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From: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
To: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	agk@redhat.com, axboe@kernel.dk, snitzer@redhat.com,
	jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com,
	viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, paul@paul-moore.com, eparis@redhat.com,
	jannh@google.com, dm-devel@redhat.com,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-audit@redhat.com
Cc: tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	corbet@lwn.net, sashal@kernel.org,
	jaskarankhurana@linux.microsoft.com, mdsakib@microsoft.com,
	nramas@linux.microsoft.com, pasha.tatshin@soleen.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v4 02/12] security: add ipe lsm evaluation loop and audit system
Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2020 09:44:01 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <f7cda924-a14d-35bf-7c00-f12e2be9844c@linux.microsoft.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <4b0c9925-d163-46a2-bbcb-74deb7446540@infradead.org>



On 7/17/2020 4:16 PM, Randy Dunlap wrote:
> On 7/17/20 4:09 PM, Deven Bowers wrote:
>> +config SECURITY_IPE_PERMISSIVE_SWITCH
>> +	bool "Enable the ability to switch IPE to permissive mode"
>> +	default y
>> +	help
>> +	  This option enables two ways of switching IPE to permissive mode,
>> +	  a sysctl (if enabled), `ipe.enforce`, or a kernel command line
>> +	  parameter, `ipe.enforce`. If either of these are set to 0, files
> 
> 	                                               is set

Thanks, I'll change it in the next iteration.

> 
>> +	  will be subject to IPE's policy, audit messages will be logged, but
>> +	  the policy will not be enforced.
>> +
>> +	  If unsure, answer Y.
> 
> 

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
To: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	agk@redhat.com, axboe@kernel.dk, snitzer@redhat.com,
	jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com,
	viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, paul@paul-moore.com, eparis@redhat.com,
	jannh@google.com, dm-devel@redhat.com,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	 linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-audit@redhat.com
Cc: sashal@kernel.org, mdsakib@microsoft.com, corbet@lwn.net,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, pasha.tatshin@soleen.com,
	nramas@linux.microsoft.com, tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com,
	jaskarankhurana@linux.microsoft.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v4 02/12] security: add ipe lsm evaluation loop and audit system
Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2020 09:44:01 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <f7cda924-a14d-35bf-7c00-f12e2be9844c@linux.microsoft.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <4b0c9925-d163-46a2-bbcb-74deb7446540@infradead.org>



On 7/17/2020 4:16 PM, Randy Dunlap wrote:
> On 7/17/20 4:09 PM, Deven Bowers wrote:
>> +config SECURITY_IPE_PERMISSIVE_SWITCH
>> +	bool "Enable the ability to switch IPE to permissive mode"
>> +	default y
>> +	help
>> +	  This option enables two ways of switching IPE to permissive mode,
>> +	  a sysctl (if enabled), `ipe.enforce`, or a kernel command line
>> +	  parameter, `ipe.enforce`. If either of these are set to 0, files
> 
> 	                                               is set

Thanks, I'll change it in the next iteration.

> 
>> +	  will be subject to IPE's policy, audit messages will be logged, but
>> +	  the policy will not be enforced.
>> +
>> +	  If unsure, answer Y.
> 
> 

--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit


  reply	other threads:[~2020-07-20 16:44 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 41+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-07-17 23:09 [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE) Deven Bowers
2020-07-17 23:09 ` Deven Bowers
2020-07-17 23:09 ` [RFC PATCH v4 01/12] scripts: add ipe tooling to generate boot policy Deven Bowers
2020-07-17 23:09   ` Deven Bowers
2020-07-17 23:09 ` [RFC PATCH v4 02/12] security: add ipe lsm evaluation loop and audit system Deven Bowers
2020-07-17 23:09   ` Deven Bowers
2020-07-17 23:16   ` Randy Dunlap
2020-07-17 23:16     ` Randy Dunlap
2020-07-20 16:44     ` Deven Bowers [this message]
2020-07-20 16:44       ` Deven Bowers
2020-07-18  8:33   ` kernel test robot
2020-07-17 23:09 ` [RFC PATCH v4 03/12] security: add ipe lsm policy parser and policy loading Deven Bowers
2020-07-17 23:09   ` Deven Bowers
2020-07-18 15:38   ` kernel test robot
2020-07-17 23:09 ` [RFC PATCH v4 04/12] ipe: add property for trust of boot volume Deven Bowers
2020-07-17 23:09   ` Deven Bowers
2020-07-18 22:53   ` kernel test robot
2020-07-17 23:09 ` [RFC PATCH v4 05/12] fs: add security blob and hooks for block_device Deven Bowers
2020-07-17 23:09   ` Deven Bowers
2020-07-18  0:14   ` Casey Schaufler
2020-07-18  0:14     ` Casey Schaufler
2020-07-20 16:42     ` Deven Bowers
2020-07-20 16:42       ` Deven Bowers
2020-07-17 23:09 ` [RFC PATCH v4 06/12] dm-verity: move signature check after tree validation Deven Bowers
2020-07-17 23:09   ` Deven Bowers
2020-07-18  4:56   ` kernel test robot
2020-07-18 13:39   ` kernel test robot
2020-07-19  6:08   ` kernel test robot
2020-07-17 23:09 ` [RFC PATCH v4 07/12] dm-verity: add bdev_setsecurity hook for dm-verity signature Deven Bowers
2020-07-17 23:09   ` Deven Bowers
2020-07-17 23:09 ` [RFC PATCH v4 08/12] ipe: add property for signed dmverity volumes Deven Bowers
2020-07-17 23:09   ` Deven Bowers
2020-07-19  7:28   ` kernel test robot
2020-07-17 23:09 ` [RFC PATCH v4 09/12] dm-verity: add bdev_setsecurity hook for root-hash Deven Bowers
2020-07-17 23:09   ` Deven Bowers
2020-07-17 23:09 ` [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] ipe: add property for dmverity roothash Deven Bowers
2020-07-17 23:09   ` Deven Bowers
2020-07-17 23:09 ` [RFC PATCH v4 11/12] documentation: add ipe documentation Deven Bowers
2020-07-17 23:09   ` Deven Bowers
2020-07-17 23:09 ` [RFC PATCH v4 12/12] cleanup: uapi/linux/audit.h Deven Bowers
2020-07-17 23:09   ` Deven Bowers

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