From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
To: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
"Martin K. Petersen" <martin.petersen@oracle.com>,
linux-scsi <linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, qla2xxx-upstream@qlogic.com,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v2 17/19] qla2xxx: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2018 21:38:18 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAPcyv4gb8SpBEYnuc3hULLZdiuUM1Lhc33CBirmXtckD0CsLww@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1515719956.3056.37.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
On Thu, Jan 11, 2018 at 5:19 PM, James Bottomley
<jejb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> On Thu, 2018-01-11 at 16:47 -0800, Dan Williams wrote:
>> Static analysis reports that 'handle' may be a user controlled value
>> that is used as a data dependency to read 'sp' from the
>> 'req->outstanding_cmds' array.
>
> Greg already told you it comes from hardware, specifically the hardware
> response queue. If you don't believe him, I can confirm it's quite
> definitely all copied from the iomem where the mailbox response is, so
> it can't be a user controlled value (well, unless the user has some
> influence over the firmware of the qla2xxx controller, which probably
> means you have other things to worry about than speculative information
> leaks).
I do believe him, and I still submitted this. I'm trying to probe at
the meta question of where do we draw the line with these especially
when it costs us relatively little to apply a few line patch? We fix
theoretical lockdep races, why not theoretical data leak paths?
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-01-12 5:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 59+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-12 0:46 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 00/19] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:46 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 01/19] Documentation: document array_ptr Dan Williams
2018-01-12 10:38 ` [kernel-hardening] " Geert Uytterhoeven
2018-01-16 21:01 ` Kees Cook
2018-01-12 0:46 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 02/19] arm64: implement ifence_array_ptr() Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:46 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 03/19] arm: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:46 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 04/19] x86: implement ifence() Dan Williams
2018-01-12 2:27 ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric W. Biederman
2018-01-12 3:39 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:46 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 05/19] x86: implement ifence_array_ptr() and array_ptr_mask() Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:46 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 06/19] asm-generic/barrier: mask speculative execution flows Dan Williams
2018-01-12 2:42 ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric W. Biederman
2018-01-12 9:12 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-13 0:41 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-15 8:46 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-12 0:47 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 07/19] x86: introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec and ASM_IFENCE Dan Williams
2018-01-12 17:51 ` [kernel-hardening] " Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-12 18:21 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 18:58 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-12 19:26 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 20:01 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-12 20:41 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-12 0:47 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 08/19] x86: use __uaccess_begin_nospec and ASM_IFENCE in get_user paths Dan Williams
2018-01-12 1:11 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2018-01-12 1:14 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:47 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 09/19] ipv6: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:47 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 10/19] ipv4: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12 7:59 ` [kernel-hardening] " Greg KH
2018-01-12 18:47 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-13 8:56 ` Greg KH
2018-01-12 0:47 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 11/19] vfs, fdtable: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:47 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 12/19] userns: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:47 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 13/19] udf: " Dan Williams
2018-01-15 10:32 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jan Kara
2018-01-15 17:49 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:47 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 14/19] [media] uvcvideo: " Dan Williams
2018-08-06 21:40 ` Laurent Pinchart
2018-01-12 0:47 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 15/19] carl9170: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12 14:42 ` [kernel-hardening] " Christian Lamparter
2018-01-12 18:39 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 20:01 ` Christian Lamparter
2018-01-12 23:05 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:47 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 16/19] p54: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:47 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 17/19] qla2xxx: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12 1:19 ` [kernel-hardening] " James Bottomley
2018-01-12 5:38 ` Dan Williams [this message]
2018-01-12 6:05 ` James Bottomley
2018-01-12 0:48 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 18/19] cw1200: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:48 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 19/19] net: mpls: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12 1:19 ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v2 00/19] " Linus Torvalds
2018-01-12 1:41 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-18 13:18 ` Will Deacon
2018-01-18 16:58 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-18 17:05 ` Will Deacon
2018-01-18 21:41 ` Laurent Pinchart
2018-01-13 0:15 ` Tony Luck
2018-01-13 18:51 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-16 19:21 ` Tony Luck
2018-01-12 10:02 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
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