From: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
To: qemu-devel@nongnu.org
Cc: "Connor Kuehl" <ckuehl@redhat.com>,
"Philippe Mathieu-Daudé" <philmd@redhat.com>,
"Michael S . Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
"James Bottomley" <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
"Dr . David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
"Tom Lendacky" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"Dov Murik" <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>,
"David Gibson" <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>,
"Daniel P . Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, "Eduardo Habkost" <ehabkost@redhat.com>,
"Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
"Markus Armbruster" <armbru@redhat.com>,
"Eric Blake" <eblake@redhat.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v2 06/12] i386/sev: add support to encrypt BIOS when SEV-SNP is enabled
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 2021 17:26:21 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210826222627.3556-7-michael.roth@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210826222627.3556-1-michael.roth@amd.com>
From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
The KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE command is used for encrypting the bios
image used for booting the SEV-SNP guest.
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
---
hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c | 7 ++++---
include/sysemu/sev.h | 2 +-
target/i386/sev-stub.c | 2 +-
target/i386/sev.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
target/i386/trace-events | 1 +
5 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c b/hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c
index 68d6b1f783..54ccf13c0e 100644
--- a/hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c
+++ b/hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c
@@ -149,6 +149,7 @@ static void pc_system_flash_map(PCMachineState *pcms,
void *flash_ptr;
int flash_size;
int ret;
+ hwaddr gpa;
assert(PC_MACHINE_GET_CLASS(pcms)->pci_enabled);
@@ -182,11 +183,11 @@ static void pc_system_flash_map(PCMachineState *pcms,
}
total_size += size;
+ gpa = 0x100000000ULL - total_size; /* where the flash is mapped */
qdev_prop_set_uint32(DEVICE(system_flash), "num-blocks",
size / FLASH_SECTOR_SIZE);
sysbus_realize_and_unref(SYS_BUS_DEVICE(system_flash), &error_fatal);
- sysbus_mmio_map(SYS_BUS_DEVICE(system_flash), 0,
- 0x100000000ULL - total_size);
+ sysbus_mmio_map(SYS_BUS_DEVICE(system_flash), 0, gpa);
if (i == 0) {
flash_mem = pflash_cfi01_get_memory(system_flash);
@@ -208,7 +209,7 @@ static void pc_system_flash_map(PCMachineState *pcms,
exit(1);
}
- sev_encrypt_flash(flash_ptr, flash_size, &error_fatal);
+ sev_encrypt_flash(gpa, flash_ptr, flash_size, &error_fatal);
}
}
}
diff --git a/include/sysemu/sev.h b/include/sysemu/sev.h
index 94d821d737..78e3bf97e8 100644
--- a/include/sysemu/sev.h
+++ b/include/sysemu/sev.h
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
bool sev_enabled(void);
int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp);
-int sev_encrypt_flash(uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len, Error **errp);
+int sev_encrypt_flash(hwaddr gpa, uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len, Error **errp);
int sev_inject_launch_secret(const char *hdr, const char *secret,
uint64_t gpa, Error **errp);
diff --git a/target/i386/sev-stub.c b/target/i386/sev-stub.c
index e4fb8e882e..8b35704937 100644
--- a/target/i386/sev-stub.c
+++ b/target/i386/sev-stub.c
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ int sev_inject_launch_secret(const char *hdr, const char *secret,
return 1;
}
-int sev_encrypt_flash(uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len, Error **errp)
+int sev_encrypt_flash(hwaddr gpa, uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len, Error **errp)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c
index 51689d4fa4..867c0cb457 100644
--- a/target/i386/sev.c
+++ b/target/i386/sev.c
@@ -946,6 +946,35 @@ out:
return ret;
}
+static int
+sev_snp_launch_update(SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest, hwaddr gpa, uint8_t *addr,
+ uint64_t len, int type)
+{
+ int ret, fw_error;
+ struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_update update = {0};
+
+ if (!addr || !len) {
+ error_report("%s: SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE called with invalid address / length: %lx / %lx",
+ __func__, gpa, len);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ update.uaddr = (__u64)(unsigned long)addr;
+ update.start_gfn = gpa >> TARGET_PAGE_BITS;
+ update.len = len;
+ update.page_type = type;
+ trace_kvm_sev_snp_launch_update(addr, len, type);
+ ret = sev_ioctl(SEV_COMMON(sev_snp_guest)->sev_fd,
+ KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE,
+ &update, &fw_error);
+ if (ret) {
+ error_report("%s: SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'",
+ __func__, ret, fw_error, fw_error_to_str(fw_error));
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
static int
sev_launch_update_data(SevGuestState *sev_guest, uint8_t *addr, uint64_t len)
{
@@ -1219,7 +1248,7 @@ err:
}
int
-sev_encrypt_flash(uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len, Error **errp)
+sev_encrypt_flash(hwaddr gpa, uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len, Error **errp)
{
SevCommonState *sev_common = SEV_COMMON(MACHINE(qdev_get_machine())->cgs);
@@ -1229,7 +1258,14 @@ sev_encrypt_flash(uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len, Error **errp)
/* if SEV is in update state then encrypt the data else do nothing */
if (sev_check_state(sev_common, SEV_STATE_LAUNCH_UPDATE)) {
- int ret = sev_launch_update_data(SEV_GUEST(sev_common), ptr, len);
+ int ret;
+
+ if (sev_snp_enabled()) {
+ ret = sev_snp_launch_update(SEV_SNP_GUEST(sev_common), gpa, ptr,
+ len, KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_NORMAL);
+ } else {
+ ret = sev_launch_update_data(SEV_GUEST(sev_common), ptr, len);
+ }
if (ret < 0) {
error_setg(errp, "failed to encrypt pflash rom");
return ret;
diff --git a/target/i386/trace-events b/target/i386/trace-events
index 18cc14b956..0c2d250206 100644
--- a/target/i386/trace-events
+++ b/target/i386/trace-events
@@ -12,3 +12,4 @@ kvm_sev_launch_finish(void) ""
kvm_sev_launch_secret(uint64_t hpa, uint64_t hva, uint64_t secret, int len) "hpa 0x%" PRIx64 " hva 0x%" PRIx64 " data 0x%" PRIx64 " len %d"
kvm_sev_attestation_report(const char *mnonce, const char *data) "mnonce %s data %s"
kvm_sev_snp_launch_start(uint64_t policy) "policy 0x%" PRIx64
+kvm_sev_snp_launch_update(void *addr, uint64_t len, int type) "addr %p len 0x%" PRIx64 " type %d"
--
2.25.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-08-26 22:27 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-08-26 22:26 [RFC PATCH v2 00/12] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Michael Roth
2021-08-26 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 01/12] i386/sev: introduce "sev-common" type to encapsulate common SEV state Michael Roth
[not found] ` <87pmtsqt02.fsf@dusky.pond.sub.org>
2021-09-03 15:11 ` Michael Roth
2021-08-26 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 02/12] linux-header: add the SNP specific command Michael Roth
2021-09-03 20:36 ` Dov Murik
2021-09-07 14:27 ` Michael Roth
2021-08-26 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 03/12] i386/sev: introduce 'sev-snp-guest' object Michael Roth
[not found] ` <87bl5cqsi8.fsf@dusky.pond.sub.org>
2021-09-03 15:15 ` Michael Roth
2021-09-03 21:12 ` Dov Murik
2021-09-07 14:20 ` Michael Roth
2021-08-26 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 04/12] i386/sev: initialize SNP context Michael Roth
2021-09-05 7:07 ` Dov Murik
2021-09-05 13:58 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-09-05 17:09 ` Dov Murik
2021-09-05 9:19 ` Dov Murik
2021-09-05 14:05 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-09-05 17:03 ` Dov Murik
2021-08-26 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 05/12] i386/sev: add the SNP launch start context Michael Roth
2021-08-26 22:26 ` Michael Roth [this message]
2021-08-26 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 07/12] i386/sev: populate secrets and cpuid page and finalize the SNP launch Michael Roth
2021-09-03 20:24 ` Dov Murik
2021-09-07 16:18 ` Michael Roth
2021-08-26 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 08/12] target/i386: set SEV-SNP CPUID bit when SNP enabled Michael Roth
2021-08-26 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 09/12] target/i386: allow versioned CPUs to specify new cache_info Michael Roth
2021-08-26 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 10/12] target/i386: add new EPYC CPU versions with updated cache_info Michael Roth
2021-08-26 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 11/12] i386/sev: sev-snp: add support for CPUID validation Michael Roth
2021-09-05 10:02 ` Dov Murik
2021-09-07 16:50 ` Michael Roth
2021-09-07 17:44 ` Dov Murik
2021-08-26 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 12/12] i386/sev: update query-sev QAPI format to handle SEV-SNP Michael Roth
2021-09-03 15:27 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
[not found] ` <87tuj4qt71.fsf@dusky.pond.sub.org>
2021-09-03 15:13 ` Michael Roth
2021-09-03 15:30 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-09-03 15:43 ` Michael Roth
2021-09-03 15:58 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-09-03 16:01 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-09-07 11:52 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-09-07 14:33 ` Michael Roth
2021-11-16 9:23 ` [RFC PATCH v2 00/12] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-11-16 11:54 ` Brijesh Singh
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