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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>,
	Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>,
	Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
	Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
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	Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
	Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
	Vitaly Wool <vitalywool@gmail.com>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
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	sparclinux <sparclinux@vger.kernel.org>,
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	Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 02/11] mm: Hardened usercopy
Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2016 13:34:46 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+HqLY1gZycV9S9_Vf8uuQj4Z3qsV8WBxLORuseiJaw5Q@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <578E8A22.5080807@de.ibm.com>

On Tue, Jul 19, 2016 at 1:14 PM, Christian Borntraeger
<borntraeger@de.ibm.com> wrote:
> On 07/19/2016 09:31 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
>> On Tue, Jul 19, 2016 at 2:21 AM, Christian Borntraeger
>> <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> wrote:
>>> On 07/15/2016 11:44 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
>>>> +config HAVE_ARCH_LINEAR_KERNEL_MAPPING
>>>> +     bool
>>>> +     help
>>>> +       An architecture should select this if it has a secondary linear
>>>> +       mapping of the kernel text. This is used to verify that kernel
>>>> +       text exposures are not visible under CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY.
>>>
>>> I have trouble parsing this. (What does secondary linear mapping mean?)
>>
>> I likely need help clarifying this language...
>>
>>> So let me give an example below
>>>
>>>> +
>>> [...]
>>>> +/* Is this address range in the kernel text area? */
>>>> +static inline const char *check_kernel_text_object(const void *ptr,
>>>> +                                                unsigned long n)
>>>> +{
>>>> +     unsigned long textlow = (unsigned long)_stext;
>>>> +     unsigned long texthigh = (unsigned long)_etext;
>>>> +
>>>> +     if (overlaps(ptr, n, textlow, texthigh))
>>>> +             return "<kernel text>";
>>>> +
>>>> +#ifdef HAVE_ARCH_LINEAR_KERNEL_MAPPING
>>>> +     /* Check against linear mapping as well. */
>>>> +     if (overlaps(ptr, n, (unsigned long)__va(__pa(textlow)),
>>>> +                  (unsigned long)__va(__pa(texthigh))))
>>>> +             return "<linear kernel text>";
>>>> +#endif
>>>> +
>>>> +     return NULL;
>>>> +}
>>>
>>> s390 has an address space for user (primary address space from 0..4TB/8PB) and a separate
>>> address space (home space from 0..4TB/8PB) for the kernel. In this home space the kernel
>>> mapping is virtual containing the physical memory as well as vmalloc memory (creating aliases
>>> into the physical one). The kernel text is mapped from _stext to _etext in this mapping.
>>> So I assume this would qualify for HAVE_ARCH_LINEAR_KERNEL_MAPPING ?
>>
>> If I understand your example, yes. In the home space you have two
>> addresses that reference the kernel image?
>
> No, there is only one address that points to the kernel.
> As we have no kernel ASLR yet, and the kernel mapping is
> a 1:1 mapping from 0 to memory end and the kernel is only
> from _stext to _etext. The vmalloc area contains modules
> and vmalloc but not a 2nd kernel mapping.
>
> But thanks for your example, now I understood. If we have only
> one address
>>>> +     if (overlaps(ptr, n, textlow, texthigh))
>>>> +             return "<kernel text>";
>
> This is just enough.
>
> So what about for the CONFIG text:
>
>        An architecture should select this if the kernel mapping has a secondary
>        linear mapping of the kernel text - in other words more than one virtual
>        kernel address that points to the kernel image. This is used to verify
>        that kernel text exposures are not visible under CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY.

Sounds good, I've adjusted it for now.

>> I wonder if I can avoid the CONFIG entirely if I just did a
>> __va(__pa(_stext)) != _stext test... would that break anyone?
>
> Can this be resolved on all platforms at compile time?

Well, I think it still needs a runtime check (compile-time may not be
able to tell about kaslr, or who knows what else). I would really like
to avoid the CONFIG if possible, though. Would this do the right thing
on s390? This appears to work where I'm able to test it (32/64 x86,
32/64 arm):

        unsigned long textlow = (unsigned long)_stext;
        unsigned long texthigh = (unsigned long)_etext;
        unsigned long textlow_linear = (unsigned long)__va(__pa(textlow);
        unsigned long texthigh_linear = (unsigned long)__va(__pa(texthigh);

        if (overlaps(ptr, n, textlow, texthigh))
                return "<kernel text>";

        /* Check against possible secondary linear mapping as well. */
        if (textlow != textlow_linear &&
            overlaps(ptr, n, textlow_linear, texthigh_linear))
                return "<linear kernel text>";

        return NULL;


-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security

  reply	other threads:[~2016-07-19 20:34 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-07-15 21:44 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 00/11] mm: Hardened usercopy Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 01/11] mm: Implement stack frame object validation Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 02/11] mm: Hardened usercopy Kees Cook
2016-07-19  1:06   ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2016-07-19 18:48     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 22:00       ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH] mm: Add is_migrate_cma_page Laura Abbott
2016-07-19 22:40         ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-20 10:24       ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 02/11] mm: Hardened usercopy Balbir Singh
2016-07-20 15:36         ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-19  1:52   ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-19 19:12     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 22:55       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19  9:21   ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-19 19:31     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 20:14       ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-19 20:34         ` Kees Cook [this message]
2016-07-19 20:44           ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-21  6:52   ` Michael Ellerman
     [not found]   ` <5790711f.2350420a.b4287.2cc0SMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com>
2016-07-21 18:34     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-22 17:45       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-07-25  9:27         ` [kernel-hardening] " David Laight
2016-07-26  2:09           ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-26  2:03         ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Ellerman
2016-07-26  4:46           ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 03/11] x86/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 04/11] ARM: uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 05/11] arm64/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 06/11] ia64/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 07/11] powerpc/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 08/11] sparc/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 09/11] s390/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 10/11] mm: SLAB hardened usercopy support Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 11/11] mm: SLUB " Kees Cook
2016-07-18  8:26 ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 00/11] mm: Hardened usercopy Balbir Singh
2016-07-20  9:52 ` [kernel-hardening] " David Laight
2016-07-20 15:31   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-20 16:02     ` [kernel-hardening] " David Laight
2016-07-20 16:22       ` [kernel-hardening] " Rik van Riel
2016-07-20 17:44       ` Kees Cook

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