From: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
"benh@kernel.crashing.org" <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
"james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com"
<james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Robert Richter <rric@kernel.org>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
"intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org"
<intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>,
Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>,
Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>,
Lionel Landwerlin <lionel.g.landwerlin@intel.com>,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
"selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
"linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org>,
oprofile-list@lists.sf.net
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 03/10] perf/core: open access to probes for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
Date: Wed, 29 Jan 2020 08:16:40 +1100 (AEDT) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.21.2001290816290.2204@namei.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <6cdc10f2-31e5-6d71-7d71-c6b5250b74f1@linux.intel.com>
On Tue, 28 Jan 2020, Alexey Budankov wrote:
>
> Open access to monitoring via kprobes and uprobes and eBPF tracing for
> CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON
> capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes
> chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure.
>
> perf kprobes and uprobes are used by ftrace and eBPF. perf probe uses
> ftrace to define new kprobe events, and those events are treated as
> tracepoint events. eBPF defines new probes via perf_event_open interface
> and then the probes are used in eBPF tracing.
>
> CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance
> monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle
> of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or
> program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to
> accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges
> are actually required)
>
> For backward compatibility reasons access to perf_events subsystem remains
> open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for
> secure perf_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON
> capability.
>
> Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
> ---
> kernel/events/core.c | 4 ++--
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
--
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
"benh@kernel.crashing.org" <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Lionel Landwerlin <lionel.g.landwerlin@intel.com>,
"james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com"
<james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>,
Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
oprofile-list@lists.sf.net, Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>,
Robert Richter <rric@kernel.org>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
"selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
"intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org"
<intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
Stephane Eranian <eranian@goo>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 03/10] perf/core: open access to probes for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
Date: Wed, 29 Jan 2020 08:16:40 +1100 (AEDT) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.21.2001290816290.2204@namei.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <6cdc10f2-31e5-6d71-7d71-c6b5250b74f1@linux.intel.com>
On Tue, 28 Jan 2020, Alexey Budankov wrote:
>
> Open access to monitoring via kprobes and uprobes and eBPF tracing for
> CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON
> capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes
> chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure.
>
> perf kprobes and uprobes are used by ftrace and eBPF. perf probe uses
> ftrace to define new kprobe events, and those events are treated as
> tracepoint events. eBPF defines new probes via perf_event_open interface
> and then the probes are used in eBPF tracing.
>
> CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance
> monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle
> of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or
> program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to
> accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges
> are actually required)
>
> For backward compatibility reasons access to perf_events subsystem remains
> open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for
> secure perf_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON
> capability.
>
> Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
> ---
> kernel/events/core.c | 4 ++--
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
--
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Lionel Landwerlin <lionel.g.landwerlin@intel.com>,
"james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com"
<james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>,
Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
oprofile-list@lists.sf.net, Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>,
Robert Richter <rric@kernel.org>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
"selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
"intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org"
<intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>,
Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
"linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 03/10] perf/core: open access to probes for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
Date: Wed, 29 Jan 2020 08:16:40 +1100 (AEDT) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.21.2001290816290.2204@namei.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <6cdc10f2-31e5-6d71-7d71-c6b5250b74f1@linux.intel.com>
On Tue, 28 Jan 2020, Alexey Budankov wrote:
>
> Open access to monitoring via kprobes and uprobes and eBPF tracing for
> CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON
> capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes
> chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure.
>
> perf kprobes and uprobes are used by ftrace and eBPF. perf probe uses
> ftrace to define new kprobe events, and those events are treated as
> tracepoint events. eBPF defines new probes via perf_event_open interface
> and then the probes are used in eBPF tracing.
>
> CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance
> monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle
> of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or
> program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to
> accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges
> are actually required)
>
> For backward compatibility reasons access to perf_events subsystem remains
> open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for
> secure perf_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON
> capability.
>
> Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
> ---
> kernel/events/core.c | 4 ++--
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
--
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
"benh@kernel.crashing.org" <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Lionel Landwerlin <lionel.g.landwerlin@intel.com>,
"james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com"
<james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>,
Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
oprofile-list@lists.sf.net, Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>,
Robert Richter <rric@kernel.org>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
"selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
"intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org"
<intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>,
Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
"linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 03/10] perf/core: open access to probes for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
Date: Wed, 29 Jan 2020 08:16:40 +1100 (AEDT) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.21.2001290816290.2204@namei.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <6cdc10f2-31e5-6d71-7d71-c6b5250b74f1@linux.intel.com>
On Tue, 28 Jan 2020, Alexey Budankov wrote:
>
> Open access to monitoring via kprobes and uprobes and eBPF tracing for
> CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON
> capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes
> chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure.
>
> perf kprobes and uprobes are used by ftrace and eBPF. perf probe uses
> ftrace to define new kprobe events, and those events are treated as
> tracepoint events. eBPF defines new probes via perf_event_open interface
> and then the probes are used in eBPF tracing.
>
> CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance
> monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle
> of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or
> program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to
> accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges
> are actually required)
>
> For backward compatibility reasons access to perf_events subsystem remains
> open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for
> secure perf_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON
> capability.
>
> Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
> ---
> kernel/events/core.c | 4 ++--
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
--
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>
_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
"benh@kernel.crashing.org" <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
"james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com"
<james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>,
Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
oprofile-list@lists.sf.net, Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>,
Robert Richter <rric@kernel.org>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
"selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
"intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org"
<intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>,
Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
"linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>
Subject: Re: [Intel-gfx] [PATCH v6 03/10] perf/core: open access to probes for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
Date: Wed, 29 Jan 2020 08:16:40 +1100 (AEDT) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.21.2001290816290.2204@namei.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <6cdc10f2-31e5-6d71-7d71-c6b5250b74f1@linux.intel.com>
On Tue, 28 Jan 2020, Alexey Budankov wrote:
>
> Open access to monitoring via kprobes and uprobes and eBPF tracing for
> CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON
> capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes
> chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure.
>
> perf kprobes and uprobes are used by ftrace and eBPF. perf probe uses
> ftrace to define new kprobe events, and those events are treated as
> tracepoint events. eBPF defines new probes via perf_event_open interface
> and then the probes are used in eBPF tracing.
>
> CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance
> monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle
> of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or
> program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to
> accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges
> are actually required)
>
> For backward compatibility reasons access to perf_events subsystem remains
> open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for
> secure perf_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON
> capability.
>
> Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
> ---
> kernel/events/core.c | 4 ++--
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
--
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>
_______________________________________________
Intel-gfx mailing list
Intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/intel-gfx
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-01-28 21:19 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 97+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-01-28 5:52 [PATCH v6 00/10] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 5:52 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 5:52 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 5:52 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 5:52 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 6:07 ` [PATCH v6 01/10] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 6:07 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 6:07 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 6:07 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 6:07 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 21:16 ` James Morris
2020-01-28 21:16 ` [Intel-gfx] " James Morris
2020-01-28 21:16 ` James Morris
2020-01-28 21:16 ` James Morris
2020-01-28 21:16 ` James Morris
2020-01-28 6:08 ` [PATCH v6 02/10] perf/core: open access to the core for CAP_PERFMON privileged process Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 6:08 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 6:08 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 6:08 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 6:08 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 6:09 ` [PATCH v6 03/10] perf/core: open access to probes " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 6:09 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 6:09 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 6:09 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 6:09 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 21:16 ` James Morris [this message]
2020-01-28 21:16 ` [Intel-gfx] " James Morris
2020-01-28 21:16 ` James Morris
2020-01-28 21:16 ` James Morris
2020-01-28 21:16 ` James Morris
2020-01-28 6:09 ` [PATCH v6 04/10] perf tool: extend Perf tool with CAP_PERFMON capability support Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 6:09 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 6:09 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 6:09 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 6:09 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-01 20:50 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 6:10 ` [PATCH v6 05/10] drm/i915/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 6:10 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 6:10 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 6:10 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 6:10 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 6:11 ` [PATCH v6 06/10] trace/bpf_trace: " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 6:11 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 6:11 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 6:11 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 6:11 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 21:17 ` James Morris
2020-01-28 21:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " James Morris
2020-01-28 21:17 ` James Morris
2020-01-28 21:17 ` James Morris
2020-01-28 21:17 ` James Morris
2020-01-28 6:12 ` [PATCH v6 07/10] powerpc/perf: " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 6:12 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 6:12 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 6:12 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 6:12 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 21:17 ` James Morris
2020-01-28 21:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " James Morris
2020-01-28 21:17 ` James Morris
2020-01-28 21:17 ` James Morris
2020-01-28 21:17 ` James Morris
2020-01-28 6:12 ` [PATCH v6 08/10] parisc/perf: " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 6:12 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 6:12 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 6:12 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 6:12 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 21:17 ` James Morris
2020-01-28 21:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " James Morris
2020-01-28 21:17 ` James Morris
2020-01-28 21:17 ` James Morris
2020-01-28 21:17 ` James Morris
2020-01-28 6:13 ` [PATCH v6 09/10] drivers/perf: " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 6:13 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 6:13 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 6:13 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 6:13 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 21:18 ` James Morris
2020-01-28 21:18 ` [Intel-gfx] " James Morris
2020-01-28 21:18 ` James Morris
2020-01-28 21:18 ` James Morris
2020-01-28 21:18 ` James Morris
2020-01-28 6:14 ` [PATCH v6 10/10] drivers/oprofile: " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 6:14 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 6:14 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 6:14 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 6:14 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 21:18 ` James Morris
2020-01-28 21:18 ` [Intel-gfx] " James Morris
2020-01-28 21:18 ` James Morris
2020-01-28 21:18 ` James Morris
2020-01-28 21:18 ` James Morris
2020-01-28 6:42 ` [Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.CHECKPATCH: warning for Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability (rev2) Patchwork
2020-01-28 7:35 ` [Intel-gfx] ✓ Fi.CI.BAT: success " Patchwork
2020-01-29 6:03 ` [Intel-gfx] ✓ Fi.CI.IGT: " Patchwork
2020-02-05 17:25 [PATCH v6 00/10] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability Alexey Budankov
2020-02-05 17:31 ` [PATCH v6 03/10] perf/core: open access to probes for CAP_PERFMON privileged process Alexey Budankov
2020-02-05 17:31 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-05 17:31 ` Alexey Budankov
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