From: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
To: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
peterz@infradead.org, Alan Cox <alan.cox@intel.com>,
Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Solomon Peachy <pizza@shaftnet.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Christian Lamparter <chunkeey@googlemail.com>,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
"James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
x86@kernel.org, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru>,
Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com>,
linux-media@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>, Eduardo Valentin <edubezval@gmail.com>,
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
qla2xxx-upstream@qlogic.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org>,
Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>,
alan@linux.intel.com,
"Martin K. Petersen" <martin.petersen@oracle.com>,
Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>,
gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, torvalds@linux-foundation.org,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com>,
dan.carpenter@oracle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/18] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
Date: Sat, 6 Jan 2018 10:59:06 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <e567c704-e141-63db-5d59-7294e0c78e26@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ca6f24c0-d6cf-e309-aa68-92f1378ee75a@gmail.com>
> It sounds like Coverity was used to produce these patches? If so, is
> there a plan to have smatch (hey Dan) or other open source static
> analysis tool be possibly enhanced to do a similar type of work?
I'd love for that to happen; the tricky part is being able to have even a
sort of sensible concept of "trusted" vs "untrusted" value...
if you look at a very small window of code, that does not work well;
you likely need to even look (as tool) across .c file boundaries
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
To: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
peterz@infradead.org, Alan Cox <alan.cox@intel.com>,
Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Solomon Peachy <pizza@shaftnet.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Christian Lamparter <chunkeey@googlemail.com>,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
"James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
x86@kernel.org, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru>,
Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com>,
linux-media@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>, Eduardo Valentin <edubezval@gmail.com>,
Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/18] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
Date: Sat, 6 Jan 2018 10:59:06 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <e567c704-e141-63db-5d59-7294e0c78e26@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ca6f24c0-d6cf-e309-aa68-92f1378ee75a@gmail.com>
> It sounds like Coverity was used to produce these patches? If so, is
> there a plan to have smatch (hey Dan) or other open source static
> analysis tool be possibly enhanced to do a similar type of work?
I'd love for that to happen; the tricky part is being able to have even a
sort of sensible concept of "trusted" vs "untrusted" value...
if you look at a very small window of code, that does not work well;
you likely need to even look (as tool) across .c file boundaries
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
To: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
peterz@infradead.org, Alan Cox <alan.cox@intel.com>,
Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Solomon Peachy <pizza@shaftnet.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Christian Lamparter <chunkeey@googlemail.com>,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
"James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
x86@kernel.org, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru>,
Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com>,
linux-media@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>, Eduardo Valentin <edubezval@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/18] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
Date: Sat, 6 Jan 2018 10:59:06 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <e567c704-e141-63db-5d59-7294e0c78e26@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ca6f24c0-d6cf-e309-aa68-92f1378ee75a@gmail.com>
> It sounds like Coverity was used to produce these patches? If so, is
> there a plan to have smatch (hey Dan) or other open source static
> analysis tool be possibly enhanced to do a similar type of work?
I'd love for that to happen; the tricky part is being able to have even a
sort of sensible concept of "trusted" vs "untrusted" value...
if you look at a very small window of code, that does not work well;
you likely need to even look (as tool) across .c file boundaries
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-01-06 18:59 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 196+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-06 1:09 [PATCH 00/18] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams
2018-01-06 1:09 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 1:09 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 1:09 ` [PATCH 01/18] asm-generic/barrier: add generic nospec helpers Dan Williams
2018-01-06 2:55 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-06 5:23 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 17:08 ` Mark Rutland
2018-01-06 1:10 ` [PATCH 02/18] Documentation: document " Dan Williams
2018-01-08 16:29 ` Jonathan Corbet
2018-01-08 17:09 ` Mark Rutland
2018-01-08 21:19 ` Jonathan Corbet
2018-01-06 1:10 ` [PATCH 03/18] arm64: implement nospec_ptr() Dan Williams
2018-01-06 1:10 ` [PATCH 04/18] arm: " Dan Williams
2018-01-10 2:04 ` Laura Abbott
2018-01-10 7:40 ` Hanjun Guo
2018-01-10 7:40 ` Hanjun Guo
2018-01-10 17:24 ` Laura Abbott
2018-01-06 1:10 ` [PATCH 05/18] x86: implement nospec_barrier() Dan Williams
2018-01-06 1:10 ` [PATCH 06/18] x86, barrier: stop speculation for failed access_ok Dan Williams
2018-01-06 2:52 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-06 3:09 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-06 23:31 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-07 1:20 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-08 21:09 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-08 23:44 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-08 23:53 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 5:47 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 12:32 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-06 17:56 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-06 18:13 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-06 18:29 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 18:39 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-06 18:54 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 19:25 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-06 19:36 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 19:41 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-08 10:02 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-06 18:38 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-06 18:51 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-06 19:55 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-06 20:09 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-06 20:22 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-06 21:17 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-06 21:21 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-06 23:05 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-07 3:38 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-07 6:33 ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-07 19:47 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-07 20:12 ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-07 20:17 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-07 20:56 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-08 2:23 ` David Miller
2018-01-08 2:23 ` David Miller
2018-01-08 2:23 ` David Miller
2018-01-08 7:38 ` Greg KH
2018-01-07 22:15 ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-07 20:15 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-08 2:24 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-08 9:51 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-08 18:21 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-08 12:00 ` David Laight
2018-01-08 12:12 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-08 12:33 ` David Laight
2018-01-07 10:08 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-08 2:09 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-07 13:59 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-08 2:57 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-08 9:57 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-06 20:42 ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-07 1:36 ` David Miller
2018-01-07 17:19 ` James Bottomley
2018-01-07 18:31 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-08 2:04 ` David Miller
2018-01-07 19:24 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-09 21:41 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-09 21:47 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-09 21:49 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-09 21:59 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-09 22:23 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-09 22:35 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 1:10 ` [PATCH 07/18] [media] uvcvideo: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams
2018-01-06 9:09 ` Greg KH
2018-01-06 9:40 ` Greg KH
2018-01-06 17:41 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-07 9:09 ` Greg KH
2018-01-07 19:37 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-09 8:40 ` Laurent Pinchart
2018-01-09 10:04 ` Greg KH
2018-01-09 14:26 ` Laurent Pinchart
2018-01-09 14:47 ` Greg KH
2018-01-08 11:23 ` Laurent Pinchart
2018-01-09 2:11 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 1:10 ` [PATCH 08/18] carl9170: " Dan Williams
2018-01-06 10:01 ` Sergei Shtylyov
2018-01-06 14:23 ` Christian Lamparter
2018-01-06 15:06 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-06 16:38 ` Christian Lamparter
2018-01-06 16:34 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 1:10 ` [PATCH 09/18] p54: " Dan Williams
2018-01-06 10:01 ` Sergei Shtylyov
2018-01-06 1:10 ` [PATCH 10/18] qla2xxx: " Dan Williams
2018-01-06 9:03 ` Greg KH
2018-01-06 9:42 ` Greg KH
2018-01-11 22:15 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 7:27 ` Greg KH
2018-01-12 15:25 ` James Bottomley
2018-01-06 1:10 ` [PATCH 11/18] cw1200: " Dan Williams
2018-01-06 1:10 ` [PATCH 12/18] Thermal/int340x: " Dan Williams
2018-01-06 1:53 ` Srinivas Pandruvada
2018-01-06 1:57 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 17:24 ` Srinivas Pandruvada
2018-01-06 10:03 ` Sergei Shtylyov
2018-01-06 1:11 ` [PATCH 13/18] ipv6: " Dan Williams
2018-01-06 10:04 ` Sergei Shtylyov
2018-01-06 14:48 ` Stephen Hemminger
2018-01-06 18:05 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 1:11 ` [PATCH 14/18] ipv4: " Dan Williams
2018-01-06 9:00 ` Greg KH
2018-01-06 9:01 ` Greg KH
2018-01-06 12:23 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-06 15:14 ` Greg KH
2018-01-06 16:29 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 18:10 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 10:04 ` Sergei Shtylyov
2018-01-06 1:11 ` [PATCH 15/18] vfs, fdtable: " Dan Williams
2018-01-06 10:05 ` Sergei Shtylyov
2018-01-06 1:11 ` [PATCH 16/18] net: mpls: " Dan Williams
2018-01-06 10:06 ` Sergei Shtylyov
2018-01-09 3:11 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-01-09 3:42 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-09 4:13 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-09 4:21 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-10 0:48 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-10 1:33 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-10 1:57 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-10 2:22 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-10 3:07 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-10 3:27 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-09 16:17 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-01-09 18:01 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-10 0:54 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-01-10 1:31 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 1:11 ` [PATCH 17/18] udf: " Dan Williams
2018-01-08 10:20 ` Jan Kara
2018-01-06 1:11 ` [PATCH 18/18] userns: " Dan Williams
2018-01-06 2:22 ` [PATCH 00/18] " Eric W. Biederman
2018-01-06 2:22 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-01-06 2:22 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-01-06 6:30 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 6:30 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-08 10:08 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-08 10:08 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-08 11:14 ` Laurent Pinchart
2018-01-08 11:43 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-08 11:43 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-08 11:43 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-08 11:55 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-08 11:55 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-08 11:55 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-08 18:33 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-08 18:33 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-08 18:33 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-08 16:20 ` Bart Van Assche
2018-01-08 16:20 ` Bart Van Assche
2018-01-06 18:56 ` Florian Fainelli
2018-01-06 18:56 ` Florian Fainelli
2018-01-06 18:56 ` Florian Fainelli
2018-01-06 18:59 ` Arjan van de Ven [this message]
2018-01-06 18:59 ` Arjan van de Ven
2018-01-06 18:59 ` Arjan van de Ven
2018-01-06 19:37 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 19:37 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 19:37 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 20:07 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 20:07 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 20:07 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-08 4:49 ` Bart Van Assche
2018-01-08 13:33 ` Arjan van de Ven
2018-01-09 19:34 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-09 19:34 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-09 19:34 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-09 19:44 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-09 19:44 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-09 20:55 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-09 20:55 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-09 20:55 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-11 9:54 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-11 9:54 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-11 9:54 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-11 15:58 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-11 15:58 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-11 15:58 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-11 16:34 ` Daniel Borkmann
2018-01-11 16:34 ` Daniel Borkmann
2018-01-11 16:34 ` Daniel Borkmann
2018-01-13 11:33 ` QingFeng Hao
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