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From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
To: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: "Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>, "Wei Liu" <wl@xen.org>,
	Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 6/8] x86/entry: Track the IST-ness of an entry for the exit paths
Date: Fri, 15 Sep 2023 09:13:24 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <b6640dbb-05e5-7114-dc70-012c27dd96e7@suse.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <fb9ec99d-9c76-82ff-9b82-22fff1a62c6c@citrix.com>

On 14.09.2023 21:44, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 14/09/2023 10:32 am, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> On 13.09.2023 22:27, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S
>>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S
>>> @@ -117,8 +117,15 @@ compat_process_trap:
>>>          call  compat_create_bounce_frame
>>>          jmp   compat_test_all_events
>>>  
>>> -/* %rbx: struct vcpu, interrupts disabled */
>>> +/* %rbx: struct vcpu, %r12: ist_exit, interrupts disabled */
>>>  ENTRY(compat_restore_all_guest)
>>> +
>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG
>>> +        mov   %rsp, %rdi
>>> +        mov   %r12, %rsi
>>> +        call  check_ist_exit
>>> +#endif
>>> +
>>>          ASSERT_INTERRUPTS_DISABLED
>>>          mov   $~(X86_EFLAGS_IOPL | X86_EFLAGS_VM), %r11d
>>>          and   UREGS_eflags(%rsp),%r11d
>> Without having peeked ahead, is there any use of %r12 going to appear
>> on this path? I thought it's only going to be restore_all_xen?
> 
> For now, we only need to change behaviour based on ist_exit in
> restore_all_xen.
> 
> But, we do get here in IST context, and I'm not interested in having to
> re-do the analysis to determine if this is safe.  ist_exit is a global
> property of exiting Xen, so should be kept correct from the outset.

Would be nice to mention this just-in-case aspect in the description.

>>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
>>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
>>> @@ -142,10 +142,16 @@ process_trap:
>>>  
>>>          .section .text.entry, "ax", @progbits
>>>  
>>> -/* %rbx: struct vcpu, interrupts disabled */
>>> +/* %rbx: struct vcpu, %r12: ist_exit, interrupts disabled */
>>>  restore_all_guest:
>>> -        ASSERT_INTERRUPTS_DISABLED
>>>  
>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG
>>> +        mov   %rsp, %rdi
>>> +        mov   %r12, %rsi
>>> +        call  check_ist_exit
>>> +#endif
>>> +
>>> +        ASSERT_INTERRUPTS_DISABLED
>>>          /* Stash guest SPEC_CTRL value while we can read struct vcpu. */
>>>          mov VCPU_arch_msrs(%rbx), %rdx
>>>          mov VCPUMSR_spec_ctrl_raw(%rdx), %r15d
>> Even here I don't think I see a need for the addition. Plus if the check
>> is warranted here, is it really necessary for it to live ahead of the
>> interrupts-disabled check?
> 
> What makes you think there is a relevance to the order of two assertions
> in fully irqs-off code?

You explicitly making it more churn than strictly needed. IOW I was
simply wondering whether I was overlooking some aspect.

> The checks are in the same order as the comment stating the invariants.

If that's the only criteria, then okay (but still slightly odd to
see more churn than necessary).

Jan


  reply	other threads:[~2023-09-15  7:13 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-09-13 20:27 [PATCH 0/8] x86/spec-ctrl: AMD DIV fix, and VERW prerequisite bugfixes Andrew Cooper
2023-09-13 20:27 ` [PATCH 1/8] x86/spec-ctrl: Fix confusion between SPEC_CTRL_EXIT_TO_XEN{,_IST} Andrew Cooper
2023-09-14  6:56   ` Jan Beulich
2023-09-14  9:54     ` Andrew Cooper
2023-09-13 20:27 ` [PATCH 2/8] x86/spec-ctrl: Fold DO_SPEC_CTRL_EXIT_TO_XEN into it's single user Andrew Cooper
2023-09-14  6:59   ` Jan Beulich
2023-09-13 20:27 ` [PATCH 3/8] x86/spec-ctrl: Turn the remaining SPEC_CTRL_{ENTRY,EXIT}_* into asm macros Andrew Cooper
2023-09-14  7:20   ` Jan Beulich
2023-09-13 20:27 ` [PATCH 4/8] x86/spec-ctrl: Extend all SPEC_CTRL_{ENTER,EXIT}_* comments Andrew Cooper
2023-09-14  7:58   ` Jan Beulich
2023-09-14 19:23     ` Andrew Cooper
2023-09-15  7:07       ` Jan Beulich
2023-09-15  9:27         ` Andrew Cooper
2023-09-13 20:27 ` [PATCH 5/8] x86/entry: Adjust restore_all_xen to hold stack_end in %r14 Andrew Cooper
2023-09-14  8:51   ` Jan Beulich
2023-09-14 19:28     ` Andrew Cooper
2023-09-13 20:27 ` [PATCH 6/8] x86/entry: Track the IST-ness of an entry for the exit paths Andrew Cooper
2023-09-14  9:32   ` Jan Beulich
2023-09-14 19:44     ` Andrew Cooper
2023-09-15  7:13       ` Jan Beulich [this message]
2023-09-15  9:30         ` Andrew Cooper
2023-09-13 20:27 ` [PATCH 7/8] x86/spec-ctrl: Issue VERW during IST exit to Xen Andrew Cooper
2023-09-14 10:01   ` Jan Beulich
2023-09-14 19:49     ` Andrew Cooper
2023-09-15  7:15       ` Jan Beulich
2023-09-13 20:27 ` [PATCH 8/8] x86/spec-ctrl: Mitigate the Zen1 DIV leakge Andrew Cooper
2023-09-13 20:43   ` Andrew Cooper
2023-09-13 21:12   ` Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
2023-09-14 10:52   ` Jan Beulich
2023-09-14 20:01     ` Andrew Cooper
2023-09-14 13:12   ` Jason Andryuk
2023-09-14 20:05     ` Andrew Cooper

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