* [PATCH v2 bpf-next] bpf: Fix verifier assumptions about socket->sk
@ 2024-04-27 0:25 Alexei Starovoitov
2024-04-29 21:30 ` patchwork-bot+netdevbpf
0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: Alexei Starovoitov @ 2024-04-27 0:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: bpf
Cc: daniel, andrii, martin.lau, memxor, eddyz87, liamwisehart, kernel-team
From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
The verifier assumes that 'sk' field in 'struct socket' is valid
and non-NULL when 'socket' pointer itself is trusted and non-NULL.
That may not be the case when socket was just created and
passed to LSM socket_accept hook.
Fix this verifier assumption and adjust tests.
Reported-by: Liam Wisehart <liamwisehart@meta.com>
Acked-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Fixes: 6fcd486b3a0a ("bpf: Refactor RCU enforcement in the verifier.")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
v1->v2: Fixed bench_local_storage_create.c
---
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 23 +++++++++++++++----
.../bpf/progs/bench_local_storage_create.c | 5 ++--
.../selftests/bpf/progs/local_storage.c | 20 ++++++++--------
.../testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm_cgroup.c | 8 +++++--
4 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 4e474ef44e9c..c2780a5c396a 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -2368,6 +2368,8 @@ static void mark_btf_ld_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
regs[regno].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | flag;
regs[regno].btf = btf;
regs[regno].btf_id = btf_id;
+ if (type_may_be_null(flag))
+ regs[regno].id = ++env->id_gen;
}
#define DEF_NOT_SUBREG (0)
@@ -5400,8 +5402,6 @@ static int check_map_kptr_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
*/
mark_btf_ld_reg(env, cur_regs(env), value_regno, PTR_TO_BTF_ID, kptr_field->kptr.btf,
kptr_field->kptr.btf_id, btf_ld_kptr_type(env, kptr_field));
- /* For mark_ptr_or_null_reg */
- val_reg->id = ++env->id_gen;
} else if (class == BPF_STX) {
val_reg = reg_state(env, value_regno);
if (!register_is_null(val_reg) &&
@@ -5719,7 +5719,8 @@ static bool is_trusted_reg(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
return true;
/* Types listed in the reg2btf_ids are always trusted */
- if (reg2btf_ids[base_type(reg->type)])
+ if (reg2btf_ids[base_type(reg->type)] &&
+ !bpf_type_has_unsafe_modifiers(reg->type))
return true;
/* If a register is not referenced, it is trusted if it has the
@@ -6339,6 +6340,7 @@ static int bpf_map_direct_read(struct bpf_map *map, int off, int size, u64 *val,
#define BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(__type) __PASTE(__type, __safe_rcu)
#define BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU_OR_NULL(__type) __PASTE(__type, __safe_rcu_or_null)
#define BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(__type) __PASTE(__type, __safe_trusted)
+#define BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(__type) __PASTE(__type, __safe_trusted_or_null)
/*
* Allow list few fields as RCU trusted or full trusted.
@@ -6402,7 +6404,7 @@ BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct dentry) {
struct inode *d_inode;
};
-BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct socket) {
+BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct socket) {
struct sock *sk;
};
@@ -6437,11 +6439,20 @@ static bool type_is_trusted(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct linux_binprm));
BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct file));
BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct dentry));
- BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct socket));
return btf_nested_type_is_trusted(&env->log, reg, field_name, btf_id, "__safe_trusted");
}
+static bool type_is_trusted_or_null(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
+ const char *field_name, u32 btf_id)
+{
+ BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct socket));
+
+ return btf_nested_type_is_trusted(&env->log, reg, field_name, btf_id,
+ "__safe_trusted_or_null");
+}
+
static int check_ptr_to_btf_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_reg_state *regs,
int regno, int off, int size,
@@ -6550,6 +6561,8 @@ static int check_ptr_to_btf_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
*/
if (type_is_trusted(env, reg, field_name, btf_id)) {
flag |= PTR_TRUSTED;
+ } else if (type_is_trusted_or_null(env, reg, field_name, btf_id)) {
+ flag |= PTR_TRUSTED | PTR_MAYBE_NULL;
} else if (in_rcu_cs(env) && !type_may_be_null(reg->type)) {
if (type_is_rcu(env, reg, field_name, btf_id)) {
/* ignore __rcu tag and mark it MEM_RCU */
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bench_local_storage_create.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bench_local_storage_create.c
index e4bfbba6c193..c8ec0d0368e4 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bench_local_storage_create.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bench_local_storage_create.c
@@ -61,14 +61,15 @@ SEC("lsm.s/socket_post_create")
int BPF_PROG(socket_post_create, struct socket *sock, int family, int type,
int protocol, int kern)
{
+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct storage *stg;
__u32 pid;
pid = bpf_get_current_pid_tgid() >> 32;
- if (pid != bench_pid)
+ if (pid != bench_pid || !sk)
return 0;
- stg = bpf_sk_storage_get(&sk_storage_map, sock->sk, NULL,
+ stg = bpf_sk_storage_get(&sk_storage_map, sk, NULL,
BPF_LOCAL_STORAGE_GET_F_CREATE);
if (stg)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/local_storage.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/local_storage.c
index e5e3a8b8dd07..637e75df2e14 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/local_storage.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/local_storage.c
@@ -140,11 +140,12 @@ int BPF_PROG(socket_bind, struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
{
__u32 pid = bpf_get_current_pid_tgid() >> 32;
struct local_storage *storage;
+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
- if (pid != monitored_pid)
+ if (pid != monitored_pid || !sk)
return 0;
- storage = bpf_sk_storage_get(&sk_storage_map, sock->sk, 0, 0);
+ storage = bpf_sk_storage_get(&sk_storage_map, sk, 0, 0);
if (!storage)
return 0;
@@ -155,24 +156,24 @@ int BPF_PROG(socket_bind, struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
/* This tests that we can associate multiple elements
* with the local storage.
*/
- storage = bpf_sk_storage_get(&sk_storage_map2, sock->sk, 0,
+ storage = bpf_sk_storage_get(&sk_storage_map2, sk, 0,
BPF_LOCAL_STORAGE_GET_F_CREATE);
if (!storage)
return 0;
- if (bpf_sk_storage_delete(&sk_storage_map2, sock->sk))
+ if (bpf_sk_storage_delete(&sk_storage_map2, sk))
return 0;
- storage = bpf_sk_storage_get(&sk_storage_map2, sock->sk, 0,
+ storage = bpf_sk_storage_get(&sk_storage_map2, sk, 0,
BPF_LOCAL_STORAGE_GET_F_CREATE);
if (!storage)
return 0;
- if (bpf_sk_storage_delete(&sk_storage_map, sock->sk))
+ if (bpf_sk_storage_delete(&sk_storage_map, sk))
return 0;
/* Ensure that the sk_storage_map is disconnected from the storage. */
- if (!sock->sk->sk_bpf_storage || sock->sk->sk_bpf_storage->smap)
+ if (!sk->sk_bpf_storage || sk->sk_bpf_storage->smap)
return 0;
sk_storage_result = 0;
@@ -185,11 +186,12 @@ int BPF_PROG(socket_post_create, struct socket *sock, int family, int type,
{
__u32 pid = bpf_get_current_pid_tgid() >> 32;
struct local_storage *storage;
+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
- if (pid != monitored_pid)
+ if (pid != monitored_pid || !sk)
return 0;
- storage = bpf_sk_storage_get(&sk_storage_map, sock->sk, 0,
+ storage = bpf_sk_storage_get(&sk_storage_map, sk, 0,
BPF_LOCAL_STORAGE_GET_F_CREATE);
if (!storage)
return 0;
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm_cgroup.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm_cgroup.c
index 02c11d16b692..d7598538aa2d 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm_cgroup.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm_cgroup.c
@@ -103,11 +103,15 @@ static __always_inline int real_bind(struct socket *sock,
int addrlen)
{
struct sockaddr_ll sa = {};
+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
- if (sock->sk->__sk_common.skc_family != AF_PACKET)
+ if (!sk)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (sk->__sk_common.skc_family != AF_PACKET)
return 1;
- if (sock->sk->sk_kern_sock)
+ if (sk->sk_kern_sock)
return 1;
bpf_probe_read_kernel(&sa, sizeof(sa), address);
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2 bpf-next] bpf: Fix verifier assumptions about socket->sk
2024-04-27 0:25 [PATCH v2 bpf-next] bpf: Fix verifier assumptions about socket->sk Alexei Starovoitov
@ 2024-04-29 21:30 ` patchwork-bot+netdevbpf
0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: patchwork-bot+netdevbpf @ 2024-04-29 21:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Alexei Starovoitov
Cc: bpf, daniel, andrii, martin.lau, memxor, eddyz87, liamwisehart,
kernel-team
Hello:
This patch was applied to bpf/bpf-next.git (master)
by Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>:
On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 17:25:44 -0700 you wrote:
> From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
>
> The verifier assumes that 'sk' field in 'struct socket' is valid
> and non-NULL when 'socket' pointer itself is trusted and non-NULL.
> That may not be the case when socket was just created and
> passed to LSM socket_accept hook.
> Fix this verifier assumption and adjust tests.
>
> [...]
Here is the summary with links:
- [v2,bpf-next] bpf: Fix verifier assumptions about socket->sk
https://git.kernel.org/bpf/bpf-next/c/0db63c0b86e9
You are awesome, thank you!
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