From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Jason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net>
Cc: "Roberts, William C" <william.c.roberts@intel.com>,
Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>,
"benh@kernel.crashing.org" <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>,
Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>,
Daniel Cashman <dcashman@android.com>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v2 1/7] random: Simplify API for random address requests
Date: Sun, 31 Jul 2016 09:46:53 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jL3ZtjbhOYujVUpBuDttPjetaz8rSY_hNK13r6OtR4sFQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160730154244.403-2-jason@lakedaemon.net>
On Sat, Jul 30, 2016 at 8:42 AM, Jason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net> wrote:
> To date, all callers of randomize_range() have set the length to 0, and
> check for a zero return value. For the current callers, the only way
> to get zero returned is if end <= start. Since they are all adding a
> constant to the start address, this is unnecessary.
>
> We can remove a bunch of needless checks by simplifying the API to do
> just what everyone wants, return an address between [start, start +
> range).
>
> While we're here, s/get_random_int/get_random_long/. No current call
> site is adversely affected by get_random_int(), since all current range
> requests are < UINT_MAX. However, we should match caller expectations
> to avoid coming up short (ha!) in the future.
>
> All current callers to randomize_range() chose to use the start address
> if randomize_range() failed. Therefore, we simplify things by just
> returning the start address on error.
>
> randomize_range() will be removed once all callers have been converted
> over to randomize_addr().
>
> Signed-off-by: Jason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net>
> ---
> Changes from v1:
> - Explicitly mention page_aligned start assumption (Yann Droneaud)
> - pick random pages vice random addresses (Yann Droneaud)
> - catch range=0 last
>
> drivers/char/random.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> include/linux/random.h | 1 +
> 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
> index 0158d3bff7e5..3bedf69546d6 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/random.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/random.c
> @@ -1840,6 +1840,34 @@ randomize_range(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long len)
> return PAGE_ALIGN(get_random_int() % range + start);
> }
>
> +/**
> + * randomize_addr - Generate a random, page aligned address
> + * @start: The smallest acceptable address the caller will take.
> + * @range: The size of the area, starting at @start, within which the
> + * random address must fall.
> + *
> + * If @start + @range would overflow, @range is capped.
> + *
> + * NOTE: Historical use of randomize_range, which this replaces, presumed that
> + * @start was already page aligned. This assumption still holds.
> + *
> + * Return: A page aligned address within [start, start + range). On error,
> + * @start is returned.
> + */
> +unsigned long
> +randomize_addr(unsigned long start, unsigned long range)
Since we're changing other things about this, let's try to document
its behavior in its name too and call this "randomize_page" instead.
If it requires a page-aligned value, we should probably also BUG_ON
it, or adjust the start too.
-Kees
> +{
> + if (start > ULONG_MAX - range)
> + range = ULONG_MAX - start;
> +
> + range >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
> +
> + if (range == 0)
> + return start;
> +
> + return start + (get_random_long() % range << PAGE_SHIFT);
> +}
> +
> /* Interface for in-kernel drivers of true hardware RNGs.
> * Those devices may produce endless random bits and will be throttled
> * when our pool is full.
> diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h
> index e47e533742b5..f1ca2fa4c071 100644
> --- a/include/linux/random.h
> +++ b/include/linux/random.h
> @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ extern const struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops;
> unsigned int get_random_int(void);
> unsigned long get_random_long(void);
> unsigned long randomize_range(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long len);
> +unsigned long randomize_addr(unsigned long start, unsigned long range);
>
> u32 prandom_u32(void);
> void prandom_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
> --
> 2.9.2
>
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-07-31 16:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 37+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-07-28 20:47 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/7] char/random: Simplify random address requests Jason Cooper
2016-07-28 20:47 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/7] random: Simplify API for " Jason Cooper
2016-07-29 8:59 ` [kernel-hardening] " Yann Droneaud
2016-07-29 18:20 ` Jason Cooper
2016-07-28 20:47 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/7] x86: Use simpler " Jason Cooper
2016-07-28 20:47 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 3/7] ARM: " Jason Cooper
2016-07-28 20:47 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/7] arm64: " Jason Cooper
2016-07-29 13:48 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Deacon
2016-07-28 20:47 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 5/7] tile: " Jason Cooper
2016-07-28 20:47 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 6/7] unicore32: " Jason Cooper
2016-07-28 20:47 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 7/7] random: Remove unused randomize_range() Jason Cooper
2016-07-30 15:42 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 0/7] char/random: Simplify random address requests Jason Cooper
2016-07-30 15:42 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 1/7] random: Simplify API for " Jason Cooper
2016-07-31 16:46 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2016-07-31 20:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason Cooper
2016-08-01 19:47 ` Kees Cook
2016-08-01 23:17 ` Jason Cooper
2016-08-02 3:35 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-08-03 18:42 ` Jason Cooper
2016-07-30 15:42 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 2/7] x86: Use simpler " Jason Cooper
2016-07-30 15:42 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 3/7] ARM: " Jason Cooper
2016-07-30 15:42 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 4/7] arm64: " Jason Cooper
2016-07-30 15:42 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 5/7] tile: " Jason Cooper
2016-07-30 15:42 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 6/7] unicore32: " Jason Cooper
2016-07-30 15:42 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 7/7] random: Remove unused randomize_range() Jason Cooper
2016-08-03 23:39 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 0/7] char/random: Simplify random address requests Jason Cooper
2016-08-03 23:39 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 1/7] random: Simplify API for " Jason Cooper
2016-08-04 12:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Yann Droneaud
2016-08-03 23:39 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 2/7] x86: Use simpler " Jason Cooper
2016-08-03 23:39 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 3/7] ARM: " Jason Cooper
2016-08-03 23:39 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 4/7] arm64: " Jason Cooper
2016-08-03 23:39 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 5/7] tile: " Jason Cooper
2016-08-03 23:39 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 6/7] unicore32: " Jason Cooper
2016-08-03 23:39 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 7/7] random: Remove unused randomize_range() Jason Cooper
2016-08-03 23:48 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Morton
2016-08-04 0:19 ` Jason Cooper
2016-08-04 2:41 ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 0/7] char/random: Simplify random address requests Kees Cook
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