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From: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>
To: Alexander Aring <alex.aring@gmail.com>
Cc: Stefan Schmidt <stefan@datenfreihafen.org>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	linux-wpan - ML <linux-wpan@vger.kernel.org>,
	"open list:NETWORKING [GENERAL]" <netdev@vger.kernel.org>,
	kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	syzbot+12cf5fbfdeba210a89dd@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] net: mac802154: Fix null pointer dereference
Date: Thu, 04 Mar 2021 12:23:22 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <e70d7b45638db427be978c620475a330cb9db57c.camel@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAB_54W6-ONBmLhaQqrDD=efiinRosxe06VEGDqmMM-1-XjYcPw@mail.gmail.com>

Hi, thanks for your reply!

On Wed, 2021-03-03 at 21:40 -0500, Alexander Aring wrote:
> Hi,
> 
> On Wed, 3 Mar 2021 at 11:28, Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> > syzbot found general protection fault in crypto_destroy_tfm()[1].
> > It was caused by wrong clean up loop in llsec_key_alloc().
> > If one of the tfm array members won't be initialized it will cause
> > NULL dereference in crypto_destroy_tfm().
> > 
> > Call Trace:
> >  crypto_free_aead include/crypto/aead.h:191 [inline] [1]
> >  llsec_key_alloc net/mac802154/llsec.c:156 [inline]
> >  mac802154_llsec_key_add+0x9e0/0xcc0 net/mac802154/llsec.c:249
> >  ieee802154_add_llsec_key+0x56/0x80 net/mac802154/cfg.c:338
> >  rdev_add_llsec_key net/ieee802154/rdev-ops.h:260 [inline]
> >  nl802154_add_llsec_key+0x3d3/0x560 net/ieee802154/nl802154.c:1584
> >  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x228/0x320 net/netlink/genetlink.c:739
> >  genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:783 [inline]
> >  genl_rcv_msg+0x328/0x580 net/netlink/genetlink.c:800
> >  netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2502
> >  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:811
> >  netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1312 [inline]
> >  netlink_unicast+0x533/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1338
> >  netlink_sendmsg+0x856/0xd90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1927
> >  sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline]
> >  sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:674
> >  ____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x810 net/socket.c:2350
> >  ___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2404
> >  __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2433
> >  do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
> >  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>
> > Reported-by: syzbot+12cf5fbfdeba210a89dd@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> > ---
> >  net/mac802154/llsec.c | 2 +-
> >  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
> > 
> > diff --git a/net/mac802154/llsec.c b/net/mac802154/llsec.c
> > index 585d33144c33..6709f186f777 100644
> > --- a/net/mac802154/llsec.c
> > +++ b/net/mac802154/llsec.c
> > @@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ llsec_key_alloc(const struct
> > ieee802154_llsec_key *template)
> >  err_tfm0:
> >         crypto_free_sync_skcipher(key->tfm0);
> >  err_tfm:
> > -       for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(key->tfm); i++)
> > +       for (; i >= 0; i--)
> >                 if (key->tfm[i])
> 
> I think this need to be:
> 
> if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(key->tfm[i]))
> 
> otherwise we still run into issues for the current iterator when
> key->tfm[i] is in range of IS_ERR().

Oh... I got it completly wrong, I'm sorry. If it's still not fixed,
I'll send rigth patch for that.

> 
> - Alex
-- 
With regards,
Pavel Skripkin


  reply	other threads:[~2021-03-04  9:25 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-03-03 16:27 [PATCH] net: mac802154: Fix null pointer dereference Pavel Skripkin
2021-03-04  2:40 ` Alexander Aring
2021-03-04  9:23   ` Pavel Skripkin [this message]
2021-03-04 14:22     ` Alexander Aring
2021-03-04 15:21       ` [PATCH v2] net: mac802154: Fix general protection fault Pavel Skripkin
2021-03-08  8:27         ` Stefan Schmidt
2021-04-05  0:43         ` Alexander Aring
2021-04-05  5:45           ` Pavel Skripkin
2021-04-05 11:50             ` Alexander Aring
2021-04-06 20:43               ` Stefan Schmidt

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