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From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: brijesh.singh@amd.com, x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
	Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>,
	David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Subject: Re: [Part1 PATCH v7 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active
Date: Sat, 21 Oct 2017 06:26:52 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <e98c9c16-0dfd-708f-64c7-764fd50d46e3@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171020193953.7814f013@alans-desktop>

Hi Alan,


On 10/20/17 1:39 PM, Alan Cox wrote:
> On Fri, 20 Oct 2017 09:30:55 -0500
> Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> wrote:
>
>> From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>>
>> Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) does not support string I/O, so
>> unroll the string I/O operation into a loop operating on one element at
>> a time.
> Does this also mean that any firmware running in the virtual machine
> (EFI, BIOS, VGA etc) has to be patched and if so shouldn't that be
> documented somewhere ?

Yes. SEV support has been added to EDK2/OVMF virtual machine bios and we
have similar patch [1].

[1]
https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/b6d11d7c467810ea7f2e2eda46ef0bdc57bf1475

-Brijesh

  reply	other threads:[~2017-10-21 11:27 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 42+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-10-20 14:30 [Part1 PATCH v7 00/17] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 01/17] Documentation/x86: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) description Brijesh Singh
2017-11-07 14:42   ` [tip:x86/asm] " tip-bot for Brijesh Singh
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 02/17] x86/mm: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Brijesh Singh
2017-11-07 14:43   ` [tip:x86/asm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 03/17] x86/mm: Don't attempt to encrypt initrd under SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-11-07 14:43   ` [tip:x86/asm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 04/17] x86/realmode: Don't decrypt trampoline area " Brijesh Singh
2017-11-07 14:44   ` [tip:x86/asm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 05/17] x86/mm: Use encrypted access of boot related data with SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-11-07 14:44   ` [tip:x86/asm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 06/17] x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes Brijesh Singh
2017-11-07 14:44   ` [tip:x86/asm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 07/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-11-07 14:45   ` [tip:x86/asm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 08/17] resource: Consolidate resource walking code Brijesh Singh
2017-11-07 14:45   ` [tip:x86/asm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 09/17] resource: Provide resource struct in resource walk callback Brijesh Singh
2017-10-20 14:30   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-11-07 14:46   ` [tip:x86/asm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 10/17] x86/mm, resource: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory pages Brijesh Singh
2017-11-07 14:46   ` [tip:x86/asm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 11/17] x86/mm: Add DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh
2017-11-07 14:46   ` [tip:x86/asm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 12/17] x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active Brijesh Singh
2017-11-07 14:47   ` [tip:x86/asm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-10-20 18:39   ` Alan Cox
2017-10-21 11:26     ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2017-11-07 14:47   ` [tip:x86/asm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 14/17] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot Brijesh Singh
2017-11-07 14:48   ` [tip:x86/asm] " tip-bot for Brijesh Singh
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 15/17] percpu: Introduce DEFINE_PER_CPU_DECRYPTED Brijesh Singh
2017-11-07 14:48   ` [tip:x86/asm] " tip-bot for Brijesh Singh
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 16/17] X86/KVM: Decrypt shared per-cpu variables when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-11-07 14:49   ` [tip:x86/asm] " tip-bot for Brijesh Singh
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 17/17] X86/KVM: Clear encryption attribute " Brijesh Singh
2017-11-07 14:49   ` [tip:x86/asm] " tip-bot for Brijesh Singh
2017-11-15 23:57 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 00/17] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Steve Rutherford
2017-11-16 10:02   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-11-16 14:41     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-11-21 23:18       ` Steve Rutherford

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