From: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
To: pasic@linux.ibm.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com, pair@us.ibm.com,
dgilbert@redhat.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org
Cc: andi.kleen@intel.com, qemu-ppc@nongnu.org,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"Marcelo Tosatti" <mtosatti@redhat.com>,
"David Gibson" <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>,
"Greg Kurz" <groug@kaod.org>,
frankja@linux.ibm.com, thuth@redhat.com,
"Christian Borntraeger" <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>,
mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, richard.henderson@linaro.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, "Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>,
"Marcel Apfelbaum" <marcel.apfelbaum@gmail.com>,
"Eduardo Habkost" <ehabkost@redhat.com>,
david@redhat.com, "Cornelia Huck" <cohuck@redhat.com>,
mst@redhat.com, qemu-s390x@nongnu.org,
pragyansri.pathi@intel.com, jun.nakajima@intel.com
Subject: [PATCH v6 08/13] confidential guest support: Move SEV initialization into arch specific code
Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2021 15:45:03 +1100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210112044508.427338-9-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210112044508.427338-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
While we've abstracted some (potential) differences between mechanisms for
securing guest memory, the initialization is still specific to SEV. Given
that, move it into x86's kvm_arch_init() code, rather than the generic
kvm_init() code.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
---
accel/kvm/kvm-all.c | 14 --------------
accel/kvm/sev-stub.c | 4 ++--
target/i386/kvm/kvm.c | 12 ++++++++++++
target/i386/sev.c | 7 ++++++-
4 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c
index c5b0750fd0..adf27c1864 100644
--- a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c
+++ b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c
@@ -2177,20 +2177,6 @@ static int kvm_init(MachineState *ms)
kvm_state = s;
- /*
- * if memory encryption object is specified then initialize the memory
- * encryption context.
- */
- if (ms->cgs) {
- Error *local_err = NULL;
- /* FIXME handle mechanisms other than SEV */
- ret = sev_kvm_init(ms->cgs, &local_err);
- if (ret < 0) {
- error_report_err(local_err);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
ret = kvm_arch_init(ms, s);
if (ret < 0) {
goto err;
diff --git a/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c b/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c
index 512e205f7f..9587d1b2a3 100644
--- a/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c
+++ b/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c
@@ -17,6 +17,6 @@
int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp)
{
- /* SEV can't be selected if it's not compiled */
- g_assert_not_reached();
+ /* If we get here, cgs must be some non-SEV thing */
+ return 0;
}
diff --git a/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c b/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c
index 6dc1ee052d..e8b9dc48a2 100644
--- a/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c
+++ b/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
#include "hw/i386/intel_iommu.h"
#include "hw/i386/x86-iommu.h"
#include "hw/i386/e820_memory_layout.h"
+#include "sysemu/sev.h"
#include "hw/pci/pci.h"
#include "hw/pci/msi.h"
@@ -2135,6 +2136,17 @@ int kvm_arch_init(MachineState *ms, KVMState *s)
uint64_t shadow_mem;
int ret;
struct utsname utsname;
+ Error *local_err = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * if memory encryption object is specified then initialize the
+ * memory encryption context (no-op otherwise)
+ */
+ ret = sev_kvm_init(ms->cgs, &local_err);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ error_report_err(local_err);
+ return ret;
+ }
if (!kvm_check_extension(s, KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING)) {
error_report("kvm: KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING not supported by KVM");
diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c
index 3d94635397..aa79cacabe 100644
--- a/target/i386/sev.c
+++ b/target/i386/sev.c
@@ -664,13 +664,18 @@ sev_vm_state_change(void *opaque, int running, RunState state)
int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp)
{
- SevGuestState *sev = SEV_GUEST(cgs);
+ SevGuestState *sev
+ = (SevGuestState *)object_dynamic_cast(OBJECT(cgs), TYPE_SEV_GUEST);
char *devname;
int ret, fw_error;
uint32_t ebx;
uint32_t host_cbitpos;
struct sev_user_data_status status = {};
+ if (!sev) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
ret = ram_block_discard_disable(true);
if (ret) {
error_report("%s: cannot disable RAM discard", __func__);
--
2.29.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-01-12 4:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-01-12 4:44 [PATCH v6 00/13] Generalize memory encryption models David Gibson
2021-01-12 4:44 ` [PATCH v6 01/13] qom: Allow optional sugar props David Gibson
2021-01-12 4:44 ` [PATCH v6 02/13] confidential guest support: Introduce new confidential guest support class David Gibson
2021-01-12 9:46 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-01-13 2:09 ` David Gibson
2021-01-12 4:44 ` [PATCH v6 03/13] sev: Remove false abstraction of flash encryption David Gibson
2021-01-12 4:44 ` [PATCH v6 04/13] confidential guest support: Move side effect out of machine_set_memory_encryption() David Gibson
2021-01-12 4:45 ` [PATCH v6 05/13] confidential guest support: Rework the "memory-encryption" property David Gibson
[not found] ` <20210112115959.2c042dbb@bahia.lan>
2021-01-13 0:50 ` David Gibson
2021-01-13 12:03 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-01-12 4:45 ` [PATCH v6 06/13] sev: Add Error ** to sev_kvm_init() David Gibson
2021-01-12 4:45 ` [PATCH v6 07/13] confidential guest support: Introduce cgs "ready" flag David Gibson
2021-01-12 4:45 ` David Gibson [this message]
2021-01-12 4:45 ` [PATCH v6 09/13] confidential guest support: Update documentation David Gibson
2021-01-12 4:45 ` [PATCH v6 10/13] spapr: Add PEF based confidential guest support David Gibson
2021-01-12 7:56 ` Christian Borntraeger
2021-01-12 8:36 ` David Gibson
2021-01-12 9:52 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-01-12 9:56 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-01-13 0:52 ` David Gibson
[not found] ` <20210112122750.5dcd995c@bahia.lan>
2021-01-13 0:56 ` David Gibson
2021-01-12 4:45 ` [PATCH v6 11/13] spapr: PEF: prevent migration David Gibson
2021-01-12 4:45 ` [PATCH v6 12/13] confidential guest support: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests David Gibson
2021-01-12 4:45 ` [PATCH v6 13/13] s390: Recognize confidential-guest-support option David Gibson
2021-01-12 8:15 ` Christian Borntraeger
2021-01-12 11:36 ` Cornelia Huck
2021-01-12 11:48 ` Christian Borntraeger
2021-01-12 11:49 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-01-13 0:57 ` David Gibson
2021-01-13 6:57 ` Christian Borntraeger
2021-01-13 23:56 ` David Gibson
2021-01-12 9:54 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20210112044508.427338-9-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au \
--to=david@gibson.dropbear.id.au \
--cc=andi.kleen@intel.com \
--cc=berrange@redhat.com \
--cc=borntraeger@de.ibm.com \
--cc=brijesh.singh@amd.com \
--cc=cohuck@redhat.com \
--cc=david@redhat.com \
--cc=dgilbert@redhat.com \
--cc=ehabkost@redhat.com \
--cc=frankja@linux.ibm.com \
--cc=groug@kaod.org \
--cc=jun.nakajima@intel.com \
--cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=marcel.apfelbaum@gmail.com \
--cc=mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com \
--cc=mst@redhat.com \
--cc=mtosatti@redhat.com \
--cc=pair@us.ibm.com \
--cc=pasic@linux.ibm.com \
--cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
--cc=pragyansri.pathi@intel.com \
--cc=qemu-devel@nongnu.org \
--cc=qemu-ppc@nongnu.org \
--cc=qemu-s390x@nongnu.org \
--cc=richard.henderson@linaro.org \
--cc=thuth@redhat.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).