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From: tip-bot for Tom Lendacky <tipbot@zytor.com>
To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, bp@suse.de, hpa@zytor.com,
	kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com, luto@kernel.org,
	thomas.lendacky@amd.com, bp@alien8.de, brijesh.singh@amd.com,
	mingo@kernel.org, labbott@redhat.com, tglx@linutronix.de
Subject: [tip:x86/asm] x86/realmode: Don't decrypt trampoline area under SEV
Date: Tue, 7 Nov 2017 06:44:05 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <tip-fcdcd6cdd98ff4d0cf876f863024a2fb0b491d41@git.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171020143059.3291-5-brijesh.singh@amd.com>

Commit-ID:  fcdcd6cdd98ff4d0cf876f863024a2fb0b491d41
Gitweb:     https://git.kernel.org/tip/fcdcd6cdd98ff4d0cf876f863024a2fb0b491d41
Author:     Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
AuthorDate: Fri, 20 Oct 2017 09:30:46 -0500
Committer:  Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CommitDate: Tue, 7 Nov 2017 15:35:55 +0100

x86/realmode: Don't decrypt trampoline area under SEV

When SEV is active the trampoline area will need to be in encrypted
memory so only mark the area decrypted if SME is active.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-5-brijesh.singh@amd.com

---
 arch/x86/realmode/init.c | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/realmode/init.c b/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
index ed84d39..d101058 100644
--- a/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
+++ b/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
@@ -64,9 +64,10 @@ static void __init setup_real_mode(void)
 	/*
 	 * If SME is active, the trampoline area will need to be in
 	 * decrypted memory in order to bring up other processors
-	 * successfully.
+	 * successfully. This is not needed for SEV.
 	 */
-	set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)base, size >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+	if (sme_active())
+		set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)base, size >> PAGE_SHIFT);
 
 	memcpy(base, real_mode_blob, size);
 

  reply	other threads:[~2017-11-07 14:47 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 42+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-10-20 14:30 [Part1 PATCH v7 00/17] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 01/17] Documentation/x86: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) description Brijesh Singh
2017-11-07 14:42   ` [tip:x86/asm] " tip-bot for Brijesh Singh
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 02/17] x86/mm: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Brijesh Singh
2017-11-07 14:43   ` [tip:x86/asm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 03/17] x86/mm: Don't attempt to encrypt initrd under SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-11-07 14:43   ` [tip:x86/asm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 04/17] x86/realmode: Don't decrypt trampoline area " Brijesh Singh
2017-11-07 14:44   ` tip-bot for Tom Lendacky [this message]
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 05/17] x86/mm: Use encrypted access of boot related data with SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-11-07 14:44   ` [tip:x86/asm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 06/17] x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes Brijesh Singh
2017-11-07 14:44   ` [tip:x86/asm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 07/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-11-07 14:45   ` [tip:x86/asm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 08/17] resource: Consolidate resource walking code Brijesh Singh
2017-11-07 14:45   ` [tip:x86/asm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 09/17] resource: Provide resource struct in resource walk callback Brijesh Singh
2017-10-20 14:30   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-11-07 14:46   ` [tip:x86/asm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 10/17] x86/mm, resource: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory pages Brijesh Singh
2017-11-07 14:46   ` [tip:x86/asm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 11/17] x86/mm: Add DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh
2017-11-07 14:46   ` [tip:x86/asm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 12/17] x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active Brijesh Singh
2017-11-07 14:47   ` [tip:x86/asm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-10-20 18:39   ` Alan Cox
2017-10-21 11:26     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-11-07 14:47   ` [tip:x86/asm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 14/17] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot Brijesh Singh
2017-11-07 14:48   ` [tip:x86/asm] " tip-bot for Brijesh Singh
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 15/17] percpu: Introduce DEFINE_PER_CPU_DECRYPTED Brijesh Singh
2017-11-07 14:48   ` [tip:x86/asm] " tip-bot for Brijesh Singh
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 16/17] X86/KVM: Decrypt shared per-cpu variables when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-11-07 14:49   ` [tip:x86/asm] " tip-bot for Brijesh Singh
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 17/17] X86/KVM: Clear encryption attribute " Brijesh Singh
2017-11-07 14:49   ` [tip:x86/asm] " tip-bot for Brijesh Singh
2017-11-15 23:57 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 00/17] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Steve Rutherford
2017-11-16 10:02   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-11-16 14:41     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-11-21 23:18       ` Steve Rutherford

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