From: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> To: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: catalin.marinas@arm.com, will.deacon@arm.com, marc.zyngier@arm.com, suzuki.poulose@arm.com, Dave.Martin@arm.com, shankerd@codeaurora.org, julien.thierry@arm.com, mlangsdo@redhat.com, stefan.wahren@i2e.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 05/10] arm64: Use firmware to detect CPUs that are not affected by Spectre-v2 Date: Fri, 1 Mar 2019 00:58:19 -0600 [thread overview] Message-ID: <e1df235f-bcdd-62f0-7b2f-e396df6d9bae@foss.arm.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20190227010544.597579-6-jeremy.linton@arm.com> Hi, On 2/26/19 7:05 PM, Jeremy Linton wrote: > From: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> > > The SMCCC ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 service can indicate that although the > firmware knows about the Spectre-v2 mitigation, this particular > CPU is not vulnerable, and it is thus not necessary to call > the firmware on this CPU. > > Let's use this information to our benefit. Yes, that matches the firmware interface description. > Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> > Signed-off-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> Cheers, Andre. > --- > arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------- > 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c > index c8972255b365..77f021e78a28 100644 > --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c > +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c > @@ -230,22 +230,36 @@ static int detect_harden_bp_fw(void) > case PSCI_CONDUIT_HVC: > arm_smccc_1_1_hvc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID, > ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res); > - if ((int)res.a0 < 0) > + switch ((int)res.a0) { > + case 1: > + /* Firmware says we're just fine */ > + return 0; > + case 0: > + cb = call_hvc_arch_workaround_1; > + /* This is a guest, no need to patch KVM vectors */ > + smccc_start = NULL; > + smccc_end = NULL; > + break; > + default: > return -1; > - cb = call_hvc_arch_workaround_1; > - /* This is a guest, no need to patch KVM vectors */ > - smccc_start = NULL; > - smccc_end = NULL; > + } > break; > > case PSCI_CONDUIT_SMC: > arm_smccc_1_1_smc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID, > ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res); > - if ((int)res.a0 < 0) > + switch ((int)res.a0) { > + case 1: > + /* Firmware says we're just fine */ > + return 0; > + case 0: > + cb = call_smc_arch_workaround_1; > + smccc_start = __smccc_workaround_1_smc_start; > + smccc_end = __smccc_workaround_1_smc_end; > + break; > + default: > return -1; > - cb = call_smc_arch_workaround_1; > - smccc_start = __smccc_workaround_1_smc_start; > - smccc_end = __smccc_workaround_1_smc_end; > + } > break; > > default: >
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> To: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: mlangsdo@redhat.com, suzuki.poulose@arm.com, marc.zyngier@arm.com, catalin.marinas@arm.com, julien.thierry@arm.com, will.deacon@arm.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stefan.wahren@i2e.com, Dave.Martin@arm.com, shankerd@codeaurora.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 05/10] arm64: Use firmware to detect CPUs that are not affected by Spectre-v2 Date: Fri, 1 Mar 2019 00:58:19 -0600 [thread overview] Message-ID: <e1df235f-bcdd-62f0-7b2f-e396df6d9bae@foss.arm.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20190227010544.597579-6-jeremy.linton@arm.com> Hi, On 2/26/19 7:05 PM, Jeremy Linton wrote: > From: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> > > The SMCCC ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 service can indicate that although the > firmware knows about the Spectre-v2 mitigation, this particular > CPU is not vulnerable, and it is thus not necessary to call > the firmware on this CPU. > > Let's use this information to our benefit. Yes, that matches the firmware interface description. > Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> > Signed-off-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> Cheers, Andre. > --- > arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------- > 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c > index c8972255b365..77f021e78a28 100644 > --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c > +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c > @@ -230,22 +230,36 @@ static int detect_harden_bp_fw(void) > case PSCI_CONDUIT_HVC: > arm_smccc_1_1_hvc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID, > ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res); > - if ((int)res.a0 < 0) > + switch ((int)res.a0) { > + case 1: > + /* Firmware says we're just fine */ > + return 0; > + case 0: > + cb = call_hvc_arch_workaround_1; > + /* This is a guest, no need to patch KVM vectors */ > + smccc_start = NULL; > + smccc_end = NULL; > + break; > + default: > return -1; > - cb = call_hvc_arch_workaround_1; > - /* This is a guest, no need to patch KVM vectors */ > - smccc_start = NULL; > - smccc_end = NULL; > + } > break; > > case PSCI_CONDUIT_SMC: > arm_smccc_1_1_smc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID, > ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res); > - if ((int)res.a0 < 0) > + switch ((int)res.a0) { > + case 1: > + /* Firmware says we're just fine */ > + return 0; > + case 0: > + cb = call_smc_arch_workaround_1; > + smccc_start = __smccc_workaround_1_smc_start; > + smccc_end = __smccc_workaround_1_smc_end; > + break; > + default: > return -1; > - cb = call_smc_arch_workaround_1; > - smccc_start = __smccc_workaround_1_smc_start; > - smccc_end = __smccc_workaround_1_smc_end; > + } > break; > > default: > _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-03-01 6:58 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 70+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2019-02-27 1:05 [PATCH v5 00/10] arm64: add system vulnerability sysfs entries Jeremy Linton 2019-02-27 1:05 ` Jeremy Linton 2019-02-27 1:05 ` [PATCH v5 01/10] arm64: Provide a command line to disable spectre_v2 mitigation Jeremy Linton 2019-02-27 1:05 ` Jeremy Linton 2019-02-28 18:14 ` Suzuki K Poulose 2019-02-28 18:14 ` Suzuki K Poulose 2019-02-28 18:21 ` Catalin Marinas 2019-02-28 18:21 ` Catalin Marinas 2019-02-28 18:25 ` Suzuki K Poulose 2019-02-28 18:25 ` Suzuki K Poulose 2019-03-01 6:54 ` Andre Przywara 2019-03-01 6:54 ` Andre Przywara 2019-02-27 1:05 ` [PATCH v5 02/10] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre v1 Jeremy Linton 2019-02-27 1:05 ` Jeremy Linton 2019-02-28 18:29 ` Suzuki K Poulose 2019-02-28 18:29 ` Suzuki K Poulose 2019-03-01 6:54 ` Andre Przywara 2019-03-01 6:54 ` Andre Przywara 2019-02-27 1:05 ` [PATCH v5 03/10] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for meltdown Jeremy Linton 2019-02-27 1:05 ` Jeremy Linton 2019-02-28 18:33 ` Suzuki K Poulose 2019-02-28 18:33 ` Suzuki K Poulose 2019-03-01 7:11 ` Andre Przywara 2019-03-01 7:11 ` Andre Przywara 2019-03-01 16:12 ` Jeremy Linton 2019-03-01 16:12 ` Jeremy Linton 2019-03-01 16:20 ` Catalin Marinas 2019-03-01 16:20 ` Catalin Marinas 2019-03-01 16:53 ` Jeremy Linton 2019-03-01 16:53 ` Jeremy Linton 2019-03-01 17:15 ` Catalin Marinas 2019-03-01 17:15 ` Catalin Marinas 2019-03-01 17:30 ` Andre Przywara 2019-03-01 17:30 ` Andre Przywara 2019-02-27 1:05 ` [PATCH v5 04/10] arm64: Advertise mitigation of Spectre-v2, or lack thereof Jeremy Linton 2019-02-27 1:05 ` Jeremy Linton 2019-03-01 6:57 ` Andre Przywara 2019-03-01 6:57 ` Andre Przywara 2019-02-27 1:05 ` [PATCH v5 05/10] arm64: Use firmware to detect CPUs that are not affected by Spectre-v2 Jeremy Linton 2019-02-27 1:05 ` Jeremy Linton 2019-03-01 6:58 ` Andre Przywara [this message] 2019-03-01 6:58 ` Andre Przywara 2019-02-27 1:05 ` [PATCH v5 06/10] arm64: Always enable spectrev2 vulnerability detection Jeremy Linton 2019-02-27 1:05 ` Jeremy Linton 2019-03-01 6:58 ` Andre Przywara 2019-03-01 6:58 ` Andre Przywara 2019-02-27 1:05 ` [PATCH v5 07/10] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre v2 Jeremy Linton 2019-02-27 1:05 ` Jeremy Linton 2019-03-01 6:59 ` Andre Przywara 2019-03-01 6:59 ` Andre Przywara 2019-02-27 1:05 ` [PATCH v5 08/10] arm64: Always enable ssb vulnerability detection Jeremy Linton 2019-02-27 1:05 ` Jeremy Linton 2019-03-01 7:02 ` Andre Przywara 2019-03-01 7:02 ` Andre Przywara 2019-03-01 16:16 ` Jeremy Linton 2019-03-01 16:16 ` Jeremy Linton 2019-02-27 1:05 ` [PATCH v5 09/10] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for speculative store bypass Jeremy Linton 2019-02-27 1:05 ` Jeremy Linton 2019-03-01 7:02 ` Andre Przywara 2019-03-01 7:02 ` Andre Przywara 2019-03-01 16:41 ` Jeremy Linton 2019-03-01 16:41 ` Jeremy Linton 2019-02-27 1:05 ` [PATCH v5 10/10] arm64: enable generic CPU vulnerabilites support Jeremy Linton 2019-02-27 1:05 ` Jeremy Linton 2019-03-01 7:03 ` Andre Przywara 2019-03-01 7:03 ` Andre Przywara 2019-02-28 12:01 ` [PATCH v5 00/10] arm64: add system vulnerability sysfs entries Catalin Marinas 2019-02-28 12:01 ` Catalin Marinas 2019-03-01 19:35 ` Stefan Wahren 2019-03-01 19:35 ` Stefan Wahren
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