From: Matteo Rizzo <matteorizzo@google.com>
To: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
io-uring@vger.kernel.org, axboe@kernel.dk,
asml.silence@gmail.com
Cc: matteorizzo@google.com, corbet@lwn.net,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, keescook@chromium.org,
ribalda@chromium.org, rostedt@goodmis.org, jannh@google.com,
chenhuacai@kernel.org, gpiccoli@igalia.com,
ldufour@linux.ibm.com, evn@google.com, poprdi@google.com,
jordyzomer@google.com, jmoyer@redhat.com, krisman@suse.de
Subject: [PATCH v3 0/1] Add a sysctl to disable io_uring system-wide
Date: Fri, 30 Jun 2023 15:10:02 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230630151003.3622786-1-matteorizzo@google.com> (raw)
Over the last few years we've seen many critical vulnerabilities in
io_uring[1] which could be exploited by an unprivileged process to gain
control over the kernel. This patch introduces a new sysctl which disables
the creation of new io_uring instances system-wide.
The goal of this patch is to give distros, system admins, and cloud
providers a way to reduce the risk of privilege escalation through io_uring
where disabling it with seccomp or at compile time is not practical. For
example a distro or cloud provider might want to disable io_uring by
default and have users enable it again if they need to run a program that
requires it. The new sysctl is designed to let a user with root on the
machine enable and disable io_uring systemwide at runtime without requiring
a kernel recompilation or a reboot.
[1] Link: https://goo.gle/limit-iouring
---
v3:
* Fix the commit message
* Use READ_ONCE in io_uring_allowed to avoid races
* Add reviews
v2:
* Documentation style fixes
* Add a third level that only disables io_uring for unprivileged
processes
Matteo Rizzo (1):
io_uring: add a sysctl to disable io_uring system-wide
Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst | 19 +++++++++++++
io_uring/io_uring.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 50 insertions(+)
base-commit: 1601fb26b26758668533bdb211fdfbb5234367ee
--
2.41.0.255.g8b1d071c50-goog
next reply other threads:[~2023-06-30 15:10 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-06-30 15:10 Matteo Rizzo [this message]
2023-06-30 15:10 ` [PATCH v3 1/1] io_uring: add a sysctl to disable io_uring system-wide Matteo Rizzo
2023-06-30 15:15 ` Jann Horn
2023-07-26 17:45 ` Andres Freund
2023-07-26 20:02 ` Jeff Moyer
2023-08-09 15:09 ` Andres Freund
2023-08-09 16:45 ` Jens Axboe
2023-08-09 18:38 ` Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
2023-07-11 20:51 ` [PATCH v3 0/1] Add " Jens Axboe
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