[MODERATED] [PATCH 4/6] Patch 4

[MODERATED] [PATCH 4/6] Patch 4

[Andi Kleen]

L1TF core kernel workarounds are cheap and generally always disabled.
However we still want to report in sysfs if the system is vulnerable
or mitigated. Add the necessary checks.

- We use the same checks as Meltdown to determine if the system is
vulnerable. This excludes some Atom CPUs which don't have this
problem.
- We check for the (very unlikely) memory > MAX_PA/2 case
- We check for 32bit PAE and warn

Note this patch will likely conflict with some other workaround patches
floating around, but should be straight forward to fix.

Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h |  2 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c         | 11 +++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c       |  8 +++++++-
 drivers/base/cpu.c                 |  8 ++++++++
 include/linux/cpu.h                |  2 ++
 5 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index d554c11e01ff..f51549640f64 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -214,6 +214,7 @@
 
 #define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB		( 7*32+21) /* "" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier enabled */
 #define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW		( 7*32+22) /* "" Use IBRS during runtime firmware calls */
+#define X86_FEATURE_NO_L1TF_FIX		( 7*32+23) /* "" L1TF workaround needed, but disabled */
 
 /* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW		( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */
@@ -362,5 +363,6 @@
 #define X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN		X86_BUG(14) /* CPU is affected by meltdown attack and needs kernel page table isolation */
 #define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1		X86_BUG(15) /* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 1 attack with conditional branches */
 #define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2		X86_BUG(16) /* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 2 attack with indirect branches */
+#define X86_BUG_L1TF			X86_BUG(17) /* CPU is affected by L1 Terminal Fault */
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index bfca937bdcc3..141a0135a8ca 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -340,4 +340,15 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, c
 		       boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? ", IBRS_FW" : "",
 		       spectre_v2_module_string());
 }
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_l1tf(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF))
+		return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NO_L1TF_FIX))
+		return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation Unavailable\n");
+
+	return sprintf(buf, "Mitigated\n");
+}
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 8a5b185735e1..2b292aa237ee 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -989,8 +989,14 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS);
 
 	if (!x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_speculation)) {
-		if (cpu_vulnerable_to_meltdown(c))
+		if (cpu_vulnerable_to_meltdown(c)) {
 			setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
+			setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF);
+#if CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS == 2
+			pr_warn("Kernel not compiled for PAE. No workaround for L1TF\n");
+			setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_FEATURE_NO_L1TF_FIX);
+#endif
+		}
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
 	}
diff --git a/drivers/base/cpu.c b/drivers/base/cpu.c
index 2da998baa75c..ed7b8591d461 100644
--- a/drivers/base/cpu.c
+++ b/drivers/base/cpu.c
@@ -534,14 +534,22 @@ ssize_t __weak cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev,
 	return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
 }
 
+ssize_t __weak cpu_show_l1tf(struct device *dev,
+				   struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+}
+
 static DEVICE_ATTR(meltdown, 0444, cpu_show_meltdown, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v1, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v1, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v2, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v2, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(l1tf, 0444, cpu_show_l1tf, NULL);
 
 static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
 	&dev_attr_meltdown.attr,
 	&dev_attr_spectre_v1.attr,
 	&dev_attr_spectre_v2.attr,
+	&dev_attr_l1tf.attr,
 	NULL
 };
 
diff --git a/include/linux/cpu.h b/include/linux/cpu.h
index 7b01bc11c692..75c430046ca0 100644
--- a/include/linux/cpu.h
+++ b/include/linux/cpu.h
@@ -53,6 +53,8 @@ extern ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev,
 				   struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
 extern ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev,
 				   struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
+extern ssize_t cpu_show_l1tf(struct device *dev,
+				   struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
 
 extern __printf(4, 5)
 struct device *cpu_device_create(struct device *parent, void *drvdata,
-- 
2.15.0

[MODERATED] Re: ***UNCHECKED*** [PATCH 4/6] Patch 4

[Vlastimil Babka]

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 158 bytes --]

On 04/27/2018 11:44 PM, speck for Andi Kleen wrote:
> L1TF core kernel workarounds are cheap and generally always disabled.

s/disabled/enabled/ right?