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From: Janis Schoetterl-Glausch <scgl@linux.ibm.com>
To: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: borntraeger@de.ibm.com, frankja@linux.ibm.com, thuth@redhat.com,
	pasic@linux.ibm.com, david@redhat.com,
	linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	mimu@linux.ibm.com, nrb@linux.ibm.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 01/17] KVM: s390: pv: leak the topmost page table when destroy fails
Date: Thu, 3 Mar 2022 15:40:42 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ff7291c0-e762-9fe9-4181-e62125bf2f59@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220302181143.188283-2-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>

On 3/2/22 19:11, Claudio Imbrenda wrote:
> Each secure guest must have a unique ASCE (address space control
> element); we must avoid that new guests use the same page for their
> ASCE, to avoid errors.
> 
> Since the ASCE mostly consists of the address of the topmost page table
> (plus some flags), we must not return that memory to the pool unless
> the ASCE is no longer in use.
> 
> Only a successful Destroy Secure Configuration UVC will make the ASCE
> reusable again.
> 
> If the Destroy Configuration UVC fails, the ASCE cannot be reused for a
> secure guest (either for the ASCE or for other memory areas). To avoid
> a collision, it must not be used again. This is a permanent error and
> the page becomes in practice unusable, so we set it aside and leak it.
> On failure we already leak other memory that belongs to the ultravisor
> (i.e. the variable and base storage for a guest) and not leaking the
> topmost page table was an oversight.
> 
> This error (and thus the leakage) should not happen unless the hardware
> is broken or KVM has some unknown serious bug.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
> Fixes: 29b40f105ec8d55 ("KVM: s390: protvirt: Add initial vm and cpu lifecycle handling")
> ---
>  arch/s390/include/asm/gmap.h |  2 +
>  arch/s390/kvm/pv.c           |  9 +++--
>  arch/s390/mm/gmap.c          | 71 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  3 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> 
[...]

> +/**
> + * s390_replace_asce - Try to replace the current ASCE of a gmap with
> + * another equivalent one.
> + * @gmap the gmap
> + *
> + * If the allocation of the new top level page table fails, the ASCE is not
> + * replaced.
> + * In any case, the old ASCE is always removed from the list. Therefore the
> + * caller has to make sure to save a pointer to it beforehands, unless an
> + * intentional leak is intended.
> + */
> +int s390_replace_asce(struct gmap *gmap)
> +{
> +	unsigned long asce;
> +	struct page *page;
> +	void *table;
> +
> +	s390_remove_old_asce(gmap);
> +
> +	page = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT, CRST_ALLOC_ORDER);
> +	if (!page)
> +		return -ENOMEM;
> +	table = page_to_virt(page);
> +	memcpy(table, gmap->table, 1UL << (CRST_ALLOC_ORDER + PAGE_SHIFT));

Is concurrent modification of *gmap->table possible during the copy?

> +
> +	/*
> +	 * The caller has to deal with the old ASCE, but here we make sure
> +	 * the new one is properly added to the list of page tables, so that
> +	 * it will be freed when the VM is torn down.
> +	 */
> +	spin_lock(&gmap->guest_table_lock);
> +	list_add(&page->lru, &gmap->crst_list);
> +	spin_unlock(&gmap->guest_table_lock);
> +
> +	/* Set new table origin while preserving existing ASCE control bits */
> +	asce = (gmap->asce & _ASCE_ORIGIN) | __pa(table);
> +	WRITE_ONCE(gmap->asce, asce);
> +	WRITE_ONCE(gmap->mm->context.gmap_asce, asce);
> +	WRITE_ONCE(gmap->table, table);
> +
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(s390_replace_asce);


  reply	other threads:[~2022-03-03 14:40 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-03-02 18:11 [PATCH v8 00/17] KVM: s390: pv: implement lazy destroy for reboot Claudio Imbrenda
2022-03-02 18:11 ` [PATCH v8 01/17] KVM: s390: pv: leak the topmost page table when destroy fails Claudio Imbrenda
2022-03-03 14:40   ` Janis Schoetterl-Glausch [this message]
2022-03-03 15:05     ` Claudio Imbrenda
2022-03-03 16:34       ` Janis Schoetterl-Glausch
2022-03-02 18:11 ` [PATCH v8 02/17] KVM: s390: pv: handle secure storage violations for protected guests Claudio Imbrenda
2022-03-02 18:11 ` [PATCH v8 03/17] KVM: s390: pv: handle secure storage exceptions for normal guests Claudio Imbrenda
2022-03-02 18:11 ` [PATCH v8 04/17] KVM: s390: pv: refactor s390_reset_acc Claudio Imbrenda
2022-03-02 18:11 ` [PATCH v8 05/17] KVM: s390: pv: usage counter instead of flag Claudio Imbrenda
2022-03-02 18:11 ` [PATCH v8 06/17] KVM: s390: pv: add export before import Claudio Imbrenda
2022-03-02 18:11 ` [PATCH v8 07/17] KVM: s390: pv: module parameter to fence lazy destroy Claudio Imbrenda
2022-03-02 18:11 ` [PATCH v8 08/17] KVM: s390: pv: clear the state without memset Claudio Imbrenda
2022-03-02 18:11 ` [PATCH v8 09/17] KVM: s390: pv: Add kvm_s390_cpus_from_pv to kvm-s390.h and add documentation Claudio Imbrenda
2022-03-02 18:11 ` [PATCH v8 10/17] KVM: s390: pv: add mmu_notifier Claudio Imbrenda
2022-03-03  3:12   ` kernel test robot
2022-03-03  3:12   ` kernel test robot
2022-03-02 18:11 ` [PATCH v8 11/17] s390/mm: KVM: pv: when tearing down, try to destroy protected pages Claudio Imbrenda
2022-03-02 18:11 ` [PATCH v8 12/17] KVM: s390: pv: refactoring of kvm_s390_pv_deinit_vm Claudio Imbrenda
2022-03-02 18:11 ` [PATCH v8 13/17] KVM: s390: pv: cleanup leftover protected VMs if needed Claudio Imbrenda
2022-03-02 18:11 ` [PATCH v8 14/17] KVM: s390: pv: asynchronous destroy for reboot Claudio Imbrenda
2022-03-02 18:11 ` [PATCH v8 15/17] KVM: s390: pv: api documentation for asynchronous destroy Claudio Imbrenda
2022-03-02 18:11 ` [PATCH v8 16/17] KVM: s390: pv: add KVM_CAP_S390_PROTECTED_ASYNC_DISABLE Claudio Imbrenda
2022-03-02 18:11 ` [PATCH v8 17/17] KVM: s390: pv: avoid export before import if possible Claudio Imbrenda

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