From: "Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@intel.com>
To: "kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"david@redhat.com" <david@redhat.com>
Cc: "Hansen, Dave" <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
"Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>,
"bagasdotme@gmail.com" <bagasdotme@gmail.com>,
"ak@linux.intel.com" <ak@linux.intel.com>,
"Wysocki, Rafael J" <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>,
"kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com"
<kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>, "Christopherson,,
Sean" <seanjc@google.com>,
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"pbonzini@redhat.com" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"tglx@linutronix.de" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Yamahata, Isaku" <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>,
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"Gao, Chao" <chao.gao@intel.com>,
"Brown, Len" <len.brown@intel.com>,
"sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com"
<sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>,
"Huang, Ying" <ying.huang@intel.com>,
"Williams, Dan J" <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 02/16] x86/virt/tdx: Detect TDX during kernel boot
Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2023 22:15:37 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2152f69f2127267fdcc5e5c7e7937177da699ab9.camel@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <3dd0e43d-36f7-3325-7680-33779e9b0a55@redhat.com>
On Thu, 2023-03-23 at 18:02 +0100, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> On 16.03.23 23:37, Huang, Kai wrote:
> > On Thu, 2023-03-16 at 13:48 +0100, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> > > On 06.03.23 15:13, Kai Huang wrote:
> > > > Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) protects guest VMs from malicious
> > > > host and certain physical attacks. A CPU-attested software module
> > > > called 'the TDX module' runs inside a new isolated memory range as a
> > > > trusted hypervisor to manage and run protected VMs.
> > > >
> > > > Pre-TDX Intel hardware has support for a memory encryption architecture
> > > > called MKTME. The memory encryption hardware underpinning MKTME is also
> > > > used for Intel TDX. TDX ends up "stealing" some of the physical address
> > > > space from the MKTME architecture for crypto-protection to VMs. The
> > > > BIOS is responsible for partitioning the "KeyID" space between legacy
> > > > MKTME and TDX. The KeyIDs reserved for TDX are called 'TDX private
> > > > KeyIDs' or 'TDX KeyIDs' for short.
> > > >
> > > > TDX doesn't trust the BIOS. During machine boot, TDX verifies the TDX
> > > > private KeyIDs are consistently and correctly programmed by the BIOS
> > > > across all CPU packages before it enables TDX on any CPU core. A valid
> > > > TDX private KeyID range on BSP indicates TDX has been enabled by the
> > > > BIOS, otherwise the BIOS is buggy.
> > >
>
> Sorry for the late reply!
Not late for me :) Thanks!
[...]
> > > >
> > > > +config INTEL_TDX_HOST
> > > > + bool "Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) host support"
> > > > + depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
> > > > + depends on X86_64
> > > > + depends on KVM_INTEL
> > > > + help
> > > > + Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) protects guest VMs from malicious
> > > > + host and certain physical attacks. This option enables necessary TDX
> > > > + support in host kernel to run protected VMs.
> > >
> > > s/in host/in the host/ ?
> >
> > Sure.
> >
> > >
> > > Also, is "protected VMs" the right term to use here? "Encrypted VMs",
> > > "Confidential VMs" ... ?
> >
> > "Encrypted VM" perhaps is not a good choice, because there are more things than
> > encryption. I am also OK with "Confidential VMs", but "protected VMs" is also
> > used in the KVM series (not upstreamed yet), and also used by s390 by looking at
> > the git log.
> >
> > So both "protected VM" and "confidential VM" work for me.
> >
> > Not sure anyone else wants to comment?
>
> I'm fine as long as it's used consistently. "Protected VM" would have
> been the one out of the 3 alternatives that I have heard least frequently.
> >
Yes I'll make sure it is used consistently. Thanks!
I am also glad to change to "Confidential VMs" if anyone else believes it is
better.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-03-23 22:16 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 48+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-03-06 14:13 [PATCH v10 00/16] TDX host kernel support Kai Huang
2023-03-06 14:13 ` [PATCH v10 01/16] x86/tdx: Define TDX supported page sizes as macros Kai Huang
2023-03-16 12:37 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-03-16 22:41 ` Huang, Kai
2023-03-06 14:13 ` [PATCH v10 02/16] x86/virt/tdx: Detect TDX during kernel boot Kai Huang
2023-03-16 12:48 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-03-16 22:37 ` Huang, Kai
2023-03-23 17:02 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-03-23 22:15 ` Huang, Kai [this message]
2023-03-06 14:13 ` [PATCH v10 03/16] x86/virt/tdx: Make INTEL_TDX_HOST depend on X86_X2APIC Kai Huang
2023-03-16 12:57 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-03-06 14:13 ` [PATCH v10 04/16] x86/virt/tdx: Add SEAMCALL infrastructure Kai Huang
2023-03-06 14:13 ` [PATCH v10 05/16] x86/virt/tdx: Add skeleton to enable TDX on demand Kai Huang
2023-03-08 22:27 ` Isaku Yamahata
2023-03-12 23:08 ` Huang, Kai
2023-03-13 23:49 ` Isaku Yamahata
2023-03-14 1:50 ` Huang, Kai
2023-03-14 4:02 ` Isaku Yamahata
2023-03-14 5:45 ` Dave Hansen
2023-03-14 17:16 ` Isaku Yamahata
2023-03-14 17:38 ` Dave Hansen
2023-03-14 15:48 ` Dave Hansen
2023-03-15 11:10 ` Huang, Kai
2023-03-16 22:07 ` Huang, Kai
2023-03-23 13:49 ` Dave Hansen
2023-03-23 22:09 ` Huang, Kai
2023-03-23 22:12 ` Dave Hansen
2023-03-23 22:42 ` Huang, Kai
2023-03-16 0:31 ` Isaku Yamahata
2023-03-16 2:45 ` Isaku Yamahata
2023-03-16 2:52 ` Huang, Kai
2023-03-06 14:13 ` [PATCH v10 06/16] x86/virt/tdx: Get information about TDX module and TDX-capable memory Kai Huang
2023-03-06 14:13 ` [PATCH v10 07/16] x86/virt/tdx: Use all system memory when initializing TDX module as TDX memory Kai Huang
2023-03-09 1:38 ` Isaku Yamahata
2023-03-06 14:13 ` [PATCH v10 08/16] x86/virt/tdx: Add placeholder to construct TDMRs to cover all TDX memory regions Kai Huang
2023-03-06 14:13 ` [PATCH v10 09/16] x86/virt/tdx: Fill out " Kai Huang
2023-03-06 14:13 ` [PATCH v10 10/16] x86/virt/tdx: Allocate and set up PAMTs for TDMRs Kai Huang
2023-03-21 7:44 ` Dong, Eddie
2023-03-21 8:05 ` Huang, Kai
2023-03-06 14:13 ` [PATCH v10 11/16] x86/virt/tdx: Designate reserved areas for all TDMRs Kai Huang
2023-03-06 14:13 ` [PATCH v10 12/16] x86/virt/tdx: Configure TDX module with the TDMRs and global KeyID Kai Huang
2023-03-06 14:13 ` [PATCH v10 13/16] x86/virt/tdx: Configure global KeyID on all packages Kai Huang
2023-03-06 14:13 ` [PATCH v10 14/16] x86/virt/tdx: Initialize all TDMRs Kai Huang
2023-03-06 14:14 ` [PATCH v10 15/16] x86/virt/tdx: Flush cache in kexec() when TDX is enabled Kai Huang
2023-03-06 14:14 ` [PATCH v10 16/16] Documentation/x86: Add documentation for TDX host support Kai Huang
2023-03-08 1:11 ` [PATCH v10 00/16] TDX host kernel support Isaku Yamahata
2023-03-16 12:35 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-03-16 22:06 ` Huang, Kai
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