From: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
To: <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <linux-coco@lists.linux.dev>, <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
<linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>, <x86@kernel.org>,
<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <tglx@linutronix.de>,
<mingo@redhat.com>, <jroedel@suse.de>, <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
<hpa@zytor.com>, <ardb@kernel.org>, <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
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<tony.luck@intel.com>, <marcorr@google.com>,
<sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>,
<alpergun@google.com>, <dgilbert@redhat.com>, <jarkko@kernel.org>,
<ashish.kalra@amd.com>, <nikunj.dadhania@amd.com>,
<liam.merwick@oracle.com>, <zhi.a.wang@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH RFC v9 19/51] x86/sev: Introduce snp leaked pages list
Date: Sun, 11 Jun 2023 23:25:27 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230612042559.375660-20-michael.roth@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230612042559.375660-1-michael.roth@amd.com>
From: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Pages are unsafe to be released back to the page-allocator, if they
have been transitioned to firmware/guest state and can't be reclaimed
or transitioned back to hypervisor/shared state. In this case add
them to an internal leaked pages list to ensure that they are not freed
or touched/accessed to cause fatal page faults.
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
[mdr: relocate to arch/x86/coco/sev/host.c]
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/coco/sev/host.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/include/asm/sev-host.h | 3 +++
2 files changed, 31 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/host.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/host.c
index cd3b4c6a25bc..373e91f5a337 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/host.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/host.c
@@ -64,6 +64,12 @@ struct rmpentry {
static unsigned long rmptable_start __ro_after_init;
static unsigned long rmptable_end __ro_after_init;
+/* list of pages which are leaked and cannot be reclaimed */
+static LIST_HEAD(snp_leaked_pages_list);
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(snp_leaked_pages_list_lock);
+
+static atomic_long_t snp_nr_leaked_pages = ATOMIC_LONG_INIT(0);
+
#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "SEV-SNP: " fmt
@@ -494,3 +500,25 @@ int rmp_make_shared(u64 pfn, enum pg_level level)
return rmpupdate(pfn, &val);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rmp_make_shared);
+
+void snp_leak_pages(unsigned long pfn, unsigned int npages)
+{
+ struct page *page = pfn_to_page(pfn);
+
+ WARN(1, "psc failed, pfn 0x%lx pages %d (marked offline)\n", pfn, npages);
+
+ spin_lock(&snp_leaked_pages_list_lock);
+ while (npages--) {
+ /*
+ * Reuse the page's buddy list for chaining into the leaked
+ * pages list. This page should not be on a free list currently
+ * and is also unsafe to be added to a free list.
+ */
+ list_add_tail(&page->buddy_list, &snp_leaked_pages_list);
+ sev_dump_rmpentry(pfn);
+ pfn++;
+ }
+ spin_unlock(&snp_leaked_pages_list_lock);
+ atomic_long_inc(&snp_nr_leaked_pages);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snp_leak_pages);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-host.h
index 753e80d16433..bab3b226777a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-host.h
@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ void sev_dump_rmpentry(u64 pfn);
int psmash(u64 pfn);
int rmp_make_private(u64 pfn, u64 gpa, enum pg_level level, int asid, bool immutable);
int rmp_make_shared(u64 pfn, enum pg_level level);
+void snp_leak_pages(unsigned long pfn, unsigned int npages);
+
#else
static inline int snp_lookup_rmpentry(u64 pfn, bool *assigned, int *level) { return 0; }
static inline void sev_dump_rmpentry(u64 pfn) {}
@@ -29,6 +31,7 @@ static inline int rmp_make_private(u64 pfn, u64 gpa, enum pg_level level, int as
return -ENODEV;
}
static inline int rmp_make_shared(u64 pfn, enum pg_level level) { return -ENODEV; }
+void snp_leak_pages(unsigned long pfn, unsigned int npages) {}
#endif
#endif
--
2.25.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-06-12 4:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 102+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-06-12 4:25 [PATCH RFC v9 00/51] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 01/51] KVM: x86: Add gmem hook for initializing private memory Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 02/51] KVM: x86: Add gmem hook for invalidating " Michael Roth
2023-06-12 10:49 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-06-19 13:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 03/51] KVM: x86: Use full 64-bit error code for kvm_mmu_do_page_fault Michael Roth
2023-06-14 14:24 ` Isaku Yamahata
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 04/51] KVM: x86: Determine shared/private faults using a configurable mask Michael Roth
2023-06-14 16:47 ` Isaku Yamahata
2023-06-20 20:28 ` Michael Roth
2023-06-20 21:18 ` Isaku Yamahata
2023-06-21 23:00 ` Michael Roth
2023-06-22 8:01 ` Isaku Yamahata
2023-06-22 9:55 ` Huang, Kai
2023-06-22 15:32 ` Michael Roth
2023-06-22 22:31 ` Huang, Kai
2023-06-22 23:39 ` Isaku Yamahata
2023-06-22 23:52 ` Huang, Kai
2023-06-23 14:43 ` Isaku Yamahata
2023-06-19 16:27 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-06-20 20:36 ` Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 05/51] x86/coco: move CONFIG_HAS_CC_PLATFORM check down into coco/Makefile Michael Roth
2023-06-12 7:07 ` Kirill A . Shutemov
2023-06-20 12:09 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-06-20 20:43 ` Michael Roth
2023-06-21 8:54 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-06-29 21:02 ` Michael Roth
2023-07-10 3:05 ` Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy
2023-07-10 13:11 ` Tom Lendacky
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 06/51] x86/cpufeatures: Add SEV-SNP CPU feature Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 07/51] x86/sev: Add the host SEV-SNP initialization support Michael Roth
2023-06-12 15:34 ` Dave Hansen
2023-06-21 9:15 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-06-21 14:31 ` Dave Hansen
2023-06-21 15:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-06-21 9:42 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-06-21 14:36 ` Tom Lendacky
2023-06-21 19:15 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-08-09 13:03 ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 08/51] x86/speculation: Do not enable Automatic IBRS if SEV SNP is enabled Michael Roth
2023-06-12 15:39 ` Dave Hansen
2023-07-18 22:34 ` Kim Phillips
2023-07-18 23:17 ` Dave Hansen
2023-07-20 19:11 ` Kim Phillips
2023-07-20 22:24 ` Dave Hansen
2023-07-21 16:56 ` Kim Phillips
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 09/51] x86/sev: Add RMP entry lookup helpers Michael Roth
2023-06-12 16:08 ` Dave Hansen
2023-06-30 21:57 ` Michael Roth
2023-06-30 22:29 ` Dave Hansen
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 10/51] x86/fault: Add helper for dumping RMP entries Michael Roth
2023-06-12 16:12 ` Dave Hansen
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 11/51] x86/traps: Define RMP violation #PF error code Michael Roth
2023-06-12 16:26 ` Dave Hansen
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 12/51] x86/fault: Report RMP page faults for kernel addresses Michael Roth
2023-06-12 16:30 ` Dave Hansen
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 13/51] x86/fault: Handle RMP page faults for user addresses Michael Roth
2023-06-12 16:40 ` Dave Hansen
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 14/51] x86/sev: Add helper functions for RMPUPDATE and PSMASH instruction Michael Roth
2023-06-12 17:00 ` Dave Hansen
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 15/51] x86/sev: Invalidate pages from the direct map when adding them to the RMP table Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 16/51] crypto: ccp: Define the SEV-SNP commands Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 17/51] crypto: ccp: Add support to initialize the AMD-SP for SEV-SNP Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 18/51] crypto: ccp: Provide API to issue SEV and SNP commands Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` Michael Roth [this message]
2023-08-09 12:46 ` [PATCH RFC v9 19/51] x86/sev: Introduce snp leaked pages list Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 20/51] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy TMR allocation when SNP is enabled Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 21/51] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy SEV command " Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 22/51] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS command Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 23/51] KVM: SEV: Select CONFIG_KVM_PROTECTED_VM when CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 24/51] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle AP reset MSR protocol Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 25/51] KVM: SVM: Add GHCB handling for Hypervisor Feature Support requests Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 26/51] KVM: SVM: Make AVIC backing, VMSA and VMCB memory allocation SNP safe Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 27/51] KVM: SVM: Add initial SEV-SNP support Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 28/51] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SNP_INIT command Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 29/51] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START command Michael Roth
2023-06-12 17:08 ` Peter Gonda
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 30/51] KVM: Add HVA range operator Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 31/51] KVM: Split out memory attribute xarray updates to helper function Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 32/51] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE command Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 33/51] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 34/51] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle GHCB GPA register VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 35/51] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_EXIT_VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 36/51] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle MSR based Page State Change VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 37/51] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle " Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 38/51] KVM: x86: Export the kvm_zap_gfn_range() for the SNP use Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 39/51] KVM: x86: Define RMP page fault error bits for #NPF Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 40/51] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle RMP nested page faults Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 41/51] KVM: SVM: Use a VMSA physical address variable for populating VMCB Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 42/51] KVM: SVM: Support SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event Michael Roth
2023-08-15 16:00 ` Peter Gonda
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 43/51] KVM: SEV: Configure MMU to check for private fault flags Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 44/51] KVM: SEV: Implement gmem hook for initializing private pages Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 45/51] KVM: SEV: Implement gmem hook for invalidating " Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 46/51] KVM: SVM: Add module parameter to enable the SEV-SNP Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 47/51] iommu/amd: Add IOMMU_SNP_SHUTDOWN support Michael Roth
2023-09-07 10:31 ` Suthikulpanit, Suravee
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 48/51] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_{SET,GET}_EXT_CONFIG command Michael Roth
2023-06-13 6:24 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 49/51] x86/sev: Add KVM commands for per-instance certs Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 50/51] KVM: SVM: Provide support for SNP_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 51/51] crypto: ccp: Add debug support for decrypting pages Michael Roth
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