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From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
	<kvm@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
	<x86@kernel.org>, <kexec@lists.infradead.org>,
	<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>,
	<linux-mm@kvack.org>, <iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org>
Cc: "Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Larry Woodman" <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
	"Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"Dave Young" <dyoung@redhat.com>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
Date: Fri, 21 Apr 2017 13:56:13 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <c29edaff-24f2-ee9b-4142-bdbf8c42083f@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170418212223.10190.85121.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net>

On 4/18/2017 4:22 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> Add support to check if SME has been enabled and if memory encryption
> should be activated (checking of command line option based on the
> configuration of the default state).  If memory encryption is to be
> activated, then the encryption mask is set and the kernel is encrypted
> "in place."
>
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S |    1 +
>  arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c |   83 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>  2 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>

...

>
> -unsigned long __init sme_enable(void)
> +unsigned long __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
>  {
> +	const char *cmdline_ptr, *cmdline_arg, *cmdline_on, *cmdline_off;
> +	unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
> +	unsigned long me_mask;
> +	bool active_by_default;
> +	char buffer[16];

So it turns out that when KASLR is enabled (CONFIG_RAMDOMIZE_BASE=y)
the stack-protector support causes issues with this function because
it is called so early. I can get past it by adding:

CFLAGS_mem_encrypt.o := $(nostackp)

in the arch/x86/mm/Makefile, but that obviously eliminates the support
for the whole file.  Would it be better to split out the sme_enable()
and other boot routines into a separate file or just apply the
$(nostackp) to the whole file?

Thanks,
Tom

> +	u64 msr;
> +
> +	/* Check for the SME support leaf */
> +	eax = 0x80000000;
> +	ecx = 0;
> +	native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
> +	if (eax < 0x8000001f)
> +		goto out;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Check for the SME feature:
> +	 *   CPUID Fn8000_001F[EAX] - Bit 0
> +	 *     Secure Memory Encryption support
> +	 *   CPUID Fn8000_001F[EBX] - Bits 5:0
> +	 *     Pagetable bit position used to indicate encryption
> +	 */
> +	eax = 0x8000001f;
> +	ecx = 0;
> +	native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
> +	if (!(eax & 1))
> +		goto out;
> +	me_mask = 1UL << (ebx & 0x3f);
> +
> +	/* Check if SME is enabled */
> +	msr = __rdmsr(MSR_K8_SYSCFG);
> +	if (!(msr & MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT))
> +		goto out;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Fixups have not been applied to phys_base yet, so we must obtain
> +	 * the address to the SME command line option data in the following
> +	 * way.
> +	 */
> +	asm ("lea sme_cmdline_arg(%%rip), %0"
> +	     : "=r" (cmdline_arg)
> +	     : "p" (sme_cmdline_arg));
> +	asm ("lea sme_cmdline_on(%%rip), %0"
> +	     : "=r" (cmdline_on)
> +	     : "p" (sme_cmdline_on));
> +	asm ("lea sme_cmdline_off(%%rip), %0"
> +	     : "=r" (cmdline_off)
> +	     : "p" (sme_cmdline_off));
> +
> +	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT))
> +		active_by_default = true;
> +	else
> +		active_by_default = false;
> +
> +	cmdline_ptr = (const char *)((u64)bp->hdr.cmd_line_ptr |
> +				     ((u64)bp->ext_cmd_line_ptr << 32));
> +
> +	cmdline_find_option(cmdline_ptr, cmdline_arg, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
> +
> +	if (strncmp(buffer, cmdline_on, sizeof(buffer)) == 0)
> +		sme_me_mask = me_mask;
> +	else if (strncmp(buffer, cmdline_off, sizeof(buffer)) == 0)
> +		sme_me_mask = 0;
> +	else
> +		sme_me_mask = active_by_default ? me_mask : 0;
> +
> +out:
>  	return sme_me_mask;
>  }
>
> @@ -543,9 +618,9 @@ unsigned long sme_get_me_mask(void)
>
>  #else	/* !CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
>
> -void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void)	{ }
> -unsigned long __init sme_enable(void)	{ return 0; }
> +void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void)			{ }
> +unsigned long __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)	{ return 0; }
>
> -unsigned long sme_get_me_mask(void)	{ return 0; }
> +unsigned long sme_get_me_mask(void)			{ return 0; }
>
>  #endif	/* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
>

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org
Cc: "Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Larry Woodman" <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
	"Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"Dave Young" <dyoung@redhat.com>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
Date: Fri, 21 Apr 2017 13:56:13 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <c29edaff-24f2-ee9b-4142-bdbf8c42083f@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170418212223.10190.85121.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net>

On 4/18/2017 4:22 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> Add support to check if SME has been enabled and if memory encryption
> should be activated (checking of command line option based on the
> configuration of the default state).  If memory encryption is to be
> activated, then the encryption mask is set and the kernel is encrypted
> "in place."
>
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S |    1 +
>  arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c |   83 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>  2 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>

...

>
> -unsigned long __init sme_enable(void)
> +unsigned long __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
>  {
> +	const char *cmdline_ptr, *cmdline_arg, *cmdline_on, *cmdline_off;
> +	unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
> +	unsigned long me_mask;
> +	bool active_by_default;
> +	char buffer[16];

So it turns out that when KASLR is enabled (CONFIG_RAMDOMIZE_BASE=y)
the stack-protector support causes issues with this function because
it is called so early. I can get past it by adding:

CFLAGS_mem_encrypt.o := $(nostackp)

in the arch/x86/mm/Makefile, but that obviously eliminates the support
for the whole file.  Would it be better to split out the sme_enable()
and other boot routines into a separate file or just apply the
$(nostackp) to the whole file?

Thanks,
Tom

> +	u64 msr;
> +
> +	/* Check for the SME support leaf */
> +	eax = 0x80000000;
> +	ecx = 0;
> +	native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
> +	if (eax < 0x8000001f)
> +		goto out;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Check for the SME feature:
> +	 *   CPUID Fn8000_001F[EAX] - Bit 0
> +	 *     Secure Memory Encryption support
> +	 *   CPUID Fn8000_001F[EBX] - Bits 5:0
> +	 *     Pagetable bit position used to indicate encryption
> +	 */
> +	eax = 0x8000001f;
> +	ecx = 0;
> +	native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
> +	if (!(eax & 1))
> +		goto out;
> +	me_mask = 1UL << (ebx & 0x3f);
> +
> +	/* Check if SME is enabled */
> +	msr = __rdmsr(MSR_K8_SYSCFG);
> +	if (!(msr & MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT))
> +		goto out;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Fixups have not been applied to phys_base yet, so we must obtain
> +	 * the address to the SME command line option data in the following
> +	 * way.
> +	 */
> +	asm ("lea sme_cmdline_arg(%%rip), %0"
> +	     : "=r" (cmdline_arg)
> +	     : "p" (sme_cmdline_arg));
> +	asm ("lea sme_cmdline_on(%%rip), %0"
> +	     : "=r" (cmdline_on)
> +	     : "p" (sme_cmdline_on));
> +	asm ("lea sme_cmdline_off(%%rip), %0"
> +	     : "=r" (cmdline_off)
> +	     : "p" (sme_cmdline_off));
> +
> +	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT))
> +		active_by_default = true;
> +	else
> +		active_by_default = false;
> +
> +	cmdline_ptr = (const char *)((u64)bp->hdr.cmd_line_ptr |
> +				     ((u64)bp->ext_cmd_line_ptr << 32));
> +
> +	cmdline_find_option(cmdline_ptr, cmdline_arg, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
> +
> +	if (strncmp(buffer, cmdline_on, sizeof(buffer)) == 0)
> +		sme_me_mask = me_mask;
> +	else if (strncmp(buffer, cmdline_off, sizeof(buffer)) == 0)
> +		sme_me_mask = 0;
> +	else
> +		sme_me_mask = active_by_default ? me_mask : 0;
> +
> +out:
>  	return sme_me_mask;
>  }
>
> @@ -543,9 +618,9 @@ unsigned long sme_get_me_mask(void)
>
>  #else	/* !CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
>
> -void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void)	{ }
> -unsigned long __init sme_enable(void)	{ return 0; }
> +void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void)			{ }
> +unsigned long __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)	{ return 0; }
>
> -unsigned long sme_get_me_mask(void)	{ return 0; }
> +unsigned long sme_get_me_mask(void)			{ return 0; }
>
>  #endif	/* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
>

--
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org
Cc: "Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Larry Woodman" <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
	"Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"Dave Young" <dyoung@redhat.com>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
Date: Fri, 21 Apr 2017 13:56:13 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <c29edaff-24f2-ee9b-4142-bdbf8c42083f@amd.com> (raw)
Message-ID: <20170421185613.AFuF3aXvsf0F5q7ssUSOl8IIXZAgA9e5wRRtjn0z6Yo@z> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170418212223.10190.85121.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net>

On 4/18/2017 4:22 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> Add support to check if SME has been enabled and if memory encryption
> should be activated (checking of command line option based on the
> configuration of the default state).  If memory encryption is to be
> activated, then the encryption mask is set and the kernel is encrypted
> "in place."
>
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S |    1 +
>  arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c |   83 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>  2 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>

...

>
> -unsigned long __init sme_enable(void)
> +unsigned long __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
>  {
> +	const char *cmdline_ptr, *cmdline_arg, *cmdline_on, *cmdline_off;
> +	unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
> +	unsigned long me_mask;
> +	bool active_by_default;
> +	char buffer[16];

So it turns out that when KASLR is enabled (CONFIG_RAMDOMIZE_BASE=y)
the stack-protector support causes issues with this function because
it is called so early. I can get past it by adding:

CFLAGS_mem_encrypt.o := $(nostackp)

in the arch/x86/mm/Makefile, but that obviously eliminates the support
for the whole file.  Would it be better to split out the sme_enable()
and other boot routines into a separate file or just apply the
$(nostackp) to the whole file?

Thanks,
Tom

> +	u64 msr;
> +
> +	/* Check for the SME support leaf */
> +	eax = 0x80000000;
> +	ecx = 0;
> +	native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
> +	if (eax < 0x8000001f)
> +		goto out;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Check for the SME feature:
> +	 *   CPUID Fn8000_001F[EAX] - Bit 0
> +	 *     Secure Memory Encryption support
> +	 *   CPUID Fn8000_001F[EBX] - Bits 5:0
> +	 *     Pagetable bit position used to indicate encryption
> +	 */
> +	eax = 0x8000001f;
> +	ecx = 0;
> +	native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
> +	if (!(eax & 1))
> +		goto out;
> +	me_mask = 1UL << (ebx & 0x3f);
> +
> +	/* Check if SME is enabled */
> +	msr = __rdmsr(MSR_K8_SYSCFG);
> +	if (!(msr & MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT))
> +		goto out;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Fixups have not been applied to phys_base yet, so we must obtain
> +	 * the address to the SME command line option data in the following
> +	 * way.
> +	 */
> +	asm ("lea sme_cmdline_arg(%%rip), %0"
> +	     : "=r" (cmdline_arg)
> +	     : "p" (sme_cmdline_arg));
> +	asm ("lea sme_cmdline_on(%%rip), %0"
> +	     : "=r" (cmdline_on)
> +	     : "p" (sme_cmdline_on));
> +	asm ("lea sme_cmdline_off(%%rip), %0"
> +	     : "=r" (cmdline_off)
> +	     : "p" (sme_cmdline_off));
> +
> +	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT))
> +		active_by_default = true;
> +	else
> +		active_by_default = false;
> +
> +	cmdline_ptr = (const char *)((u64)bp->hdr.cmd_line_ptr |
> +				     ((u64)bp->ext_cmd_line_ptr << 32));
> +
> +	cmdline_find_option(cmdline_ptr, cmdline_arg, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
> +
> +	if (strncmp(buffer, cmdline_on, sizeof(buffer)) == 0)
> +		sme_me_mask = me_mask;
> +	else if (strncmp(buffer, cmdline_off, sizeof(buffer)) == 0)
> +		sme_me_mask = 0;
> +	else
> +		sme_me_mask = active_by_default ? me_mask : 0;
> +
> +out:
>  	return sme_me_mask;
>  }
>
> @@ -543,9 +618,9 @@ unsigned long sme_get_me_mask(void)
>
>  #else	/* !CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
>
> -void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void)	{ }
> -unsigned long __init sme_enable(void)	{ return 0; }
> +void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void)			{ }
> +unsigned long __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)	{ return 0; }
>
> -unsigned long sme_get_me_mask(void)	{ return 0; }
> +unsigned long sme_get_me_mask(void)			{ return 0; }
>
>  #endif	/* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
>

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
	<kvm@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
	<x86@kernel.org>, <kexec@lists.infradead.org>,
	<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>,
	<linux-mm@kvack.org>, <iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org>
Cc: "Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Larry Woodman" <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
	"Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"Dave Young" <dyoung@redhat.com>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
Date: Fri, 21 Apr 2017 13:56:13 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <c29edaff-24f2-ee9b-4142-bdbf8c42083f@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170418212223.10190.85121.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net>

On 4/18/2017 4:22 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> Add support to check if SME has been enabled and if memory encryption
> should be activated (checking of command line option based on the
> configuration of the default state).  If memory encryption is to be
> activated, then the encryption mask is set and the kernel is encrypted
> "in place."
>
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S |    1 +
>  arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c |   83 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>  2 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>

...

>
> -unsigned long __init sme_enable(void)
> +unsigned long __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
>  {
> +	const char *cmdline_ptr, *cmdline_arg, *cmdline_on, *cmdline_off;
> +	unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
> +	unsigned long me_mask;
> +	bool active_by_default;
> +	char buffer[16];

So it turns out that when KASLR is enabled (CONFIG_RAMDOMIZE_BASE=y)
the stack-protector support causes issues with this function because
it is called so early. I can get past it by adding:

CFLAGS_mem_encrypt.o := $(nostackp)

in the arch/x86/mm/Makefile, but that obviously eliminates the support
for the whole file.  Would it be better to split out the sme_enable()
and other boot routines into a separate file or just apply the
$(nostackp) to the whole file?

Thanks,
Tom

> +	u64 msr;
> +
> +	/* Check for the SME support leaf */
> +	eax = 0x80000000;
> +	ecx = 0;
> +	native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
> +	if (eax < 0x8000001f)
> +		goto out;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Check for the SME feature:
> +	 *   CPUID Fn8000_001F[EAX] - Bit 0
> +	 *     Secure Memory Encryption support
> +	 *   CPUID Fn8000_001F[EBX] - Bits 5:0
> +	 *     Pagetable bit position used to indicate encryption
> +	 */
> +	eax = 0x8000001f;
> +	ecx = 0;
> +	native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
> +	if (!(eax & 1))
> +		goto out;
> +	me_mask = 1UL << (ebx & 0x3f);
> +
> +	/* Check if SME is enabled */
> +	msr = __rdmsr(MSR_K8_SYSCFG);
> +	if (!(msr & MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT))
> +		goto out;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Fixups have not been applied to phys_base yet, so we must obtain
> +	 * the address to the SME command line option data in the following
> +	 * way.
> +	 */
> +	asm ("lea sme_cmdline_arg(%%rip), %0"
> +	     : "=r" (cmdline_arg)
> +	     : "p" (sme_cmdline_arg));
> +	asm ("lea sme_cmdline_on(%%rip), %0"
> +	     : "=r" (cmdline_on)
> +	     : "p" (sme_cmdline_on));
> +	asm ("lea sme_cmdline_off(%%rip), %0"
> +	     : "=r" (cmdline_off)
> +	     : "p" (sme_cmdline_off));
> +
> +	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT))
> +		active_by_default = true;
> +	else
> +		active_by_default = false;
> +
> +	cmdline_ptr = (const char *)((u64)bp->hdr.cmd_line_ptr |
> +				     ((u64)bp->ext_cmd_line_ptr << 32));
> +
> +	cmdline_find_option(cmdline_ptr, cmdline_arg, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
> +
> +	if (strncmp(buffer, cmdline_on, sizeof(buffer)) == 0)
> +		sme_me_mask = me_mask;
> +	else if (strncmp(buffer, cmdline_off, sizeof(buffer)) == 0)
> +		sme_me_mask = 0;
> +	else
> +		sme_me_mask = active_by_default ? me_mask : 0;
> +
> +out:
>  	return sme_me_mask;
>  }
>
> @@ -543,9 +618,9 @@ unsigned long sme_get_me_mask(void)
>
>  #else	/* !CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
>
> -void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void)	{ }
> -unsigned long __init sme_enable(void)	{ return 0; }
> +void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void)			{ }
> +unsigned long __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)	{ return 0; }
>
> -unsigned long sme_get_me_mask(void)	{ return 0; }
> +unsigned long sme_get_me_mask(void)			{ return 0; }
>
>  #endif	/* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
>

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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org
Cc: "Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>,
	"Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"Dave Young" <dyoung@redhat.com>,
	"Larry Woodman" <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
Date: Fri, 21 Apr 2017 13:56:13 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <c29edaff-24f2-ee9b-4142-bdbf8c42083f@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170418212223.10190.85121.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net>

On 4/18/2017 4:22 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> Add support to check if SME has been enabled and if memory encryption
> should be activated (checking of command line option based on the
> configuration of the default state).  If memory encryption is to be
> activated, then the encryption mask is set and the kernel is encrypted
> "in place."
>
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S |    1 +
>  arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c |   83 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>  2 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>

...

>
> -unsigned long __init sme_enable(void)
> +unsigned long __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
>  {
> +	const char *cmdline_ptr, *cmdline_arg, *cmdline_on, *cmdline_off;
> +	unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
> +	unsigned long me_mask;
> +	bool active_by_default;
> +	char buffer[16];

So it turns out that when KASLR is enabled (CONFIG_RAMDOMIZE_BASE=y)
the stack-protector support causes issues with this function because
it is called so early. I can get past it by adding:

CFLAGS_mem_encrypt.o := $(nostackp)

in the arch/x86/mm/Makefile, but that obviously eliminates the support
for the whole file.  Would it be better to split out the sme_enable()
and other boot routines into a separate file or just apply the
$(nostackp) to the whole file?

Thanks,
Tom

> +	u64 msr;
> +
> +	/* Check for the SME support leaf */
> +	eax = 0x80000000;
> +	ecx = 0;
> +	native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
> +	if (eax < 0x8000001f)
> +		goto out;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Check for the SME feature:
> +	 *   CPUID Fn8000_001F[EAX] - Bit 0
> +	 *     Secure Memory Encryption support
> +	 *   CPUID Fn8000_001F[EBX] - Bits 5:0
> +	 *     Pagetable bit position used to indicate encryption
> +	 */
> +	eax = 0x8000001f;
> +	ecx = 0;
> +	native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
> +	if (!(eax & 1))
> +		goto out;
> +	me_mask = 1UL << (ebx & 0x3f);
> +
> +	/* Check if SME is enabled */
> +	msr = __rdmsr(MSR_K8_SYSCFG);
> +	if (!(msr & MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT))
> +		goto out;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Fixups have not been applied to phys_base yet, so we must obtain
> +	 * the address to the SME command line option data in the following
> +	 * way.
> +	 */
> +	asm ("lea sme_cmdline_arg(%%rip), %0"
> +	     : "=r" (cmdline_arg)
> +	     : "p" (sme_cmdline_arg));
> +	asm ("lea sme_cmdline_on(%%rip), %0"
> +	     : "=r" (cmdline_on)
> +	     : "p" (sme_cmdline_on));
> +	asm ("lea sme_cmdline_off(%%rip), %0"
> +	     : "=r" (cmdline_off)
> +	     : "p" (sme_cmdline_off));
> +
> +	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT))
> +		active_by_default = true;
> +	else
> +		active_by_default = false;
> +
> +	cmdline_ptr = (const char *)((u64)bp->hdr.cmd_line_ptr |
> +				     ((u64)bp->ext_cmd_line_ptr << 32));
> +
> +	cmdline_find_option(cmdline_ptr, cmdline_arg, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
> +
> +	if (strncmp(buffer, cmdline_on, sizeof(buffer)) == 0)
> +		sme_me_mask = me_mask;
> +	else if (strncmp(buffer, cmdline_off, sizeof(buffer)) == 0)
> +		sme_me_mask = 0;
> +	else
> +		sme_me_mask = active_by_default ? me_mask : 0;
> +
> +out:
>  	return sme_me_mask;
>  }
>
> @@ -543,9 +618,9 @@ unsigned long sme_get_me_mask(void)
>
>  #else	/* !CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
>
> -void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void)	{ }
> -unsigned long __init sme_enable(void)	{ return 0; }
> +void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void)			{ }
> +unsigned long __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)	{ return 0; }
>
> -unsigned long sme_get_me_mask(void)	{ return 0; }
> +unsigned long sme_get_me_mask(void)			{ return 0; }
>
>  #endif	/* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
>

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  reply	other threads:[~2017-04-21 18:56 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 553+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-04-18 21:16 [PATCH v5 00/32] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:16 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:16 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:16 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:16 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:16 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:16 ` [PATCH v5 01/32] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:16   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:16   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:16   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:16   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-19  9:02   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-19  9:02     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-19  9:02     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-19  9:02     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-19 14:23     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-19 14:23       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-19 14:23       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-19 14:23       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-19 15:38       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-19 15:38         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-19 15:38         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-19 15:38         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-19  9:52   ` David Howells
2017-04-19  9:52     ` David Howells
2017-04-19  9:52     ` David Howells
2017-04-19  9:52     ` David Howells
2017-04-19  9:52     ` David Howells
2017-04-18 21:16 ` [PATCH v5 02/32] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:16   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:16   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:16   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:16   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:16 ` [PATCH v5 03/32] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:16   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:16   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:16   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:16   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:17 ` [PATCH v5 04/32] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:17   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:17   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:17   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:17   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:17 ` [PATCH v5 05/32] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:17   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:17   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:17   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:17   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-20 16:59   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-20 16:59     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-20 16:59     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-20 16:59     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-20 17:29     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-20 17:29       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-20 17:29       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-20 17:29       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-20 18:52       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-20 18:52         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-20 18:52         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-20 18:52         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-18 21:17 ` [PATCH v5 06/32] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:17   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:17   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:17   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:17   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:17   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-27 15:46   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-27 15:46     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-27 15:46     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-27 15:46     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-04 14:24     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-04 14:24       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-04 14:24       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-04 14:24       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-04 14:36       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-04 14:36         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-04 14:36         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-04 14:36         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-16 19:28         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-16 19:28           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-16 19:28           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-16 19:28           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-17  7:05           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-17  7:05             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-17  7:05             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-17  7:05             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-18 21:17 ` [PATCH v5 07/32] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:17   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:17   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:17   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:17   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-21 14:55   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-21 14:55     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-21 14:55     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-21 21:40     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-21 21:40       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-21 21:40       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-21 21:40       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:17 ` [PATCH v5 08/32] x86/mm: Simplify p[g4um]d_page() macros Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:17   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:17   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:17   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:17   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:17 ` [PATCH v5 09/32] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:17   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:17   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:17   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:17   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-21 21:52   ` Dave Hansen
2017-04-21 21:52     ` Dave Hansen
2017-04-21 21:52     ` Dave Hansen
2017-04-21 21:52     ` Dave Hansen
2017-04-24 15:53     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-24 15:53       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-24 15:53       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-24 15:53       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-24 15:53       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-24 15:57       ` Dave Hansen
2017-04-24 15:57         ` Dave Hansen
2017-04-24 15:57         ` Dave Hansen
2017-04-24 15:57         ` Dave Hansen
2017-04-24 16:10         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-24 16:10           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-24 16:10           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-24 16:10           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-24 16:10           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-24 16:10           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-27 16:12   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-27 16:12     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-27 16:12     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-27 16:12     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-04 14:34     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-04 14:34       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-04 14:34       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-04 14:34       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-04 17:01       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-04 17:01         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-04 17:01         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-04 17:01         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-18 21:18 ` [PATCH v5 10/32] x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:18   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:18   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:18   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:18   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:18 ` [PATCH v5 11/32] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:18   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:18   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:18   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:18   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:18 ` [PATCH v5 12/32] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:18   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:18   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:18   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:18   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-04 10:16   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-04 10:16     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-04 10:16     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-04 14:39     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-04 14:39       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-04 14:39       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-04 14:39       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:18 ` [PATCH v5 13/32] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:18   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:18   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:18   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:18   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:18   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-05 17:11   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-05 17:11     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-05 17:11     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-06  7:48     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-05-06  7:48       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-05-06  7:48       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-05-06  7:48       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-04-18 21:18 ` [PATCH v5 14/32] efi: Add an EFI table address match function Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:18   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:18   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:18   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:18   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-15 18:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-15 18:09     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-15 18:09     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-15 18:09     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-16 21:53     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-16 21:53       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-16 21:53       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-16 21:53       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19 ` [PATCH v5 15/32] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0 Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-07 17:18   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-07 17:18     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-07 17:18     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-08 13:20     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-08 13:20       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-08 13:20       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-08 13:20       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19 ` [PATCH v5 16/32] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19 ` [PATCH v5 17/32] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-15 18:35   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-15 18:35     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-15 18:35     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-15 18:35     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-17 18:54     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-17 18:54       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-17 18:54       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-17 18:54       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-18  9:02       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-18  9:02         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-18  9:02         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-18  9:02         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 20:50         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-19 20:50           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-19 20:50           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-19 20:50           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-21  7:16           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-21  7:16             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-21  7:16             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-21  7:16             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 16:46             ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-30 16:46               ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-30 16:46               ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-30 16:46               ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-31 11:31               ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-31 11:31                 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-31 11:31                 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-31 11:31                 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-18 19:50     ` Matt Fleming
2017-05-18 19:50       ` Matt Fleming
2017-05-18 19:50       ` Matt Fleming
2017-05-18 19:50       ` Matt Fleming
2017-05-26 16:22       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-26 16:22         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-26 16:22         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-26 16:22         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-26 16:35         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-26 16:35           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-26 16:35           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-26 16:35           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 17:47           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-30 17:47             ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-30 17:47             ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-30 17:47             ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19 ` [PATCH v5 18/32] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-16  8:36   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-16  8:36     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-16  8:36     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-16  8:36     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-17 20:26     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-17 20:26       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-17 20:26       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-17 20:26       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-18  9:03       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-18  9:03         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-18  9:03         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-18  9:03         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-18 21:19 ` [PATCH v5 19/32] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-16 14:04   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-16 14:04     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-16 14:04     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-16 14:04     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 19:52     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-19 19:52       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-19 19:52       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-19 19:52       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19 ` [PATCH v5 20/32] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19 ` [PATCH v5 21/32] x86, realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20 ` [PATCH v5 22/32] x86, swiotlb: DMA support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-16 14:27   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-16 14:27     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-16 14:27     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-16 14:27     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 19:54     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-19 19:54       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-19 19:54       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-19 19:54       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20 ` [PATCH v5 23/32] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-16 14:52   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-16 14:52     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-16 14:52     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-16 14:52     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 19:55     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-19 19:55       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-19 19:55       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-19 19:55       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20 ` [PATCH v5 24/32] iommu/amd: Disable AMD IOMMU if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20 ` [PATCH v5 25/32] x86, realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20 ` [PATCH v5 26/32] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-16 17:35   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-16 17:35     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-16 17:35     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-16 17:35     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 20:07     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-30 20:07       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-30 20:07       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-30 20:07       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:21 ` [PATCH v5 27/32] kvm: x86: svm: Enable Secure Memory Encryption within KVM Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:21   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:21   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:21   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:21   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:21 ` [PATCH v5 28/32] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:21   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:21   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:21   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:21   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-17 19:17   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-17 19:17     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-17 19:17     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-17 19:17     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 20:45     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-19 20:45       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-19 20:45       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-19 20:45       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-19 20:58       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 20:58         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 20:58         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 20:58         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 21:07         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-19 21:07           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-19 21:07           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-19 21:07           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-19 21:28           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 21:28             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 21:28             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 21:28             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 21:38             ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-19 21:38               ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-19 21:38               ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-19 21:38               ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-26  4:17   ` Xunlei Pang
2017-05-26  4:17     ` Xunlei Pang
2017-05-26  4:17     ` Xunlei Pang
2017-05-26  4:17     ` Xunlei Pang
2017-05-27  2:17     ` Dave Young
2017-05-27  2:17       ` Dave Young
2017-05-27  2:17       ` Dave Young
2017-05-27  2:17       ` Dave Young
2017-05-30 17:46     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-30 17:46       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-30 17:46       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-30 17:46       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-30 17:46       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-30 17:46       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-31 10:01       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-31 10:01         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-31 10:01         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-31 10:01         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-31 15:03       ` Xunlei Pang
2017-05-31 15:03         ` Xunlei Pang
2017-05-31 15:03         ` Xunlei Pang
2017-05-31 15:03         ` Xunlei Pang
2017-05-31 15:48         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-31 15:48           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-31 15:48           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-31 15:48           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-18 21:21 ` [PATCH v5 29/32] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:21   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:21   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:21   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:21   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-18 12:46   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-18 12:46     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-18 12:46     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-18 12:46     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-25 22:24     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-25 22:24       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-25 22:24       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-25 22:24       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-26 16:25       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-26 16:25         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-26 16:25         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-26 16:25         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 16:39         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-30 16:39           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-30 16:39           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-30 16:39           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-31  9:51           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-31  9:51             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-31  9:51             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-31  9:51             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-31 13:12             ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-31 13:12               ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-31 13:12               ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-31 13:12               ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 30/32] x86/boot: Add early cmdline parsing for options with arguments Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:22   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:22   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:22   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:22   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 31/32] x86: Add sysfs support for Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:22   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:22   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:22   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:22   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:22   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-21 21:55   ` Dave Hansen
2017-04-21 21:55     ` Dave Hansen
2017-04-21 21:55     ` Dave Hansen
2017-04-27  7:25     ` Dave Young
2017-04-27  7:25       ` Dave Young
2017-04-27  7:25       ` Dave Young
2017-04-27  7:25       ` Dave Young
2017-04-27 15:52       ` Dave Hansen
2017-04-27 15:52         ` Dave Hansen
2017-04-27 15:52         ` Dave Hansen
2017-04-27 15:52         ` Dave Hansen
2017-04-28  5:32         ` Dave Young
2017-04-28  5:32           ` Dave Young
2017-04-28  5:32           ` Dave Young
2017-04-28  5:32           ` Dave Young
2017-05-04 14:17         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-04 14:17           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-04 14:17           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-04 14:17           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-04 14:13       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-04 14:13         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-04 14:13         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-04 14:13         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-18 17:01   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-18 17:01     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-18 17:01     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-18 17:01     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-26  2:49     ` Dave Young
2017-05-26  2:49       ` Dave Young
2017-05-26  2:49       ` Dave Young
2017-05-26  2:49       ` Dave Young
2017-05-26  5:04       ` Xunlei Pang
2017-05-26  5:04         ` Xunlei Pang
2017-05-26  5:04         ` Xunlei Pang
2017-05-26  5:04         ` Xunlei Pang
2017-05-26 15:47         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-26 15:47           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-26 15:47           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-26 15:47           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-26 15:47           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-26 15:47           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of " Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:22   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:22   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:22   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:22   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-21 18:56   ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2017-04-21 18:56     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-21 18:56     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-21 18:56     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-21 18:56     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-19 11:30     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 11:30       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 11:30       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 11:30       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 20:16       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2017-05-19 20:16         ` Josh Poimboeuf
2017-05-19 20:16         ` Josh Poimboeuf
2017-05-19 20:16         ` Josh Poimboeuf
2017-05-19 20:29         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 20:29           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 20:29           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 20:29           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 15:48         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-30 15:48           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-30 15:48           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-30 15:48           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-31  9:15           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-31  9:15             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-31  9:15             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-31  9:15             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 15:46       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-30 15:46         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-30 15:46         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-30 15:46         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-19 11:27   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 11:27     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 11:27     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 11:27     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 14:38     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-30 14:38       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-30 14:38       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-30 14:38       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-30 14:55       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 14:55         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 14:55         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 14:55         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 15:37         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-30 15:37           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-30 15:37           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-30 15:37           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-31  8:49           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-31  8:49             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-31  8:49             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-31  8:49             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-31 13:37             ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-31 13:37               ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-31 13:37               ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-31 13:37               ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-31 14:12               ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-31 14:12                 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-31 14:12                 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-31 14:12                 ` Borislav Petkov

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