[PATCH 3/1] xfstests: generic/062: Do not run on newer kernels

[PATCH 3/1] xfstests: generic/062: Do not run on newer kernels

[Vivek Goyal]

xfstests: generic/062: Do not run on newer kernels

This test has been written with assumption that setting user.* xattrs will
fail on symlink and special files. When newer kernels support setting
user.* xattrs on symlink and special files, this test starts failing.

Found it hard to change test in such a way that it works on both type of
kernels. Primary problem is 062.out file which hardcodes the output and
output will be different on old and new kernels.

So instead, do not run this test if kernel is new and is expected to
exhibit new behavior. Next patch will create a new test and run that
test on new kernel.

IOW, on old kernels run 062 and on new kernels run new test.

This is a proposed patch. Will need to be fixed if corresponding
kernel changes are merged upstream.

Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
---
 tests/generic/062 |   20 ++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+)

Index: xfstests-dev/tests/generic/062
===================================================================
--- xfstests-dev.orig/tests/generic/062	2021-08-31 15:51:08.160307982 -0400
+++ xfstests-dev/tests/generic/062	2021-08-31 16:27:41.678307982 -0400
@@ -55,6 +55,26 @@ _require_attrs
 _require_symlinks
 _require_mknod
 
+user_xattr_allowed()
+{
+	local kernel_version kernel_patchlevel
+
+	kernel_version=`uname -r | awk -F. '{print $1}'`
+	kernel_patchlevel=`uname -r | awk -F. '{print $2}'`
+
+	# Kernel version 5.14 onwards allow user xattr on symlink/special files.
+	[ $kernel_version -lt 5 ] && return 1
+	[ $kernel_patchlevel -lt 14 ] && return 1
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+# Kernel version 5.14 onwards allow user xattr on symlink/special files.
+# Do not run this test on newer kernels. Instead run the new test
+# which has been written with the assumption that user.* xattr
+# will succeed on symlink and special files.
+user_xattr_allowed && _notrun "Kernel allows user.* xattrs on symlinks and special files. Skipping this test. Run newer test instead."
+
 rm -f $tmp.backup1 $tmp.backup2 $seqres.full
 
 # real QA test starts here

[PATCH 4/1] xfstest: Add a new test to test xattr operations

[Vivek Goyal]

generic/062 has been written with assumption that user.* xattrs will fail
on symlinks and special files. On newer kernel this will not be true. Found
it very hard to modify generic/062 so that it can deal with both the
possibilities. So creating a new test which basically is same as 062. Only
difference is that it runs only if user.* xattrs can be set on symlinks
and special files.

Given this test is more or less same as 062, I have retained original copyright
as well.

Modified the test slightly to bail out if kernel is older and user xattrs
are not supposed to be set on symlinks and special files.

This patch will need little modification if corresponding kernel changes
are merged upstream.

Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
---
 tests/generic/648     |  227 ++++++++++++++
 tests/generic/648.out |  766 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 993 insertions(+)

Index: xfstests-dev/tests/generic/648
===================================================================
--- /dev/null	1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000
+++ xfstests-dev/tests/generic/648	2021-09-01 13:23:47.271016463 -0400
@@ -0,0 +1,227 @@
+#! /bin/bash
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+# Copyright (c) 2000-2002 Silicon Graphics, Inc.  All Rights Reserved
+# Copyright (c) 2021 Red Hat, Inc.  All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# FS QA Test No. 648
+#
+# Exercises the getfattr/setfattr tools
+# Derived from test 062. Modified it so that it can run on kernels which
+# support user.* xattr on symlinks and special files.
+#
+. ./common/preamble
+_begin_fstest attr udf auto quick
+
+# Import common functions.
+. ./common/filter
+. ./common/attr
+
+# Override the default cleanup function.
+_cleanup()
+{
+        cd /
+	echo; echo "*** unmount"
+	_scratch_unmount 2>/dev/null
+	rm -f $tmp.*
+}
+
+getfattr()
+{
+    _getfattr --absolute-names -dh $@ 2>&1 | _filter_scratch
+}
+
+setfattr()
+{
+    $SETFATTR_PROG $@ 2>&1 | _filter_scratch
+}
+
+_create_test_bed()
+{
+	echo "*** create test bed"
+	touch $SCRATCH_MNT/reg
+	mkdir -p $SCRATCH_MNT/dir
+	ln -s $SCRATCH_MNT/dir $SCRATCH_MNT/lnk
+	mkdir $SCRATCH_MNT/dev
+	mknod $SCRATCH_MNT/dev/b b 0 0
+	mknod $SCRATCH_MNT/dev/c c 1 3
+	mknod $SCRATCH_MNT/dev/p p
+	# sanity check
+	find $SCRATCH_MNT | LC_COLLATE=POSIX sort | _filter_scratch | grep -v "lost+found"
+}
+
+# real QA test starts here
+_supported_fs generic
+
+_require_scratch
+_require_attrs
+_require_symlinks
+_require_mknod
+
+user_xattr_allowed()
+{
+	local kernel_version kernel_patchlevel
+
+	kernel_version=`uname -r | awk -F. '{print $1}'`
+	kernel_patchlevel=`uname -r | awk -F. '{print $2}'`
+
+	# Kernel version 5.14 onwards allow user xattr on symlink/special files.
+	[ $kernel_version -lt 5 ] && return 1
+	[ $kernel_patchlevel -lt 14 ] && return 1
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+# Kernel version 5.14 onwards allow user xattr on symlink/special files.
+# Do not run this test on older kernels. Instead run the old test 062
+# which has been written with the assumption that user.* xattr
+# will not succeed on symlink and special files.
+user_xattr_allowed || _notrun "Kernel does not allows user.* xattrs on symlinks and special files. Skipping this test. Run test 062 instead."
+
+rm -f $tmp.backup1 $tmp.backup2 $seqres.full
+
+# real QA test starts here
+_scratch_mkfs > /dev/null 2>&1 || _fail "mkfs failed"
+_scratch_mount
+_create_test_bed
+
+# In kernels before 3.0, getxattr() fails with EPERM for an attribute which
+# cannot exist.  Later kernels fail with ENODATA.  Accept both results.
+invalid_attribute_filter() {
+	sed -e "s:\(No such attribute\|Operation not permitted\):No such attribute or operation not permitted:"
+}
+
+if [ "$USE_ATTR_SECURE" = yes ]; then
+    ATTR_MODES="user security trusted"
+    ATTR_FILTER="^(user|security|trusted)"
+else
+    ATTR_MODES="user trusted"
+    ATTR_FILTER="^(user|trusted)"
+fi
+
+_require_attrs $ATTR_MODES
+
+for nsp in $ATTR_MODES; do
+	for inode in reg dir lnk dev/b dev/c dev/p; do
+
+		echo; echo "=== TYPE $inode; NAMESPACE $nsp"; echo
+		echo "*** set/get one initially empty attribute"
+
+		setfattr -h -n $nsp.name $SCRATCH_MNT/$inode
+		getfattr -m $nsp $SCRATCH_MNT/$inode
+
+		echo "*** overwrite empty, set several new attributes"
+		setfattr -h -n $nsp.name -v 0xbabe $SCRATCH_MNT/$inode
+		setfattr -h -n $nsp.name2 -v 0xdeadbeef $SCRATCH_MNT/$inode
+		setfattr -h -n $nsp.name3 -v 0xdeface $SCRATCH_MNT/$inode
+
+		echo "*** fetch several attribute names and values (hex)"
+		getfattr -m $nsp -e hex $SCRATCH_MNT/$inode
+
+		echo "*** fetch several attribute names and values (base64)"
+		getfattr -m $nsp -e base64 $SCRATCH_MNT/$inode
+
+		echo "*** shrink value of an existing attribute"
+		setfattr -h -n $nsp.name2 -v 0xdeaf $SCRATCH_MNT/$inode
+		getfattr -m $nsp -e hex $SCRATCH_MNT/$inode
+
+		echo "*** grow value of existing attribute"
+		setfattr -h -n $nsp.name2 -v 0xdecade $SCRATCH_MNT/$inode
+		getfattr -m $nsp -e hex $SCRATCH_MNT/$inode
+
+		echo "*** set an empty value for second attribute"
+		setfattr -h -n $nsp.name2 $SCRATCH_MNT/$inode
+		getfattr -m $nsp -n $nsp.name2 $SCRATCH_MNT/$inode 2>&1 | invalid_attribute_filter
+
+		echo "*** overwrite empty value"
+		setfattr -h -n $nsp.name2 -v 0xcafe $SCRATCH_MNT/$inode
+		getfattr -m $nsp -e hex -n $nsp.name2 $SCRATCH_MNT/$inode 2>&1 | invalid_attribute_filter
+
+		echo "*** remove attribute"
+		setfattr -h -x $nsp.name2 $SCRATCH_MNT/$inode
+		getfattr -m $nsp -e hex -n $nsp.name2 $SCRATCH_MNT/$inode 2>&1 | invalid_attribute_filter
+
+		echo "*** final list (strings, type=$inode, nsp=$nsp)"
+		getfattr -m $ATTR_FILTER -e hex $SCRATCH_MNT/$inode
+
+	done
+done
+
+#
+# Test the directory descent code
+#
+echo; echo
+
+_extend_test_bed()
+{
+	echo "*** extend test bed"
+	# must set some descents' attributes to be useful
+	mkdir -p $SCRATCH_MNT/here/up/ascend
+	mkdir -p $SCRATCH_MNT/descend/down/here
+	find $SCRATCH_MNT/descend | xargs setfattr -n user.x -v yz
+	find $SCRATCH_MNT/descend | xargs setfattr -n user.1 -v 23
+	find $SCRATCH_MNT/here | xargs setfattr -n trusted.a -v bc
+	find $SCRATCH_MNT/here | xargs setfattr -n trusted.9 -v 87
+	# whack a symlink in the middle, just to be difficult
+	ln -s $SCRATCH_MNT/here/up $SCRATCH_MNT/descend/and
+	# dump out our new starting point
+	find $SCRATCH_MNT | LC_COLLATE=POSIX sort | _filter_scratch | grep -v "lost+found"
+}
+
+_extend_test_bed
+
+echo
+echo "*** directory descent with us following symlinks"
+getfattr -h -L -R -m "$ATTR_FILTER" -e hex $SCRATCH_MNT | _sort_getfattr_output
+
+echo
+echo "*** directory descent without following symlinks"
+getfattr -h -P -R -m "$ATTR_FILTER" -e hex $SCRATCH_MNT | _sort_getfattr_output
+
+#
+# Test the backup/restore code
+#
+echo; echo
+
+_backup()
+{
+	# Note: we don't filter scratch here since we need to restore too.  But
+	# we *do* sort the output by path, since it otherwise would depend on
+	# readdir order, which on some filesystems may change after re-creating
+	# the files.
+	_getfattr --absolute-names -dh -R -m $ATTR_FILTER $SCRATCH_MNT | _sort_getfattr_output >$1
+	echo BACKUP $1 >>$seqres.full
+	cat $1 >> $seqres.full
+	[ ! -s $1 ] && echo "warning: $1 (backup file) is empty"
+}
+
+echo "*** backup everything"
+_backup $tmp.backup1
+
+echo "*** clear out the scratch device"
+rm -rf $(find $SCRATCH_MNT/* | grep -v "lost+found")
+echo "AFTER REMOVE" >>$seqres.full
+getfattr -L -R -m '.' $SCRATCH_MNT >>$seqres.full
+
+echo "*** reset test bed with no extended attributes"
+_create_test_bed
+_extend_test_bed
+
+echo "*** restore everything"
+setfattr -h --restore=$tmp.backup1
+_backup $tmp.backup2
+
+echo "AFTER RESTORE" >>$seqres.full
+getfattr -L -R -m '.' $SCRATCH_MNT >>$seqres.full
+
+echo "*** compare before and after backups"
+diff $tmp.backup1 $tmp.backup2
+if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+	echo "urk, failed - creating $seq.backup1 and $seq.backup2"
+	cp $tmp.backup1 $seq.backup1 && cp $tmp.backup2 $seq.backup2
+	status=1
+	exit
+fi
+
+# success, all done
+status=0
+exit
Index: xfstests-dev/tests/generic/648.out
===================================================================
--- /dev/null	1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000
+++ xfstests-dev/tests/generic/648.out	2021-09-01 13:08:00.260016463 -0400
@@ -0,0 +1,766 @@
+QA output created by 648
+*** create test bed
+SCRATCH_MNT
+SCRATCH_MNT/dev
+SCRATCH_MNT/dev/b
+SCRATCH_MNT/dev/c
+SCRATCH_MNT/dev/p
+SCRATCH_MNT/dir
+SCRATCH_MNT/lnk
+SCRATCH_MNT/reg
+
+=== TYPE reg; NAMESPACE user
+
+*** set/get one initially empty attribute
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/reg
+user.name
+
+*** overwrite empty, set several new attributes
+*** fetch several attribute names and values (hex)
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/reg
+user.name=0xbabe
+user.name2=0xdeadbeef
+user.name3=0xdeface
+
+*** fetch several attribute names and values (base64)
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/reg
+user.name=0sur4=
+user.name2=0s3q2+7w==
+user.name3=0s3vrO
+
+*** shrink value of an existing attribute
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/reg
+user.name=0xbabe
+user.name2=0xdeaf
+user.name3=0xdeface
+
+*** grow value of existing attribute
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/reg
+user.name=0xbabe
+user.name2=0xdecade
+user.name3=0xdeface
+
+*** set an empty value for second attribute
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/reg
+user.name2
+
+*** overwrite empty value
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/reg
+user.name2=0xcafe
+
+*** remove attribute
+SCRATCH_MNT/reg: user.name2: No such attribute or operation not permitted
+*** final list (strings, type=reg, nsp=user)
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/reg
+user.name=0xbabe
+user.name3=0xdeface
+
+
+=== TYPE dir; NAMESPACE user
+
+*** set/get one initially empty attribute
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dir
+user.name
+
+*** overwrite empty, set several new attributes
+*** fetch several attribute names and values (hex)
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dir
+user.name=0xbabe
+user.name2=0xdeadbeef
+user.name3=0xdeface
+
+*** fetch several attribute names and values (base64)
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dir
+user.name=0sur4=
+user.name2=0s3q2+7w==
+user.name3=0s3vrO
+
+*** shrink value of an existing attribute
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dir
+user.name=0xbabe
+user.name2=0xdeaf
+user.name3=0xdeface
+
+*** grow value of existing attribute
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dir
+user.name=0xbabe
+user.name2=0xdecade
+user.name3=0xdeface
+
+*** set an empty value for second attribute
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dir
+user.name2
+
+*** overwrite empty value
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dir
+user.name2=0xcafe
+
+*** remove attribute
+SCRATCH_MNT/dir: user.name2: No such attribute or operation not permitted
+*** final list (strings, type=dir, nsp=user)
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dir
+user.name=0xbabe
+user.name3=0xdeface
+
+
+=== TYPE lnk; NAMESPACE user
+
+*** set/get one initially empty attribute
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/lnk
+user.name
+
+*** overwrite empty, set several new attributes
+*** fetch several attribute names and values (hex)
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/lnk
+user.name=0xbabe
+user.name2=0xdeadbeef
+user.name3=0xdeface
+
+*** fetch several attribute names and values (base64)
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/lnk
+user.name=0sur4=
+user.name2=0s3q2+7w==
+user.name3=0s3vrO
+
+*** shrink value of an existing attribute
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/lnk
+user.name=0xbabe
+user.name2=0xdeaf
+user.name3=0xdeface
+
+*** grow value of existing attribute
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/lnk
+user.name=0xbabe
+user.name2=0xdecade
+user.name3=0xdeface
+
+*** set an empty value for second attribute
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/lnk
+user.name2
+
+*** overwrite empty value
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/lnk
+user.name2=0xcafe
+
+*** remove attribute
+SCRATCH_MNT/lnk: user.name2: No such attribute or operation not permitted
+*** final list (strings, type=lnk, nsp=user)
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/lnk
+user.name=0xbabe
+user.name3=0xdeface
+
+
+=== TYPE dev/b; NAMESPACE user
+
+*** set/get one initially empty attribute
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dev/b
+user.name
+
+*** overwrite empty, set several new attributes
+*** fetch several attribute names and values (hex)
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dev/b
+user.name=0xbabe
+user.name2=0xdeadbeef
+user.name3=0xdeface
+
+*** fetch several attribute names and values (base64)
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dev/b
+user.name=0sur4=
+user.name2=0s3q2+7w==
+user.name3=0s3vrO
+
+*** shrink value of an existing attribute
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dev/b
+user.name=0xbabe
+user.name2=0xdeaf
+user.name3=0xdeface
+
+*** grow value of existing attribute
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dev/b
+user.name=0xbabe
+user.name2=0xdecade
+user.name3=0xdeface
+
+*** set an empty value for second attribute
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dev/b
+user.name2
+
+*** overwrite empty value
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dev/b
+user.name2=0xcafe
+
+*** remove attribute
+SCRATCH_MNT/dev/b: user.name2: No such attribute or operation not permitted
+*** final list (strings, type=dev/b, nsp=user)
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dev/b
+user.name=0xbabe
+user.name3=0xdeface
+
+
+=== TYPE dev/c; NAMESPACE user
+
+*** set/get one initially empty attribute
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dev/c
+user.name
+
+*** overwrite empty, set several new attributes
+*** fetch several attribute names and values (hex)
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dev/c
+user.name=0xbabe
+user.name2=0xdeadbeef
+user.name3=0xdeface
+
+*** fetch several attribute names and values (base64)
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dev/c
+user.name=0sur4=
+user.name2=0s3q2+7w==
+user.name3=0s3vrO
+
+*** shrink value of an existing attribute
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dev/c
+user.name=0xbabe
+user.name2=0xdeaf
+user.name3=0xdeface
+
+*** grow value of existing attribute
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dev/c
+user.name=0xbabe
+user.name2=0xdecade
+user.name3=0xdeface
+
+*** set an empty value for second attribute
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dev/c
+user.name2
+
+*** overwrite empty value
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dev/c
+user.name2=0xcafe
+
+*** remove attribute
+SCRATCH_MNT/dev/c: user.name2: No such attribute or operation not permitted
+*** final list (strings, type=dev/c, nsp=user)
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dev/c
+user.name=0xbabe
+user.name3=0xdeface
+
+
+=== TYPE dev/p; NAMESPACE user
+
+*** set/get one initially empty attribute
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dev/p
+user.name
+
+*** overwrite empty, set several new attributes
+*** fetch several attribute names and values (hex)
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dev/p
+user.name=0xbabe
+user.name2=0xdeadbeef
+user.name3=0xdeface
+
+*** fetch several attribute names and values (base64)
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dev/p
+user.name=0sur4=
+user.name2=0s3q2+7w==
+user.name3=0s3vrO
+
+*** shrink value of an existing attribute
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dev/p
+user.name=0xbabe
+user.name2=0xdeaf
+user.name3=0xdeface
+
+*** grow value of existing attribute
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dev/p
+user.name=0xbabe
+user.name2=0xdecade
+user.name3=0xdeface
+
+*** set an empty value for second attribute
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dev/p
+user.name2
+
+*** overwrite empty value
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dev/p
+user.name2=0xcafe
+
+*** remove attribute
+SCRATCH_MNT/dev/p: user.name2: No such attribute or operation not permitted
+*** final list (strings, type=dev/p, nsp=user)
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dev/p
+user.name=0xbabe
+user.name3=0xdeface
+
+
+=== TYPE reg; NAMESPACE trusted
+
+*** set/get one initially empty attribute
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/reg
+trusted.name
+
+*** overwrite empty, set several new attributes
+*** fetch several attribute names and values (hex)
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/reg
+trusted.name=0xbabe
+trusted.name2=0xdeadbeef
+trusted.name3=0xdeface
+
+*** fetch several attribute names and values (base64)
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/reg
+trusted.name=0sur4=
+trusted.name2=0s3q2+7w==
+trusted.name3=0s3vrO
+
+*** shrink value of an existing attribute
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/reg
+trusted.name=0xbabe
+trusted.name2=0xdeaf
+trusted.name3=0xdeface
+
+*** grow value of existing attribute
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/reg
+trusted.name=0xbabe
+trusted.name2=0xdecade
+trusted.name3=0xdeface
+
+*** set an empty value for second attribute
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/reg
+trusted.name2
+
+*** overwrite empty value
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/reg
+trusted.name2=0xcafe
+
+*** remove attribute
+SCRATCH_MNT/reg: trusted.name2: No such attribute or operation not permitted
+*** final list (strings, type=reg, nsp=trusted)
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/reg
+trusted.name=0xbabe
+trusted.name3=0xdeface
+user.name=0xbabe
+user.name3=0xdeface
+
+
+=== TYPE dir; NAMESPACE trusted
+
+*** set/get one initially empty attribute
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dir
+trusted.name
+
+*** overwrite empty, set several new attributes
+*** fetch several attribute names and values (hex)
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dir
+trusted.name=0xbabe
+trusted.name2=0xdeadbeef
+trusted.name3=0xdeface
+
+*** fetch several attribute names and values (base64)
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dir
+trusted.name=0sur4=
+trusted.name2=0s3q2+7w==
+trusted.name3=0s3vrO
+
+*** shrink value of an existing attribute
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dir
+trusted.name=0xbabe
+trusted.name2=0xdeaf
+trusted.name3=0xdeface
+
+*** grow value of existing attribute
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dir
+trusted.name=0xbabe
+trusted.name2=0xdecade
+trusted.name3=0xdeface
+
+*** set an empty value for second attribute
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dir
+trusted.name2
+
+*** overwrite empty value
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dir
+trusted.name2=0xcafe
+
+*** remove attribute
+SCRATCH_MNT/dir: trusted.name2: No such attribute or operation not permitted
+*** final list (strings, type=dir, nsp=trusted)
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dir
+trusted.name=0xbabe
+trusted.name3=0xdeface
+user.name=0xbabe
+user.name3=0xdeface
+
+
+=== TYPE lnk; NAMESPACE trusted
+
+*** set/get one initially empty attribute
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/lnk
+trusted.name
+
+*** overwrite empty, set several new attributes
+*** fetch several attribute names and values (hex)
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/lnk
+trusted.name=0xbabe
+trusted.name2=0xdeadbeef
+trusted.name3=0xdeface
+
+*** fetch several attribute names and values (base64)
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/lnk
+trusted.name=0sur4=
+trusted.name2=0s3q2+7w==
+trusted.name3=0s3vrO
+
+*** shrink value of an existing attribute
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/lnk
+trusted.name=0xbabe
+trusted.name2=0xdeaf
+trusted.name3=0xdeface
+
+*** grow value of existing attribute
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/lnk
+trusted.name=0xbabe
+trusted.name2=0xdecade
+trusted.name3=0xdeface
+
+*** set an empty value for second attribute
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/lnk
+trusted.name2
+
+*** overwrite empty value
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/lnk
+trusted.name2=0xcafe
+
+*** remove attribute
+SCRATCH_MNT/lnk: trusted.name2: No such attribute or operation not permitted
+*** final list (strings, type=lnk, nsp=trusted)
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/lnk
+trusted.name=0xbabe
+trusted.name3=0xdeface
+user.name=0xbabe
+user.name3=0xdeface
+
+
+=== TYPE dev/b; NAMESPACE trusted
+
+*** set/get one initially empty attribute
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dev/b
+trusted.name
+
+*** overwrite empty, set several new attributes
+*** fetch several attribute names and values (hex)
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dev/b
+trusted.name=0xbabe
+trusted.name2=0xdeadbeef
+trusted.name3=0xdeface
+
+*** fetch several attribute names and values (base64)
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dev/b
+trusted.name=0sur4=
+trusted.name2=0s3q2+7w==
+trusted.name3=0s3vrO
+
+*** shrink value of an existing attribute
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dev/b
+trusted.name=0xbabe
+trusted.name2=0xdeaf
+trusted.name3=0xdeface
+
+*** grow value of existing attribute
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dev/b
+trusted.name=0xbabe
+trusted.name2=0xdecade
+trusted.name3=0xdeface
+
+*** set an empty value for second attribute
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dev/b
+trusted.name2
+
+*** overwrite empty value
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dev/b
+trusted.name2=0xcafe
+
+*** remove attribute
+SCRATCH_MNT/dev/b: trusted.name2: No such attribute or operation not permitted
+*** final list (strings, type=dev/b, nsp=trusted)
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dev/b
+trusted.name=0xbabe
+trusted.name3=0xdeface
+user.name=0xbabe
+user.name3=0xdeface
+
+
+=== TYPE dev/c; NAMESPACE trusted
+
+*** set/get one initially empty attribute
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dev/c
+trusted.name
+
+*** overwrite empty, set several new attributes
+*** fetch several attribute names and values (hex)
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dev/c
+trusted.name=0xbabe
+trusted.name2=0xdeadbeef
+trusted.name3=0xdeface
+
+*** fetch several attribute names and values (base64)
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dev/c
+trusted.name=0sur4=
+trusted.name2=0s3q2+7w==
+trusted.name3=0s3vrO
+
+*** shrink value of an existing attribute
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dev/c
+trusted.name=0xbabe
+trusted.name2=0xdeaf
+trusted.name3=0xdeface
+
+*** grow value of existing attribute
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dev/c
+trusted.name=0xbabe
+trusted.name2=0xdecade
+trusted.name3=0xdeface
+
+*** set an empty value for second attribute
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dev/c
+trusted.name2
+
+*** overwrite empty value
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dev/c
+trusted.name2=0xcafe
+
+*** remove attribute
+SCRATCH_MNT/dev/c: trusted.name2: No such attribute or operation not permitted
+*** final list (strings, type=dev/c, nsp=trusted)
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dev/c
+trusted.name=0xbabe
+trusted.name3=0xdeface
+user.name=0xbabe
+user.name3=0xdeface
+
+
+=== TYPE dev/p; NAMESPACE trusted
+
+*** set/get one initially empty attribute
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dev/p
+trusted.name
+
+*** overwrite empty, set several new attributes
+*** fetch several attribute names and values (hex)
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dev/p
+trusted.name=0xbabe
+trusted.name2=0xdeadbeef
+trusted.name3=0xdeface
+
+*** fetch several attribute names and values (base64)
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dev/p
+trusted.name=0sur4=
+trusted.name2=0s3q2+7w==
+trusted.name3=0s3vrO
+
+*** shrink value of an existing attribute
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dev/p
+trusted.name=0xbabe
+trusted.name2=0xdeaf
+trusted.name3=0xdeface
+
+*** grow value of existing attribute
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dev/p
+trusted.name=0xbabe
+trusted.name2=0xdecade
+trusted.name3=0xdeface
+
+*** set an empty value for second attribute
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dev/p
+trusted.name2
+
+*** overwrite empty value
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dev/p
+trusted.name2=0xcafe
+
+*** remove attribute
+SCRATCH_MNT/dev/p: trusted.name2: No such attribute or operation not permitted
+*** final list (strings, type=dev/p, nsp=trusted)
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dev/p
+trusted.name=0xbabe
+trusted.name3=0xdeface
+user.name=0xbabe
+user.name3=0xdeface
+
+
+
+*** extend test bed
+SCRATCH_MNT
+SCRATCH_MNT/descend
+SCRATCH_MNT/descend/and
+SCRATCH_MNT/descend/down
+SCRATCH_MNT/descend/down/here
+SCRATCH_MNT/dev
+SCRATCH_MNT/dev/b
+SCRATCH_MNT/dev/c
+SCRATCH_MNT/dev/p
+SCRATCH_MNT/dir
+SCRATCH_MNT/here
+SCRATCH_MNT/here/up
+SCRATCH_MNT/here/up/ascend
+SCRATCH_MNT/lnk
+SCRATCH_MNT/reg
+
+*** directory descent with us following symlinks
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/descend
+user.1=0x3233
+user.x=0x797a
+
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/descend/and/ascend
+trusted.9=0x3837
+trusted.a=0x6263
+
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/descend/down
+user.1=0x3233
+user.x=0x797a
+
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/descend/down/here
+user.1=0x3233
+user.x=0x797a
+
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dev/b
+trusted.name=0xbabe
+trusted.name3=0xdeface
+user.name=0xbabe
+user.name3=0xdeface
+
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dev/c
+trusted.name=0xbabe
+trusted.name3=0xdeface
+user.name=0xbabe
+user.name3=0xdeface
+
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dev/p
+trusted.name=0xbabe
+trusted.name3=0xdeface
+user.name=0xbabe
+user.name3=0xdeface
+
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dir
+trusted.name=0xbabe
+trusted.name3=0xdeface
+user.name=0xbabe
+user.name3=0xdeface
+
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/here
+trusted.9=0x3837
+trusted.a=0x6263
+
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/here/up
+trusted.9=0x3837
+trusted.a=0x6263
+
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/here/up/ascend
+trusted.9=0x3837
+trusted.a=0x6263
+
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/lnk
+trusted.name=0xbabe
+trusted.name3=0xdeface
+user.name=0xbabe
+user.name3=0xdeface
+
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/reg
+trusted.name=0xbabe
+trusted.name3=0xdeface
+user.name=0xbabe
+user.name3=0xdeface
+
+
+*** directory descent without following symlinks
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/descend
+user.1=0x3233
+user.x=0x797a
+
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/descend/down
+user.1=0x3233
+user.x=0x797a
+
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/descend/down/here
+user.1=0x3233
+user.x=0x797a
+
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dev/b
+trusted.name=0xbabe
+trusted.name3=0xdeface
+user.name=0xbabe
+user.name3=0xdeface
+
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dev/c
+trusted.name=0xbabe
+trusted.name3=0xdeface
+user.name=0xbabe
+user.name3=0xdeface
+
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dev/p
+trusted.name=0xbabe
+trusted.name3=0xdeface
+user.name=0xbabe
+user.name3=0xdeface
+
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/dir
+trusted.name=0xbabe
+trusted.name3=0xdeface
+user.name=0xbabe
+user.name3=0xdeface
+
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/here
+trusted.9=0x3837
+trusted.a=0x6263
+
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/here/up
+trusted.9=0x3837
+trusted.a=0x6263
+
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/here/up/ascend
+trusted.9=0x3837
+trusted.a=0x6263
+
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/lnk
+trusted.name=0xbabe
+trusted.name3=0xdeface
+user.name=0xbabe
+user.name3=0xdeface
+
+# file: SCRATCH_MNT/reg
+trusted.name=0xbabe
+trusted.name3=0xdeface
+user.name=0xbabe
+user.name3=0xdeface
+
+
+
+*** backup everything
+*** clear out the scratch device
+*** reset test bed with no extended attributes
+*** create test bed
+SCRATCH_MNT
+SCRATCH_MNT/dev
+SCRATCH_MNT/dev/b
+SCRATCH_MNT/dev/c
+SCRATCH_MNT/dev/p
+SCRATCH_MNT/dir
+SCRATCH_MNT/lnk
+SCRATCH_MNT/reg
+*** extend test bed
+SCRATCH_MNT
+SCRATCH_MNT/descend
+SCRATCH_MNT/descend/and
+SCRATCH_MNT/descend/down
+SCRATCH_MNT/descend/down/here
+SCRATCH_MNT/dev
+SCRATCH_MNT/dev/b
+SCRATCH_MNT/dev/c
+SCRATCH_MNT/dev/p
+SCRATCH_MNT/dir
+SCRATCH_MNT/here
+SCRATCH_MNT/here/up
+SCRATCH_MNT/here/up/ascend
+SCRATCH_MNT/lnk
+SCRATCH_MNT/reg
+*** restore everything
+*** compare before and after backups
+
+*** unmount

Re: [PATCH 3/1] xfstests: generic/062: Do not run on newer kernels

[Dave Chinner]

On Thu, Sep 02, 2021 at 11:47:31AM -0400, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> 
> xfstests: generic/062: Do not run on newer kernels
> 
> This test has been written with assumption that setting user.* xattrs will
> fail on symlink and special files. When newer kernels support setting
> user.* xattrs on symlink and special files, this test starts failing.
> 
> Found it hard to change test in such a way that it works on both type of
> kernels. Primary problem is 062.out file which hardcodes the output and
> output will be different on old and new kernels.
> 
> So instead, do not run this test if kernel is new and is expected to
> exhibit new behavior. Next patch will create a new test and run that
> test on new kernel.
> 
> IOW, on old kernels run 062 and on new kernels run new test.
> 
> This is a proposed patch. Will need to be fixed if corresponding
> kernel changes are merged upstream.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
> ---
>  tests/generic/062 |   20 ++++++++++++++++++++
>  1 file changed, 20 insertions(+)
> 
> Index: xfstests-dev/tests/generic/062
> ===================================================================
> --- xfstests-dev.orig/tests/generic/062	2021-08-31 15:51:08.160307982 -0400
> +++ xfstests-dev/tests/generic/062	2021-08-31 16:27:41.678307982 -0400
> @@ -55,6 +55,26 @@ _require_attrs
>  _require_symlinks
>  _require_mknod
>  
> +user_xattr_allowed()
> +{
> +	local kernel_version kernel_patchlevel
> +
> +	kernel_version=`uname -r | awk -F. '{print $1}'`
> +	kernel_patchlevel=`uname -r | awk -F. '{print $2}'`
> +
> +	# Kernel version 5.14 onwards allow user xattr on symlink/special files.
> +	[ $kernel_version -lt 5 ] && return 1
> +	[ $kernel_patchlevel -lt 14 ] && return 1
> +	return 0;
> +}

We don't do this because code changes get backported to random
kernels and so the kernel release is not a reliable indicator of
feature support.

Probing the functionality is the only way to reliably detect what a
kernel supports. That's what we don in all the _requires*()
functions, which is what this should all be wrapped in.

> +# Kernel version 5.14 onwards allow user xattr on symlink/special files.
> +# Do not run this test on newer kernels. Instead run the new test
> +# which has been written with the assumption that user.* xattr
> +# will succeed on symlink and special files.
> +user_xattr_allowed && _notrun "Kernel allows user.* xattrs on symlinks and special files. Skipping this test. Run newer test instead."

"run a newer test instead" is not a useful error message. Nor do you
need "skipping this test" - that's exactly what "notrun" means.

Cheers,

Dave.
-- 
Dave Chinner
david@fromorbit.com

Re: [PATCH 3/1] xfstests: generic/062: Do not run on newer kernels

[Andreas Gruenbacher]

On Thu, Sep 2, 2021 at 5:47 PM Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> wrote:
> xfstests: generic/062: Do not run on newer kernels
>
> This test has been written with assumption that setting user.* xattrs will
> fail on symlink and special files. When newer kernels support setting
> user.* xattrs on symlink and special files, this test starts failing.

It's actually a good thing that this test case triggers for the kernel
change you're proposing; that change should never be merged. The
user.* namespace is meant for data with the same access permissions as
the file data, and it has been for many years. We may have
applications that assume the existing behavior. In addition, this
change would create backwards compatibility problems for things like
backups.

I'm not convinced that what you're actually proposing (mapping
security.selinux to a different attribute name) actually makes sense,
but that's a question for the selinux folks to decide. Mapping it to a
user.* attribute is definitely wrong though. The modified behavior
would affect anybody, not only users of selinux and/or virtiofs. If
mapping attribute names is actually the right approach, then you need
to look at trusted.* xattrs, which exist specifically for this kind of
purpose. You've noted that trusted.* xattrs aren't supported over nfs.
That's unfortunate, but not an acceptable excuse for messing up user.*
xattrs.

Thanks,
Andreas

Re: [PATCH 3/1] xfstests: generic/062: Do not run on newer kernels

[Zorro Lang]

On Thu, Sep 02, 2021 at 11:47:31AM -0400, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> 
> xfstests: generic/062: Do not run on newer kernels
> 
> This test has been written with assumption that setting user.* xattrs will
> fail on symlink and special files. When newer kernels support setting
> user.* xattrs on symlink and special files, this test starts failing.
> 
> Found it hard to change test in such a way that it works on both type of
> kernels. Primary problem is 062.out file which hardcodes the output and
> output will be different on old and new kernels.
> 
> So instead, do not run this test if kernel is new and is expected to
> exhibit new behavior. Next patch will create a new test and run that
> test on new kernel.
> 
> IOW, on old kernels run 062 and on new kernels run new test.
> 
> This is a proposed patch. Will need to be fixed if corresponding
> kernel changes are merged upstream.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
> ---
>  tests/generic/062 |   20 ++++++++++++++++++++
>  1 file changed, 20 insertions(+)
> 
> Index: xfstests-dev/tests/generic/062
> ===================================================================
> --- xfstests-dev.orig/tests/generic/062	2021-08-31 15:51:08.160307982 -0400
> +++ xfstests-dev/tests/generic/062	2021-08-31 16:27:41.678307982 -0400
> @@ -55,6 +55,26 @@ _require_attrs
>  _require_symlinks
>  _require_mknod
>  
> +user_xattr_allowed()
> +{
> +	local kernel_version kernel_patchlevel
> +
> +	kernel_version=`uname -r | awk -F. '{print $1}'`
> +	kernel_patchlevel=`uname -r | awk -F. '{print $2}'`
> +
> +	# Kernel version 5.14 onwards allow user xattr on symlink/special files.
> +	[ $kernel_version -lt 5 ] && return 1
> +	[ $kernel_patchlevel -lt 14 ] && return 1
> +	return 0;
> +}

I don't think this's a good way to judge if run or notrun a test. Many downstream
kernels always backport upstream features. I can't say what's the best way to
deal with this thing, I only can provide two optional methods:

1) Add new requre_* helpers to check if current kernel support to set xattr on
symlink and special files, then let this case only run on support/unsupport
condition.

2) Use _link_out_file() to link the .out file to different golden images (refer to
generic/050 etc), according to different feature implementation.

If anyone has a better method, feel free to talk :)

Thanks,
Zorro

> +
> +
> +# Kernel version 5.14 onwards allow user xattr on symlink/special files.
> +# Do not run this test on newer kernels. Instead run the new test
> +# which has been written with the assumption that user.* xattr
> +# will succeed on symlink and special files.
> +user_xattr_allowed && _notrun "Kernel allows user.* xattrs on symlinks and special files. Skipping this test. Run newer test instead."
> +
>  rm -f $tmp.backup1 $tmp.backup2 $seqres.full
>  
>  # real QA test starts here
> 

Re: [PATCH 3/1] xfstests: generic/062: Do not run on newer kernels

[Andreas Gruenbacher]

On Fri, Sep 3, 2021 at 8:31 AM Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 2, 2021 at 5:47 PM Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> wrote:
> > xfstests: generic/062: Do not run on newer kernels
> >
> > This test has been written with assumption that setting user.* xattrs will
> > fail on symlink and special files. When newer kernels support setting
> > user.* xattrs on symlink and special files, this test starts failing.
>
> It's actually a good thing that this test case triggers for the kernel
> change you're proposing; that change should never be merged. The
> user.* namespace is meant for data with the same access permissions as
> the file data, and it has been for many years. We may have
> applications that assume the existing behavior. In addition, this
> change would create backwards compatibility problems for things like
> backups.
>
> I'm not convinced that what you're actually proposing (mapping
> security.selinux to a different attribute name) actually makes sense,
> but that's a question for the selinux folks to decide. Mapping it to a
> user.* attribute is definitely wrong though. The modified behavior
> would affect anybody, not only users of selinux and/or virtiofs. If
> mapping attribute names is actually the right approach, then you need
> to look at trusted.* xattrs, which exist specifically for this kind of
> purpose. You've noted that trusted.* xattrs aren't supported over nfs.
> That's unfortunate, but not an acceptable excuse for messing up user.*
> xattrs.

Another possibility would be to make selinux use a different
security.* attribute for this nested selinux case. That way, the
"host" selinux would retain some control over the labels the "guest"
uses.

Thanks,
Andreas

Re: [PATCH 3/1] xfstests: generic/062: Do not run on newer kernels

[Bruce Fields]

Well, we could also look at supporting trusted.* xattrs over NFS.  I
don't know much about them, but it looks like it wouldn't be a lot of
work to specify, especially now that we've already got user xattrs?
We'd just write a new internet draft that refers to the existing
user.* xattr draft for most of the details.

--b.

On Fri, Sep 3, 2021 at 2:56 AM Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> wrote:
>
> On Fri, Sep 3, 2021 at 8:31 AM Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> wrote:
> > On Thu, Sep 2, 2021 at 5:47 PM Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> wrote:
> > > xfstests: generic/062: Do not run on newer kernels
> > >
> > > This test has been written with assumption that setting user.* xattrs will
> > > fail on symlink and special files. When newer kernels support setting
> > > user.* xattrs on symlink and special files, this test starts failing.
> >
> > It's actually a good thing that this test case triggers for the kernel
> > change you're proposing; that change should never be merged. The
> > user.* namespace is meant for data with the same access permissions as
> > the file data, and it has been for many years. We may have
> > applications that assume the existing behavior. In addition, this
> > change would create backwards compatibility problems for things like
> > backups.
> >
> > I'm not convinced that what you're actually proposing (mapping
> > security.selinux to a different attribute name) actually makes sense,
> > but that's a question for the selinux folks to decide. Mapping it to a
> > user.* attribute is definitely wrong though. The modified behavior
> > would affect anybody, not only users of selinux and/or virtiofs. If
> > mapping attribute names is actually the right approach, then you need
> > to look at trusted.* xattrs, which exist specifically for this kind of
> > purpose. You've noted that trusted.* xattrs aren't supported over nfs.
> > That's unfortunate, but not an acceptable excuse for messing up user.*
> > xattrs.
>
> Another possibility would be to make selinux use a different
> security.* attribute for this nested selinux case. That way, the
> "host" selinux would retain some control over the labels the "guest"
> uses.
>
> Thanks,
> Andreas
>

Re: [PATCH 3/1] xfstests: generic/062: Do not run on newer kernels

[Vivek Goyal]

On Fri, Sep 03, 2021 at 10:42:34AM -0400, Bruce Fields wrote:
> Well, we could also look at supporting trusted.* xattrs over NFS.  I
> don't know much about them, but it looks like it wouldn't be a lot of
> work to specify, especially now that we've already got user xattrs?
> We'd just write a new internet draft that refers to the existing
> user.* xattr draft for most of the details.

Will be nice if we can support trusted.* xattrs on NFS.

Vivek

> 
> --b.
> 
> On Fri, Sep 3, 2021 at 2:56 AM Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Fri, Sep 3, 2021 at 8:31 AM Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> wrote:
> > > On Thu, Sep 2, 2021 at 5:47 PM Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> wrote:
> > > > xfstests: generic/062: Do not run on newer kernels
> > > >
> > > > This test has been written with assumption that setting user.* xattrs will
> > > > fail on symlink and special files. When newer kernels support setting
> > > > user.* xattrs on symlink and special files, this test starts failing.
> > >
> > > It's actually a good thing that this test case triggers for the kernel
> > > change you're proposing; that change should never be merged. The
> > > user.* namespace is meant for data with the same access permissions as
> > > the file data, and it has been for many years. We may have
> > > applications that assume the existing behavior. In addition, this
> > > change would create backwards compatibility problems for things like
> > > backups.
> > >
> > > I'm not convinced that what you're actually proposing (mapping
> > > security.selinux to a different attribute name) actually makes sense,
> > > but that's a question for the selinux folks to decide. Mapping it to a
> > > user.* attribute is definitely wrong though. The modified behavior
> > > would affect anybody, not only users of selinux and/or virtiofs. If
> > > mapping attribute names is actually the right approach, then you need
> > > to look at trusted.* xattrs, which exist specifically for this kind of
> > > purpose. You've noted that trusted.* xattrs aren't supported over nfs.
> > > That's unfortunate, but not an acceptable excuse for messing up user.*
> > > xattrs.
> >
> > Another possibility would be to make selinux use a different
> > security.* attribute for this nested selinux case. That way, the
> > "host" selinux would retain some control over the labels the "guest"
> > uses.
> >
> > Thanks,
> > Andreas
> >
> 

Re: [PATCH 3/1] xfstests: generic/062: Do not run on newer kernels

[Bruce Fields]

On Fri, Sep 3, 2021 at 11:43 AM Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 03, 2021 at 10:42:34AM -0400, Bruce Fields wrote:
> > Well, we could also look at supporting trusted.* xattrs over NFS.  I
> > don't know much about them, but it looks like it wouldn't be a lot of
> > work to specify, especially now that we've already got user xattrs?
> > We'd just write a new internet draft that refers to the existing
> > user.* xattr draft for most of the details.
>
> Will be nice if we can support trusted.* xattrs on NFS.

Maybe I should start a separate thread for that.  Who would need to be
on it to be sure we get this right?

--b.

Re: [PATCH 3/1] xfstests: generic/062: Do not run on newer kernels

[Casey Schaufler]

On 9/3/2021 8:50 AM, Bruce Fields wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 3, 2021 at 11:43 AM Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> wrote:
>> On Fri, Sep 03, 2021 at 10:42:34AM -0400, Bruce Fields wrote:
>>> Well, we could also look at supporting trusted.* xattrs over NFS.  I
>>> don't know much about them, but it looks like it wouldn't be a lot of
>>> work to specify, especially now that we've already got user xattrs?
>>> We'd just write a new internet draft that refers to the existing
>>> user.* xattr draft for most of the details.
>> Will be nice if we can support trusted.* xattrs on NFS.
> Maybe I should start a separate thread for that.  Who would need to be
> on it to be sure we get this right?

I would like to be included. It would probably be a good idea to
include the LSM list, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org. I'll leave
the networking and filesystem folks to speak for themselves.

>
> --b.
>

Re: [PATCH 3/1] xfstests: generic/062: Do not run on newer kernels

[Vivek Goyal]

On Fri, Sep 03, 2021 at 11:50:43AM -0400, Bruce Fields wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 3, 2021 at 11:43 AM Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> wrote:
> > On Fri, Sep 03, 2021 at 10:42:34AM -0400, Bruce Fields wrote:
> > > Well, we could also look at supporting trusted.* xattrs over NFS.  I
> > > don't know much about them, but it looks like it wouldn't be a lot of
> > > work to specify, especially now that we've already got user xattrs?
> > > We'd just write a new internet draft that refers to the existing
> > > user.* xattr draft for most of the details.
> >
> > Will be nice if we can support trusted.* xattrs on NFS.
> 
> Maybe I should start a separate thread for that.  Who would need to be
> on it to be sure we get this right?

I will like to be on cc list.

Vivek