From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: "Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>,
"Michael Roth" <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: brijesh.singh@amd.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org,
"Philippe Mathieu-Daudé" <philmd@redhat.com>,
"Michael S . Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
"James Bottomley" <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
"Dr . David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
"Tom Lendacky" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"Dov Murik" <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>,
"David Gibson" <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, "Eduardo Habkost" <ehabkost@redhat.com>,
"Markus Armbruster" <armbru@redhat.com>,
"Eric Blake" <eblake@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 00/12] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 2021 05:54:25 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <64efe8e8-9731-b906-ac3f-08846c7b0342@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <YZN4kBG4A/Sr1kIq@redhat.com>
On 11/16/21 3:23 AM, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote:
> On Thu, Aug 26, 2021 at 05:26:15PM -0500, Michael Roth wrote:
>> These patches implement SEV-SNP along with CPUID enforcement support for QEMU,
>> and are also available at:
>>
>> https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fmdroth%2Fqemu%2Fcommits%2Fsnp-rfc-v2-upstream&data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7C3506c40b7121401945b108d9a8e2c8d0%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637726514264887241%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&sdata=HXdG4TmNY157Gz6qLXhAL8FufCTxe9VzSiTaQICGawo%3D&reserved=0
>>
>> They are based on the initial RFC submitted by Brijesh:
>>
>> https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flore.kernel.org%2Fqemu-devel%2F20210722000259.ykepl7t6ptua7im5%40amd.com%2FT%2F&data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7C3506c40b7121401945b108d9a8e2c8d0%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637726514264887241%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&sdata=AhOI%2FoQFq4k%2B6uOqYQqos6FlxE4AD1FFYfIPPiSHioI%3D&reserved=0
> What's the status of these patches ? Is there going to be any non-RFC
> version posted in the near future ?
I am waiting for the KVM interface to be finalized before spinning the
qemu patch. With the recent discussion on KVM patch we may see some
change in the interfaces. I am hoping to post updated series after
posting the newer KVM series.
thanls
>
> Regards,
> Daniel
prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-11-16 11:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-08-26 22:26 [RFC PATCH v2 00/12] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Michael Roth
2021-08-26 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 01/12] i386/sev: introduce "sev-common" type to encapsulate common SEV state Michael Roth
[not found] ` <87pmtsqt02.fsf@dusky.pond.sub.org>
2021-09-03 15:11 ` Michael Roth
2021-08-26 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 02/12] linux-header: add the SNP specific command Michael Roth
2021-09-03 20:36 ` Dov Murik
2021-09-07 14:27 ` Michael Roth
2021-08-26 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 03/12] i386/sev: introduce 'sev-snp-guest' object Michael Roth
[not found] ` <87bl5cqsi8.fsf@dusky.pond.sub.org>
2021-09-03 15:15 ` Michael Roth
2021-09-03 21:12 ` Dov Murik
2021-09-07 14:20 ` Michael Roth
2021-08-26 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 04/12] i386/sev: initialize SNP context Michael Roth
2021-09-05 7:07 ` Dov Murik
2021-09-05 13:58 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-09-05 17:09 ` Dov Murik
2021-09-05 9:19 ` Dov Murik
2021-09-05 14:05 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-09-05 17:03 ` Dov Murik
2021-08-26 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 05/12] i386/sev: add the SNP launch start context Michael Roth
2021-08-26 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 06/12] i386/sev: add support to encrypt BIOS when SEV-SNP is enabled Michael Roth
2021-08-26 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 07/12] i386/sev: populate secrets and cpuid page and finalize the SNP launch Michael Roth
2021-09-03 20:24 ` Dov Murik
2021-09-07 16:18 ` Michael Roth
2021-08-26 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 08/12] target/i386: set SEV-SNP CPUID bit when SNP enabled Michael Roth
2021-08-26 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 09/12] target/i386: allow versioned CPUs to specify new cache_info Michael Roth
2021-08-26 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 10/12] target/i386: add new EPYC CPU versions with updated cache_info Michael Roth
2021-08-26 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 11/12] i386/sev: sev-snp: add support for CPUID validation Michael Roth
2021-09-05 10:02 ` Dov Murik
2021-09-07 16:50 ` Michael Roth
2021-09-07 17:44 ` Dov Murik
2021-08-26 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 12/12] i386/sev: update query-sev QAPI format to handle SEV-SNP Michael Roth
2021-09-03 15:27 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
[not found] ` <87tuj4qt71.fsf@dusky.pond.sub.org>
2021-09-03 15:13 ` Michael Roth
2021-09-03 15:30 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-09-03 15:43 ` Michael Roth
2021-09-03 15:58 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-09-03 16:01 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-09-07 11:52 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-09-07 14:33 ` Michael Roth
2021-11-16 9:23 ` [RFC PATCH v2 00/12] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-11-16 11:54 ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
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