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From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Xin3 Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
Cc: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>,
	"kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	 "linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
	 "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	 "linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org" <linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org>,
	 "linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org"
	<linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org>,
	 "pbonzini@redhat.com" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"corbet@lwn.net" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	 "kys@microsoft.com" <kys@microsoft.com>,
	"haiyangz@microsoft.com" <haiyangz@microsoft.com>,
	 "wei.liu@kernel.org" <wei.liu@kernel.org>,
	Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>,
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	"mingo@redhat.com" <mingo@redhat.com>,
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	 "dave.hansen@linux.intel.com" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
	 "hpa@zytor.com" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"vkuznets@redhat.com" <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
	 "peterz@infradead.org" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Ravi V Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 06/23] KVM: VMX: Defer enabling FRED MSRs save/load until after set CPUID
Date: Thu, 9 Nov 2023 16:18:22 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZU12zoH8VtcZ_USh@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <SA1PR11MB67347A31E38D604FDF2BD606A8AFA@SA1PR11MB6734.namprd11.prod.outlook.com>

On Thu, Nov 09, 2023, Xin3 Li wrote:
> > >+static void vmx_vcpu_config_fred_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > >+{
> > >+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
> > >+
> > >+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_FRED) ||
> > >+	    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_FRED))
> > >+		return;
> > >+
> > >+	/* Enable loading guest FRED MSRs from VMCS */
> > >+	vm_entry_controls_setbit(vmx, VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_FRED);
> > >+
> > >+	/*
> > >+	 * Enable saving guest FRED MSRs into VMCS and loading host FRED MSRs
> > >+	 * from VMCS.
> > >+	 */
> > >+	vm_exit_controls_setbit(vmx,
> > VM_EXIT_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS);
> > >+	secondary_vm_exit_controls_setbit(vmx,
> > >+					  SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_FRED
> > |
> > >+
> > SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_FRED);
> > 
> > all above vmcs controls need to be cleared if guest doesn't enumerate FRED, see
> > 
> > https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZJYzPn7ipYfO0fLZ@google.com/
> 
> Good point, the user space could set cpuid multiple times...
>  
> > Clearing VM_EXIT_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS may be problematic when
> > new bits are added to secondary vmcs controls. Why not keep
> > VM_EXIT_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS always on if it is supported? or you
> > see any perf impact?
> 
> I think it from the other way, why keeps hw loading it on every vmentry
> even if it's not used by a guest?

Oh, yeesh, this is clearing the activation control.  Yeah, NAK to that, just
leave it set.  If it weren't for the fact that there is apparently a metrict ton
of FRED state (I thought the whole point of FRED was to kill off legacy crap like
CPL1 and CPL2 stacks?) _and_ that KVM needs to toggle MSR intercepts, I'd probably
push back on toggling even the FRED controls.

> Different CPUs may implement it in different ways, which we can't assume.

Implement what in a different way?  The VMCS fields and FRED are architectural.
The internal layout of the VMCS is uarch specific, but the encodings and semantics
absolutely cannot change without breaking software.  And if Intel does something
asinine like make a control active-low then we have far, far bigger problems.

> Other features needing it should set it separately, say with a refcount.

Absolutely not.  Unless Intel screwed up the implementation, the cost of leaving
VM_EXIT_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS set when it's supported shouldn't even be
measurable.

  reply	other threads:[~2023-11-10  0:18 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 70+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-11-08 18:29 [PATCH v1 00/23] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 01/23] KVM: VMX: Cleanup VMX basic information defines and usages Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 02/23] KVM: VMX: Cleanup VMX misc " Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 03/23] KVM: VMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 04/23] KVM: x86: Mark CR4.FRED as not reserved Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 05/23] KVM: VMX: Initialize FRED VM entry/exit controls in vmcs_config Xin Li
2023-11-09  8:53   ` Chao Gao
2023-11-09 15:15     ` Sean Christopherson
2023-11-10  0:04       ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-10 15:01         ` Sean Christopherson
2023-11-14  4:05           ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-13 17:18   ` Nikolay Borisov
2023-11-15  2:39     ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 06/23] KVM: VMX: Defer enabling FRED MSRs save/load until after set CPUID Xin Li
2023-11-09  9:15   ` Chao Gao
2023-11-09 23:50     ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-10  0:18       ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2023-11-14  2:50         ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-15 21:47           ` Sean Christopherson
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 07/23] KVM: VMX: Disable intercepting FRED MSRs Xin Li
2023-11-09  9:21   ` Chao Gao
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 08/23] KVM: VMX: Initialize VMCS FRED fields Xin Li
2023-11-13  3:04   ` Chao Gao
2023-11-14  6:02     ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-14  6:51       ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 09/23] KVM: VMX: Switch FRED RSP0 between host and guest Xin Li
2023-11-13  3:47   ` Chao Gao
2023-11-14  5:17     ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-14  7:47       ` Chao Gao
2023-11-15  3:04         ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 10/23] KVM: VMX: Add support for FRED context save/restore Xin Li
2023-11-13  5:24   ` Chao Gao
2023-11-14  4:48     ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 11/23] KVM: x86: Add kvm_is_fred_enabled() Xin Li
2023-11-13  7:35   ` Chao Gao
2023-11-14  4:42     ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-14  8:16       ` Chao Gao
2023-11-14 18:57         ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-20  9:04           ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 12/23] KVM: VMX: Handle FRED event data Xin Li
2023-11-13 10:14   ` Chao Gao
2023-11-14  4:34     ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-14  8:58       ` Chao Gao
2023-11-15  2:52         ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-16  2:39           ` Chao Gao
2023-11-20  8:16             ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 13/23] KVM: VMX: Handle VMX nested exception for FRED Xin Li
2023-11-14  7:40   ` Chao Gao
2023-11-15  3:03     ` Li, Xin3
2023-12-06  8:37       ` Li, Xin3
2023-12-07  8:42         ` Chao Gao
2023-12-07 10:09           ` Li, Xin3
2023-12-08  1:56             ` Chao Gao
2023-12-08 23:48               ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 14/23] KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs() Xin Li
2023-11-14 14:36   ` Nikolay Borisov
2023-11-15  2:41     ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 15/23] KVM: nVMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li
2023-11-09  8:21   ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-11-10  0:12     ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-20 15:52   ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2023-11-20 17:42     ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 16/23] KVM: nVMX: Add FRED VMCS fields Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 17/23] KVM: nVMX: Add support for VMX FRED controls Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 18/23] KVM: nVMX: Add VMCS FRED states checking Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 19/23] KVM: x86: Allow FRED/LKGS/WRMSRNS to be exposed to guests Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:30 ` [PATCH v1 20/23] KVM: selftests: Add FRED VMCS fields to evmcs Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:30 ` [PATCH v1 21/23] KVM: selftests: Run debug_regs test with FRED enabled Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:30 ` [PATCH v1 22/23] KVM: selftests: Add a new VM guest mode to run user level code Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:30 ` [PATCH v1 23/23] KVM: selftests: Add fred exception tests Xin Li

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