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From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	x86@kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Kai Huang <kai.huang@linux.intel.com>,
	Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com>,
	Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH, RFC 01/62] mm: Do no merge VMAs with different encryption KeyIDs
Date: Wed,  8 May 2019 17:43:21 +0300
Message-ID: <20190508144422.13171-2-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190508144422.13171-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>

VMAs with different KeyID do not mix together. Only VMAs with the same
KeyID are compatible.

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
---
 fs/userfaultfd.c   |  7 ++++---
 include/linux/mm.h |  9 ++++++++-
 mm/madvise.c       |  2 +-
 mm/mempolicy.c     |  3 ++-
 mm/mlock.c         |  2 +-
 mm/mmap.c          | 31 +++++++++++++++++++------------
 mm/mprotect.c      |  2 +-
 7 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/userfaultfd.c b/fs/userfaultfd.c
index f5de1e726356..6032aecda4ed 100644
--- a/fs/userfaultfd.c
+++ b/fs/userfaultfd.c
@@ -901,7 +901,7 @@ static int userfaultfd_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 				 new_flags, vma->anon_vma,
 				 vma->vm_file, vma->vm_pgoff,
 				 vma_policy(vma),
-				 NULL_VM_UFFD_CTX);
+				 NULL_VM_UFFD_CTX, vma_keyid(vma));
 		if (prev)
 			vma = prev;
 		else
@@ -1451,7 +1451,8 @@ static int userfaultfd_register(struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx,
 		prev = vma_merge(mm, prev, start, vma_end, new_flags,
 				 vma->anon_vma, vma->vm_file, vma->vm_pgoff,
 				 vma_policy(vma),
-				 ((struct vm_userfaultfd_ctx){ ctx }));
+				 ((struct vm_userfaultfd_ctx){ ctx }),
+				 vma_keyid(vma));
 		if (prev) {
 			vma = prev;
 			goto next;
@@ -1613,7 +1614,7 @@ static int userfaultfd_unregister(struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx,
 		prev = vma_merge(mm, prev, start, vma_end, new_flags,
 				 vma->anon_vma, vma->vm_file, vma->vm_pgoff,
 				 vma_policy(vma),
-				 NULL_VM_UFFD_CTX);
+				 NULL_VM_UFFD_CTX, vma_keyid(vma));
 		if (prev) {
 			vma = prev;
 			goto next;
diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index 6b10c21630f5..13c40c43ce00 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -1599,6 +1599,13 @@ static inline bool vma_is_anonymous(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 	return !vma->vm_ops;
 }
 
+#ifndef vma_keyid
+static inline int vma_keyid(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SHMEM
 /*
  * The vma_is_shmem is not inline because it is used only by slow
@@ -2275,7 +2282,7 @@ static inline int vma_adjust(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long start,
 extern struct vm_area_struct *vma_merge(struct mm_struct *,
 	struct vm_area_struct *prev, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
 	unsigned long vm_flags, struct anon_vma *, struct file *, pgoff_t,
-	struct mempolicy *, struct vm_userfaultfd_ctx);
+	struct mempolicy *, struct vm_userfaultfd_ctx, int keyid);
 extern struct anon_vma *find_mergeable_anon_vma(struct vm_area_struct *);
 extern int __split_vma(struct mm_struct *, struct vm_area_struct *,
 	unsigned long addr, int new_below);
diff --git a/mm/madvise.c b/mm/madvise.c
index 21a7881a2db4..e9925a512b15 100644
--- a/mm/madvise.c
+++ b/mm/madvise.c
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ static long madvise_behavior(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 	pgoff = vma->vm_pgoff + ((start - vma->vm_start) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
 	*prev = vma_merge(mm, *prev, start, end, new_flags, vma->anon_vma,
 			  vma->vm_file, pgoff, vma_policy(vma),
-			  vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx);
+			  vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx, vma_keyid(vma));
 	if (*prev) {
 		vma = *prev;
 		goto success;
diff --git a/mm/mempolicy.c b/mm/mempolicy.c
index 2219e747df49..14b18449c623 100644
--- a/mm/mempolicy.c
+++ b/mm/mempolicy.c
@@ -731,7 +731,8 @@ static int mbind_range(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start,
 			((vmstart - vma->vm_start) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
 		prev = vma_merge(mm, prev, vmstart, vmend, vma->vm_flags,
 				 vma->anon_vma, vma->vm_file, pgoff,
-				 new_pol, vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx);
+				 new_pol, vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx,
+				 vma_keyid(vma));
 		if (prev) {
 			vma = prev;
 			next = vma->vm_next;
diff --git a/mm/mlock.c b/mm/mlock.c
index 080f3b36415b..d44cb0c9e9ca 100644
--- a/mm/mlock.c
+++ b/mm/mlock.c
@@ -535,7 +535,7 @@ static int mlock_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **prev,
 	pgoff = vma->vm_pgoff + ((start - vma->vm_start) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
 	*prev = vma_merge(mm, *prev, start, end, newflags, vma->anon_vma,
 			  vma->vm_file, pgoff, vma_policy(vma),
-			  vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx);
+			  vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx, vma_keyid(vma));
 	if (*prev) {
 		vma = *prev;
 		goto success;
diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
index bd7b9f293b39..de0bdf4d8f90 100644
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -1007,7 +1007,8 @@ int __vma_adjust(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long start,
  */
 static inline int is_mergeable_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 				struct file *file, unsigned long vm_flags,
-				struct vm_userfaultfd_ctx vm_userfaultfd_ctx)
+				struct vm_userfaultfd_ctx vm_userfaultfd_ctx,
+				int keyid)
 {
 	/*
 	 * VM_SOFTDIRTY should not prevent from VMA merging, if we
@@ -1021,6 +1022,8 @@ static inline int is_mergeable_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 		return 0;
 	if (vma->vm_file != file)
 		return 0;
+	if (vma_keyid(vma) != keyid)
+		return 0;
 	if (vma->vm_ops && vma->vm_ops->close)
 		return 0;
 	if (!is_mergeable_vm_userfaultfd_ctx(vma, vm_userfaultfd_ctx))
@@ -1057,9 +1060,10 @@ static int
 can_vma_merge_before(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long vm_flags,
 		     struct anon_vma *anon_vma, struct file *file,
 		     pgoff_t vm_pgoff,
-		     struct vm_userfaultfd_ctx vm_userfaultfd_ctx)
+		     struct vm_userfaultfd_ctx vm_userfaultfd_ctx,
+		     int keyid)
 {
-	if (is_mergeable_vma(vma, file, vm_flags, vm_userfaultfd_ctx) &&
+	if (is_mergeable_vma(vma, file, vm_flags, vm_userfaultfd_ctx, keyid) &&
 	    is_mergeable_anon_vma(anon_vma, vma->anon_vma, vma)) {
 		if (vma->vm_pgoff == vm_pgoff)
 			return 1;
@@ -1078,9 +1082,10 @@ static int
 can_vma_merge_after(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long vm_flags,
 		    struct anon_vma *anon_vma, struct file *file,
 		    pgoff_t vm_pgoff,
-		    struct vm_userfaultfd_ctx vm_userfaultfd_ctx)
+		    struct vm_userfaultfd_ctx vm_userfaultfd_ctx,
+		    int keyid)
 {
-	if (is_mergeable_vma(vma, file, vm_flags, vm_userfaultfd_ctx) &&
+	if (is_mergeable_vma(vma, file, vm_flags, vm_userfaultfd_ctx, keyid) &&
 	    is_mergeable_anon_vma(anon_vma, vma->anon_vma, vma)) {
 		pgoff_t vm_pglen;
 		vm_pglen = vma_pages(vma);
@@ -1135,7 +1140,8 @@ struct vm_area_struct *vma_merge(struct mm_struct *mm,
 			unsigned long end, unsigned long vm_flags,
 			struct anon_vma *anon_vma, struct file *file,
 			pgoff_t pgoff, struct mempolicy *policy,
-			struct vm_userfaultfd_ctx vm_userfaultfd_ctx)
+			struct vm_userfaultfd_ctx vm_userfaultfd_ctx,
+			int keyid)
 {
 	pgoff_t pglen = (end - addr) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
 	struct vm_area_struct *area, *next;
@@ -1168,7 +1174,7 @@ struct vm_area_struct *vma_merge(struct mm_struct *mm,
 			mpol_equal(vma_policy(prev), policy) &&
 			can_vma_merge_after(prev, vm_flags,
 					    anon_vma, file, pgoff,
-					    vm_userfaultfd_ctx)) {
+					    vm_userfaultfd_ctx, keyid)) {
 		/*
 		 * OK, it can.  Can we now merge in the successor as well?
 		 */
@@ -1177,7 +1183,8 @@ struct vm_area_struct *vma_merge(struct mm_struct *mm,
 				can_vma_merge_before(next, vm_flags,
 						     anon_vma, file,
 						     pgoff+pglen,
-						     vm_userfaultfd_ctx) &&
+						     vm_userfaultfd_ctx,
+						     keyid) &&
 				is_mergeable_anon_vma(prev->anon_vma,
 						      next->anon_vma, NULL)) {
 							/* cases 1, 6 */
@@ -1200,7 +1207,7 @@ struct vm_area_struct *vma_merge(struct mm_struct *mm,
 			mpol_equal(policy, vma_policy(next)) &&
 			can_vma_merge_before(next, vm_flags,
 					     anon_vma, file, pgoff+pglen,
-					     vm_userfaultfd_ctx)) {
+					     vm_userfaultfd_ctx, keyid)) {
 		if (prev && addr < prev->vm_end)	/* case 4 */
 			err = __vma_adjust(prev, prev->vm_start,
 					 addr, prev->vm_pgoff, NULL, next);
@@ -1745,7 +1752,7 @@ unsigned long mmap_region(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
 	 * Can we just expand an old mapping?
 	 */
 	vma = vma_merge(mm, prev, addr, addr + len, vm_flags,
-			NULL, file, pgoff, NULL, NULL_VM_UFFD_CTX);
+			NULL, file, pgoff, NULL, NULL_VM_UFFD_CTX, 0);
 	if (vma)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -3023,7 +3030,7 @@ static int do_brk_flags(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len, unsigned long fla
 
 	/* Can we just expand an old private anonymous mapping? */
 	vma = vma_merge(mm, prev, addr, addr + len, flags,
-			NULL, NULL, pgoff, NULL, NULL_VM_UFFD_CTX);
+			NULL, NULL, pgoff, NULL, NULL_VM_UFFD_CTX, 0);
 	if (vma)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -3221,7 +3228,7 @@ struct vm_area_struct *copy_vma(struct vm_area_struct **vmap,
 		return NULL;	/* should never get here */
 	new_vma = vma_merge(mm, prev, addr, addr + len, vma->vm_flags,
 			    vma->anon_vma, vma->vm_file, pgoff, vma_policy(vma),
-			    vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx);
+			    vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx, vma_keyid(vma));
 	if (new_vma) {
 		/*
 		 * Source vma may have been merged into new_vma
diff --git a/mm/mprotect.c b/mm/mprotect.c
index 028c724dcb1a..e768cd656a48 100644
--- a/mm/mprotect.c
+++ b/mm/mprotect.c
@@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **pprev,
 	pgoff = vma->vm_pgoff + ((start - vma->vm_start) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
 	*pprev = vma_merge(mm, *pprev, start, end, newflags,
 			   vma->anon_vma, vma->vm_file, pgoff, vma_policy(vma),
-			   vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx);
+			   vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx, vma_keyid(vma));
 	if (*pprev) {
 		vma = *pprev;
 		VM_WARN_ON((vma->vm_flags ^ newflags) & ~VM_SOFTDIRTY);
-- 
2.20.1


  reply index

Thread overview: 153+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-05-08 14:43 [PATCH, RFC 00/62] Intel MKTME enabling Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` Kirill A. Shutemov [this message]
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 02/62] mm: Add helpers to setup zero page mappings Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-29  7:21   ` Mike Rapoport
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 03/62] mm/ksm: Do not merge pages with different KeyIDs Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-10 18:07   ` Dave Hansen
2019-05-13 14:27     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 04/62] mm/page_alloc: Unify alloc_hugepage_vma() Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 05/62] mm/page_alloc: Handle allocation for encrypted memory Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-29  7:21   ` Mike Rapoport
2019-05-29 12:47     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 06/62] mm/khugepaged: Handle encrypted pages Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 07/62] x86/mm: Mask out KeyID bits from page table entry pfn Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 08/62] x86/mm: Introduce variables to store number, shift and mask of KeyIDs Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 09/62] x86/mm: Preserve KeyID on pte_modify() and pgprot_modify() Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-14  9:15   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-14 13:03     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 10/62] x86/mm: Detect MKTME early Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 11/62] x86/mm: Add a helper to retrieve KeyID for a page Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 12/62] x86/mm: Add a helper to retrieve KeyID for a VMA Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 13/62] x86/mm: Add hooks to allocate and free encrypted pages Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-14  9:34   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-14 11:04     ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-14 13:28       ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-14 13:43         ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-14 22:41           ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-17  9:25             ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-14 13:14     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 14/62] x86/mm: Map zero pages into encrypted mappings correctly Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 15/62] x86/mm: Rename CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY_PHYSICAL_PADDING Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 16/62] x86/mm: Allow to disable MKTME after enumeration Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 17/62] x86/mm: Calculate direct mapping size Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 18/62] x86/mm: Implement syncing per-KeyID direct mappings Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-14  9:51   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-14 22:43     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-17  9:27       ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-17 14:43         ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-17 14:51           ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-17 15:17             ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 19/62] x86/mm: Handle encrypted memory in page_to_virt() and __pa() Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-14 11:10   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 20/62] mm/page_ext: Export lookup_page_ext() symbol Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-14 11:12   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-14 22:44     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-17  9:30       ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-17 11:01         ` Kai Huang
2019-06-17 11:13           ` Huang, Kai
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 21/62] mm/rmap: Clear vma->anon_vma on unlink_anon_vmas() Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 22/62] x86/pconfig: Set a valid encryption algorithm for all MKTME commands Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 23/62] keys/mktme: Introduce a Kernel Key Service for MKTME Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 24/62] keys/mktme: Preparse the MKTME key payload Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 25/62] keys/mktme: Instantiate and destroy MKTME keys Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 26/62] keys/mktme: Move the MKTME payload into a cache aligned structure Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-14 11:35   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-14 17:10     ` Alison Schofield
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 27/62] keys/mktme: Strengthen the entropy of CPU generated MKTME keys Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 28/62] keys/mktme: Set up PCONFIG programming targets for " Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 29/62] keys/mktme: Program MKTME keys into the platform hardware Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 30/62] keys/mktme: Set up a percpu_ref_count for MKTME keys Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 31/62] keys/mktme: Require CAP_SYS_RESOURCE capability " Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 32/62] keys/mktme: Store MKTME payloads if cmdline parameter allows Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 33/62] acpi: Remove __init from acpi table parsing functions Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 34/62] acpi/hmat: Determine existence of an ACPI HMAT Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 35/62] keys/mktme: Require ACPI HMAT to register the MKTME Key Service Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 36/62] acpi/hmat: Evaluate topology presented in ACPI HMAT for MKTME Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 37/62] keys/mktme: Do not allow key creation in unsafe topologies Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 38/62] keys/mktme: Support CPU hotplug for MKTME key service Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 39/62] keys/mktme: Find new PCONFIG targets during memory hotplug Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 40/62] keys/mktme: Program new PCONFIG targets with MKTME keys Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 41/62] keys/mktme: Support memory hotplug for " Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 42/62] mm: Generalize the mprotect implementation to support extensions Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 43/62] syscall/x86: Wire up a system call for MKTME encryption keys Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-29  7:21   ` Mike Rapoport
2019-05-29 18:12     ` Alison Schofield
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 44/62] x86/mm: Set KeyIDs in encrypted VMAs for MKTME Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-14 11:44   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-14 17:33     ` Alison Schofield
2019-06-14 18:26       ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-14 18:46         ` Alison Schofield
2019-06-14 19:11           ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-17  9:10             ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 45/62] mm: Add the encrypt_mprotect() system call " Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-14 11:47   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-14 17:35     ` Alison Schofield
2019-06-14 11:51   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-15  0:32     ` Alison Schofield
2019-06-17  9:08       ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-17 15:07   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-17 15:28     ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-17 15:46       ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-17 18:27         ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-17 19:12           ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-17 21:36             ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-18  0:48               ` Kai Huang
2019-06-18  1:50                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-18  2:11                   ` Kai Huang
2019-06-18  4:24                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-18 14:19                   ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-18  0:05             ` Kai Huang
2019-06-18  0:15               ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-18  1:35                 ` Kai Huang
2019-06-18  1:43                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-18  2:23                     ` Kai Huang
2019-06-18  9:12                       ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-18 14:09                         ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-18 16:15                           ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-18 16:22                             ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-18 16:36                               ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-18 16:48                                 ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-18 14:13                 ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-17 23:59           ` Kai Huang
2019-06-18  1:34             ` Lendacky, Thomas
2019-06-18  1:40               ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-18  2:02                 ` Lendacky, Thomas
2019-06-18  4:19                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 46/62] x86/mm: Keep reference counts on encrypted VMAs " Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-14 11:54   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-14 18:39     ` Alison Schofield
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 47/62] mm: Restrict MKTME memory encryption to anonymous VMAs Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-14 11:55   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-15  0:07     ` Alison Schofield
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 48/62] selftests/x86/mktme: Test the MKTME APIs Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 17:09   ` Alison Schofield
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 49/62] mm, x86: export several MKTME variables Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-14 11:56   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-17  3:14     ` Kai Huang
2019-06-17  7:46       ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-17  8:39         ` Kai Huang
2019-06-17 11:25           ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 50/62] kvm, x86, mmu: setup MKTME keyID to spte for given PFN Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 51/62] iommu/vt-d: Support MKTME in DMA remapping Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-06-14 12:04   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 52/62] x86/mm: introduce common code for mem encryption Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 16:58   ` Christoph Hellwig
2019-05-08 20:52     ` Jacob Pan
2019-05-08 21:21       ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 53/62] x86/mm: Use common code for DMA memory encryption Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 54/62] x86/mm: Disable MKTME on incompatible platform configurations Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 55/62] x86/mm: Disable MKTME if not all system memory supports encryption Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 56/62] x86: Introduce CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MKTME Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 57/62] x86/mktme: Overview of Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-29  7:21   ` Mike Rapoport
2019-05-29 18:13     ` Alison Schofield
2019-07-14 18:16   ` Randy Dunlap
2019-07-15  9:02     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 58/62] x86/mktme: Document the MKTME provided security mitigations Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 59/62] x86/mktme: Document the MKTME kernel configuration requirements Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 60/62] x86/mktme: Document the MKTME Key Service API Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 61/62] x86/mktme: Document the MKTME API for anonymous memory encryption Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 62/62] x86/mktme: Demonstration program using the MKTME APIs Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-05-29  7:30 ` [PATCH, RFC 00/62] Intel MKTME enabling Mike Rapoport
2019-05-29 18:20   ` Alison Schofield
2019-06-14 12:15 ` Peter Zijlstra

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