From: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
To: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org
Cc: seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, corbet@lwn.net,
kys@microsoft.com, haiyangz@microsoft.com, wei.liu@kernel.org,
decui@microsoft.com, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com,
bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org,
hpa@zytor.com, vkuznets@redhat.com, peterz@infradead.org,
ravi.v.shankar@intel.com
Subject: [PATCH v1 07/23] KVM: VMX: Disable intercepting FRED MSRs
Date: Wed, 8 Nov 2023 10:29:47 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20231108183003.5981-8-xin3.li@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231108183003.5981-1-xin3.li@intel.com>
Add FRED MSRs to the valid passthrough MSR list and disable intercepting
FRED MSRs only if FRED is enumerated after set CPUID.
Tested-by: Shan Kang <shan.kang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 13 +++++++++++++
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 5d4786812664..327e052d90c1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -700,6 +700,9 @@ static bool is_valid_passthrough_msr(u32 msr)
case MSR_LBR_CORE_TO ... MSR_LBR_CORE_TO + 8:
/* LBR MSRs. These are handled in vmx_update_intercept_for_lbr_msrs() */
return true;
+ case MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0 ... MSR_IA32_FRED_CONFIG:
+ /* FRED MSRs should be passthrough to FRED guests only */
+ return true;
}
r = possible_passthrough_msr_slot(msr) != -ENOENT;
@@ -7813,6 +7816,16 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_config_fred_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
secondary_vm_exit_controls_setbit(vmx,
SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_FRED |
SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_FRED);
+
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP1, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP2, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP3, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP1, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP2, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP3, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FRED_CONFIG, MSR_TYPE_RW);
}
static void vmx_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
--
2.42.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-11-08 19:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 70+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-11-08 18:29 [PATCH v1 00/23] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 01/23] KVM: VMX: Cleanup VMX basic information defines and usages Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 02/23] KVM: VMX: Cleanup VMX misc " Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 03/23] KVM: VMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 04/23] KVM: x86: Mark CR4.FRED as not reserved Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 05/23] KVM: VMX: Initialize FRED VM entry/exit controls in vmcs_config Xin Li
2023-11-09 8:53 ` Chao Gao
2023-11-09 15:15 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-11-10 0:04 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-10 15:01 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-11-14 4:05 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-13 17:18 ` Nikolay Borisov
2023-11-15 2:39 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 06/23] KVM: VMX: Defer enabling FRED MSRs save/load until after set CPUID Xin Li
2023-11-09 9:15 ` Chao Gao
2023-11-09 23:50 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-10 0:18 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-11-14 2:50 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-15 21:47 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-11-08 18:29 ` Xin Li [this message]
2023-11-09 9:21 ` [PATCH v1 07/23] KVM: VMX: Disable intercepting FRED MSRs Chao Gao
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 08/23] KVM: VMX: Initialize VMCS FRED fields Xin Li
2023-11-13 3:04 ` Chao Gao
2023-11-14 6:02 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-14 6:51 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 09/23] KVM: VMX: Switch FRED RSP0 between host and guest Xin Li
2023-11-13 3:47 ` Chao Gao
2023-11-14 5:17 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-14 7:47 ` Chao Gao
2023-11-15 3:04 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 10/23] KVM: VMX: Add support for FRED context save/restore Xin Li
2023-11-13 5:24 ` Chao Gao
2023-11-14 4:48 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 11/23] KVM: x86: Add kvm_is_fred_enabled() Xin Li
2023-11-13 7:35 ` Chao Gao
2023-11-14 4:42 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-14 8:16 ` Chao Gao
2023-11-14 18:57 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-20 9:04 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 12/23] KVM: VMX: Handle FRED event data Xin Li
2023-11-13 10:14 ` Chao Gao
2023-11-14 4:34 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-14 8:58 ` Chao Gao
2023-11-15 2:52 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-16 2:39 ` Chao Gao
2023-11-20 8:16 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 13/23] KVM: VMX: Handle VMX nested exception for FRED Xin Li
2023-11-14 7:40 ` Chao Gao
2023-11-15 3:03 ` Li, Xin3
2023-12-06 8:37 ` Li, Xin3
2023-12-07 8:42 ` Chao Gao
2023-12-07 10:09 ` Li, Xin3
2023-12-08 1:56 ` Chao Gao
2023-12-08 23:48 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 14/23] KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs() Xin Li
2023-11-14 14:36 ` Nikolay Borisov
2023-11-15 2:41 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 15/23] KVM: nVMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li
2023-11-09 8:21 ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-11-10 0:12 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-20 15:52 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2023-11-20 17:42 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 16/23] KVM: nVMX: Add FRED VMCS fields Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 17/23] KVM: nVMX: Add support for VMX FRED controls Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 18/23] KVM: nVMX: Add VMCS FRED states checking Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 19/23] KVM: x86: Allow FRED/LKGS/WRMSRNS to be exposed to guests Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:30 ` [PATCH v1 20/23] KVM: selftests: Add FRED VMCS fields to evmcs Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:30 ` [PATCH v1 21/23] KVM: selftests: Run debug_regs test with FRED enabled Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:30 ` [PATCH v1 22/23] KVM: selftests: Add a new VM guest mode to run user level code Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:30 ` [PATCH v1 23/23] KVM: selftests: Add fred exception tests Xin Li
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