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From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>,
	"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com" 
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>, Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>,
	Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v4 16/16] x86/mm: Improve stack-overflow #PF handling
Date: Thu, 23 Jun 2016 21:23:11 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <c85b0bbcdc877ff0b4e10a0b205d9623f4350428.1466741835.git.luto@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1466741835.git.luto@kernel.org>
In-Reply-To: <cover.1466741835.git.luto@kernel.org>

If we get a page fault indicating kernel stack overflow, invoke
handle_stack_overflow().  To prevent us from overflowing the stack
again while handling the overflow (because we are likely to have
very little stack space left), call handle_stack_overflow() on the
double-fault stack

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h |  6 ++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c      |  6 +++---
 arch/x86/mm/fault.c          | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
index c3496619740a..01fd0a7f48cd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
@@ -117,6 +117,12 @@ extern void ist_exit(struct pt_regs *regs);
 extern void ist_begin_non_atomic(struct pt_regs *regs);
 extern void ist_end_non_atomic(void);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
+void __noreturn handle_stack_overflow(const char *message,
+				      struct pt_regs *regs,
+				      unsigned long fault_address);
+#endif
+
 /* Interrupts/Exceptions */
 enum {
 	X86_TRAP_DE = 0,	/*  0, Divide-by-zero */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
index 9cb7ea781176..b389c0539eb9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
@@ -293,9 +293,9 @@ DO_ERROR(X86_TRAP_SS,     SIGBUS,  "stack segment",		stack_segment)
 DO_ERROR(X86_TRAP_AC,     SIGBUS,  "alignment check",		alignment_check)
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
-static void __noreturn handle_stack_overflow(const char *message,
-					     struct pt_regs *regs,
-					     unsigned long fault_address)
+__visible void __noreturn handle_stack_overflow(const char *message,
+						struct pt_regs *regs,
+						unsigned long fault_address)
 {
 	printk(KERN_EMERG "BUG: stack guard page was hit at %p (stack is %p..%p)\n",
 		 (void *)fault_address, current->stack,
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
index 7d1fa7cd2374..c68b81f5659f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
@@ -753,6 +753,45 @@ no_context(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
 		return;
 	}
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
+	/*
+	 * Stack overflow?  During boot, we can fault near the initial
+	 * stack in the direct map, but that's not an overflow -- check
+	 * that we're in vmalloc space to avoid this.
+	 *
+	 * Check this after trying fixup_exception, since there are handful
+	 * of kernel code paths that wander off the top of the stack but
+	 * handle any faults that occur.  Once those are fixed, we can
+	 * move this above fixup_exception.
+	 */
+	if (is_vmalloc_addr((void *)address) &&
+	    (((unsigned long)tsk->stack - 1 - address < PAGE_SIZE) ||
+	     address - ((unsigned long)tsk->stack + THREAD_SIZE) < PAGE_SIZE)) {
+		register void *__sp asm("rsp");
+		unsigned long stack =
+			this_cpu_read(orig_ist.ist[DOUBLEFAULT_STACK]) -
+			sizeof(void *);
+		/*
+		 * We're likely to be running with very little stack space
+		 * left.  It's plausible that we'd hit this condition but
+		 * double-fault even before we get this far, in which case
+		 * we're fine: the double-fault handler will deal with it.
+		 *
+		 * We don't want to make it all the way into the oops code
+		 * and then double-fault, though, because we're likely to
+		 * break the console driver and lose most of the stack dump.
+		 */
+		asm volatile ("movq %[stack], %%rsp\n\t"
+			      "call handle_stack_overflow\n\t"
+			      "1: jmp 1b"
+			      : "+r" (__sp)
+			      : "D" ("kernel stack overflow (page fault)"),
+				"S" (regs), "d" (address),
+				[stack] "rm" (stack));
+		unreachable();
+	}
+#endif
+
 	/*
 	 * 32-bit:
 	 *
-- 
2.5.5

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>,
	"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>, Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>,
	Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 16/16] x86/mm: Improve stack-overflow #PF handling
Date: Thu, 23 Jun 2016 21:23:11 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <c85b0bbcdc877ff0b4e10a0b205d9623f4350428.1466741835.git.luto@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1466741835.git.luto@kernel.org>
In-Reply-To: <cover.1466741835.git.luto@kernel.org>

If we get a page fault indicating kernel stack overflow, invoke
handle_stack_overflow().  To prevent us from overflowing the stack
again while handling the overflow (because we are likely to have
very little stack space left), call handle_stack_overflow() on the
double-fault stack

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h |  6 ++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c      |  6 +++---
 arch/x86/mm/fault.c          | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
index c3496619740a..01fd0a7f48cd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
@@ -117,6 +117,12 @@ extern void ist_exit(struct pt_regs *regs);
 extern void ist_begin_non_atomic(struct pt_regs *regs);
 extern void ist_end_non_atomic(void);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
+void __noreturn handle_stack_overflow(const char *message,
+				      struct pt_regs *regs,
+				      unsigned long fault_address);
+#endif
+
 /* Interrupts/Exceptions */
 enum {
 	X86_TRAP_DE = 0,	/*  0, Divide-by-zero */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
index 9cb7ea781176..b389c0539eb9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
@@ -293,9 +293,9 @@ DO_ERROR(X86_TRAP_SS,     SIGBUS,  "stack segment",		stack_segment)
 DO_ERROR(X86_TRAP_AC,     SIGBUS,  "alignment check",		alignment_check)
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
-static void __noreturn handle_stack_overflow(const char *message,
-					     struct pt_regs *regs,
-					     unsigned long fault_address)
+__visible void __noreturn handle_stack_overflow(const char *message,
+						struct pt_regs *regs,
+						unsigned long fault_address)
 {
 	printk(KERN_EMERG "BUG: stack guard page was hit at %p (stack is %p..%p)\n",
 		 (void *)fault_address, current->stack,
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
index 7d1fa7cd2374..c68b81f5659f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
@@ -753,6 +753,45 @@ no_context(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
 		return;
 	}
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
+	/*
+	 * Stack overflow?  During boot, we can fault near the initial
+	 * stack in the direct map, but that's not an overflow -- check
+	 * that we're in vmalloc space to avoid this.
+	 *
+	 * Check this after trying fixup_exception, since there are handful
+	 * of kernel code paths that wander off the top of the stack but
+	 * handle any faults that occur.  Once those are fixed, we can
+	 * move this above fixup_exception.
+	 */
+	if (is_vmalloc_addr((void *)address) &&
+	    (((unsigned long)tsk->stack - 1 - address < PAGE_SIZE) ||
+	     address - ((unsigned long)tsk->stack + THREAD_SIZE) < PAGE_SIZE)) {
+		register void *__sp asm("rsp");
+		unsigned long stack =
+			this_cpu_read(orig_ist.ist[DOUBLEFAULT_STACK]) -
+			sizeof(void *);
+		/*
+		 * We're likely to be running with very little stack space
+		 * left.  It's plausible that we'd hit this condition but
+		 * double-fault even before we get this far, in which case
+		 * we're fine: the double-fault handler will deal with it.
+		 *
+		 * We don't want to make it all the way into the oops code
+		 * and then double-fault, though, because we're likely to
+		 * break the console driver and lose most of the stack dump.
+		 */
+		asm volatile ("movq %[stack], %%rsp\n\t"
+			      "call handle_stack_overflow\n\t"
+			      "1: jmp 1b"
+			      : "+r" (__sp)
+			      : "D" ("kernel stack overflow (page fault)"),
+				"S" (regs), "d" (address),
+				[stack] "rm" (stack));
+		unreachable();
+	}
+#endif
+
 	/*
 	 * 32-bit:
 	 *
-- 
2.5.5

  parent reply	other threads:[~2016-06-24  4:24 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 89+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-06-24  4:22 [PATCH v4 00/16] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24  4:22 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24  4:22 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24  4:22 ` [PATCH v4 01/16] bluetooth: Switch SMP to crypto_cipher_encrypt_one() Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24  4:22   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24  4:22   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24  6:10   ` Herbert Xu
2016-06-24  6:10     ` [kernel-hardening] " Herbert Xu
2016-06-24  6:10     ` Herbert Xu
2016-06-24  7:19   ` Johan Hedberg
2016-06-24  7:19     ` [kernel-hardening] " Johan Hedberg
2016-06-24  7:19     ` Johan Hedberg
2016-06-24  4:22 ` [PATCH v4 02/16] rxrpc: Avoid using stack memory in SG lists in rxkad Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24  4:22   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24  4:22   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24  4:22 ` [PATCH v4 03/16] x86/mm/hotplug: Don't remove PGD entries in remove_pagetable() Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24  4:22   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24  4:22   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24  4:22   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24  4:22 ` [PATCH v4 04/16] x86/cpa: In populate_pgd, don't set the pgd entry until it's populated Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24  4:22   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24  4:22   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24  4:23 ` [PATCH v4 05/16] x86/mm: Remove kernel_unmap_pages_in_pgd() and efi_cleanup_page_tables() Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24  4:23   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24  4:23   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24  4:23 ` [PATCH v4 06/16] mm: Track NR_KERNEL_STACK in KiB instead of number of stacks Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24  4:23   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24  4:23   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24  4:23   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24 15:21   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-06-24 15:21     ` [kernel-hardening] " Josh Poimboeuf
2016-06-24 15:21     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-06-24 15:21     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-06-24  4:23 ` [PATCH v4 07/16] mm: Fix memcg stack accounting for sub-page stacks Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24  4:23   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24  4:23   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24  4:23   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24 15:22   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-06-24 15:22     ` [kernel-hardening] " Josh Poimboeuf
2016-06-24 15:22     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-06-24 15:22     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-06-24  4:23 ` [PATCH v4 08/16] dma-api: Teach the "DMA-from-stack" check about vmapped stacks Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24  4:23   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24  4:23   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24  4:23 ` [PATCH v4 09/16] fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24  4:23   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24  4:23   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24  4:23 ` [PATCH v4 10/16] x86/die: Don't try to recover from an OOPS on a non-default stack Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24  4:23   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24  4:23   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24  4:23 ` [PATCH v4 11/16] x86/dumpstack: When OOPSing, rewind the stack before do_exit Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24  4:23   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24  4:23   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24 15:30   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-06-24 15:30     ` [kernel-hardening] " Josh Poimboeuf
2016-06-24 15:30     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-06-24 15:35     ` Brian Gerst
2016-06-24 15:35       ` [kernel-hardening] " Brian Gerst
2016-06-24 15:35       ` Brian Gerst
2016-06-24 15:48       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-06-24 15:48         ` [kernel-hardening] " Josh Poimboeuf
2016-06-24 15:48         ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-06-24  4:23 ` [PATCH v4 12/16] x86/dumpstack: When dumping stack bytes due to OOPS, start with regs->sp Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24  4:23   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24  4:23   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24 15:31   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-06-24 15:31     ` [kernel-hardening] " Josh Poimboeuf
2016-06-24 15:31     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-06-24  4:23 ` [PATCH v4 13/16] x86/dumpstack: Try harder to get a call trace on stack overflow Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24  4:23   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24  4:23   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24 15:35   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-06-24 15:35     ` [kernel-hardening] " Josh Poimboeuf
2016-06-24 15:35     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-06-26 16:59     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-26 16:59       ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-26 16:59       ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24  4:23 ` [PATCH v4 14/16] x86/dumpstack/64: Handle faults when printing the "Stack:" part of an OOPS Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24  4:23   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24  4:23   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24 15:36   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-06-24 15:36     ` [kernel-hardening] " Josh Poimboeuf
2016-06-24 15:36     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-06-24  4:23 ` [PATCH v4 15/16] x86/mm/64: Enable vmapped stacks Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24  4:23   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24  4:23   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24  4:23 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2016-06-24  4:23   ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 16/16] x86/mm: Improve stack-overflow #PF handling Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24  4:23   ` Andy Lutomirski

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