* [xen-4.3-testing test] 64090: regressions - FAIL
@ 2015-11-12 8:40 osstest service owner
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From: osstest service owner @ 2015-11-12 8:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel, osstest-admin
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flight 64090 xen-4.3-testing real [real]
http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs/64090/
Regressions :-(
Tests which did not succeed and are blocking,
including tests which could not be run:
test-amd64-amd64-migrupgrade 21 guest-migrate/src_host/dst_host fail REGR. vs. 63212
test-amd64-i386-xl-raw 20 guest-start/debian.repeat fail REGR. vs. 63212
Regressions which are regarded as allowable (not blocking):
test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 13 guest-localmigrate fail REGR. vs. 63212
test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3 15 guest-localmigrate.2 fail like 63151
Tests which did not succeed, but are not blocking:
test-amd64-amd64-rumpuserxen-amd64 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a
test-amd64-i386-rumpuserxen-i386 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a
test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-ovmf-amd64 9 debian-hvm-install fail never pass
build-i386-rumpuserxen 6 xen-build fail never pass
build-amd64-rumpuserxen 6 xen-build fail never pass
test-amd64-i386-migrupgrade 21 guest-migrate/src_host/dst_host fail never pass
test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-qcow2 6 xen-boot fail never pass
test-armhf-armhf-libvirt 6 xen-boot fail never pass
test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-ovmf-amd64 9 debian-hvm-install fail never pass
test-amd64-i386-libvirt 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass
test-armhf-armhf-xl-credit2 6 xen-boot fail never pass
test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-raw 6 xen-boot fail never pass
test-armhf-armhf-xl-arndale 6 xen-boot fail never pass
test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 17 guest-stop fail never pass
test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-vhd 11 migrate-support-check fail never pass
test-armhf-armhf-xl-multivcpu 6 xen-boot fail never pass
test-armhf-armhf-xl-cubietruck 6 xen-boot fail never pass
test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 17 guest-stop fail never pass
test-armhf-armhf-xl-vhd 6 xen-boot fail never pass
test-amd64-amd64-libvirt 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass
test-armhf-armhf-xl 6 xen-boot fail never pass
test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 17 guest-stop fail never pass
test-amd64-i386-xend-qemut-winxpsp3 21 leak-check/check fail never pass
version targeted for testing:
xen fd1e4cc4d1d100337931b6f6dc50ed0b9766968a
baseline version:
xen 85ca813ec23c5a60680e4a13777dad530065902b
Last test of basis 63212 2015-10-22 10:03:01 Z 20 days
Failing since 63360 2015-10-29 13:39:04 Z 13 days 10 attempts
Testing same since 64090 2015-11-10 18:01:42 Z 1 days 1 attempts
------------------------------------------------------------
People who touched revisions under test:
Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
jobs:
build-amd64 pass
build-armhf pass
build-i386 pass
build-amd64-libvirt pass
build-armhf-libvirt pass
build-i386-libvirt pass
build-amd64-prev pass
build-i386-prev pass
build-amd64-pvops pass
build-armhf-pvops pass
build-i386-pvops pass
build-amd64-rumpuserxen fail
build-i386-rumpuserxen fail
test-amd64-amd64-xl pass
test-armhf-armhf-xl fail
test-amd64-i386-xl pass
test-amd64-i386-qemut-rhel6hvm-amd pass
test-amd64-i386-qemuu-rhel6hvm-amd pass
test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-debianhvm-amd64 pass
test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-debianhvm-amd64 pass
test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64 pass
test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64 pass
test-amd64-i386-freebsd10-amd64 pass
test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-ovmf-amd64 fail
test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-ovmf-amd64 fail
test-amd64-amd64-rumpuserxen-amd64 blocked
test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 fail
test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 fail
test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 fail
test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 fail
test-armhf-armhf-xl-arndale fail
test-amd64-amd64-xl-credit2 pass
test-armhf-armhf-xl-credit2 fail
test-armhf-armhf-xl-cubietruck fail
test-amd64-i386-freebsd10-i386 pass
test-amd64-i386-rumpuserxen-i386 blocked
test-amd64-i386-qemut-rhel6hvm-intel pass
test-amd64-i386-qemuu-rhel6hvm-intel pass
test-amd64-amd64-libvirt pass
test-armhf-armhf-libvirt fail
test-amd64-i386-libvirt pass
test-amd64-amd64-migrupgrade fail
test-amd64-i386-migrupgrade fail
test-amd64-amd64-xl-multivcpu pass
test-armhf-armhf-xl-multivcpu fail
test-amd64-amd64-pair pass
test-amd64-i386-pair pass
test-amd64-amd64-pv pass
test-amd64-i386-pv pass
test-amd64-amd64-amd64-pvgrub pass
test-amd64-amd64-i386-pvgrub pass
test-amd64-amd64-pygrub pass
test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-qcow2 fail
test-amd64-amd64-xl-qcow2 pass
test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-raw fail
test-amd64-i386-xl-raw fail
test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-winxpsp3-vcpus1 pass
test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3-vcpus1 pass
test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-vhd pass
test-armhf-armhf-xl-vhd fail
test-amd64-i386-xend-qemut-winxpsp3 fail
test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-winxpsp3 pass
test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3 fail
------------------------------------------------------------
sg-report-flight on osstest.test-lab.xenproject.org
logs: /home/logs/logs
images: /home/logs/images
Logs, config files, etc. are available at
http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs
Explanation of these reports, and of osstest in general, is at
http://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=osstest.git;a=blob;f=README.email;hb=master
http://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=osstest.git;a=blob;f=README;hb=master
Test harness code can be found at
http://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb?p=osstest.git;a=summary
Not pushing.
------------------------------------------------------------
commit fd1e4cc4d1d100337931b6f6dc50ed0b9766968a
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Date: Tue Nov 10 12:23:43 2015 +0100
x86/HVM: always intercept #AC and #DB
Both being benign exceptions, and both being possible to get triggered
by exception delivery, this is required to prevent a guest from locking
up a CPU (resulting from no other VM exits occurring once getting into
such a loop).
The specific scenarios:
1) #AC may be raised during exception delivery if the handler is set to
be a ring-3 one by a 32-bit guest, and the stack is misaligned.
This is CVE-2015-5307 / XSA-156.
Reported-by: Benjamin Serebrin <serebrin@google.com>
2) #DB may be raised during exception delivery when a breakpoint got
placed on a data structure involved in delivering the exception. This
can result in an endless loop when a 64-bit guest uses a non-zero IST
for the vector 1 IDT entry, but even without use of IST the time it
takes until a contributory fault would get raised (results depending
on the handler) may be quite long.
This is CVE-2015-8104 / XSA-156.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Tested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: bd2239d9fa975a1ee5bcd27c218ae042cd0a57bc
master date: 2015-11-10 12:03:08 +0100
commit e875e0e5fcc5912f71422b53674a97e5c0ae77be
Author: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Date: Wed Oct 21 16:18:30 2015 +0100
libxl: adjust PoD target by memory fudge, too
PoD guests need to balloon at least as far as required by PoD, or risk
crashing. Currently they don't necessarily know what the right value
is, because our memory accounting is (at the very least) confusing.
Apply the memory limit fudge factor to the in-hypervisor PoD memory
target, too. This will increase the size of the guest's PoD cache by
the fudge factor LIBXL_MAXMEM_CONSTANT (currently 1Mby). This ensures
that even with a slightly-off balloon driver, the guest will be
stable even under memory pressure.
There are two call sites of xc_domain_set_pod_target that need fixing:
The one in libxl_set_memory_target is straightforward.
The one in xc_hvm_build_x86.c:setup_guest is more awkward. Simply
setting the PoD target differently does not work because the various
amounts of memory during domain construction no longer match up.
Instead, we adjust the guest memory target in xenstore (but only for
PoD guests).
This introduces a 1Mby discrepancy between the balloon target of a PoD
guest at boot, and the target set by an apparently-equivalent `xl
mem-set' (or similar) later. This approach is low-risk for a security
fix but we need to fix this up properly in xen.git#staging and
probably also in stable trees.
This is XSA-153.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 56fb5fd62320eb40a7517206f9706aa9188d6f7b)
(cherry picked from commit 423d2cd814e8460d5ea8bd191a770f3c48b3947c)
Conflicts:
tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 73b70e3c5d59e63126c890068ee0cbf8a2a3b640)
commit 9f359c61e3927f94bb280ffb200155dd20465fda
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Date: Thu Oct 29 14:28:33 2015 +0100
x86: rate-limit logging in do_xen{oprof,pmu}_op()
Some of the sub-ops are acessible to all guests, and hence should be
rate-limited. In the xenoprof case, just like for XSA-146, include them
only in debug builds. Since the vPMU code is rather new, allow them to
be always present, but downgrade them to (rate limited) guest messages.
This is CVE-2015-7971 / XSA-152.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
master commit: 95e7415843b94c346e5ba8682665f508f220e04b
master date: 2015-10-29 13:37:19 +0100
commit 7f28d311a80e9d33d8270d6fb7b949dd4eef37f0
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Date: Thu Oct 29 14:28:06 2015 +0100
xenoprof: free domain's vcpu array
This was overlooked in fb442e2171 ("x86_64: allow more vCPU-s per
guest").
This is CVE-2015-7969 / XSA-151.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
master commit: 6e97c4b37386c2d09e09e9b5d5d232e37728b960
master date: 2015-10-29 13:36:52 +0100
commit 2d330c121eff67f4828dc8536180986e0dfdf14b
Author: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Date: Thu Oct 29 14:27:44 2015 +0100
x86/PoD: Eager sweep for zeroed pages
Based on the contents of a guests physical address space,
p2m_pod_emergency_sweep() could degrade into a linear memcmp() from 0 to
max_gfn, which runs non-preemptibly.
As p2m_pod_emergency_sweep() runs behind the scenes in a number of contexts,
making it preemptible is not feasible.
Instead, a different approach is taken. Recently-populated pages are eagerly
checked for reclaimation, which amortises the p2m_pod_emergency_sweep()
operation across each p2m_pod_demand_populate() operation.
Note that in the case that a 2M superpage can't be reclaimed as a superpage,
it is shattered if 4K pages of zeros can be reclaimed. This is unfortunate
but matches the previous behaviour, and is required to avoid regressions
(domain crash from PoD exhaustion) with VMs configured close to the limit.
This is CVE-2015-7970 / XSA-150.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
master commit: 101ce53266866144e724ed593173bc4098b300b9
master date: 2015-10-29 13:36:25 +0100
commit d7f7c5c6559ac3fa52dba5d8fe952b2c00f962db
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Date: Thu Oct 29 14:27:02 2015 +0100
free domain's vcpu array
This was overlooked in fb442e2171 ("x86_64: allow more vCPU-s per
guest").
This is CVE-2015-7969 / XSA-149.
Reported-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
master commit: d46896ebbb23f3a9fef2eb6066ae614fd1acfd96
master date: 2015-10-29 13:35:40 +0100
commit 3be91e6c200af155a1badefc5945008c8da12ce7
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Date: Thu Oct 29 14:24:40 2015 +0100
x86: guard against undue super page PTE creation
When optional super page support got added (commit bd1cd81d64 "x86: PV
support for hugepages"), two adjustments were missed: mod_l2_entry()
needs to consider the PSE and RW bits when deciding whether to use the
fast path, and the PSE bit must not be removed from L2_DISALLOW_MASK
unconditionally.
This is CVE-2015-7835 / XSA-148.
Reported-by: "栾尚聪(好风)" <shangcong.lsc@alibaba-inc.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
master commit: fe360c90ea13f309ef78810f1a2b92f2ae3b30b8
master date: 2015-10-29 13:35:07 +0100
commit fb02dec2d06a2dd104682973a21375795e344e25
Author: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Date: Thu Oct 29 14:24:17 2015 +0100
arm: handle races between relinquish_memory and free_domheap_pages
Primarily this means XENMEM_decrease_reservation from a toolstack
domain.
Unlike x86 we have no requirement right now to queue such pages onto
a separate list, if we hit this race then the other code has already
fully accepted responsibility for freeing this page and therefore
there is no more for relinquish_memory to do.
This is CVE-2015-7814 / XSA-147.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 1ef01396fdff88b1c3331a09ca5c69619b90f4ea
master date: 2015-10-29 13:34:17 +0100
commit e06f1c36d36260b7d82f8563f1a6f226160d4b23
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Date: Thu Oct 29 14:23:35 2015 +0100
AMD Vi: fix HPET ID check
Cherry picked from commit 2ca9fbd739 ("AMD IOMMU: allocate IRTE entries
instead of using a static mapping") mainly to fix build with gcc 5.x.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
commit 39698f92e4185afdd956e9af6888923c27728875
Author: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Date: Thu Oct 29 14:10:31 2015 +0100
xen: common: Use unbounded array for symbols_offset.
Using a singleton array causes gcc5 to report:
symbols.c: In function 'symbols_lookup':
symbols.c:128:359: error: array subscript is above array bounds [-Werror=array-bounds]
symbols.c:136:176: error: array subscript is above array bounds [-Werror=array-bounds]
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 3f82ea62826d4eb06002d8dba475bafcc454b845
master date: 2015-03-20 12:02:03 +0000
========================================
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