From: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
To: <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <linux-coco@lists.linux.dev>, <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
<linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>, <x86@kernel.org>,
<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <tglx@linutronix.de>,
<mingo@redhat.com>, <jroedel@suse.de>, <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
<hpa@zytor.com>, <ardb@kernel.org>, <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
<seanjc@google.com>, <vkuznets@redhat.com>, <jmattson@google.com>,
<luto@kernel.org>, <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
<slp@redhat.com>, <pgonda@google.com>, <peterz@infradead.org>,
<srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com>, <rientjes@google.com>,
<dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>, <tobin@ibm.com>, <bp@alien8.de>,
<vbabka@suse.cz>, <kirill@shutemov.name>, <ak@linux.intel.com>,
<tony.luck@intel.com>, <marcorr@google.com>,
<sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>,
<alpergun@google.com>, <dgilbert@redhat.com>, <jarkko@kernel.org>,
<ashish.kalra@amd.com>, <nikunj.dadhania@amd.com>,
<liam.merwick@oracle.com>, <zhi.a.wang@intel.com>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH RFC v9 16/51] crypto: ccp: Define the SEV-SNP commands
Date: Sun, 11 Jun 2023 23:25:24 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230612042559.375660-17-michael.roth@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230612042559.375660-1-michael.roth@amd.com>
From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
AMD introduced the next generation of SEV called SEV-SNP (Secure Nested
Paging). SEV-SNP builds upon existing SEV and SEV-ES functionality
while adding new hardware security protection.
Define the commands and structures used to communicate with the AMD-SP
when creating and managing the SEV-SNP guests. The SEV-SNP firmware spec
is available at developer.amd.com/sev.
Co-developed-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
[mdr: update SNP command list and SNP status struct based on current
spec]
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
---
drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c | 16 +++
include/linux/psp-sev.h | 246 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/uapi/linux/psp-sev.h | 53 ++++++++
3 files changed, 315 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
index e2f25926eb51..ab3572286755 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
@@ -128,6 +128,8 @@ static int sev_cmd_buffer_len(int cmd)
switch (cmd) {
case SEV_CMD_INIT: return sizeof(struct sev_data_init);
case SEV_CMD_INIT_EX: return sizeof(struct sev_data_init_ex);
+ case SEV_CMD_SNP_SHUTDOWN_EX: return sizeof(struct sev_data_snp_shutdown_ex);
+ case SEV_CMD_SNP_INIT_EX: return sizeof(struct sev_data_snp_init_ex);
case SEV_CMD_PLATFORM_STATUS: return sizeof(struct sev_user_data_status);
case SEV_CMD_PEK_CSR: return sizeof(struct sev_data_pek_csr);
case SEV_CMD_PEK_CERT_IMPORT: return sizeof(struct sev_data_pek_cert_import);
@@ -156,6 +158,20 @@ static int sev_cmd_buffer_len(int cmd)
case SEV_CMD_GET_ID: return sizeof(struct sev_data_get_id);
case SEV_CMD_ATTESTATION_REPORT: return sizeof(struct sev_data_attestation_report);
case SEV_CMD_SEND_CANCEL: return sizeof(struct sev_data_send_cancel);
+ case SEV_CMD_SNP_GCTX_CREATE: return sizeof(struct sev_data_snp_addr);
+ case SEV_CMD_SNP_LAUNCH_START: return sizeof(struct sev_data_snp_launch_start);
+ case SEV_CMD_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE: return sizeof(struct sev_data_snp_launch_update);
+ case SEV_CMD_SNP_ACTIVATE: return sizeof(struct sev_data_snp_activate);
+ case SEV_CMD_SNP_DECOMMISSION: return sizeof(struct sev_data_snp_addr);
+ case SEV_CMD_SNP_PAGE_RECLAIM: return sizeof(struct sev_data_snp_page_reclaim);
+ case SEV_CMD_SNP_GUEST_STATUS: return sizeof(struct sev_data_snp_guest_status);
+ case SEV_CMD_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH: return sizeof(struct sev_data_snp_launch_finish);
+ case SEV_CMD_SNP_DBG_DECRYPT: return sizeof(struct sev_data_snp_dbg);
+ case SEV_CMD_SNP_DBG_ENCRYPT: return sizeof(struct sev_data_snp_dbg);
+ case SEV_CMD_SNP_PAGE_UNSMASH: return sizeof(struct sev_data_snp_page_unsmash);
+ case SEV_CMD_SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS: return sizeof(struct sev_data_snp_addr);
+ case SEV_CMD_SNP_GUEST_REQUEST: return sizeof(struct sev_data_snp_guest_request);
+ case SEV_CMD_SNP_CONFIG: return sizeof(struct sev_user_data_snp_config);
default: return 0;
}
diff --git a/include/linux/psp-sev.h b/include/linux/psp-sev.h
index 1595088c428b..06d0619ca442 100644
--- a/include/linux/psp-sev.h
+++ b/include/linux/psp-sev.h
@@ -86,6 +86,36 @@ enum sev_cmd {
SEV_CMD_DBG_DECRYPT = 0x060,
SEV_CMD_DBG_ENCRYPT = 0x061,
+ /* SNP specific commands */
+ SEV_CMD_SNP_INIT = 0x81,
+ SEV_CMD_SNP_SHUTDOWN = 0x82,
+ SEV_CMD_SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS = 0x83,
+ SEV_CMD_SNP_DF_FLUSH = 0x84,
+ SEV_CMD_SNP_INIT_EX = 0x85,
+ SEV_CMD_SNP_SHUTDOWN_EX = 0x86,
+ SEV_CMD_SNP_DECOMMISSION = 0x90,
+ SEV_CMD_SNP_ACTIVATE = 0x91,
+ SEV_CMD_SNP_GUEST_STATUS = 0x92,
+ SEV_CMD_SNP_GCTX_CREATE = 0x93,
+ SEV_CMD_SNP_GUEST_REQUEST = 0x94,
+ SEV_CMD_SNP_ACTIVATE_EX = 0x95,
+ SEV_CMD_SNP_LAUNCH_START = 0xA0,
+ SEV_CMD_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE = 0xA1,
+ SEV_CMD_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH = 0xA2,
+ SEV_CMD_SNP_DBG_DECRYPT = 0xB0,
+ SEV_CMD_SNP_DBG_ENCRYPT = 0xB1,
+ SEV_CMD_SNP_PAGE_SWAP_OUT = 0xC0,
+ SEV_CMD_SNP_PAGE_SWAP_IN = 0xC1,
+ SEV_CMD_SNP_PAGE_MOVE = 0xC2,
+ SEV_CMD_SNP_PAGE_MD_INIT = 0xC3,
+ SEV_CMD_SNP_PAGE_SET_STATE = 0xC6,
+ SEV_CMD_SNP_PAGE_RECLAIM = 0xC7,
+ SEV_CMD_SNP_PAGE_UNSMASH = 0xC8,
+ SEV_CMD_SNP_CONFIG = 0xC9,
+ SEV_CMD_SNP_DOWNLOAD_FIRMWARE_EX = 0xCA,
+ SEV_CMD_SNP_COMMIT = 0xCB,
+ SEV_CMD_SNP_VLEK_LOAD = 0xCD,
+
SEV_CMD_MAX,
};
@@ -531,6 +561,222 @@ struct sev_data_attestation_report {
u32 len; /* In/Out */
} __packed;
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_snp_download_firmware - SNP_DOWNLOAD_FIRMWARE command params
+ *
+ * @address: physical address of firmware image
+ * @len: len of the firmware image
+ */
+struct sev_data_snp_download_firmware {
+ u64 address; /* In */
+ u32 len; /* In */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_snp_activate - SNP_ACTIVATE command params
+ *
+ * @gctx_paddr: system physical address guest context page
+ * @asid: ASID to bind to the guest
+ */
+struct sev_data_snp_activate {
+ u64 gctx_paddr; /* In */
+ u32 asid; /* In */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_snp_addr - generic SNP command params
+ *
+ * @address: system physical address guest context page
+ */
+struct sev_data_snp_addr {
+ u64 gctx_paddr; /* In */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_snp_launch_start - SNP_LAUNCH_START command params
+ *
+ * @gctx_addr: system physical address of guest context page
+ * @policy: guest policy
+ * @ma_gctx_addr: system physical address of migration agent
+ * @imi_en: launch flow is launching an IMI for the purpose of
+ * guest-assisted migration.
+ * @ma_en: the guest is associated with a migration agent
+ */
+struct sev_data_snp_launch_start {
+ u64 gctx_paddr; /* In */
+ u64 policy; /* In */
+ u64 ma_gctx_paddr; /* In */
+ u32 ma_en:1; /* In */
+ u32 imi_en:1; /* In */
+ u32 rsvd:30;
+ u8 gosvw[16]; /* In */
+} __packed;
+
+/* SNP support page type */
+enum {
+ SNP_PAGE_TYPE_NORMAL = 0x1,
+ SNP_PAGE_TYPE_VMSA = 0x2,
+ SNP_PAGE_TYPE_ZERO = 0x3,
+ SNP_PAGE_TYPE_UNMEASURED = 0x4,
+ SNP_PAGE_TYPE_SECRET = 0x5,
+ SNP_PAGE_TYPE_CPUID = 0x6,
+
+ SNP_PAGE_TYPE_MAX
+};
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_snp_launch_update - SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE command params
+ *
+ * @gctx_addr: system physical address of guest context page
+ * @imi_page: indicates that this page is part of the IMI of the guest
+ * @page_type: encoded page type
+ * @page_size: page size 0 indicates 4K and 1 indicates 2MB page
+ * @address: system physical address of destination page to encrypt
+ * @vmpl1_perms: VMPL permission mask for VMPL1
+ * @vmpl2_perms: VMPL permission mask for VMPL2
+ * @vmpl3_perms: VMPL permission mask for VMPL3
+ */
+struct sev_data_snp_launch_update {
+ u64 gctx_paddr; /* In */
+ u32 page_size:1; /* In */
+ u32 page_type:3; /* In */
+ u32 imi_page:1; /* In */
+ u32 rsvd:27;
+ u32 rsvd2;
+ u64 address; /* In */
+ u32 rsvd3:8;
+ u32 vmpl1_perms:8; /* In */
+ u32 vmpl2_perms:8; /* In */
+ u32 vmpl3_perms:8; /* In */
+ u32 rsvd4;
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_snp_launch_finish - SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command params
+ *
+ * @gctx_addr: system physical address of guest context page
+ */
+struct sev_data_snp_launch_finish {
+ u64 gctx_paddr;
+ u64 id_block_paddr;
+ u64 id_auth_paddr;
+ u8 id_block_en:1;
+ u8 auth_key_en:1;
+ u64 rsvd:62;
+ u8 host_data[32];
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_snp_guest_status - SNP_GUEST_STATUS command params
+ *
+ * @gctx_paddr: system physical address of guest context page
+ * @address: system physical address of guest status page
+ */
+struct sev_data_snp_guest_status {
+ u64 gctx_paddr;
+ u64 address;
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_snp_page_reclaim - SNP_PAGE_RECLAIM command params
+ *
+ * @paddr: system physical address of page to be claimed. The 0th bit
+ * in the address indicates the page size. 0h indicates 4 kB and
+ * 1h indicates 2 MB page.
+ */
+struct sev_data_snp_page_reclaim {
+ u64 paddr;
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_snp_page_unsmash - SNP_PAGE_UNSMASH command params
+ *
+ * @paddr: system physical address of page to be unsmashed. The 0th bit
+ * in the address indicates the page size. 0h indicates 4 kB and
+ * 1h indicates 2 MB page.
+ */
+struct sev_data_snp_page_unsmash {
+ u64 paddr;
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_dbg - DBG_ENCRYPT/DBG_DECRYPT command parameters
+ *
+ * @handle: handle of the VM to perform debug operation
+ * @src_addr: source address of data to operate on
+ * @dst_addr: destination address of data to operate on
+ */
+struct sev_data_snp_dbg {
+ u64 gctx_paddr; /* In */
+ u64 src_addr; /* In */
+ u64 dst_addr; /* In */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_snp_guest_request - SNP_GUEST_REQUEST command params
+ *
+ * @gctx_paddr: system physical address of guest context page
+ * @req_paddr: system physical address of request page
+ * @res_paddr: system physical address of response page
+ */
+struct sev_data_snp_guest_request {
+ u64 gctx_paddr; /* In */
+ u64 req_paddr; /* In */
+ u64 res_paddr; /* In */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_snp_init - SNP_INIT_EX structure
+ *
+ * @init_rmp: indicate that the RMP should be initialized.
+ * @list_paddr_en: indicate that list_paddr is valid
+ * @list_paddr: system physical address of range list
+ */
+struct sev_data_snp_init_ex {
+ u32 init_rmp:1;
+ u32 list_paddr_en:1;
+ u32 rsvd:30;
+ u32 rsvd1;
+ u64 list_paddr;
+ u8 rsvd2[48];
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_range - RANGE structure
+ *
+ * @base: system physical address of first byte of range
+ * @page_count: number of 4KB pages in this range
+ */
+struct sev_data_range {
+ u64 base;
+ u32 page_count;
+ u32 rsvd;
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_range_list - RANGE_LIST structure
+ *
+ * @num_elements: number of elements in RANGE_ARRAY
+ * @ranges: array of num_elements of type RANGE
+ */
+struct sev_data_range_list {
+ u32 num_elements;
+ u32 rsvd;
+ struct sev_data_range ranges[0];
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_snp_shutdown_ex - SNP_SHUTDOWN_EX structure
+ *
+ * @length: len of the command buffer read by the PSP
+ * @iommu_snp_shutdown: Disable enforcement of SNP in the IOMMU
+ */
+struct sev_data_snp_shutdown_ex {
+ u32 length;
+ u32 iommu_snp_shutdown:1;
+ u32 rsvd1:31;
+} __packed;
+
#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP
/**
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/psp-sev.h b/include/uapi/linux/psp-sev.h
index 91b4c63d5cbf..7d8a2dd20273 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/psp-sev.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/psp-sev.h
@@ -61,6 +61,13 @@ typedef enum {
SEV_RET_INVALID_PARAM,
SEV_RET_RESOURCE_LIMIT,
SEV_RET_SECURE_DATA_INVALID,
+ SEV_RET_INVALID_PAGE_SIZE,
+ SEV_RET_INVALID_PAGE_STATE,
+ SEV_RET_INVALID_MDATA_ENTRY,
+ SEV_RET_INVALID_PAGE_OWNER,
+ SEV_RET_INVALID_PAGE_AEAD_OFLOW,
+ SEV_RET_RMP_INIT_REQUIRED,
+
SEV_RET_MAX,
} sev_ret_code;
@@ -147,6 +154,52 @@ struct sev_user_data_get_id2 {
__u32 length; /* In/Out */
} __packed;
+/**
+ * struct sev_user_data_snp_status - SNP status
+ *
+ * @major: API major version
+ * @minor: API minor version
+ * @state: current platform state
+ * @is_rmp_initialized: whether RMP is initialized or not
+ * @build: firmware build id for the API version
+ * @mask_chip_id: whether chip id is present in attestation reports or not
+ * @mask_chip_key: whether attestation reports are signed or not
+ * @vlek_en: VLEK hashstick is loaded
+ * @guest_count: the number of guest currently managed by the firmware
+ * @current_tcb_version: current TCB version
+ * @reported_tcb_version: reported TCB version
+ */
+struct sev_user_data_snp_status {
+ __u8 api_major; /* Out */
+ __u8 api_minor; /* Out */
+ __u8 state; /* Out */
+ __u8 is_rmp_initialized:1; /* Out */
+ __u8 rsvd:7;
+ __u32 build_id; /* Out */
+ __u32 mask_chip_id:1; /* Out */
+ __u32 mask_chip_key:1; /* Out */
+ __u32 vlek_en:1; /* Out */
+ __u32 rsvd1:29;
+ __u32 guest_count; /* Out */
+ __u64 current_tcb_version; /* Out */
+ __u64 reported_tcb_version; /* Out */
+} __packed;
+
+/*
+ * struct sev_user_data_snp_config - system wide configuration value for SNP.
+ *
+ * @reported_tcb: The TCB version to report in the guest attestation report.
+ * @mask_chip_id: Indicates that the CHID_ID field in the attestation report
+ * will always be zero.
+ */
+struct sev_user_data_snp_config {
+ __u64 reported_tcb ; /* In */
+ __u32 mask_chip_id:1; /* In */
+ __u32 mask_chip_key:1; /* In */
+ __u32 rsvd:30; /* In */
+ __u8 rsvd1[52];
+} __packed;
+
/**
* struct sev_issue_cmd - SEV ioctl parameters
*
--
2.25.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-06-12 4:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 102+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-06-12 4:25 [PATCH RFC v9 00/51] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 01/51] KVM: x86: Add gmem hook for initializing private memory Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 02/51] KVM: x86: Add gmem hook for invalidating " Michael Roth
2023-06-12 10:49 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-06-19 13:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 03/51] KVM: x86: Use full 64-bit error code for kvm_mmu_do_page_fault Michael Roth
2023-06-14 14:24 ` Isaku Yamahata
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 04/51] KVM: x86: Determine shared/private faults using a configurable mask Michael Roth
2023-06-14 16:47 ` Isaku Yamahata
2023-06-20 20:28 ` Michael Roth
2023-06-20 21:18 ` Isaku Yamahata
2023-06-21 23:00 ` Michael Roth
2023-06-22 8:01 ` Isaku Yamahata
2023-06-22 9:55 ` Huang, Kai
2023-06-22 15:32 ` Michael Roth
2023-06-22 22:31 ` Huang, Kai
2023-06-22 23:39 ` Isaku Yamahata
2023-06-22 23:52 ` Huang, Kai
2023-06-23 14:43 ` Isaku Yamahata
2023-06-19 16:27 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-06-20 20:36 ` Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 05/51] x86/coco: move CONFIG_HAS_CC_PLATFORM check down into coco/Makefile Michael Roth
2023-06-12 7:07 ` Kirill A . Shutemov
2023-06-20 12:09 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-06-20 20:43 ` Michael Roth
2023-06-21 8:54 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-06-29 21:02 ` Michael Roth
2023-07-10 3:05 ` Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy
2023-07-10 13:11 ` Tom Lendacky
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 06/51] x86/cpufeatures: Add SEV-SNP CPU feature Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 07/51] x86/sev: Add the host SEV-SNP initialization support Michael Roth
2023-06-12 15:34 ` Dave Hansen
2023-06-21 9:15 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-06-21 14:31 ` Dave Hansen
2023-06-21 15:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-06-21 9:42 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-06-21 14:36 ` Tom Lendacky
2023-06-21 19:15 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-08-09 13:03 ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 08/51] x86/speculation: Do not enable Automatic IBRS if SEV SNP is enabled Michael Roth
2023-06-12 15:39 ` Dave Hansen
2023-07-18 22:34 ` Kim Phillips
2023-07-18 23:17 ` Dave Hansen
2023-07-20 19:11 ` Kim Phillips
2023-07-20 22:24 ` Dave Hansen
2023-07-21 16:56 ` Kim Phillips
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 09/51] x86/sev: Add RMP entry lookup helpers Michael Roth
2023-06-12 16:08 ` Dave Hansen
2023-06-30 21:57 ` Michael Roth
2023-06-30 22:29 ` Dave Hansen
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 10/51] x86/fault: Add helper for dumping RMP entries Michael Roth
2023-06-12 16:12 ` Dave Hansen
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 11/51] x86/traps: Define RMP violation #PF error code Michael Roth
2023-06-12 16:26 ` Dave Hansen
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 12/51] x86/fault: Report RMP page faults for kernel addresses Michael Roth
2023-06-12 16:30 ` Dave Hansen
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 13/51] x86/fault: Handle RMP page faults for user addresses Michael Roth
2023-06-12 16:40 ` Dave Hansen
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 14/51] x86/sev: Add helper functions for RMPUPDATE and PSMASH instruction Michael Roth
2023-06-12 17:00 ` Dave Hansen
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 15/51] x86/sev: Invalidate pages from the direct map when adding them to the RMP table Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` Michael Roth [this message]
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 17/51] crypto: ccp: Add support to initialize the AMD-SP for SEV-SNP Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 18/51] crypto: ccp: Provide API to issue SEV and SNP commands Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 19/51] x86/sev: Introduce snp leaked pages list Michael Roth
2023-08-09 12:46 ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 20/51] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy TMR allocation when SNP is enabled Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 21/51] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy SEV command " Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 22/51] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS command Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 23/51] KVM: SEV: Select CONFIG_KVM_PROTECTED_VM when CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 24/51] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle AP reset MSR protocol Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 25/51] KVM: SVM: Add GHCB handling for Hypervisor Feature Support requests Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 26/51] KVM: SVM: Make AVIC backing, VMSA and VMCB memory allocation SNP safe Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 27/51] KVM: SVM: Add initial SEV-SNP support Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 28/51] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SNP_INIT command Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 29/51] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START command Michael Roth
2023-06-12 17:08 ` Peter Gonda
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 30/51] KVM: Add HVA range operator Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 31/51] KVM: Split out memory attribute xarray updates to helper function Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 32/51] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE command Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 33/51] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 34/51] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle GHCB GPA register VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 35/51] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_EXIT_VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 36/51] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle MSR based Page State Change VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 37/51] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle " Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 38/51] KVM: x86: Export the kvm_zap_gfn_range() for the SNP use Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 39/51] KVM: x86: Define RMP page fault error bits for #NPF Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 40/51] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle RMP nested page faults Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 41/51] KVM: SVM: Use a VMSA physical address variable for populating VMCB Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 42/51] KVM: SVM: Support SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event Michael Roth
2023-08-15 16:00 ` Peter Gonda
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 43/51] KVM: SEV: Configure MMU to check for private fault flags Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 44/51] KVM: SEV: Implement gmem hook for initializing private pages Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 45/51] KVM: SEV: Implement gmem hook for invalidating " Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 46/51] KVM: SVM: Add module parameter to enable the SEV-SNP Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 47/51] iommu/amd: Add IOMMU_SNP_SHUTDOWN support Michael Roth
2023-09-07 10:31 ` Suthikulpanit, Suravee
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 48/51] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_{SET,GET}_EXT_CONFIG command Michael Roth
2023-06-13 6:24 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 49/51] x86/sev: Add KVM commands for per-instance certs Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 50/51] KVM: SVM: Provide support for SNP_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 51/51] crypto: ccp: Add debug support for decrypting pages Michael Roth
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