From: Alan Maguire <firstname.lastname@example.org>
To: email@example.com, firstname.lastname@example.org, email@example.com
Cc: firstname.lastname@example.org, email@example.com, firstname.lastname@example.org,
Alan Maguire <email@example.com>
Subject: [PATCH v4 bpf-next 1/2] bpf: refine kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled behaviour
Date: Thu, 19 May 2022 15:25:33 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <firstname.lastname@example.org> (raw)
With unprivileged BPF disabled, all cmds associated with the BPF syscall
are blocked to users without CAP_BPF/CAP_SYS_ADMIN. However there are
use cases where we may wish to allow interactions with BPF programs
without being able to load and attach them. So for example, a process
with required capabilities loads/attaches a BPF program, and a process
with less capabilities interacts with it; retrieving perf/ring buffer
events, modifying map-specified config etc. With all BPF syscall
commands blocked as a result of unprivileged BPF being disabled,
this mode of interaction becomes impossible for processes without
As Alexei notes
"The bpf ACL model is the same as traditional file's ACL.
The creds and ACLs are checked at open(). Then during file's write/read
additional checks might be performed. BPF has such functionality already.
Different map_creates have capability checks while map_lookup has:
map_get_sys_perms(map, f) & FMODE_CAN_READ.
In other words it's enough to gate FD-receiving parts of bpf
with unprivileged_bpf_disabled sysctl.
The rest is handled by availability of FD and access to files in bpffs."
So key fd creation syscall commands BPF_PROG_LOAD and BPF_MAP_CREATE
are blocked with unprivileged BPF disabled and no CAP_BPF.
And as Alexei notes, map creation with unprivileged BPF disabled off
blocks creation of maps aside from array, hash and ringbuf maps.
Programs responsible for loading and attaching the BPF program
can still control access to its pinned representation by restricting
permissions on the pin path, as with normal files.
Signed-off-by: Alan Maguire <email@example.com>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <firstname.lastname@example.org>
Acked-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <email@example.com>
Acked-by: KP Singh <firstname.lastname@example.org>
kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 14 +++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
index 72e53489165d..2b69306d3c6e 100644
@@ -4863,9 +4863,21 @@ static int bpf_prog_bind_map(union bpf_attr *attr)
static int __sys_bpf(int cmd, bpfptr_t uattr, unsigned int size)
union bpf_attr attr;
+ bool capable;
- if (sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled && !bpf_capable())
+ capable = bpf_capable() || !sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled;
+ /* Intent here is for unprivileged_bpf_disabled to block key object
+ * creation commands for unprivileged users; other actions depend
+ * of fd availability and access to bpffs, so are dependent on
+ * object creation success. Capabilities are later verified for
+ * operations such as load and map create, so even with unprivileged
+ * BPF disabled, capability checks are still carried out for these
+ * and other operations.
+ if (!capable &&
+ (cmd == BPF_MAP_CREATE || cmd == BPF_PROG_LOAD))
err = bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero(uattr, sizeof(attr), size);
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-05-19 14:26 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-05-19 14:25 [PATCH v4 bpf-next 0/2] bpf: refine kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled behaviour Alan Maguire
2022-05-19 14:25 ` Alan Maguire [this message]
2022-05-19 14:25 ` [PATCH v4 bpf-next 2/2] selftests/bpf: add tests verifying unprivileged bpf behaviour Alan Maguire
2022-05-21 3:00 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2022-05-21 3:10 ` [PATCH v4 bpf-next 0/2] bpf: refine kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled behaviour patchwork-bot+netdevbpf
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).