From: Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com>
To: dhowells@redhat.com, tglx@linutronix.de
Cc: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>,
Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>,
Kirill Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@intel.com>,
jmorris@namei.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com,
hpa@zytor.com, x86@kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org
Subject: [RFC 09/12] mm: Restrict memory encryption to anonymous VMA's
Date: Fri, 07 Sep 2018 22:37:51 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <f69e3d4f96504185054d951c7c85075ebf63e47a.1536356108.git.alison.schofield@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1536356108.git.alison.schofield@intel.com>
Memory encryption is only supported for mappings that are ANONYMOUS.
Test the entire range of VMA's in an encrypt_mprotect() request to
make sure they all meet that requirement before encrypting any.
The encrypt_mprotect syscall will return -EINVAL and will not encrypt
any VMA's if this check fails.
Signed-off-by: Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com>
---
mm/mprotect.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 22 insertions(+)
diff --git a/mm/mprotect.c b/mm/mprotect.c
index 6c2e1106525c..3384b755aad1 100644
--- a/mm/mprotect.c
+++ b/mm/mprotect.c
@@ -311,6 +311,24 @@ unsigned long change_protection(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long start,
return pages;
}
+/*
+ * Encrypted mprotect is only supported on anonymous mappings.
+ * All VMA's in the requested range must be anonymous. If this
+ * test fails on any single VMA, the entire mprotect request fails.
+ */
+bool mem_supports_encryption(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long end)
+{
+ struct vm_area_struct *test_vma = vma;
+
+ do {
+ if (!vma_is_anonymous(test_vma))
+ return false;
+
+ test_vma = test_vma->vm_next;
+ } while (test_vma && test_vma->vm_start < end);
+ return true;
+}
+
int
mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **pprev,
unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long newflags,
@@ -491,6 +509,10 @@ static int do_mprotect_ext(unsigned long start, size_t len,
goto out;
}
}
+ if (keyid > 0 && !mem_supports_encryption(vma, end)) {
+ error = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
if (start > vma->vm_start)
prev = vma;
--
2.14.1
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: alison.schofield@intel.com (Alison Schofield)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [RFC 09/12] mm: Restrict memory encryption to anonymous VMA's
Date: Fri, 7 Sep 2018 15:37:51 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <f69e3d4f96504185054d951c7c85075ebf63e47a.1536356108.git.alison.schofield@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1536356108.git.alison.schofield@intel.com>
Memory encryption is only supported for mappings that are ANONYMOUS.
Test the entire range of VMA's in an encrypt_mprotect() request to
make sure they all meet that requirement before encrypting any.
The encrypt_mprotect syscall will return -EINVAL and will not encrypt
any VMA's if this check fails.
Signed-off-by: Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com>
---
mm/mprotect.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 22 insertions(+)
diff --git a/mm/mprotect.c b/mm/mprotect.c
index 6c2e1106525c..3384b755aad1 100644
--- a/mm/mprotect.c
+++ b/mm/mprotect.c
@@ -311,6 +311,24 @@ unsigned long change_protection(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long start,
return pages;
}
+/*
+ * Encrypted mprotect is only supported on anonymous mappings.
+ * All VMA's in the requested range must be anonymous. If this
+ * test fails on any single VMA, the entire mprotect request fails.
+ */
+bool mem_supports_encryption(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long end)
+{
+ struct vm_area_struct *test_vma = vma;
+
+ do {
+ if (!vma_is_anonymous(test_vma))
+ return false;
+
+ test_vma = test_vma->vm_next;
+ } while (test_vma && test_vma->vm_start < end);
+ return true;
+}
+
int
mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **pprev,
unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long newflags,
@@ -491,6 +509,10 @@ static int do_mprotect_ext(unsigned long start, size_t len,
goto out;
}
}
+ if (keyid > 0 && !mem_supports_encryption(vma, end)) {
+ error = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
if (start > vma->vm_start)
prev = vma;
--
2.14.1
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com>
To: dhowells@redhat.com, tglx@linutronix.de
Cc: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>,
Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>,
Kirill Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@intel.com>,
jmorris@namei.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com,
hpa@zytor.com, x86@kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org
Subject: [RFC 09/12] mm: Restrict memory encryption to anonymous VMA's
Date: Fri, 7 Sep 2018 15:37:51 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <f69e3d4f96504185054d951c7c85075ebf63e47a.1536356108.git.alison.schofield@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1536356108.git.alison.schofield@intel.com>
Memory encryption is only supported for mappings that are ANONYMOUS.
Test the entire range of VMA's in an encrypt_mprotect() request to
make sure they all meet that requirement before encrypting any.
The encrypt_mprotect syscall will return -EINVAL and will not encrypt
any VMA's if this check fails.
Signed-off-by: Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com>
---
mm/mprotect.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 22 insertions(+)
diff --git a/mm/mprotect.c b/mm/mprotect.c
index 6c2e1106525c..3384b755aad1 100644
--- a/mm/mprotect.c
+++ b/mm/mprotect.c
@@ -311,6 +311,24 @@ unsigned long change_protection(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long start,
return pages;
}
+/*
+ * Encrypted mprotect is only supported on anonymous mappings.
+ * All VMA's in the requested range must be anonymous. If this
+ * test fails on any single VMA, the entire mprotect request fails.
+ */
+bool mem_supports_encryption(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long end)
+{
+ struct vm_area_struct *test_vma = vma;
+
+ do {
+ if (!vma_is_anonymous(test_vma))
+ return false;
+
+ test_vma = test_vma->vm_next;
+ } while (test_vma && test_vma->vm_start < end);
+ return true;
+}
+
int
mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **pprev,
unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long newflags,
@@ -491,6 +509,10 @@ static int do_mprotect_ext(unsigned long start, size_t len,
goto out;
}
}
+ if (keyid > 0 && !mem_supports_encryption(vma, end)) {
+ error = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
if (start > vma->vm_start)
prev = vma;
--
2.14.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-09-07 22:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 159+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-09-07 22:23 [RFC 00/12] Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption API (MKTME) Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:23 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:23 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:34 ` [RFC 01/12] docs/x86: Document the Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption API Alison Schofield
2018-09-08 18:44 ` Randy Dunlap
2018-09-08 18:44 ` Randy Dunlap
2018-09-08 18:44 ` Randy Dunlap
2018-09-10 1:28 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10 1:28 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10 1:28 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-11 0:13 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11 0:13 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11 0:13 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11 0:33 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-11 0:33 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-11 0:33 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-11 0:45 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11 0:45 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11 0:45 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11 1:14 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-11 1:14 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-11 1:14 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-11 0:14 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-11 0:14 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-11 0:14 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10 17:32 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-09-10 17:32 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-09-10 17:32 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-09-11 0:19 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11 0:19 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11 0:19 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:34 ` [RFC 02/12] mm: Generalize the mprotect implementation to support extensions Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:34 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:34 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 10:12 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-09-10 10:12 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-09-10 10:12 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-09-11 0:34 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11 0:34 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11 0:34 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:34 ` [RFC 03/12] syscall/x86: Wire up a new system call for memory encryption keys Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:34 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:34 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:36 ` [RFC 04/12] x86/mm: Add helper functions to manage " Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:36 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:36 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 2:56 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10 2:56 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10 2:56 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10 23:37 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10 23:37 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10 23:37 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10 23:41 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 23:41 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 23:41 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 17:37 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-09-07 22:36 ` [RFC 05/12] x86/mm: Add a helper function to set keyid bits in encrypted VMA's Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:36 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:36 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 17:57 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-09-10 17:57 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-09-10 17:57 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-09-07 22:36 ` [RFC 06/12] mm: Add the encrypt_mprotect() system call Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 18:02 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-09-10 18:02 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-09-10 18:02 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-09-11 2:15 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11 2:15 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11 2:15 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:37 ` [RFC 07/12] x86/mm: Add helper functions to track encrypted VMA's Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:37 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:37 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 3:17 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10 3:17 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-07 22:37 ` [RFC 08/12] mm: Track VMA's in use for each memory encryption keyid Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:37 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:37 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 18:20 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-09-10 18:20 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-09-10 18:20 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-09-11 2:39 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11 2:39 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11 2:39 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:37 ` Alison Schofield [this message]
2018-09-07 22:37 ` [RFC 09/12] mm: Restrict memory encryption to anonymous VMA's Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:37 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 18:21 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-09-10 18:21 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-09-10 18:21 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-09-10 18:57 ` Dave Hansen
2018-09-10 18:57 ` Dave Hansen
2018-09-10 18:57 ` Dave Hansen
2018-09-10 21:07 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-09-10 21:07 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-09-10 21:07 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-09-10 21:09 ` Dave Hansen
2018-09-10 21:09 ` Dave Hansen
2018-09-10 21:09 ` Dave Hansen
2018-09-07 22:38 ` [RFC 10/12] x86/pconfig: Program memory encryption keys on a system-wide basis Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:38 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:38 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 1:46 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10 1:46 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10 18:24 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-09-10 18:24 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-09-10 18:24 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-09-11 2:46 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11 2:46 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11 2:46 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11 14:31 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-09-11 14:31 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-09-11 14:31 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-09-07 22:38 ` [RFC 11/12] keys/mktme: Add a new key service type for memory encryption keys Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:38 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:38 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 3:29 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10 3:29 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10 3:29 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10 21:47 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 21:47 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 21:47 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-15 0:06 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-15 0:06 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-15 0:06 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-17 10:48 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-17 10:48 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-17 10:48 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-17 22:34 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-17 22:34 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-17 22:34 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-07 22:39 ` [RFC 12/12] keys/mktme: Do not revoke in use " Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:39 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:39 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 1:10 ` [RFC 00/12] Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption API (MKTME) Huang, Kai
2018-09-10 1:10 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10 19:10 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 19:10 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 19:10 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11 3:15 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-11 3:15 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-11 3:15 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10 17:29 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-09-10 17:29 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-09-10 17:29 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-09-11 22:03 ` [RFC 11/12] keys/mktme: Add a new key service type for memory encryption keys David Howells
2018-09-11 22:03 ` David Howells
2018-09-11 22:03 ` David Howells
2018-09-11 22:39 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11 22:39 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11 22:39 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11 23:01 ` David Howells
2018-09-11 23:01 ` David Howells
2018-09-11 23:01 ` David Howells
2018-09-11 22:56 ` [RFC 04/12] x86/mm: Add helper functions to manage " David Howells
2018-09-11 22:56 ` David Howells
2018-09-11 22:56 ` David Howells
2018-09-12 11:12 ` [RFC 12/12] keys/mktme: Do not revoke in use " David Howells
2018-09-12 11:12 ` David Howells
2018-09-12 11:12 ` David Howells
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