From: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
"jani.nikula@linux.intel.com" <jani.nikula@linux.intel.com>,
"joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com"
<joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com>,
"rodrigo.vivi@intel.com" <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>,
Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>,
Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@linux.intel.com>,
"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
"selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
"linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org>,
intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org,
Brendan Gregg <bgregg@netflix.com>,
songliubraving@fb.com,
"bpf@vger.kernel.org" <bpf@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org>,
"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>
Subject: [PATCH v3 1/7] capabilities: introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON to kernel and user space
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 2019 22:58:02 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <bd8adfde-f562-0e56-75aa-371c5354f350@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <b175f283-d256-e37e-f447-6ba4ab4f3d3a@linux.intel.com>
Introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability devoted to secure system performance
monitoring and observability so that CAP_SYS_PERFMON would assist
CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in its governing role for perf_events, i915_perf
and other subsystems of the kernel.
CAP_SYS_PERFMON intends to harden system security and integrity during
system performance monitoring and observability by decreasing attack surface
that is available to CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes.
CAP_SYS_PERFMON intends to take over CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials related to
system performance monitoring and observability and balance amount of
CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials in accordance with the recommendations provided
in the man page for CAP_SYS_ADMIN [1]: "Note: this capability is overloaded;
see Notes to kernel developers, below."
[1] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html
Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
---
include/linux/capability.h | 1 +
include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 8 +++++++-
security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 4 ++--
3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index ecce0f43c73a..6342502c4c2a 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -251,6 +251,7 @@ extern bool privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct
extern bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap);
extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
extern bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns);
+#define perfmon_capable() (capable(CAP_SYS_PERFMON) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
/* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps);
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
index 240fdb9a60f6..98e03cc76c7c 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
@@ -366,8 +366,14 @@ struct vfs_ns_cap_data {
#define CAP_AUDIT_READ 37
+/*
+ * Allow system performance and observability privileged operations
+ * using perf_events, i915_perf and other kernel subsystems
+ */
+
+#define CAP_SYS_PERFMON 38
-#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_AUDIT_READ
+#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_SYS_PERFMON
#define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index 7db24855e12d..bae602c623b0 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -27,9 +27,9 @@
"audit_control", "setfcap"
#define COMMON_CAP2_PERMS "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", \
- "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read"
+ "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read", "sys_perfmon"
-#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_AUDIT_READ
+#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_SYS_PERFMON
#error New capability defined, please update COMMON_CAP2_PERMS.
#endif
--
2.20.1
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
"jani.nikula@linux.intel.com" <jani.nikula@linux.intel.com>,
"joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com"
<joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com>,
"rodrigo.vivi@intel.com" <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>,
Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>,
Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@linux.intel.com>,
"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
"selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
"linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org>,
intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org,
Brendan Gregg <bgregg@netflix.com>,
songliubraving@fb.com,
"bpf@vger.kernel.org" <bpf@vger.kernel.org>li
Subject: [PATCH v3 1/7] capabilities: introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON to kernel and user space
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 2019 22:58:02 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <bd8adfde-f562-0e56-75aa-371c5354f350@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <b175f283-d256-e37e-f447-6ba4ab4f3d3a@linux.intel.com>
Introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability devoted to secure system performance
monitoring and observability so that CAP_SYS_PERFMON would assist
CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in its governing role for perf_events, i915_perf
and other subsystems of the kernel.
CAP_SYS_PERFMON intends to harden system security and integrity during
system performance monitoring and observability by decreasing attack surface
that is available to CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes.
CAP_SYS_PERFMON intends to take over CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials related to
system performance monitoring and observability and balance amount of
CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials in accordance with the recommendations provided
in the man page for CAP_SYS_ADMIN [1]: "Note: this capability is overloaded;
see Notes to kernel developers, below."
[1] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html
Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
---
include/linux/capability.h | 1 +
include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 8 +++++++-
security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 4 ++--
3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index ecce0f43c73a..6342502c4c2a 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -251,6 +251,7 @@ extern bool privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct
extern bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap);
extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
extern bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns);
+#define perfmon_capable() (capable(CAP_SYS_PERFMON) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
/* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps);
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
index 240fdb9a60f6..98e03cc76c7c 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
@@ -366,8 +366,14 @@ struct vfs_ns_cap_data {
#define CAP_AUDIT_READ 37
+/*
+ * Allow system performance and observability privileged operations
+ * using perf_events, i915_perf and other kernel subsystems
+ */
+
+#define CAP_SYS_PERFMON 38
-#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_AUDIT_READ
+#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_SYS_PERFMON
#define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index 7db24855e12d..bae602c623b0 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -27,9 +27,9 @@
"audit_control", "setfcap"
#define COMMON_CAP2_PERMS "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", \
- "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read"
+ "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read", "sys_perfmon"
-#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_AUDIT_READ
+#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_SYS_PERFMON
#error New capability defined, please update COMMON_CAP2_PERMS.
#endif
--
2.20.1
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
"jani.nikula@linux.intel.com" <jani.nikula@linux.intel.com>,
"joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com"
<joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com>,
"rodrigo.vivi@intel.com" <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@linux.intel.com>,
songliubraving@fb.com, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
"linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org>,
Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org,
Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>,
"linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org>,
"selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Brendan Gregg <bgregg@netflix.com>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>,
"bpf@vger.kernel.org" <bpf@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v3 1/7] capabilities: introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON to kernel and user space
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 2019 22:58:02 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <bd8adfde-f562-0e56-75aa-371c5354f350@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <b175f283-d256-e37e-f447-6ba4ab4f3d3a@linux.intel.com>
Introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability devoted to secure system performance
monitoring and observability so that CAP_SYS_PERFMON would assist
CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in its governing role for perf_events, i915_perf
and other subsystems of the kernel.
CAP_SYS_PERFMON intends to harden system security and integrity during
system performance monitoring and observability by decreasing attack surface
that is available to CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes.
CAP_SYS_PERFMON intends to take over CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials related to
system performance monitoring and observability and balance amount of
CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials in accordance with the recommendations provided
in the man page for CAP_SYS_ADMIN [1]: "Note: this capability is overloaded;
see Notes to kernel developers, below."
[1] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html
Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
---
include/linux/capability.h | 1 +
include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 8 +++++++-
security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 4 ++--
3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index ecce0f43c73a..6342502c4c2a 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -251,6 +251,7 @@ extern bool privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct
extern bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap);
extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
extern bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns);
+#define perfmon_capable() (capable(CAP_SYS_PERFMON) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
/* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps);
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
index 240fdb9a60f6..98e03cc76c7c 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
@@ -366,8 +366,14 @@ struct vfs_ns_cap_data {
#define CAP_AUDIT_READ 37
+/*
+ * Allow system performance and observability privileged operations
+ * using perf_events, i915_perf and other kernel subsystems
+ */
+
+#define CAP_SYS_PERFMON 38
-#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_AUDIT_READ
+#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_SYS_PERFMON
#define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index 7db24855e12d..bae602c623b0 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -27,9 +27,9 @@
"audit_control", "setfcap"
#define COMMON_CAP2_PERMS "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", \
- "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read"
+ "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read", "sys_perfmon"
-#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_AUDIT_READ
+#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_SYS_PERFMON
#error New capability defined, please update COMMON_CAP2_PERMS.
#endif
--
2.20.1
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
"jani.nikula@linux.intel.com" <jani.nikula@linux.intel.com>,
"joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com"
<joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com>,
"rodrigo.vivi@intel.com" <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: songliubraving@fb.com, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
"linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org>,
Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org,
Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>,
"linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org>,
"selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Brendan Gregg <bgregg@netflix.com>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>,
"bpf@vger.kernel.org" <bpf@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [Intel-gfx] [PATCH v3 1/7] capabilities: introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON to kernel and user space
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 2019 22:58:02 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <bd8adfde-f562-0e56-75aa-371c5354f350@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <b175f283-d256-e37e-f447-6ba4ab4f3d3a@linux.intel.com>
Introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability devoted to secure system performance
monitoring and observability so that CAP_SYS_PERFMON would assist
CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in its governing role for perf_events, i915_perf
and other subsystems of the kernel.
CAP_SYS_PERFMON intends to harden system security and integrity during
system performance monitoring and observability by decreasing attack surface
that is available to CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes.
CAP_SYS_PERFMON intends to take over CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials related to
system performance monitoring and observability and balance amount of
CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials in accordance with the recommendations provided
in the man page for CAP_SYS_ADMIN [1]: "Note: this capability is overloaded;
see Notes to kernel developers, below."
[1] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html
Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
---
include/linux/capability.h | 1 +
include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 8 +++++++-
security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 4 ++--
3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index ecce0f43c73a..6342502c4c2a 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -251,6 +251,7 @@ extern bool privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct
extern bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap);
extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
extern bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns);
+#define perfmon_capable() (capable(CAP_SYS_PERFMON) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
/* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps);
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
index 240fdb9a60f6..98e03cc76c7c 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
@@ -366,8 +366,14 @@ struct vfs_ns_cap_data {
#define CAP_AUDIT_READ 37
+/*
+ * Allow system performance and observability privileged operations
+ * using perf_events, i915_perf and other kernel subsystems
+ */
+
+#define CAP_SYS_PERFMON 38
-#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_AUDIT_READ
+#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_SYS_PERFMON
#define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index 7db24855e12d..bae602c623b0 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -27,9 +27,9 @@
"audit_control", "setfcap"
#define COMMON_CAP2_PERMS "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", \
- "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read"
+ "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read", "sys_perfmon"
-#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_AUDIT_READ
+#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_SYS_PERFMON
#error New capability defined, please update COMMON_CAP2_PERMS.
#endif
--
2.20.1
_______________________________________________
Intel-gfx mailing list
Intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/intel-gfx
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-12-16 19:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 45+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-12-16 19:52 [PATCH v3 0/7] Introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16 19:52 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16 19:52 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16 19:52 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16 19:58 ` Alexey Budankov [this message]
2019-12-16 19:58 ` [Intel-gfx] [PATCH v3 1/7] capabilities: introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON to kernel and user space Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16 19:58 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16 19:58 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-17 15:02 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-17 15:02 ` [Intel-gfx] " Stephen Smalley
2019-12-17 15:02 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-17 15:02 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-16 19:59 ` [PATCH v3 2/7] perf/core: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16 19:59 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16 19:59 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16 19:59 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16 20:00 ` [PATCH v3 3/7] perf tool: extend Perf tool with CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability support Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16 20:00 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16 20:00 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16 20:00 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16 20:03 ` [PATCH v3 4/7] drm/i915/perf: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16 20:03 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16 20:03 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16 20:03 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-17 9:45 ` [Intel-gfx] " Lionel Landwerlin
2019-12-17 9:45 ` Lionel Landwerlin
2019-12-17 9:45 ` Lionel Landwerlin
2019-12-17 9:45 ` Lionel Landwerlin
2019-12-17 11:38 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-17 11:38 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-17 11:38 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-17 11:38 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16 20:03 ` [PATCH v3 5/7] trace/bpf_trace: " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16 20:03 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16 20:03 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16 20:03 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16 20:04 ` [PATCH v3 6/7] powerpc/perf: " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16 20:04 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16 20:04 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16 20:04 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16 20:05 ` [PATCH v3 7/7] parisc/perf: " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16 20:05 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16 20:05 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16 20:05 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-17 4:43 ` [Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.BUILD: failure for Introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability (rev2) Patchwork
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