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From: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
To: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>,
	Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Cc: pasic@linux.ibm.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com, pair@us.ibm.com,
	dgilbert@redhat.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org, andi.kleen@intel.com,
	qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, "Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Marcelo Tosatti" <mtosatti@redhat.com>,
	"Greg Kurz" <groug@kaod.org>,
	frankja@linux.ibm.com, thuth@redhat.com,
	mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, richard.henderson@linaro.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, "Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>,
	"Marcel Apfelbaum" <marcel.apfelbaum@gmail.com>,
	"Eduardo Habkost" <ehabkost@redhat.com>,
	david@redhat.com, mst@redhat.com, qemu-s390x@nongnu.org,
	pragyansri.pathi@intel.com, jun.nakajima@intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 13/13] s390: Recognize confidential-guest-support option
Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2021 07:57:41 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <3e524040-826f-623d-6cd5-0946af51ca57@de.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210113005748.GD435587@yekko.fritz.box>



On 13.01.21 01:57, David Gibson wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 12, 2021 at 12:36:07PM +0100, Cornelia Huck wrote:
> 65;6201;1c> On Tue, 12 Jan 2021 09:15:26 +0100
>> Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> wrote:
>>
>>> On 12.01.21 05:45, David Gibson wrote:
>>>> At least some s390 cpu models support "Protected Virtualization" (PV),
>>>> a mechanism to protect guests from eavesdropping by a compromised
>>>> hypervisor.
>>>>
>>>> This is similar in function to other mechanisms like AMD's SEV and
>>>> POWER's PEF, which are controlled by the "confidential-guest-support"
>>>> machine option.  s390 is a slightly special case, because we already
>>>> supported PV, simply by using a CPU model with the required feature
>>>> (S390_FEAT_UNPACK).
>>>>
>>>> To integrate this with the option used by other platforms, we
>>>> implement the following compromise:
>>>>
>>>>  - When the confidential-guest-support option is set, s390 will
>>>>    recognize it, verify that the CPU can support PV (failing if not)
>>>>    and set virtio default options necessary for encrypted or protected
>>>>    guests, as on other platforms.  i.e. if confidential-guest-support
>>>>    is set, we will either create a guest capable of entering PV mode,
>>>>    or fail outright.
>>>>
>>>>  - If confidential-guest-support is not set, guests might still be
>>>>    able to enter PV mode, if the CPU has the right model.  This may be
>>>>    a little surprising, but shouldn't actually be harmful.
>>>>
>>>> To start a guest supporting Protected Virtualization using the new
>>>> option use the command line arguments:
>>>>     -object s390-pv-guest,id=pv0 -machine confidential-guest-support=pv0  
>>>
>>>
>>> This results in
>>>
>>> [cborntra@t35lp61 qemu]$ qemu-system-s390x -enable-kvm -nographic -m 2G -kernel ~/full.normal 
>>> **
>>> ERROR:../qom/object.c:317:type_initialize: assertion failed: (parent->instance_size <= ti->instance_size)
>>> Bail out! ERROR:../qom/object.c:317:type_initialize: assertion failed: (parent->instance_size <= ti->instance_size)
>>> Aborted (core dumped)
>>>
>>
>>>> +static const TypeInfo s390_pv_guest_info = {
>>>> +    .parent = TYPE_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT,
>>>> +    .name = TYPE_S390_PV_GUEST,
>>>> +    .instance_size = sizeof(S390PVGuestState),
>>>> +    .interfaces = (InterfaceInfo[]) {
>>>> +        { TYPE_USER_CREATABLE },
>>>> +        { }
>>>> +    }
>>>> +};
>>
>> I think this needs TYPE_OBJECT in .parent and
>> TYPE_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT as an interface to fix the crash.
> 
> No, that was true of an earlier revision, but parent is correct in the
> current version.

right now parent is obviously wrong as it triggers the above warning (and all other
variants in the previous patches also use TYPE_OBJECT). It is probably the right
thing when you fix

+struct S390PVGuestState {
+    Object parent_obj;
+};
+

and change Object to the proper type I guess. 

  reply	other threads:[~2021-01-13  6:59 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-01-12  4:44 [PATCH v6 00/13] Generalize memory encryption models David Gibson
2021-01-12  4:44 ` [PATCH v6 01/13] qom: Allow optional sugar props David Gibson
2021-01-12  4:44 ` [PATCH v6 02/13] confidential guest support: Introduce new confidential guest support class David Gibson
2021-01-12  9:46   ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-01-13  2:09     ` David Gibson
2021-01-12  4:44 ` [PATCH v6 03/13] sev: Remove false abstraction of flash encryption David Gibson
2021-01-12  4:44 ` [PATCH v6 04/13] confidential guest support: Move side effect out of machine_set_memory_encryption() David Gibson
2021-01-12  4:45 ` [PATCH v6 05/13] confidential guest support: Rework the "memory-encryption" property David Gibson
     [not found]   ` <20210112115959.2c042dbb@bahia.lan>
2021-01-13  0:50     ` David Gibson
2021-01-13 12:03       ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-01-12  4:45 ` [PATCH v6 06/13] sev: Add Error ** to sev_kvm_init() David Gibson
2021-01-12  4:45 ` [PATCH v6 07/13] confidential guest support: Introduce cgs "ready" flag David Gibson
2021-01-12  4:45 ` [PATCH v6 08/13] confidential guest support: Move SEV initialization into arch specific code David Gibson
2021-01-12  4:45 ` [PATCH v6 09/13] confidential guest support: Update documentation David Gibson
2021-01-12  4:45 ` [PATCH v6 10/13] spapr: Add PEF based confidential guest support David Gibson
2021-01-12  7:56   ` Christian Borntraeger
2021-01-12  8:36     ` David Gibson
2021-01-12  9:52   ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-01-12  9:56   ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-01-13  0:52     ` David Gibson
     [not found]   ` <20210112122750.5dcd995c@bahia.lan>
2021-01-13  0:56     ` David Gibson
2021-01-12  4:45 ` [PATCH v6 11/13] spapr: PEF: prevent migration David Gibson
2021-01-12  4:45 ` [PATCH v6 12/13] confidential guest support: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests David Gibson
2021-01-12  4:45 ` [PATCH v6 13/13] s390: Recognize confidential-guest-support option David Gibson
2021-01-12  8:15   ` Christian Borntraeger
2021-01-12 11:36     ` Cornelia Huck
2021-01-12 11:48       ` Christian Borntraeger
2021-01-12 11:49       ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-01-13  0:57       ` David Gibson
2021-01-13  6:57         ` Christian Borntraeger [this message]
2021-01-13 23:56           ` David Gibson
2021-01-12  9:54   ` Daniel P. Berrangé

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