kvm.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
To: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com>, Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com,
	bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, peterz@infradead.org,
	andrew.cooper3@citrix.com, seanjc@google.com,
	pbonzini@redhat.com, ravi.v.shankar@intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 22/34] x86/fred: FRED initialization code
Date: Fri, 17 Mar 2023 14:32:28 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5D679723-D84F-42F0-AD8A-8BD1A38FB6CD@zytor.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAJhGHyADXz-3PCFS3M_7TJ8qLGJ=4NcV9aBWrpjemuXB_SnMGg@mail.gmail.com>

On March 17, 2023 6:35:57 AM PDT, Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com> wrote:
>Hello
>
>
>Comments in cpu_init_fred_exceptions() seem scarce for understanding.
>
>On Tue, Mar 7, 2023 at 11:07 AM Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com> wrote:
>
>> +/*
>> + * Initialize FRED on this CPU. This cannot be __init as it is called
>> + * during CPU hotplug.
>> + */
>> +void cpu_init_fred_exceptions(void)
>> +{
>> +       wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_FRED_CONFIG,
>> +              FRED_CONFIG_ENTRYPOINT(fred_entrypoint_user) |
>> +              FRED_CONFIG_REDZONE(8) | /* Reserve for CALL emulation */
>> +              FRED_CONFIG_INT_STKLVL(0));
>
>What is it about "Reserve for CALL emulation"?
>
>I guess it relates to X86_TRAP_BP. In entry_64.S:
>
>        .if \vector == X86_TRAP_BP
>                /*
>                 * If coming from kernel space, create a 6-word gap to allow the
>                 * int3 handler to emulate a call instruction.
>                 */
>
>> +
>> +       wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS,
>> +              FRED_STKLVL(X86_TRAP_DB,  1) |
>> +              FRED_STKLVL(X86_TRAP_NMI, 2) |
>> +              FRED_STKLVL(X86_TRAP_MC,  2) |
>> +              FRED_STKLVL(X86_TRAP_DF,  3));
>
>Why each exception here needs a stack level > 0?
>Especially for X86_TRAP_DB and X86_TRAP_NMI.
>
>Why does or why does not X86_TRAP_VE have a stack level > 0?
>
>X86_TRAP_DF is the highest stack level, is it accidental
>or deliberate?
>
>Thanks
>Lai
>

Yes, the extra redzone space is there to allow for the call emulation without having to adjust the stack frame "manually".

In theory we could enable it only while code patching is in progress, but that would probably just result in stack overflows becoming utterly impossible to debug as we have to consider the worst case.

The purpose of separate stacks for NMI, #DB and #MC *in the kernel* (remember that user space faults are always taken on stack level 0) is to avoid overflowing the kernel stack. #DB in the kernel would imply the use of a kernel debugger.

#DF is the highest level because a #DF means "something went wrong *while delivering an exception*." The number of cases for which that can happen with FRED is drastically reduced and basically amount to "the stack you pointed me to is broken."

Thus, you basically always want to change stacks on #DF, which means it should be at the highest level.

  reply	other threads:[~2023-03-17 21:35 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 80+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-03-07  2:39 [PATCH v5 00/34] x86: enable FRED for x86-64 Xin Li
2023-03-07  2:39 ` [PATCH v5 01/34] x86/traps: let common_interrupt() handle IRQ_MOVE_CLEANUP_VECTOR Xin Li
2023-03-07  2:39 ` [PATCH v5 02/34] x86/traps: add a system interrupt table for system interrupt dispatch Xin Li
2023-03-07  2:39 ` [PATCH v5 03/34] x86/traps: add install_system_interrupt_handler() Xin Li
2023-03-07  2:39 ` [PATCH v5 04/34] x86/traps: add external_interrupt() to dispatch external interrupts Xin Li
2023-03-20 15:36   ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-03-20 17:42     ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-03-20 23:47       ` Li, Xin3
2023-03-20 17:53     ` Li, Xin3
2023-03-07  2:39 ` [PATCH v5 05/34] x86/traps: export external_interrupt() for VMX IRQ reinjection Xin Li
2023-03-22 17:52   ` Sean Christopherson
2023-03-22 22:38     ` Li, Xin3
2023-03-07  2:39 ` [PATCH v5 06/34] x86/cpufeature: add the cpu feature bit for FRED Xin Li
2023-03-07  2:39 ` [PATCH v5 07/34] x86/opcode: add ERETU, ERETS instructions to x86-opcode-map Xin Li
2023-03-07  2:39 ` [PATCH v5 08/34] x86/objtool: teach objtool about ERETU and ERETS Xin Li
2023-03-07  2:39 ` [PATCH v5 09/34] x86/cpu: add X86_CR4_FRED macro Xin Li
2023-03-07  2:39 ` [PATCH v5 10/34] x86/fred: add Kconfig option for FRED (CONFIG_X86_FRED) Xin Li
2023-03-07  2:39 ` [PATCH v5 11/34] x86/fred: if CONFIG_X86_FRED is disabled, disable FRED support Xin Li
2023-03-07  2:39 ` [PATCH v5 12/34] x86/cpu: add MSR numbers for FRED configuration Xin Li
2023-03-07  2:39 ` [PATCH v5 13/34] x86/fred: header file for event types Xin Li
2023-03-07  2:39 ` [PATCH v5 14/34] x86/fred: header file with FRED definitions Xin Li
2023-03-07  2:39 ` [PATCH v5 15/34] x86/fred: make unions for the cs and ss fields in struct pt_regs Xin Li
2023-03-07  2:39 ` [PATCH v5 16/34] x86/fred: reserve space for the FRED stack frame Xin Li
2023-03-07  2:39 ` [PATCH v5 17/34] x86/fred: add a page fault entry stub for FRED Xin Li
2023-03-07  2:39 ` [PATCH v5 18/34] x86/fred: add a debug " Xin Li
2023-03-07  2:39 ` [PATCH v5 19/34] x86/fred: add a NMI " Xin Li
2023-03-07  2:39 ` [PATCH v5 20/34] x86/fred: add a machine check " Xin Li
2023-03-20 16:00   ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-03-21  0:04     ` Li, Xin3
2023-03-21  8:59       ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-03-21 16:38         ` Li, Xin3
2023-03-07  2:39 ` [PATCH v5 21/34] x86/fred: FRED entry/exit and dispatch code Xin Li
2023-03-07  2:39 ` [PATCH v5 22/34] x86/fred: FRED initialization code Xin Li
2023-03-17 13:35   ` Lai Jiangshan
2023-03-17 21:32     ` H. Peter Anvin [this message]
2023-03-18  6:33       ` Lai Jiangshan
2023-03-20 16:49         ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-03-21  0:12           ` Li, Xin3
2023-03-21  1:02             ` andrew.cooper3
2023-03-21  7:49               ` Li, Xin3
2023-03-22 16:29               ` Dave Hansen
2023-03-22  2:22         ` Li, Xin3
2023-03-22  4:01           ` Dave Hansen
2023-03-22  5:40             ` Li, Xin3
2023-03-22 18:25           ` andrew.cooper3
2023-03-20 16:44       ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-03-21  0:13         ` Li, Xin3
2023-03-07  2:39 ` [PATCH v5 23/34] x86/fred: update MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0 during task switch Xin Li
2023-03-20 16:52   ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-03-20 23:54     ` Li, Xin3
2023-03-07  2:39 ` [PATCH v5 24/34] x86/fred: let ret_from_fork() jmp to fred_exit_user when FRED is enabled Xin Li
2023-03-07  2:39 ` [PATCH v5 25/34] x86/fred: disallow the swapgs instruction " Xin Li
2023-03-20 16:54   ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-03-20 17:58     ` Li, Xin3
2023-03-07  2:39 ` [PATCH v5 26/34] x86/fred: no ESPFIX needed " Xin Li
2023-03-07  2:39 ` [PATCH v5 27/34] x86/fred: allow single-step trap and NMI when starting a new thread Xin Li
2023-03-07  2:39 ` [PATCH v5 28/34] x86/fred: fixup fault on ERETU by jumping to fred_entrypoint_user Xin Li
2023-03-17  9:39   ` Lai Jiangshan
2023-03-17  9:55     ` andrew.cooper3
2023-03-17 13:02       ` Lai Jiangshan
2023-03-17 21:23         ` H. Peter Anvin
2023-03-17 21:00       ` H. Peter Anvin
2023-03-18  7:55     ` Li, Xin3
2023-03-07  2:39 ` [PATCH v5 29/34] x86/ia32: do not modify the DPL bits for a null selector Xin Li
2023-03-07  2:39 ` [PATCH v5 30/34] x86/fred: allow FRED systems to use interrupt vectors 0x10-0x1f Xin Li
2023-03-07  2:39 ` [PATCH v5 31/34] x86/fred: allow dynamic stack frame size Xin Li
2023-03-07  2:39 ` [PATCH v5 32/34] x86/fred: disable FRED by default in its early stage Xin Li
2023-03-07  2:39 ` [PATCH v5 33/34] KVM: x86/vmx: call external_interrupt() to handle IRQ in IRQ caused VM exits Xin Li
2023-03-22 17:57   ` Sean Christopherson
2023-03-07  2:39 ` [PATCH v5 34/34] KVM: x86/vmx: execute "int $2" to handle NMI in NMI caused VM exits when FRED is enabled Xin Li
2023-03-07 22:00   ` Li, Xin3
2023-03-22 17:49   ` Sean Christopherson
2023-03-22 23:03     ` andrew.cooper3
2023-03-22 23:42       ` Sean Christopherson
2023-03-23  0:26         ` Li, Xin3
2023-03-24 17:45           ` Li, Xin3
2023-03-22 23:43     ` Li, Xin3
2023-03-11  9:58 ` [PATCH v5 00/34] x86: enable FRED for x86-64 Kang, Shan
2023-03-11 21:29   ` Li, Xin3
2023-03-20  7:40   ` Kang, Shan

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=5D679723-D84F-42F0-AD8A-8BD1A38FB6CD@zytor.com \
    --to=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=andrew.cooper3@citrix.com \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=jiangshanlai@gmail.com \
    --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=ravi.v.shankar@intel.com \
    --cc=seanjc@google.com \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    --cc=xin3.li@intel.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).