From: mark gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
To: speck@linutronix.de
Subject: [MODERATED] [PATCH 2/4] V8 more sampling fun 2
Date: Mon, 16 Mar 2020 17:56:27 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <=?utf-8?q?=3C673ce9087365001c4966f6b5101f22c5a2c48c94=2E158699?= =?utf-8?q?6075=2Egit=2Emgross=40linux=2Eintel=2Ecom=3E?=> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1586996075.git.mgross@linux.intel.com>
From: mark gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH 2/4] x86/cpu: clean up cpu_matches
To make cpu_matches reusable for alternitive matching tables, make cpu_matches
take a x86_cpu_id table as a parameter.
Signed-off-by: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 25 ++++++++++++++-----------
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index bed0cb83fe24..2bea1cc8dcb4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1075,9 +1075,9 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
{}
};
-static bool __init cpu_matches(unsigned long which)
+static bool __init cpu_matches(unsigned long which, const struct x86_cpu_id *table)
{
- const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(cpu_vuln_whitelist);
+ const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(table);
return m && !!(m->driver_data & which);
}
@@ -1097,31 +1097,34 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
/* Set ITLB_MULTIHIT bug if cpu is not in the whitelist and not mitigated */
- if (!cpu_matches(NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO))
+ if (!cpu_matches(NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT, cpu_vuln_whitelist) &&
+ !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT);
- if (cpu_matches(NO_SPECULATION))
+ if (cpu_matches(NO_SPECULATION, cpu_vuln_whitelist))
return;
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
- if (!cpu_matches(NO_SPECTRE_V2))
+ if (!cpu_matches(NO_SPECTRE_V2, cpu_vuln_whitelist))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
- if (!cpu_matches(NO_SSB) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) &&
+ if (!cpu_matches(NO_SSB, cpu_vuln_whitelist) &&
+ !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) &&
!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL)
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED);
- if (!cpu_matches(NO_MDS) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) {
+ if (!cpu_matches(NO_MDS, cpu_vuln_whitelist) &&
+ !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) {
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MDS);
- if (cpu_matches(MSBDS_ONLY))
+ if (cpu_matches(MSBDS_ONLY, cpu_vuln_whitelist))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY);
}
- if (!cpu_matches(NO_SWAPGS))
+ if (!cpu_matches(NO_SWAPGS, cpu_vuln_whitelist))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SWAPGS);
/*
@@ -1139,7 +1142,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR)))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_TAA);
- if (cpu_matches(NO_MELTDOWN))
+ if (cpu_matches(NO_MELTDOWN, cpu_vuln_whitelist))
return;
/* Rogue Data Cache Load? No! */
@@ -1148,7 +1151,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
- if (cpu_matches(NO_L1TF))
+ if (cpu_matches(NO_L1TF, cpu_vuln_whitelist))
return;
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF);
--
2.17.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-04-16 0:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-04-16 0:14 [MODERATED] [PATCH 0/4] V8 more sampling fun 0 mark gross
2020-01-16 22:16 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH 3/4] V8 more sampling fun 3 mark gross
2020-01-30 19:12 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH 4/4] V8 more sampling fun 4 mark gross
2020-03-17 0:56 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH 1/4] V8 more sampling fun 1 mark gross
2020-03-17 0:56 ` mark gross [this message]
2020-04-16 17:15 ` [MODERATED] " Josh Poimboeuf
2020-04-16 17:30 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-04-16 17:16 ` [MODERATED] Re: [PATCH 2/4] V8 more sampling fun 2 Josh Poimboeuf
2020-04-16 17:33 ` [MODERATED] " Borislav Petkov
2020-04-16 22:47 ` mark gross
2020-04-16 17:17 ` [MODERATED] Re: [PATCH 3/4] V8 more sampling fun 3 Josh Poimboeuf
2020-04-16 17:44 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-04-16 18:01 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2020-04-16 22:45 ` mark gross
2020-04-16 22:57 ` mark gross
2020-04-17 12:34 ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-17 13:19 ` [MODERATED] " Josh Poimboeuf
2020-04-17 16:46 ` Luck, Tony
2020-04-17 19:22 ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-16 22:54 ` [MODERATED] " mark gross
2020-04-16 17:20 ` [MODERATED] Re: [PATCH 4/4] V8 more sampling fun 4 Josh Poimboeuf
2020-04-16 17:49 ` [MODERATED] " Borislav Petkov
2020-04-16 22:57 ` mark gross
2020-04-20 14:30 ` mark gross
2020-04-20 16:17 ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-20 22:30 ` [MODERATED] " mark gross
2020-04-20 21:45 ` Slow Randomizing Boosts Denial of Service - Bulletin #1 Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-23 21:35 ` [MODERATED] " mark gross
2020-04-24 7:01 ` Greg KH
2020-04-27 15:10 ` mark gross
2020-04-21 17:30 ` [MODERATED] Re: [PATCH 4/4] V8 more sampling fun 4 Borislav Petkov
2020-04-21 17:34 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-04-21 18:19 ` Borislav Petkov
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