(struct domain *d,
+                              const XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(const_uint64) pfn_list,
+                              const XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(const_uint8) access_list,
+                              uint32_t nr, uint32_t start, uint32_t mask,
+                              unsigned int altp2m_idx)
+{
+    /* Not yet implemented on ARM. */
+    return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
 int p2m_get_mem_access(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn,
                        xenmem_access_t *access)
 {
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
index 27f9d26..97c7cfd 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
  * along with this program; If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
  */
 
+#include <xen/guest_access.h> /* copy_from_guest() */
 #include <xen/iommu.h>
 #include <xen/vm_event.h>
 #include <xen/event.h>
@@ -1793,21 +1794,37 @@ int p2m_set_altp2m_mem_access(struct domain *d, struct p2m_domain *hp2m,
                          (current->domain != d));
 }
 
-/*
- * Set access type for a region of gfns.
- * If gfn == INVALID_GFN, sets the default access type.
- */
-long p2m_set_mem_access(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn, uint32_t nr,
-                        uint32_t start, uint32_t mask, xenmem_access_t access,
-                        unsigned int altp2m_idx)
+static int set_mem_access(struct domain *d, struct p2m_domain *p2m,
+                          struct p2m_domain *ap2m, p2m_access_t a,
+                          gfn_t gfn)
 {
-    struct p2m_domain *p2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(d), *ap2m = NULL;
-    p2m_access_t a, _a;
-    p2m_type_t t;
-    mfn_t mfn;
-    unsigned long gfn_l;
-    long rc = 0;
+    int rc = 0;
 
+    if ( ap2m )
+    {
+        rc = p2m_set_altp2m_mem_access(d, p2m, ap2m, a, gfn);
+        /* If the corresponding mfn is invalid we will want to just skip it */
+        if ( rc == -ESRCH )
+            rc = 0;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        mfn_t mfn;
+        p2m_access_t _a;
+        p2m_type_t t;
+        unsigned long gfn_l = gfn_x(gfn);
+
+        mfn = p2m->get_entry(p2m, gfn_l, &t, &_a, 0, NULL, NULL);
+        rc = p2m->set_entry(p2m, gfn_l, mfn, PAGE_ORDER_4K, t, a, -1);
+    }
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+static bool xenmem_access_to_p2m_access(struct p2m_domain *p2m,
+                                        xenmem_access_t xaccess,
+                                        p2m_access_t *paccess)
+{
     static const p2m_access_t memaccess[] = {
 #define ACCESS(ac) [XENMEM_access_##ac] = p2m_access_##ac
         ACCESS(n),
@@ -1823,6 +1840,34 @@ long p2m_set_mem_access(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn, uint32_t nr,
 #undef ACCESS
     };
 
+    switch ( xaccess )
+    {
+    case 0 ... ARRAY_SIZE(memaccess) - 1:
+        *paccess = memaccess[xaccess];
+        break;
+    case XENMEM_access_default:
+        *paccess = p2m->default_access;
+        break;
+    default:
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set access type for a region of gfns.
+ * If gfn == INVALID_GFN, sets the default access type.
+ */
+long p2m_set_mem_access(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn, uint32_t nr,
+                        uint32_t start, uint32_t mask, xenmem_access_t access,
+                        unsigned int altp2m_idx)
+{
+    struct p2m_domain *p2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(d), *ap2m = NULL;
+    p2m_access_t a;
+    unsigned long gfn_l;
+    long rc = 0;
+
     /* altp2m view 0 is treated as the hostp2m */
     if ( altp2m_idx )
     {
@@ -1833,17 +1878,8 @@ long p2m_set_mem_access(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn, uint32_t nr,
         ap2m = d->arch.altp2m_p2m[altp2m_idx];
     }
 
-    switch ( access )
-    {
-    case 0 ... ARRAY_SIZE(memaccess) - 1:
-        a = memaccess[access];
-        break;
-    case XENMEM_access_default:
-        a = p2m->default_access;
-        break;
-    default:
+    if ( !xenmem_access_to_p2m_access(p2m, access, &a) )
         return -EINVAL;
-    }
 
     /* If request to set default access. */
     if ( gfn_eq(gfn, INVALID_GFN) )
@@ -1858,21 +1894,69 @@ long p2m_set_mem_access(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn, uint32_t nr,
 
     for ( gfn_l = gfn_x(gfn) + start; nr > start; ++gfn_l )
     {
-        if ( ap2m )
+        rc = set_mem_access(d, p2m, ap2m, a, _gfn(gfn_l));
+
+        if ( rc )
+            break;
+
+        /* Check for continuation if it's not the last iteration. */
+        if ( nr > ++start && !(start & mask) && hypercall_preempt_check() )
         {
-            rc = p2m_set_altp2m_mem_access(d, p2m, ap2m, a, _gfn(gfn_l));
-            /* If the corresponding mfn is invalid we will just skip it */
-            if ( rc && rc != -ESRCH )
-                break;
+            rc = start;
+            break;
         }
-        else
+    }
+
+    if ( ap2m )
+        p2m_unlock(ap2m);
+    p2m_unlock(p2m);
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+long p2m_set_mem_access_multi(struct domain *d,
+                              const XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(const_uint64) pfn_list,
+                              const XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(const_uint8) access_list,
+                              uint32_t nr, uint32_t start, uint32_t mask,
+                              unsigned int altp2m_idx)
+{
+    struct p2m_domain *p2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(d), *ap2m = NULL;
+    long rc = 0;
+
+    /* altp2m view 0 is treated as the hostp2m */
+    if ( altp2m_idx )
+    {
+        if ( altp2m_idx >= MAX_ALTP2M ||
+             d->arch.altp2m_eptp[altp2m_idx] == mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) )
+            return -EINVAL;
+
+        ap2m = d->arch.altp2m_p2m[altp2m_idx];
+    }
+
+    p2m_lock(p2m);
+    if ( ap2m )
+        p2m_lock(ap2m);
+
+    while ( start < nr )
+    {
+        p2m_access_t a;
+        uint8_t access;
+        uint64_t gfn_l;
+
+        copy_from_guest_offset(&gfn_l, pfn_list, start, 1);
+        copy_from_guest_offset(&access, access_list, start, 1);
+
+        if ( !xenmem_access_to_p2m_access(p2m, access, &a) )
         {
-            mfn = p2m->get_entry(p2m, gfn_l, &t, &_a, 0, NULL, NULL);
-            rc = p2m->set_entry(p2m, gfn_l, mfn, PAGE_ORDER_4K, t, a, -1);
-            if ( rc )
-                break;
+            rc = -EINVAL;
+            break;
         }
 
+        rc = set_mem_access(d, p2m, ap2m, a, _gfn(gfn_l));
+
+        if ( rc )
+            break;
+
         /* Check for continuation if it's not the last iteration. */
         if ( nr > ++start && !(start & mask) && hypercall_preempt_check() )
         {
diff --git a/xen/common/compat/memory.c b/xen/common/compat/memory.c
index 579040e..017a709 100644
--- a/xen/common/compat/memory.c
+++ b/xen/common/compat/memory.c
@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ CHECK_TYPE(domid);
 #undef compat_domid_t
 #undef xen_domid_t
 
-CHECK_mem_access_op;
 CHECK_vmemrange;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH
@@ -71,6 +70,7 @@ int compat_memory_op(unsigned int cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) compat)
             struct xen_add_to_physmap_batch *atpb;
             struct xen_remove_from_physmap *xrfp;
             struct xen_vnuma_topology_info *vnuma;
+            struct xen_mem_access_op *mao;
         } nat;
         union {
             struct compat_memory_reservation rsrv;
@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ int compat_memory_op(unsigned int cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) compat)
             struct compat_add_to_physmap atp;
             struct compat_add_to_physmap_batch atpb;
             struct compat_vnuma_topology_info vnuma;
+            struct compat_mem_access_op mao;
         } cmp;
 
         set_xen_guest_handle(nat.hnd, COMPAT_ARG_XLAT_VIRT_BASE);
@@ -321,9 +322,22 @@ int compat_memory_op(unsigned int cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) compat)
         }
 
         case XENMEM_access_op:
-            return mem_access_memop(cmd,
-                                    guest_handle_cast(compat,
-                                                      xen_mem_access_op_t));
+        {
+            if ( copy_from_guest(&cmp.mao, compat, 1) )
+                return -EFAULT;
+
+#define XLAT_mem_access_op_HNDL_pfn_list(_d_, _s_) \
+            guest_from_compat_handle((_d_)->pfn_list, (_s_)->pfn_list)
+#define XLAT_mem_access_op_HNDL_access_list(_d_, _s_) \
+            guest_from_compat_handle((_d_)->access_list, (_s_)->access_list)
+
+            XLAT_mem_access_op(nat.mao, &cmp.mao);
+
+#undef XLAT_mem_access_op_HNDL_pfn_list
+#undef XLAT_mem_access_op_HNDL_access_list
+
+            break;
+        }
 
         case XENMEM_get_vnumainfo:
         {
@@ -510,6 +524,7 @@ int compat_memory_op(unsigned int cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) compat)
         case XENMEM_maximum_gpfn:
         case XENMEM_add_to_physmap:
         case XENMEM_remove_from_physmap:
+        case XENMEM_access_op:
             break;
 
         case XENMEM_get_vnumainfo:
diff --git a/xen/common/mem_access.c b/xen/common/mem_access.c
index 82f4bad..565a320 100644
--- a/xen/common/mem_access.c
+++ b/xen/common/mem_access.c
@@ -76,6 +76,17 @@ int mem_access_memop(unsigned long cmd,
         }
         break;
 
+    case XENMEM_access_op_set_access_multi:
+        rc = p2m_set_mem_access_multi(d, mao.pfn_list, mao.access_list, mao.nr,
+                                      start_iter, MEMOP_CMD_MASK, 0);
+        if ( rc > 0 )
+        {
+            ASSERT(!(rc & MEMOP_CMD_MASK));
+            rc = hypercall_create_continuation(__HYPERVISOR_memory_op, "lh",
+                                               XENMEM_access_op | rc, arg);
+        }
+        break;
+
     case XENMEM_access_op_get_access:
     {
         xenmem_access_t access;
diff --git a/xen/include/public/memory.h b/xen/include/public/memory.h
index 3badfb9..a5547a9 100644
--- a/xen/include/public/memory.h
+++ b/xen/include/public/memory.h
@@ -410,6 +410,7 @@ DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_mem_paging_op_t);
  * #define XENMEM_access_op_enable_emulate     2
  * #define XENMEM_access_op_disable_emulate    3
  */
+#define XENMEM_access_op_set_access_multi   4
 
 typedef enum {
     XENMEM_access_n,
@@ -442,7 +443,8 @@ struct xen_mem_access_op {
     uint8_t access;
     domid_t domid;
     /*
-     * Number of pages for set op
+     * Number of pages for set op (or size of pfn_list for
+     * XENMEM_access_op_set_access_multi)
      * Ignored on setting default access and other ops
      */
     uint32_t nr;
@@ -452,6 +454,16 @@ struct xen_mem_access_op {
      * ~0ull is used to set and get the default access for pages
      */
     uint64_aligned_t pfn;
+    /*
+     * List of pfns to set access for
+     * Used only with XENMEM_access_op_set_access_multi
+     */
+    XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(const_uint64) pfn_list;
+    /*
+     * Corresponding list of access settings for pfn_list
+     * Used only with XENMEM_access_op_set_access_multi
+     */
+    XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(const_uint8) access_list;
 };
 typedef struct xen_mem_access_op xen_mem_access_op_t;
 DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_mem_access_op_t);
diff --git a/xen/include/xen/p2m-common.h b/xen/include/xen/p2m-common.h
index b4f9077..3be1e91 100644
--- a/xen/include/xen/p2m-common.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/p2m-common.h
@@ -53,6 +53,12 @@ long p2m_set_mem_access(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn, uint32_t nr,
                         uint32_t start, uint32_t mask, xenmem_access_t access,
                         unsigned int altp2m_idx);
 
+long p2m_set_mem_access_multi(struct domain *d,
+                              const XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(const_uint64) pfn_list,
+                              const XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(const_uint8) access_list,
+                              uint32_t nr, uint32_t start, uint32_t mask,
+                              unsigned int altp2m_idx);
+
 /*
  * Get access type for a gfn.
  * If gfn == INVALID_GFN, gets the default access type.
diff --git a/xen/include/xlat.lst b/xen/include/xlat.lst
index 801a1c1..bdf1d05 100644
--- a/xen/include/xlat.lst
+++ b/xen/include/xlat.lst
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@
 !	memory_exchange			memory.h
 !	memory_map			memory.h
 !	memory_reservation		memory.h
-?	mem_access_op			memory.h
+!	mem_access_op			memory.h
 !	pod_target			memory.h
 !	remove_from_physmap		memory.h
 !	reserved_device_memory_map	memory.h
-- 
1.9.1


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Xen-devel@lists.xen.org
https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH V4] tools/libxc, xen/x86: Added xc_set_mem_access_multi()
  2016-09-07  9:12 [PATCH V4] tools/libxc, xen/x86: Added xc_set_mem_access_multi() Razvan Cojocaru
@ 2016-09-07 14:36 ` Tamas K Lengyel
  2016-09-07 16:01 ` Jan Beulich
                   ` (3 subsequent siblings)
  4 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Tamas K Lengyel @ 2016-09-07 14:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Razvan Cojocaru
  Cc: Stefano Stabellini, wei.liu2, George Dunlap, Andrew Cooper,
	Ian Jackson, Xen-devel, Julien Grall, Jan Beulich

On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 3:12 AM, Razvan Cojocaru
<rcojocaru@bitdefender.com> wrote:
> Currently it is only possible to set mem_access restrictions only for
> a contiguous range of GFNs (or, as a particular case, for a single GFN).
> This patch introduces a new libxc function taking an array of GFNs.
> The alternative would be to set each page in turn, using a userspace-HV
> roundtrip for each call, and triggering a TLB flush per page set.
>
> Signed-off-by: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>
> Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>

Acked-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas@tklengyel.com>

_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@lists.xen.org
https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH V4] tools/libxc, xen/x86: Added xc_set_mem_access_multi()
  2016-09-07  9:12 [PATCH V4] tools/libxc, xen/x86: Added xc_set_mem_access_multi() Razvan Cojocaru
  2016-09-07 14:36 ` Tamas K Lengyel
@ 2016-09-07 16:01 ` Jan Beulich
  2016-09-15 13:39   ` Razvan Cojocaru
  2016-09-09 16:31 ` Julien Grall
                   ` (2 subsequent siblings)
  4 siblings, 1 reply; 12+ messages in thread
From: Jan Beulich @ 2016-09-07 16:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Razvan Cojocaru
  Cc: sstabellini, wei.liu2, george.dunlap, andrew.cooper3,
	ian.jackson, xen-devel, julien.grall, tamas

>>> On 07.09.16 at 11:12, <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com> wrote:
> Currently it is only possible to set mem_access restrictions only for
> a contiguous range of GFNs (or, as a particular case, for a single GFN).
> This patch introduces a new libxc function taking an array of GFNs.
> The alternative would be to set each page in turn, using a userspace-HV
> roundtrip for each call, and triggering a TLB flush per page set.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>
> Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>

Hypervisor parts (without ARM and x86/mm)
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>

albeit I spotted one more cosmetic issue (which I guess could be
fixed up during commit, if no other reason for a v5 arises):

> @@ -321,9 +322,22 @@ int compat_memory_op(unsigned int cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) compat)
>          }
>  
>          case XENMEM_access_op:
> -            return mem_access_memop(cmd,
> -                                    guest_handle_cast(compat,
> -                                                      xen_mem_access_op_t));
> +        {
> +            if ( copy_from_guest(&cmp.mao, compat, 1) )
> +                return -EFAULT;
> +
> +#define XLAT_mem_access_op_HNDL_pfn_list(_d_, _s_) \
> +            guest_from_compat_handle((_d_)->pfn_list, (_s_)->pfn_list)
> +#define XLAT_mem_access_op_HNDL_access_list(_d_, _s_) \
> +            guest_from_compat_handle((_d_)->access_list, (_s_)->access_list)
> +
> +            XLAT_mem_access_op(nat.mao, &cmp.mao);
> +
> +#undef XLAT_mem_access_op_HNDL_pfn_list
> +#undef XLAT_mem_access_op_HNDL_access_list
> +
> +            break;
> +        }

There are no local variables declared here, so I don't see the need
for the braces.

Jan


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^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH V4] tools/libxc, xen/x86: Added xc_set_mem_access_multi()
  2016-09-07  9:12 [PATCH V4] tools/libxc, xen/x86: Added xc_set_mem_access_multi() Razvan Cojocaru
  2016-09-07 14:36 ` Tamas K Lengyel
  2016-09-07 16:01 ` Jan Beulich
@ 2016-09-09 16:31 ` Julien Grall
  2016-09-19 15:51 ` George Dunlap
  2016-09-21 12:03 ` Jan Beulich
  4 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Julien Grall @ 2016-09-09 16:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Razvan Cojocaru, xen-devel
  Cc: sstabellini, wei.liu2, george.dunlap, andrew.cooper3,
	ian.jackson, tamas, jbeulich

Hello Razvan,

On 07/09/16 10:12, Razvan Cojocaru wrote:
> Currently it is only possible to set mem_access restrictions only for
> a contiguous range of GFNs (or, as a particular case, for a single GFN).
> This patch introduces a new libxc function taking an array of GFNs.
> The alternative would be to set each page in turn, using a userspace-HV
> roundtrip for each call, and triggering a TLB flush per page set.
>
> Signed-off-by: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>
> Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
>
> ---
> Changes since V3:
>  - Fixed ARM compilation (replaced ENOTSUP with EOPNOTSUPP, which is
>    #defined in the in-tree errno.h). The multi code remains
>    unimplemented for ARM (it depends on " [RFC 21/22] xen/arm: p2m:
>    Re-implement p2m_set_mem_access using p2m_{set, get}_entry", and
>    Julien Grall has gracefully accepted to defer implementation
>    until after both patches go in).

For the ARM bits:

Acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>

Regards,

-- 
Julien Grall

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^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH V4] tools/libxc, xen/x86: Added xc_set_mem_access_multi()
  2016-09-07 16:01 ` Jan Beulich
@ 2016-09-15 13:39   ` Razvan Cojocaru
  2016-09-15 13:49     ` Wei Liu
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 12+ messages in thread
From: Razvan Cojocaru @ 2016-09-15 13:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Jan Beulich
  Cc: sstabellini, wei.liu2, george.dunlap, andrew.cooper3,
	ian.jackson, xen-devel, julien.grall, tamas

On 09/07/2016 07:01 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>> On 07.09.16 at 11:12, <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com> wrote:
>> Currently it is only possible to set mem_access restrictions only for
>> a contiguous range of GFNs (or, as a particular case, for a single GFN).
>> This patch introduces a new libxc function taking an array of GFNs.
>> The alternative would be to set each page in turn, using a userspace-HV
>> roundtrip for each call, and triggering a TLB flush per page set.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>
>> Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
> 
> Hypervisor parts (without ARM and x86/mm)
> Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
> 
> albeit I spotted one more cosmetic issue (which I guess could be
> fixed up during commit, if no other reason for a v5 arises):
> 
>> @@ -321,9 +322,22 @@ int compat_memory_op(unsigned int cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) compat)
>>          }
>>  
>>          case XENMEM_access_op:
>> -            return mem_access_memop(cmd,
>> -                                    guest_handle_cast(compat,
>> -                                                      xen_mem_access_op_t));
>> +        {
>> +            if ( copy_from_guest(&cmp.mao, compat, 1) )
>> +                return -EFAULT;
>> +
>> +#define XLAT_mem_access_op_HNDL_pfn_list(_d_, _s_) \
>> +            guest_from_compat_handle((_d_)->pfn_list, (_s_)->pfn_list)
>> +#define XLAT_mem_access_op_HNDL_access_list(_d_, _s_) \
>> +            guest_from_compat_handle((_d_)->access_list, (_s_)->access_list)
>> +
>> +            XLAT_mem_access_op(nat.mao, &cmp.mao);
>> +
>> +#undef XLAT_mem_access_op_HNDL_pfn_list
>> +#undef XLAT_mem_access_op_HNDL_access_list
>> +
>> +            break;
>> +        }
> 
> There are no local variables declared here, so I don't see the need
> for the braces.

There have only been Acked-by replies so far, but if you'd prefer I have
no problem sending a V5 removing the braces.


Thanks,
Razvan

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^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH V4] tools/libxc, xen/x86: Added xc_set_mem_access_multi()
  2016-09-15 13:39   ` Razvan Cojocaru
@ 2016-09-15 13:49     ` Wei Liu
  2016-09-15 13:52       ` Razvan Cojocaru
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 12+ messages in thread
From: Wei Liu @ 2016-09-15 13:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Razvan Cojocaru
  Cc: sstabellini, wei.liu2, george.dunlap, andrew.cooper3,
	ian.jackson, xen-devel, julien.grall, tamas, Jan Beulich

On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 04:39:47PM +0300, Razvan Cojocaru wrote:
> On 09/07/2016 07:01 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
> >>>> On 07.09.16 at 11:12, <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com> wrote:
> >> Currently it is only possible to set mem_access restrictions only for
> >> a contiguous range of GFNs (or, as a particular case, for a single GFN).
> >> This patch introduces a new libxc function taking an array of GFNs.
> >> The alternative would be to set each page in turn, using a userspace-HV
> >> roundtrip for each call, and triggering a TLB flush per page set.
> >>
> >> Signed-off-by: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>
> >> Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
> > 
> > Hypervisor parts (without ARM and x86/mm)
> > Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
> > 
> > albeit I spotted one more cosmetic issue (which I guess could be
> > fixed up during commit, if no other reason for a v5 arises):
> > 
> >> @@ -321,9 +322,22 @@ int compat_memory_op(unsigned int cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) compat)
> >>          }
> >>  
> >>          case XENMEM_access_op:
> >> -            return mem_access_memop(cmd,
> >> -                                    guest_handle_cast(compat,
> >> -                                                      xen_mem_access_op_t));
> >> +        {
> >> +            if ( copy_from_guest(&cmp.mao, compat, 1) )
> >> +                return -EFAULT;
> >> +
> >> +#define XLAT_mem_access_op_HNDL_pfn_list(_d_, _s_) \
> >> +            guest_from_compat_handle((_d_)->pfn_list, (_s_)->pfn_list)
> >> +#define XLAT_mem_access_op_HNDL_access_list(_d_, _s_) \
> >> +            guest_from_compat_handle((_d_)->access_list, (_s_)->access_list)
> >> +
> >> +            XLAT_mem_access_op(nat.mao, &cmp.mao);
> >> +
> >> +#undef XLAT_mem_access_op_HNDL_pfn_list
> >> +#undef XLAT_mem_access_op_HNDL_access_list
> >> +
> >> +            break;
> >> +        }
> > 
> > There are no local variables declared here, so I don't see the need
> > for the braces.
> 
> There have only been Acked-by replies so far, but if you'd prefer I have
> no problem sending a V5 removing the braces.
> 

Does this patch have all the necessary acks? If so I don't mind fixing
it up and committing it.

Wei.

> 
> Thanks,
> Razvan

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^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH V4] tools/libxc, xen/x86: Added xc_set_mem_access_multi()
  2016-09-15 13:49     ` Wei Liu
@ 2016-09-15 13:52       ` Razvan Cojocaru
  2016-09-15 13:55         ` Wei Liu
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 12+ messages in thread
From: Razvan Cojocaru @ 2016-09-15 13:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Wei Liu
  Cc: sstabellini, george.dunlap, andrew.cooper3, ian.jackson,
	xen-devel, julien.grall, tamas, Jan Beulich

On 09/15/2016 04:49 PM, Wei Liu wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 04:39:47PM +0300, Razvan Cojocaru wrote:
>> On 09/07/2016 07:01 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>>> On 07.09.16 at 11:12, <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com> wrote:
>>>> Currently it is only possible to set mem_access restrictions only for
>>>> a contiguous range of GFNs (or, as a particular case, for a single GFN).
>>>> This patch introduces a new libxc function taking an array of GFNs.
>>>> The alternative would be to set each page in turn, using a userspace-HV
>>>> roundtrip for each call, and triggering a TLB flush per page set.
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>
>>>> Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
>>>
>>> Hypervisor parts (without ARM and x86/mm)
>>> Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
>>>
>>> albeit I spotted one more cosmetic issue (which I guess could be
>>> fixed up during commit, if no other reason for a v5 arises):
>>>
>>>> @@ -321,9 +322,22 @@ int compat_memory_op(unsigned int cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) compat)
>>>>          }
>>>>  
>>>>          case XENMEM_access_op:
>>>> -            return mem_access_memop(cmd,
>>>> -                                    guest_handle_cast(compat,
>>>> -                                                      xen_mem_access_op_t));
>>>> +        {
>>>> +            if ( copy_from_guest(&cmp.mao, compat, 1) )
>>>> +                return -EFAULT;
>>>> +
>>>> +#define XLAT_mem_access_op_HNDL_pfn_list(_d_, _s_) \
>>>> +            guest_from_compat_handle((_d_)->pfn_list, (_s_)->pfn_list)
>>>> +#define XLAT_mem_access_op_HNDL_access_list(_d_, _s_) \
>>>> +            guest_from_compat_handle((_d_)->access_list, (_s_)->access_list)
>>>> +
>>>> +            XLAT_mem_access_op(nat.mao, &cmp.mao);
>>>> +
>>>> +#undef XLAT_mem_access_op_HNDL_pfn_list
>>>> +#undef XLAT_mem_access_op_HNDL_access_list
>>>> +
>>>> +            break;
>>>> +        }
>>>
>>> There are no local variables declared here, so I don't see the need
>>> for the braces.
>>
>> There have only been Acked-by replies so far, but if you'd prefer I have
>> no problem sending a V5 removing the braces.
>>
> 
> Does this patch have all the necessary acks? If so I don't mind fixing
> it up and committing it.

In addition to your ack, it's:

Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas@tklengyel.com>
Acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>

for the hypervisor parts (without ARM and x86/mm), vm_event and ARM
respectively.


Thanks,
Razvan

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^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH V4] tools/libxc, xen/x86: Added xc_set_mem_access_multi()
  2016-09-15 13:52       ` Razvan Cojocaru
@ 2016-09-15 13:55         ` Wei Liu
  2016-09-15 13:55           ` Razvan Cojocaru
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 12+ messages in thread
From: Wei Liu @ 2016-09-15 13:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Razvan Cojocaru
  Cc: sstabellini, Wei Liu, george.dunlap, andrew.cooper3, ian.jackson,
	xen-devel, julien.grall, tamas, Jan Beulich

On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 04:52:32PM +0300, Razvan Cojocaru wrote:
> On 09/15/2016 04:49 PM, Wei Liu wrote:
> > On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 04:39:47PM +0300, Razvan Cojocaru wrote:
> >> On 09/07/2016 07:01 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
> >>>>>> On 07.09.16 at 11:12, <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com> wrote:
> >>>> Currently it is only possible to set mem_access restrictions only for
> >>>> a contiguous range of GFNs (or, as a particular case, for a single GFN).
> >>>> This patch introduces a new libxc function taking an array of GFNs.
> >>>> The alternative would be to set each page in turn, using a userspace-HV
> >>>> roundtrip for each call, and triggering a TLB flush per page set.
> >>>>
> >>>> Signed-off-by: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>
> >>>> Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
> >>>
> >>> Hypervisor parts (without ARM and x86/mm)
> >>> Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
> >>>
> >>> albeit I spotted one more cosmetic issue (which I guess could be
> >>> fixed up during commit, if no other reason for a v5 arises):
> >>>
> >>>> @@ -321,9 +322,22 @@ int compat_memory_op(unsigned int cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) compat)
> >>>>          }
> >>>>  
> >>>>          case XENMEM_access_op:
> >>>> -            return mem_access_memop(cmd,
> >>>> -                                    guest_handle_cast(compat,
> >>>> -                                                      xen_mem_access_op_t));
> >>>> +        {
> >>>> +            if ( copy_from_guest(&cmp.mao, compat, 1) )
> >>>> +                return -EFAULT;
> >>>> +
> >>>> +#define XLAT_mem_access_op_HNDL_pfn_list(_d_, _s_) \
> >>>> +            guest_from_compat_handle((_d_)->pfn_list, (_s_)->pfn_list)
> >>>> +#define XLAT_mem_access_op_HNDL_access_list(_d_, _s_) \
> >>>> +            guest_from_compat_handle((_d_)->access_list, (_s_)->access_list)
> >>>> +
> >>>> +            XLAT_mem_access_op(nat.mao, &cmp.mao);
> >>>> +
> >>>> +#undef XLAT_mem_access_op_HNDL_pfn_list
> >>>> +#undef XLAT_mem_access_op_HNDL_access_list
> >>>> +
> >>>> +            break;
> >>>> +        }
> >>>
> >>> There are no local variables declared here, so I don't see the need
> >>> for the braces.
> >>
> >> There have only been Acked-by replies so far, but if you'd prefer I have
> >> no problem sending a V5 removing the braces.
> >>
> > 
> > Does this patch have all the necessary acks? If so I don't mind fixing
> > it up and committing it.
> 
> In addition to your ack, it's:
> 
> Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
> Acked-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas@tklengyel.com>
> Acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
> 
> for the hypervisor parts (without ARM and x86/mm), vm_event and ARM
> respectively.
> 

I think it still needs an ack from George for x86/mm changes.

Wei.

> 
> Thanks,
> Razvan

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^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH V4] tools/libxc, xen/x86: Added xc_set_mem_access_multi()
  2016-09-15 13:55         ` Wei Liu
@ 2016-09-15 13:55           ` Razvan Cojocaru
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Razvan Cojocaru @ 2016-09-15 13:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Wei Liu
  Cc: sstabellini, george.dunlap, andrew.cooper3, ian.jackson,
	xen-devel, julien.grall, tamas, Jan Beulich

On 09/15/2016 04:55 PM, Wei Liu wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 04:52:32PM +0300, Razvan Cojocaru wrote:
>> On 09/15/2016 04:49 PM, Wei Liu wrote:
>>> On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 04:39:47PM +0300, Razvan Cojocaru wrote:
>>>> On 09/07/2016 07:01 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 07.09.16 at 11:12, <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com> wrote:
>>>>>> Currently it is only possible to set mem_access restrictions only for
>>>>>> a contiguous range of GFNs (or, as a particular case, for a single GFN).
>>>>>> This patch introduces a new libxc function taking an array of GFNs.
>>>>>> The alternative would be to set each page in turn, using a userspace-HV
>>>>>> roundtrip for each call, and triggering a TLB flush per page set.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Signed-off-by: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>
>>>>>> Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
>>>>>
>>>>> Hypervisor parts (without ARM and x86/mm)
>>>>> Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
>>>>>
>>>>> albeit I spotted one more cosmetic issue (which I guess could be
>>>>> fixed up during commit, if no other reason for a v5 arises):
>>>>>
>>>>>> @@ -321,9 +322,22 @@ int compat_memory_op(unsigned int cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) compat)
>>>>>>          }
>>>>>>  
>>>>>>          case XENMEM_access_op:
>>>>>> -            return mem_access_memop(cmd,
>>>>>> -                                    guest_handle_cast(compat,
>>>>>> -                                                      xen_mem_access_op_t));
>>>>>> +        {
>>>>>> +            if ( copy_from_guest(&cmp.mao, compat, 1) )
>>>>>> +                return -EFAULT;
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> +#define XLAT_mem_access_op_HNDL_pfn_list(_d_, _s_) \
>>>>>> +            guest_from_compat_handle((_d_)->pfn_list, (_s_)->pfn_list)
>>>>>> +#define XLAT_mem_access_op_HNDL_access_list(_d_, _s_) \
>>>>>> +            guest_from_compat_handle((_d_)->access_list, (_s_)->access_list)
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> +            XLAT_mem_access_op(nat.mao, &cmp.mao);
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> +#undef XLAT_mem_access_op_HNDL_pfn_list
>>>>>> +#undef XLAT_mem_access_op_HNDL_access_list
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> +            break;
>>>>>> +        }
>>>>>
>>>>> There are no local variables declared here, so I don't see the need
>>>>> for the braces.
>>>>
>>>> There have only been Acked-by replies so far, but if you'd prefer I have
>>>> no problem sending a V5 removing the braces.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Does this patch have all the necessary acks? If so I don't mind fixing
>>> it up and committing it.
>>
>> In addition to your ack, it's:
>>
>> Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
>> Acked-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas@tklengyel.com>
>> Acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
>>
>> for the hypervisor parts (without ARM and x86/mm), vm_event and ARM
>> respectively.
>>
> 
> I think it still needs an ack from George for x86/mm changes.

Fair enough.


Thanks,
Razvan

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^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH V4] tools/libxc, xen/x86: Added xc_set_mem_access_multi()
  2016-09-07  9:12 [PATCH V4] tools/libxc, xen/x86: Added xc_set_mem_access_multi() Razvan Cojocaru
                   ` (2 preceding siblings ...)
  2016-09-09 16:31 ` Julien Grall
@ 2016-09-19 15:51 ` George Dunlap
  2016-09-21 12:03 ` Jan Beulich
  4 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: George Dunlap @ 2016-09-19 15:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Razvan Cojocaru, xen-devel
  Cc: sstabellini, wei.liu2, george.dunlap, andrew.cooper3,
	ian.jackson, julien.grall, tamas, jbeulich

On 07/09/16 10:12, Razvan Cojocaru wrote:
> Currently it is only possible to set mem_access restrictions only for
> a contiguous range of GFNs (or, as a particular case, for a single GFN).
> This patch introduces a new libxc function taking an array of GFNs.
> The alternative would be to set each page in turn, using a userspace-HV
> roundtrip for each call, and triggering a TLB flush per page set.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>
> Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>

Looks good:

Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>

> 
> ---
> Changes since V3:
>  - Fixed ARM compilation (replaced ENOTSUP with EOPNOTSUPP, which is
>    #defined in the in-tree errno.h). The multi code remains
>    unimplemented for ARM (it depends on " [RFC 21/22] xen/arm: p2m:
>    Re-implement p2m_set_mem_access using p2m_{set, get}_entry", and
>    Julien Grall has gracefully accepted to defer implementation
>    until after both patches go in).
>  - Reordered the xen/guest_access.h #include in p2m.c.
>  - Now passing a gfn_t to set_mem_access() instead of unsigned long.
>  - Removed the p2m prefix from p2m_xenmem_access_to_p2m_access().
>  - Switched from bool_t to bool.
>  - Moved the XENMEM_access_op case up with the other do-nothing
>    XENMEM_* cases.
> ---
>  tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h |   9 +++
>  tools/libxc/xc_mem_access.c   |  38 +++++++++++
>  xen/arch/arm/p2m.c            |  10 +++
>  xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c         | 150 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
>  xen/common/compat/memory.c    |  23 +++++--
>  xen/common/mem_access.c       |  11 ++++
>  xen/include/public/memory.h   |  14 +++-
>  xen/include/xen/p2m-common.h  |   6 ++
>  xen/include/xlat.lst          |   2 +-
>  9 files changed, 224 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h b/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h
> index 560ce7b..5e685a6 100644
> --- a/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h
> +++ b/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h
> @@ -2126,6 +2126,15 @@ int xc_set_mem_access(xc_interface *xch, domid_t domain_id,
>                        uint32_t nr);
>  
>  /*
> + * Set an array of pages to their respective access in the access array.
> + * The nr parameter specifies the size of the pages and access arrays.
> + * The same allowed access types as for xc_set_mem_access() apply.
> + */
> +int xc_set_mem_access_multi(xc_interface *xch, domid_t domain_id,
> +                            uint8_t *access, uint64_t *pages,
> +                            uint32_t nr);
> +
> +/*
>   * Gets the mem access for the given page (returned in access on success)
>   */
>  int xc_get_mem_access(xc_interface *xch, domid_t domain_id,
> diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_mem_access.c b/tools/libxc/xc_mem_access.c
> index eee088c..9536635 100644
> --- a/tools/libxc/xc_mem_access.c
> +++ b/tools/libxc/xc_mem_access.c
> @@ -41,6 +41,44 @@ int xc_set_mem_access(xc_interface *xch,
>      return do_memory_op(xch, XENMEM_access_op, &mao, sizeof(mao));
>  }
>  
> +int xc_set_mem_access_multi(xc_interface *xch,
> +                            domid_t domain_id,
> +                            uint8_t *access,
> +                            uint64_t *pages,
> +                            uint32_t nr)
> +{
> +    DECLARE_HYPERCALL_BOUNCE(access, nr, XC_HYPERCALL_BUFFER_BOUNCE_IN);
> +    DECLARE_HYPERCALL_BOUNCE(pages, nr * sizeof(uint64_t),
> +                             XC_HYPERCALL_BUFFER_BOUNCE_IN);
> +    int rc;
> +
> +    xen_mem_access_op_t mao =
> +    {
> +        .op       = XENMEM_access_op_set_access_multi,
> +        .domid    = domain_id,
> +        .access   = XENMEM_access_default + 1, /* Invalid value */
> +        .pfn      = ~0UL, /* Invalid GFN */
> +        .nr       = nr,
> +    };
> +
> +    if ( xc_hypercall_bounce_pre(xch, pages) ||
> +         xc_hypercall_bounce_pre(xch, access) )
> +    {
> +        PERROR("Could not bounce memory for XENMEM_access_op_set_access_multi");
> +        return -1;
> +    }
> +
> +    set_xen_guest_handle(mao.pfn_list, pages);
> +    set_xen_guest_handle(mao.access_list, access);
> +
> +    rc = do_memory_op(xch, XENMEM_access_op, &mao, sizeof(mao));
> +
> +    xc_hypercall_bounce_post(xch, access);
> +    xc_hypercall_bounce_post(xch, pages);
> +
> +    return rc;
> +}
> +
>  int xc_get_mem_access(xc_interface *xch,
>                        domid_t domain_id,
>                        uint64_t pfn,
> diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c b/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
> index b648a9d..5c5049f 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
> @@ -1836,6 +1836,16 @@ long p2m_set_mem_access(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn, uint32_t nr,
>      return 0;
>  }
>  
> +long p2m_set_mem_access_multi(struct domain *d,
> +                              const XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(const_uint64) pfn_list,
> +                              const XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(const_uint8) access_list,
> +                              uint32_t nr, uint32_t start, uint32_t mask,
> +                              unsigned int altp2m_idx)
> +{
> +    /* Not yet implemented on ARM. */
> +    return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> +}
> +
>  int p2m_get_mem_access(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn,
>                         xenmem_access_t *access)
>  {
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
> index 27f9d26..97c7cfd 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
> @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
>   * along with this program; If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
>   */
>  
> +#include <xen/guest_access.h> /* copy_from_guest() */
>  #include <xen/iommu.h>
>  #include <xen/vm_event.h>
>  #include <xen/event.h>
> @@ -1793,21 +1794,37 @@ int p2m_set_altp2m_mem_access(struct domain *d, struct p2m_domain *hp2m,
>                           (current->domain != d));
>  }
>  
> -/*
> - * Set access type for a region of gfns.
> - * If gfn == INVALID_GFN, sets the default access type.
> - */
> -long p2m_set_mem_access(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn, uint32_t nr,
> -                        uint32_t start, uint32_t mask, xenmem_access_t access,
> -                        unsigned int altp2m_idx)
> +static int set_mem_access(struct domain *d, struct p2m_domain *p2m,
> +                          struct p2m_domain *ap2m, p2m_access_t a,
> +                          gfn_t gfn)
>  {
> -    struct p2m_domain *p2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(d), *ap2m = NULL;
> -    p2m_access_t a, _a;
> -    p2m_type_t t;
> -    mfn_t mfn;
> -    unsigned long gfn_l;
> -    long rc = 0;
> +    int rc = 0;
>  
> +    if ( ap2m )
> +    {
> +        rc = p2m_set_altp2m_mem_access(d, p2m, ap2m, a, gfn);
> +        /* If the corresponding mfn is invalid we will want to just skip it */
> +        if ( rc == -ESRCH )
> +            rc = 0;
> +    }
> +    else
> +    {
> +        mfn_t mfn;
> +        p2m_access_t _a;
> +        p2m_type_t t;
> +        unsigned long gfn_l = gfn_x(gfn);
> +
> +        mfn = p2m->get_entry(p2m, gfn_l, &t, &_a, 0, NULL, NULL);
> +        rc = p2m->set_entry(p2m, gfn_l, mfn, PAGE_ORDER_4K, t, a, -1);
> +    }
> +
> +    return rc;
> +}
> +
> +static bool xenmem_access_to_p2m_access(struct p2m_domain *p2m,
> +                                        xenmem_access_t xaccess,
> +                                        p2m_access_t *paccess)
> +{
>      static const p2m_access_t memaccess[] = {
>  #define ACCESS(ac) [XENMEM_access_##ac] = p2m_access_##ac
>          ACCESS(n),
> @@ -1823,6 +1840,34 @@ long p2m_set_mem_access(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn, uint32_t nr,
>  #undef ACCESS
>      };
>  
> +    switch ( xaccess )
> +    {
> +    case 0 ... ARRAY_SIZE(memaccess) - 1:
> +        *paccess = memaccess[xaccess];
> +        break;
> +    case XENMEM_access_default:
> +        *paccess = p2m->default_access;
> +        break;
> +    default:
> +        return false;
> +    }
> +
> +    return true;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Set access type for a region of gfns.
> + * If gfn == INVALID_GFN, sets the default access type.
> + */
> +long p2m_set_mem_access(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn, uint32_t nr,
> +                        uint32_t start, uint32_t mask, xenmem_access_t access,
> +                        unsigned int altp2m_idx)
> +{
> +    struct p2m_domain *p2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(d), *ap2m = NULL;
> +    p2m_access_t a;
> +    unsigned long gfn_l;
> +    long rc = 0;
> +
>      /* altp2m view 0 is treated as the hostp2m */
>      if ( altp2m_idx )
>      {
> @@ -1833,17 +1878,8 @@ long p2m_set_mem_access(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn, uint32_t nr,
>          ap2m = d->arch.altp2m_p2m[altp2m_idx];
>      }
>  
> -    switch ( access )
> -    {
> -    case 0 ... ARRAY_SIZE(memaccess) - 1:
> -        a = memaccess[access];
> -        break;
> -    case XENMEM_access_default:
> -        a = p2m->default_access;
> -        break;
> -    default:
> +    if ( !xenmem_access_to_p2m_access(p2m, access, &a) )
>          return -EINVAL;
> -    }
>  
>      /* If request to set default access. */
>      if ( gfn_eq(gfn, INVALID_GFN) )
> @@ -1858,21 +1894,69 @@ long p2m_set_mem_access(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn, uint32_t nr,
>  
>      for ( gfn_l = gfn_x(gfn) + start; nr > start; ++gfn_l )
>      {
> -        if ( ap2m )
> +        rc = set_mem_access(d, p2m, ap2m, a, _gfn(gfn_l));
> +
> +        if ( rc )
> +            break;
> +
> +        /* Check for continuation if it's not the last iteration. */
> +        if ( nr > ++start && !(start & mask) && hypercall_preempt_check() )
>          {
> -            rc = p2m_set_altp2m_mem_access(d, p2m, ap2m, a, _gfn(gfn_l));
> -            /* If the corresponding mfn is invalid we will just skip it */
> -            if ( rc && rc != -ESRCH )
> -                break;
> +            rc = start;
> +            break;
>          }
> -        else
> +    }
> +
> +    if ( ap2m )
> +        p2m_unlock(ap2m);
> +    p2m_unlock(p2m);
> +
> +    return rc;
> +}
> +
> +long p2m_set_mem_access_multi(struct domain *d,
> +                              const XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(const_uint64) pfn_list,
> +                              const XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(const_uint8) access_list,
> +                              uint32_t nr, uint32_t start, uint32_t mask,
> +                              unsigned int altp2m_idx)
> +{
> +    struct p2m_domain *p2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(d), *ap2m = NULL;
> +    long rc = 0;
> +
> +    /* altp2m view 0 is treated as the hostp2m */
> +    if ( altp2m_idx )
> +    {
> +        if ( altp2m_idx >= MAX_ALTP2M ||
> +             d->arch.altp2m_eptp[altp2m_idx] == mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) )
> +            return -EINVAL;
> +
> +        ap2m = d->arch.altp2m_p2m[altp2m_idx];
> +    }
> +
> +    p2m_lock(p2m);
> +    if ( ap2m )
> +        p2m_lock(ap2m);
> +
> +    while ( start < nr )
> +    {
> +        p2m_access_t a;
> +        uint8_t access;
> +        uint64_t gfn_l;
> +
> +        copy_from_guest_offset(&gfn_l, pfn_list, start, 1);
> +        copy_from_guest_offset(&access, access_list, start, 1);
> +
> +        if ( !xenmem_access_to_p2m_access(p2m, access, &a) )
>          {
> -            mfn = p2m->get_entry(p2m, gfn_l, &t, &_a, 0, NULL, NULL);
> -            rc = p2m->set_entry(p2m, gfn_l, mfn, PAGE_ORDER_4K, t, a, -1);
> -            if ( rc )
> -                break;
> +            rc = -EINVAL;
> +            break;
>          }
>  
> +        rc = set_mem_access(d, p2m, ap2m, a, _gfn(gfn_l));
> +
> +        if ( rc )
> +            break;
> +
>          /* Check for continuation if it's not the last iteration. */
>          if ( nr > ++start && !(start & mask) && hypercall_preempt_check() )
>          {
> diff --git a/xen/common/compat/memory.c b/xen/common/compat/memory.c
> index 579040e..017a709 100644
> --- a/xen/common/compat/memory.c
> +++ b/xen/common/compat/memory.c
> @@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ CHECK_TYPE(domid);
>  #undef compat_domid_t
>  #undef xen_domid_t
>  
> -CHECK_mem_access_op;
>  CHECK_vmemrange;
>  
>  #ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH
> @@ -71,6 +70,7 @@ int compat_memory_op(unsigned int cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) compat)
>              struct xen_add_to_physmap_batch *atpb;
>              struct xen_remove_from_physmap *xrfp;
>              struct xen_vnuma_topology_info *vnuma;
> +            struct xen_mem_access_op *mao;
>          } nat;
>          union {
>              struct compat_memory_reservation rsrv;
> @@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ int compat_memory_op(unsigned int cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) compat)
>              struct compat_add_to_physmap atp;
>              struct compat_add_to_physmap_batch atpb;
>              struct compat_vnuma_topology_info vnuma;
> +            struct compat_mem_access_op mao;
>          } cmp;
>  
>          set_xen_guest_handle(nat.hnd, COMPAT_ARG_XLAT_VIRT_BASE);
> @@ -321,9 +322,22 @@ int compat_memory_op(unsigned int cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) compat)
>          }
>  
>          case XENMEM_access_op:
> -            return mem_access_memop(cmd,
> -                                    guest_handle_cast(compat,
> -                                                      xen_mem_access_op_t));
> +        {
> +            if ( copy_from_guest(&cmp.mao, compat, 1) )
> +                return -EFAULT;
> +
> +#define XLAT_mem_access_op_HNDL_pfn_list(_d_, _s_) \
> +            guest_from_compat_handle((_d_)->pfn_list, (_s_)->pfn_list)
> +#define XLAT_mem_access_op_HNDL_access_list(_d_, _s_) \
> +            guest_from_compat_handle((_d_)->access_list, (_s_)->access_list)
> +
> +            XLAT_mem_access_op(nat.mao, &cmp.mao);
> +
> +#undef XLAT_mem_access_op_HNDL_pfn_list
> +#undef XLAT_mem_access_op_HNDL_access_list
> +
> +            break;
> +        }
>  
>          case XENMEM_get_vnumainfo:
>          {
> @@ -510,6 +524,7 @@ int compat_memory_op(unsigned int cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) compat)
>          case XENMEM_maximum_gpfn:
>          case XENMEM_add_to_physmap:
>          case XENMEM_remove_from_physmap:
> +        case XENMEM_access_op:
>              break;
>  
>          case XENMEM_get_vnumainfo:
> diff --git a/xen/common/mem_access.c b/xen/common/mem_access.c
> index 82f4bad..565a320 100644
> --- a/xen/common/mem_access.c
> +++ b/xen/common/mem_access.c
> @@ -76,6 +76,17 @@ int mem_access_memop(unsigned long cmd,
>          }
>          break;
>  
> +    case XENMEM_access_op_set_access_multi:
> +        rc = p2m_set_mem_access_multi(d, mao.pfn_list, mao.access_list, mao.nr,
> +                                      start_iter, MEMOP_CMD_MASK, 0);
> +        if ( rc > 0 )
> +        {
> +            ASSERT(!(rc & MEMOP_CMD_MASK));
> +            rc = hypercall_create_continuation(__HYPERVISOR_memory_op, "lh",
> +                                               XENMEM_access_op | rc, arg);
> +        }
> +        break;
> +
>      case XENMEM_access_op_get_access:
>      {
>          xenmem_access_t access;
> diff --git a/xen/include/public/memory.h b/xen/include/public/memory.h
> index 3badfb9..a5547a9 100644
> --- a/xen/include/public/memory.h
> +++ b/xen/include/public/memory.h
> @@ -410,6 +410,7 @@ DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_mem_paging_op_t);
>   * #define XENMEM_access_op_enable_emulate     2
>   * #define XENMEM_access_op_disable_emulate    3
>   */
> +#define XENMEM_access_op_set_access_multi   4
>  
>  typedef enum {
>      XENMEM_access_n,
> @@ -442,7 +443,8 @@ struct xen_mem_access_op {
>      uint8_t access;
>      domid_t domid;
>      /*
> -     * Number of pages for set op
> +     * Number of pages for set op (or size of pfn_list for
> +     * XENMEM_access_op_set_access_multi)
>       * Ignored on setting default access and other ops
>       */
>      uint32_t nr;
> @@ -452,6 +454,16 @@ struct xen_mem_access_op {
>       * ~0ull is used to set and get the default access for pages
>       */
>      uint64_aligned_t pfn;
> +    /*
> +     * List of pfns to set access for
> +     * Used only with XENMEM_access_op_set_access_multi
> +     */
> +    XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(const_uint64) pfn_list;
> +    /*
> +     * Corresponding list of access settings for pfn_list
> +     * Used only with XENMEM_access_op_set_access_multi
> +     */
> +    XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(const_uint8) access_list;
>  };
>  typedef struct xen_mem_access_op xen_mem_access_op_t;
>  DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_mem_access_op_t);
> diff --git a/xen/include/xen/p2m-common.h b/xen/include/xen/p2m-common.h
> index b4f9077..3be1e91 100644
> --- a/xen/include/xen/p2m-common.h
> +++ b/xen/include/xen/p2m-common.h
> @@ -53,6 +53,12 @@ long p2m_set_mem_access(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn, uint32_t nr,
>                          uint32_t start, uint32_t mask, xenmem_access_t access,
>                          unsigned int altp2m_idx);
>  
> +long p2m_set_mem_access_multi(struct domain *d,
> +                              const XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(const_uint64) pfn_list,
> +                              const XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(const_uint8) access_list,
> +                              uint32_t nr, uint32_t start, uint32_t mask,
> +                              unsigned int altp2m_idx);
> +
>  /*
>   * Get access type for a gfn.
>   * If gfn == INVALID_GFN, gets the default access type.
> diff --git a/xen/include/xlat.lst b/xen/include/xlat.lst
> index 801a1c1..bdf1d05 100644
> --- a/xen/include/xlat.lst
> +++ b/xen/include/xlat.lst
> @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@
>  !	memory_exchange			memory.h
>  !	memory_map			memory.h
>  !	memory_reservation		memory.h
> -?	mem_access_op			memory.h
> +!	mem_access_op			memory.h
>  !	pod_target			memory.h
>  !	remove_from_physmap		memory.h
>  !	reserved_device_memory_map	memory.h
> 


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^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH V4] tools/libxc, xen/x86: Added xc_set_mem_access_multi()
  2016-09-07  9:12 [PATCH V4] tools/libxc, xen/x86: Added xc_set_mem_access_multi() Razvan Cojocaru
                   ` (3 preceding siblings ...)
  2016-09-19 15:51 ` George Dunlap
@ 2016-09-21 12:03 ` Jan Beulich
  2016-09-21 12:27   ` Razvan Cojocaru
  4 siblings, 1 reply; 12+ messages in thread
From: Jan Beulich @ 2016-09-21 12:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Razvan Cojocaru
  Cc: sstabellini, wei.liu2, george.dunlap, andrew.cooper3,
	ian.jackson, xen-devel, julien.grall, tamas

>>> On 07.09.16 at 11:12, <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com> wrote:
> +long p2m_set_mem_access_multi(struct domain *d,
> +                              const XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(const_uint64) pfn_list,
> +                              const XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(const_uint8) access_list,
> +                              uint32_t nr, uint32_t start, uint32_t mask,
> +                              unsigned int altp2m_idx)
> +{
> +    struct p2m_domain *p2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(d), *ap2m = NULL;
> +    long rc = 0;
> +
> +    /* altp2m view 0 is treated as the hostp2m */
> +    if ( altp2m_idx )
> +    {
> +        if ( altp2m_idx >= MAX_ALTP2M ||
> +             d->arch.altp2m_eptp[altp2m_idx] == mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) )
> +            return -EINVAL;
> +
> +        ap2m = d->arch.altp2m_p2m[altp2m_idx];
> +    }
> +
> +    p2m_lock(p2m);
> +    if ( ap2m )
> +        p2m_lock(ap2m);
> +
> +    while ( start < nr )
> +    {
> +        p2m_access_t a;
> +        uint8_t access;
> +        uint64_t gfn_l;
> +
> +        copy_from_guest_offset(&gfn_l, pfn_list, start, 1);
> +        copy_from_guest_offset(&access, access_list, start, 1);

Coverity validly complains about the missing error checks here
(IDs 1373105 and 1373106). I have no idea how none of us who
have looked at the patch noticed this before it went in, but please
submit a fix (mentioning the two IDs).

Jan


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^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH V4] tools/libxc, xen/x86: Added xc_set_mem_access_multi()
  2016-09-21 12:03 ` Jan Beulich
@ 2016-09-21 12:27   ` Razvan Cojocaru
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Razvan Cojocaru @ 2016-09-21 12:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Jan Beulich
  Cc: sstabellini, wei.liu2, george.dunlap, andrew.cooper3,
	ian.jackson, xen-devel, julien.grall, tamas

On 09/21/2016 03:03 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>> On 07.09.16 at 11:12, <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com> wrote:
>> +long p2m_set_mem_access_multi(struct domain *d,
>> +                              const XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(const_uint64) pfn_list,
>> +                              const XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(const_uint8) access_list,
>> +                              uint32_t nr, uint32_t start, uint32_t mask,
>> +                              unsigned int altp2m_idx)
>> +{
>> +    struct p2m_domain *p2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(d), *ap2m = NULL;
>> +    long rc = 0;
>> +
>> +    /* altp2m view 0 is treated as the hostp2m */
>> +    if ( altp2m_idx )
>> +    {
>> +        if ( altp2m_idx >= MAX_ALTP2M ||
>> +             d->arch.altp2m_eptp[altp2m_idx] == mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) )
>> +            return -EINVAL;
>> +
>> +        ap2m = d->arch.altp2m_p2m[altp2m_idx];
>> +    }
>> +
>> +    p2m_lock(p2m);
>> +    if ( ap2m )
>> +        p2m_lock(ap2m);
>> +
>> +    while ( start < nr )
>> +    {
>> +        p2m_access_t a;
>> +        uint8_t access;
>> +        uint64_t gfn_l;
>> +
>> +        copy_from_guest_offset(&gfn_l, pfn_list, start, 1);
>> +        copy_from_guest_offset(&access, access_list, start, 1);
> 
> Coverity validly complains about the missing error checks here
> (IDs 1373105 and 1373106). I have no idea how none of us who
> have looked at the patch noticed this before it went in, but please
> submit a fix (mentioning the two IDs).

Sent. Sorry for the omission.


Thanks,
Razvan

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^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2016-09-21 12:27 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 12+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
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2016-09-07  9:12 [PATCH V4] tools/libxc, xen/x86: Added xc_set_mem_access_multi() Razvan Cojocaru
2016-09-07 14:36 ` Tamas K Lengyel
2016-09-07 16:01 ` Jan Beulich
2016-09-15 13:39   ` Razvan Cojocaru
2016-09-15 13:49     ` Wei Liu
2016-09-15 13:52       ` Razvan Cojocaru
2016-09-15 13:55         ` Wei Liu
2016-09-15 13:55           ` Razvan Cojocaru
2016-09-09 16:31 ` Julien Grall
2016-09-19 15:51 ` George Dunlap
2016-09-21 12:03 ` Jan Beulich
2016-09-21 12:27   ` Razvan Cojocaru

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