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From: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
To: "Singh, Brijesh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: "kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>, "Borislav Petkov" <bp@suse.de>,
	"Lendacky, Thomas" <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 01/11] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV SEND_START command
Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2019 10:35:55 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAMkAt6pzXrZw1TZgcX-G0wDNZBjf=1bQdErAJTxfzYQ2MJDZvw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190710201244.25195-2-brijesh.singh@amd.com>

On Wed, Jul 10, 2019 at 1:13 PM Singh, Brijesh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> wrote:
>
> +static int sev_send_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
> +{
> +       struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
> +       void *amd_cert = NULL, *session_data = NULL;
> +       void *pdh_cert = NULL, *plat_cert = NULL;
> +       struct sev_data_send_start *data = NULL;
> +       struct kvm_sev_send_start params;
> +       int ret;
> +
> +       if (!sev_guest(kvm))
> +               return -ENOTTY;
> +
> +       if (copy_from_user(&params, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data,
> +                               sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_start)))
> +               return -EFAULT;
> +
> +       data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
> +       if (!data)
> +               return -ENOMEM;
> +
> +       /* userspace wants to query the session length */
> +       if (!params.session_len)
> +               goto cmd;
> +
> +       if (!params.pdh_cert_uaddr || !params.pdh_cert_len ||
> +           !params.session_uaddr)
> +               return -EINVAL;

I think pdh_cert is only required if the guest policy SEV bit is set.
Can pdh_cert be optional?

> +
> +       /* copy the certificate blobs from userspace */
> +       pdh_cert = psp_copy_user_blob(params.pdh_cert_uaddr, params.pdh_cert_len);
> +       if (IS_ERR(pdh_cert)) {
> +               ret = PTR_ERR(pdh_cert);
> +               goto e_free;
> +       }
> +
> +       data->pdh_cert_address = __psp_pa(pdh_cert);
> +       data->pdh_cert_len = params.pdh_cert_len;
> +
> +       plat_cert = psp_copy_user_blob(params.plat_cert_uaddr, params.plat_cert_len);
> +       if (IS_ERR(plat_cert)) {
> +               ret = PTR_ERR(plat_cert);
> +               goto e_free_pdh;
> +       }

I think plat_cert is also only required if the guest policy SEV bit is
set. Can plat_cert also be optional?

> +
> +       data->plat_cert_address = __psp_pa(plat_cert);
> +       data->plat_cert_len = params.plat_cert_len;
> +
> +       amd_cert = psp_copy_user_blob(params.amd_cert_uaddr, params.amd_cert_len);
> +       if (IS_ERR(amd_cert)) {
> +               ret = PTR_ERR(amd_cert);
> +               goto e_free_plat_cert;
> +       }

I think amd_cert is also only required if the guest policy SEV bit is
set. Can amd_cert also be optional?

> +
> +       data->amd_cert_address = __psp_pa(amd_cert);
> +       data->amd_cert_len = params.amd_cert_len;
> +
> +       ret = -EINVAL;
> +       if (params.session_len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)
> +               goto e_free_amd_cert;
> +
> +       ret = -ENOMEM;
> +       session_data = kmalloc(params.session_len, GFP_KERNEL);
> +       if (!session_data)
> +               goto e_free_amd_cert;

This pattern of returning -EINVAL if a length is greater than
SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE and -ENOMEM if kmalloc fails is used at
sev_launch_measure. And I think in your later patches you do similar,
did you consider factoring this out into a helper function similar to
psp_copy_user_blob?

  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-11-12 18:36 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 42+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-07-10 20:12 [PATCH v3 00/11] Add AMD SEV guest live migration support Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-10 20:13 ` [PATCH v3 01/11] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV SEND_START command Singh, Brijesh
2019-08-22 10:08   ` Borislav Petkov
2019-08-22 13:23     ` Singh, Brijesh
2019-11-12 18:35   ` Peter Gonda [this message]
2019-11-12 22:27     ` Brijesh Singh
2019-11-14 19:27       ` Peter Gonda
2019-11-19 14:06         ` Brijesh Singh
2019-07-10 20:13 ` [PATCH v3 02/11] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEND_UPDATE_DATA command Singh, Brijesh
2019-08-22 12:02   ` Borislav Petkov
2019-08-22 13:27     ` Singh, Brijesh
2019-08-22 13:34       ` Borislav Petkov
2019-11-12 22:23   ` Peter Gonda
2019-07-10 20:13 ` [PATCH v3 03/11] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH command Singh, Brijesh
2019-08-26 13:29   ` Borislav Petkov
2019-07-10 20:13 ` [PATCH v3 04/11] KVM: SVM: Add support for KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START command Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-10 20:13 ` [PATCH v3 05/11] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command Singh, Brijesh
2019-08-27 12:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2019-11-14 21:02   ` Peter Gonda
2019-07-10 20:13 ` [PATCH v3 06/11] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH command Singh, Brijesh
2019-08-27 12:19   ` Borislav Petkov
2019-07-10 20:13 ` [PATCH v3 07/11] KVM: x86: Add AMD SEV specific Hypercall3 Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-10 20:13 ` [PATCH v3 08/11] KVM: X86: Introduce KVM_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS hypercall Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-21 20:57   ` David Rientjes
2019-07-22 17:12     ` Cfir Cohen
2019-07-23 15:31       ` Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-23 15:16     ` Singh, Brijesh
2019-11-25 19:07   ` Peter Gonda
2019-07-10 20:13 ` [PATCH v3 09/11] KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_GET_PAGE_ENC_BITMAP ioctl Singh, Brijesh
2019-08-29 16:26   ` Borislav Petkov
2019-08-29 16:41     ` Singh, Brijesh
2019-08-29 16:56       ` Borislav Petkov
2019-07-10 20:13 ` [PATCH v3 10/11] mm: x86: Invoke hypercall when page encryption status is changed Singh, Brijesh
2019-08-29 16:52   ` Borislav Petkov
2019-08-29 18:07   ` Borislav Petkov
2019-08-29 18:21     ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-08-29 18:32       ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-07-10 20:13 ` [PATCH v3 11/11] KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_SET_PAGE_ENC_BITMAP ioctl Singh, Brijesh
2019-11-15  1:22   ` Steve Rutherford
2019-11-15  1:39     ` Steve Rutherford
2019-07-12 15:52 ` [PATCH v3 00/11] Add AMD SEV guest live migration support Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2019-07-12 16:31   ` Singh, Brijesh

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