From: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> To: Randall Huang <huangrandall@google.com>, <jaegeuk@kernel.org>, <linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org> Subject: Re: [PATCH] f2fs: fix to avoid memory leakage in f2fs_listxattr Date: Tue, 15 Oct 2019 15:22:13 +0800 [thread overview] Message-ID: <efddfbc3-bd31-b9fb-48de-decb01d01001@huawei.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20191009032019.6954-1-huangrandall@google.com> Hi Randall, On 2019/10/9 11:20, Randall Huang wrote: > In f2fs_listxattr, there is no boundary check before > memcpy e_name to buffer. > If the e_name_len is corrupted, > unexpected memory contents may be returned to the buffer. > > Signed-off-by: Randall Huang <huangrandall@google.com> > --- > fs/f2fs/xattr.c | 14 +++++++++++++- > 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/fs/f2fs/xattr.c b/fs/f2fs/xattr.c > index b32c45621679..acc3663970cd 100644 > --- a/fs/f2fs/xattr.c > +++ b/fs/f2fs/xattr.c > @@ -538,8 +538,9 @@ int f2fs_getxattr(struct inode *inode, int index, const char *name, > ssize_t f2fs_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size) > { > struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry); > + nid_t xnid = F2FS_I(inode)->i_xattr_nid; > struct f2fs_xattr_entry *entry; > - void *base_addr; > + void *base_addr, *last_base_addr; > int error = 0; > size_t rest = buffer_size; > > @@ -549,6 +550,8 @@ ssize_t f2fs_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size) > if (error) > return error; > > + last_base_addr = (void *)base_addr + XATTR_SIZE(xnid, inode); > + > list_for_each_xattr(entry, base_addr) { > const struct xattr_handler *handler = > f2fs_xattr_handler(entry->e_name_index); > @@ -559,6 +562,15 @@ ssize_t f2fs_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size) > if (!handler || (handler->list && !handler->list(dentry))) > continue; > > + if ((void *)(entry) + sizeof(__u32) > last_base_addr || > + (void *)XATTR_NEXT_ENTRY(entry) > last_base_addr) { > + f2fs_err(F2FS_I_SB(inode), "inode (%lu) has corrupted xattr", > + inode->i_ino); > + set_sbi_flag(F2FS_I_SB(inode), SBI_NEED_FSCK); > + error = -EFSCORRUPTED; > + goto cleanup; > + } Could you relocate sanity check to the place before we check handler? As I'm thinking we should always check validation of current entry before using its field (entry->index). Thanks, > + > prefix = xattr_prefix(handler); > prefix_len = strlen(prefix); > size = prefix_len + entry->e_name_len + 1; >
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> To: Randall Huang <huangrandall@google.com>, <jaegeuk@kernel.org>, <linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org> Subject: Re: [f2fs-dev] [PATCH] f2fs: fix to avoid memory leakage in f2fs_listxattr Date: Tue, 15 Oct 2019 15:22:13 +0800 [thread overview] Message-ID: <efddfbc3-bd31-b9fb-48de-decb01d01001@huawei.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20191009032019.6954-1-huangrandall@google.com> Hi Randall, On 2019/10/9 11:20, Randall Huang wrote: > In f2fs_listxattr, there is no boundary check before > memcpy e_name to buffer. > If the e_name_len is corrupted, > unexpected memory contents may be returned to the buffer. > > Signed-off-by: Randall Huang <huangrandall@google.com> > --- > fs/f2fs/xattr.c | 14 +++++++++++++- > 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/fs/f2fs/xattr.c b/fs/f2fs/xattr.c > index b32c45621679..acc3663970cd 100644 > --- a/fs/f2fs/xattr.c > +++ b/fs/f2fs/xattr.c > @@ -538,8 +538,9 @@ int f2fs_getxattr(struct inode *inode, int index, const char *name, > ssize_t f2fs_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size) > { > struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry); > + nid_t xnid = F2FS_I(inode)->i_xattr_nid; > struct f2fs_xattr_entry *entry; > - void *base_addr; > + void *base_addr, *last_base_addr; > int error = 0; > size_t rest = buffer_size; > > @@ -549,6 +550,8 @@ ssize_t f2fs_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size) > if (error) > return error; > > + last_base_addr = (void *)base_addr + XATTR_SIZE(xnid, inode); > + > list_for_each_xattr(entry, base_addr) { > const struct xattr_handler *handler = > f2fs_xattr_handler(entry->e_name_index); > @@ -559,6 +562,15 @@ ssize_t f2fs_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size) > if (!handler || (handler->list && !handler->list(dentry))) > continue; > > + if ((void *)(entry) + sizeof(__u32) > last_base_addr || > + (void *)XATTR_NEXT_ENTRY(entry) > last_base_addr) { > + f2fs_err(F2FS_I_SB(inode), "inode (%lu) has corrupted xattr", > + inode->i_ino); > + set_sbi_flag(F2FS_I_SB(inode), SBI_NEED_FSCK); > + error = -EFSCORRUPTED; > + goto cleanup; > + } Could you relocate sanity check to the place before we check handler? As I'm thinking we should always check validation of current entry before using its field (entry->index). Thanks, > + > prefix = xattr_prefix(handler); > prefix_len = strlen(prefix); > size = prefix_len + entry->e_name_len + 1; > _______________________________________________ Linux-f2fs-devel mailing list Linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/linux-f2fs-devel
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-10-15 7:22 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2019-10-09 3:20 [PATCH] f2fs: fix to avoid memory leakage in f2fs_listxattr Randall Huang 2019-10-09 3:20 ` [f2fs-dev] " Randall Huang via Linux-f2fs-devel 2019-10-15 7:22 ` Chao Yu [this message] 2019-10-15 7:22 ` Chao Yu 2019-10-18 6:56 ` [PATCH v2] " Randall Huang 2019-10-18 6:56 ` [f2fs-dev] " Randall Huang via Linux-f2fs-devel 2019-10-22 8:35 ` Chao Yu 2019-10-22 8:35 ` [f2fs-dev] " Chao Yu
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