[PATCH v6 1/4] syscalls: Restore address limit after a syscall

[PATCH v6 1/4] syscalls: Restore address limit after a syscall

[Thomas Garnier]

This patch ensures a syscall does not return to user-mode with a kernel
address limit. If that happened, a process can corrupt kernel-mode
memory and elevate privileges.

For example, it would mitigation this bug:

- https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=990

The CONFIG_ARCH_NO_SYSCALL_VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE option is also
added so each architecture can optimize this change.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org>
---
Based on next-20170404
---
 arch/s390/Kconfig        |  1 +
 include/linux/syscalls.h | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 init/Kconfig             |  7 +++++++
 kernel/sys.c             |  7 +++++++
 4 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/s390/Kconfig b/arch/s390/Kconfig
index ca2fe764be2d..4ec7563f2746 100644
--- a/arch/s390/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/s390/Kconfig
@@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ config S390
 	select ARCH_INLINE_WRITE_UNLOCK_BH
 	select ARCH_INLINE_WRITE_UNLOCK_IRQ
 	select ARCH_INLINE_WRITE_UNLOCK_IRQRESTORE
+	select ARCH_NO_SYSCALL_VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE
 	select ARCH_SAVE_PAGE_KEYS if HIBERNATION
 	select ARCH_SUPPORTS_ATOMIC_RMW
 	select ARCH_SUPPORTS_DEFERRED_STRUCT_PAGE_INIT
diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h
index 980c3c9b06f8..f9ff80fa92ff 100644
--- a/include/linux/syscalls.h
+++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h
@@ -191,6 +191,27 @@ extern struct trace_event_functions exit_syscall_print_funcs;
 	SYSCALL_METADATA(sname, x, __VA_ARGS__)			\
 	__SYSCALL_DEFINEx(x, sname, __VA_ARGS__)
 
+
+/*
+ * Called before coming back to user-mode. Returning to user-mode with an
+ * address limit different than USER_DS can allow to overwrite kernel memory.
+ */
+static inline void verify_pre_usermode_state(void) {
+	BUG_ON(!segment_eq(get_fs(), USER_DS));
+}
+
+#ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_NO_SYSCALL_VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE
+#define __CHECK_USER_CALLER() \
+	bool user_caller = segment_eq(get_fs(), USER_DS)
+#define __VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE() \
+	if (user_caller) verify_pre_usermode_state()
+#else
+#define __CHECK_USER_CALLER()
+#define __VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE()
+asmlinkage void asm_verify_pre_usermode_state(void);
+#endif
+
+
 #define __PROTECT(...) asmlinkage_protect(__VA_ARGS__)
 #define __SYSCALL_DEFINEx(x, name, ...)					\
 	asmlinkage long sys##name(__MAP(x,__SC_DECL,__VA_ARGS__))	\
@@ -199,7 +220,10 @@ extern struct trace_event_functions exit_syscall_print_funcs;
 	asmlinkage long SyS##name(__MAP(x,__SC_LONG,__VA_ARGS__));	\
 	asmlinkage long SyS##name(__MAP(x,__SC_LONG,__VA_ARGS__))	\
 	{								\
-		long ret = SYSC##name(__MAP(x,__SC_CAST,__VA_ARGS__));	\
+		long ret;						\
+		__CHECK_USER_CALLER();					\
+		ret = SYSC##name(__MAP(x,__SC_CAST,__VA_ARGS__));	\
+		__VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE();				\
 		__MAP(x,__SC_TEST,__VA_ARGS__);				\
 		__PROTECT(x, ret,__MAP(x,__SC_ARGS,__VA_ARGS__));	\
 		return ret;						\
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index 7f7027817bce..2c6b73de9a26 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
@@ -1958,6 +1958,13 @@ config PROFILING
 config TRACEPOINTS
 	bool
 
+#
+# Set by each architecture that want to optimize how verify_pre_usermode_state
+# is called.
+#
+config ARCH_NO_SYSCALL_VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE
+	bool
+
 source "arch/Kconfig"
 
 endmenu		# General setup
diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index 196c7134bee6..4ae278fcc290 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -2459,3 +2459,10 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE1(sysinfo, struct compat_sysinfo __user *, info)
 	return 0;
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_NO_SYSCALL_VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE
+asmlinkage void asm_verify_pre_usermode_state(void)
+{
+	verify_pre_usermode_state();
+}
+#endif
-- 
2.12.2.715.g7642488e1d-goog

[PATCH v6 2/4] x86/syscalls: Specific usage of verify_pre_usermode_state

[Thomas Garnier]

Implement specific usage of verify_pre_usermode_state for user-mode
returns for x86.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
---
Based on next-20170404
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig                        |  1 +
 arch/x86/entry/common.c                 |  3 +++
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S               |  8 ++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h | 11 +++++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h        | 11 -----------
 5 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 9a5af1e1cd61..3d7eb9298f2d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ config X86
 	select ARCH_MIGHT_HAVE_ACPI_PDC		if ACPI
 	select ARCH_MIGHT_HAVE_PC_PARPORT
 	select ARCH_MIGHT_HAVE_PC_SERIO
+	select ARCH_NO_SYSCALL_VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE
 	select ARCH_SUPPORTS_ATOMIC_RMW
 	select ARCH_SUPPORTS_DEFERRED_STRUCT_PAGE_INIT
 	select ARCH_SUPPORTS_NUMA_BALANCING	if X86_64
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/common.c b/arch/x86/entry/common.c
index cdefcfdd9e63..76ef050255c9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/common.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 #include <linux/user-return-notifier.h>
 #include <linux/uprobes.h>
 #include <linux/livepatch.h>
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
 
 #include <asm/desc.h>
 #include <asm/traps.h>
@@ -183,6 +184,8 @@ __visible inline void prepare_exit_to_usermode(struct pt_regs *regs)
 	struct thread_info *ti = current_thread_info();
 	u32 cached_flags;
 
+	verify_pre_usermode_state();
+
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING) && WARN_ON(!irqs_disabled()))
 		local_irq_disable();
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
index d2b2a2948ffe..c079b010205c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -218,6 +218,14 @@ entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath:
 	testl	$_TIF_ALLWORK_MASK, TASK_TI_flags(%r11)
 	jnz	1f
 
+	/*
+	 * If address limit is not based on user-mode, jump to slow path for
+	 * additional security checks.
+	 */
+	movq	$TASK_SIZE_MAX, %rcx
+	cmp	%rcx, TASK_addr_limit(%r11)
+	jnz	1f
+
 	LOCKDEP_SYS_EXIT
 	TRACE_IRQS_ON		/* user mode is traced as IRQs on */
 	movq	RIP(%rsp), %rcx
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h
index 516593e66bd6..12fa851c7fa8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h
@@ -78,4 +78,15 @@ typedef struct { pteval_t pte; } pte_t;
 
 #define EARLY_DYNAMIC_PAGE_TABLES	64
 
+/*
+ * User space process size. 47bits minus one guard page.  The guard
+ * page is necessary on Intel CPUs: if a SYSCALL instruction is at
+ * the highest possible canonical userspace address, then that
+ * syscall will enter the kernel with a non-canonical return
+ * address, and SYSRET will explode dangerously.  We avoid this
+ * particular problem by preventing anything from being mapped
+ * at the maximum canonical address.
+ */
+#define TASK_SIZE_MAX	((_AC(1, UL) << 47) - PAGE_SIZE)
+
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_PGTABLE_64_DEFS_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
index 3cada998a402..e80822582d3e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -825,17 +825,6 @@ static inline void spin_lock_prefetch(const void *x)
 #define KSTK_ESP(task)		(task_pt_regs(task)->sp)
 
 #else
-/*
- * User space process size. 47bits minus one guard page.  The guard
- * page is necessary on Intel CPUs: if a SYSCALL instruction is at
- * the highest possible canonical userspace address, then that
- * syscall will enter the kernel with a non-canonical return
- * address, and SYSRET will explode dangerously.  We avoid this
- * particular problem by preventing anything from being mapped
- * at the maximum canonical address.
- */
-#define TASK_SIZE_MAX	((1UL << 47) - PAGE_SIZE)
-
 /* This decides where the kernel will search for a free chunk of vm
  * space during mmap's.
  */
-- 
2.12.2.715.g7642488e1d-goog

Re: [PATCH v6 2/4] x86/syscalls: Specific usage of verify_pre_usermode_state

[H. Peter Anvin]

On 04/04/17 10:47, Thomas Garnier wrote:
> Implement specific usage of verify_pre_usermode_state for user-mode
> returns for x86.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
>  
> +	/*
> +	 * If address limit is not based on user-mode, jump to slow path for
> +	 * additional security checks.
> +	 */
> +	movq	$TASK_SIZE_MAX, %rcx
> +	cmp	%rcx, TASK_addr_limit(%r11)
> +	jnz	1f
> +
>  	LOCKDEP_SYS_EXIT

Nitpick: use jne not jnz when comparing for equality.  Same instruction
but more readable.

	-hpa

Re: [PATCH v6 2/4] x86/syscalls: Specific usage of verify_pre_usermode_state

[H. Peter Anvin]

On 04/04/17 10:47, Thomas Garnier wrote:
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h
> index 516593e66bd6..12fa851c7fa8 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h
> @@ -78,4 +78,15 @@ typedef struct { pteval_t pte; } pte_t;
>  
>  #define EARLY_DYNAMIC_PAGE_TABLES	64
>  
> +/*
> + * User space process size. 47bits minus one guard page.  The guard
> + * page is necessary on Intel CPUs: if a SYSCALL instruction is at
> + * the highest possible canonical userspace address, then that
> + * syscall will enter the kernel with a non-canonical return
> + * address, and SYSRET will explode dangerously.  We avoid this
> + * particular problem by preventing anything from being mapped
> + * at the maximum canonical address.
> + */
> +#define TASK_SIZE_MAX	((_AC(1, UL) << 47) - PAGE_SIZE)
> +
>  #endif /* _ASM_X86_PGTABLE_64_DEFS_H */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
> index 3cada998a402..e80822582d3e 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
> @@ -825,17 +825,6 @@ static inline void spin_lock_prefetch(const void *x)
>  #define KSTK_ESP(task)		(task_pt_regs(task)->sp)
>  
>  #else
> -/*
> - * User space process size. 47bits minus one guard page.  The guard
> - * page is necessary on Intel CPUs: if a SYSCALL instruction is at
> - * the highest possible canonical userspace address, then that
> - * syscall will enter the kernel with a non-canonical return
> - * address, and SYSRET will explode dangerously.  We avoid this
> - * particular problem by preventing anything from being mapped
> - * at the maximum canonical address.
> - */
> -#define TASK_SIZE_MAX	((1UL << 47) - PAGE_SIZE)
> -
>  /* This decides where the kernel will search for a free chunk of vm
>   * space during mmap's.
>   */
> 

This should be an entirely separate patch; if nothing else you need to
explain it in the comments.

Also, you say this is for "x86", but I still don't see any code for i386
whatsoever.  Have you verified *all* the i386 and i386-compat paths to
make sure they go via prepare_exit_to_usermode()?  [Cc: Andy]

Finally, I can't really believe I'm the only person for whom "Specific
usage of verity_pre_usermode_state" is completely opaque.

	-hpa

Re: [PATCH v6 2/4] x86/syscalls: Specific usage of verify_pre_usermode_state

[Borislav Petkov]

On Tue, Apr 04, 2017 at 11:27:07AM -0700, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
> Finally, I can't really believe I'm the only person for whom "Specific
> usage of verity_pre_usermode_state" is completely opaque.

No, you're not. I'm missing the usual layout of the commit message
"Problem is A, we need to do B, because of C." And this particular one
needs to be pretty verbose as it is tricky lowlevel, userspace return
blabla code and I'd prefer not to have to rhyme up together myself
what's going on and what we're fixing here.

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.

Re: [PATCH v6 2/4] x86/syscalls: Specific usage of verify_pre_usermode_state

[Thomas Garnier]

On Tue, Apr 4, 2017 at 11:27 AM, H. Peter Anvin <hpa-YMNOUZJC4hwAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org> wrote:
> On 04/04/17 10:47, Thomas Garnier wrote:
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h
>> index 516593e66bd6..12fa851c7fa8 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h
>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h
>> @@ -78,4 +78,15 @@ typedef struct { pteval_t pte; } pte_t;
>>
>>  #define EARLY_DYNAMIC_PAGE_TABLES    64
>>
>> +/*
>> + * User space process size. 47bits minus one guard page.  The guard
>> + * page is necessary on Intel CPUs: if a SYSCALL instruction is at
>> + * the highest possible canonical userspace address, then that
>> + * syscall will enter the kernel with a non-canonical return
>> + * address, and SYSRET will explode dangerously.  We avoid this
>> + * particular problem by preventing anything from being mapped
>> + * at the maximum canonical address.
>> + */
>> +#define TASK_SIZE_MAX        ((_AC(1, UL) << 47) - PAGE_SIZE)
>> +
>>  #endif /* _ASM_X86_PGTABLE_64_DEFS_H */
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
>> index 3cada998a402..e80822582d3e 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
>> @@ -825,17 +825,6 @@ static inline void spin_lock_prefetch(const void *x)
>>  #define KSTK_ESP(task)               (task_pt_regs(task)->sp)
>>
>>  #else
>> -/*
>> - * User space process size. 47bits minus one guard page.  The guard
>> - * page is necessary on Intel CPUs: if a SYSCALL instruction is at
>> - * the highest possible canonical userspace address, then that
>> - * syscall will enter the kernel with a non-canonical return
>> - * address, and SYSRET will explode dangerously.  We avoid this
>> - * particular problem by preventing anything from being mapped
>> - * at the maximum canonical address.
>> - */
>> -#define TASK_SIZE_MAX        ((1UL << 47) - PAGE_SIZE)
>> -
>>  /* This decides where the kernel will search for a free chunk of vm
>>   * space during mmap's.
>>   */
>>
>
> This should be an entirely separate patch; if nothing else you need to
> explain it in the comments.

I will explain it in the commit message, it should be easier than a
separate patch.

>
> Also, you say this is for "x86", but I still don't see any code for i386
> whatsoever.  Have you verified *all* the i386 and i386-compat paths to
> make sure they go via prepare_exit_to_usermode()?  [Cc: Andy]

I did but I will do it again for the next iteration.

>
> Finally, I can't really believe I'm the only person for whom "Specific
> usage of verity_pre_usermode_state" is completely opaque.

I agree, I will improve it.

>
>         -hpa
>



-- 
Thomas

Re: [PATCH v6 2/4] x86/syscalls: Specific usage of verify_pre_usermode_state

[H. Peter Anvin]

<will.deacon-5wv7dgnIgG8@public.gmane.org>,Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas-5wv7dgnIgG8@public.gmane.org>,Mark Rutland <mark.rutland-5wv7dgnIgG8@public.gmane.org>,James Morse <james.morse-5wv7dgnIgG8@public.gmane.org>,linux-s390 <linux-s390-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org>,LKML <linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org>,Linux API <linux-api-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org>,the arch/x86 maintainers <x86-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>,linux-arm-kernel-IAPFreCvJWM7uuMidbF8XUB+6BGkLq7r@public.gmane.org,Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening-ZwoEplunGu1jrUoiu81ncdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org>
From: hpa-YMNOUZJC4hwAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org
Message-ID: <C92745AD-C4D9-441E-854C-985512E5FD8F-YMNOUZJC4hwAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>

On April 4, 2017 12:21:48 PM PDT, Thomas Garnier <thgarnie-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org> wrote:
>On Tue, Apr 4, 2017 at 11:27 AM, H. Peter Anvin <hpa-YMNOUZJC4hwAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org> wrote:
>> On 04/04/17 10:47, Thomas Garnier wrote:
>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h
>b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h
>>> index 516593e66bd6..12fa851c7fa8 100644
>>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h
>>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h
>>> @@ -78,4 +78,15 @@ typedef struct { pteval_t pte; } pte_t;
>>>
>>>  #define EARLY_DYNAMIC_PAGE_TABLES    64
>>>
>>> +/*
>>> + * User space process size. 47bits minus one guard page.  The guard
>>> + * page is necessary on Intel CPUs: if a SYSCALL instruction is at
>>> + * the highest possible canonical userspace address, then that
>>> + * syscall will enter the kernel with a non-canonical return
>>> + * address, and SYSRET will explode dangerously.  We avoid this
>>> + * particular problem by preventing anything from being mapped
>>> + * at the maximum canonical address.
>>> + */
>>> +#define TASK_SIZE_MAX        ((_AC(1, UL) << 47) - PAGE_SIZE)
>>> +
>>>  #endif /* _ASM_X86_PGTABLE_64_DEFS_H */
>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
>b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
>>> index 3cada998a402..e80822582d3e 100644
>>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
>>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
>>> @@ -825,17 +825,6 @@ static inline void spin_lock_prefetch(const
>void *x)
>>>  #define KSTK_ESP(task)               (task_pt_regs(task)->sp)
>>>
>>>  #else
>>> -/*
>>> - * User space process size. 47bits minus one guard page.  The guard
>>> - * page is necessary on Intel CPUs: if a SYSCALL instruction is at
>>> - * the highest possible canonical userspace address, then that
>>> - * syscall will enter the kernel with a non-canonical return
>>> - * address, and SYSRET will explode dangerously.  We avoid this
>>> - * particular problem by preventing anything from being mapped
>>> - * at the maximum canonical address.
>>> - */
>>> -#define TASK_SIZE_MAX        ((1UL << 47) - PAGE_SIZE)
>>> -
>>>  /* This decides where the kernel will search for a free chunk of vm
>>>   * space during mmap's.
>>>   */
>>>
>>
>> This should be an entirely separate patch; if nothing else you need
>to
>> explain it in the comments.
>
>I will explain it in the commit message, it should be easier than a
>separate patch.
>
>>
>> Also, you say this is for "x86", but I still don't see any code for
>i386
>> whatsoever.  Have you verified *all* the i386 and i386-compat paths
>to
>> make sure they go via prepare_exit_to_usermode()?  [Cc: Andy]
>
>I did but I will do it again for the next iteration.
>
>>
>> Finally, I can't really believe I'm the only person for whom
>"Specific
>> usage of verity_pre_usermode_state" is completely opaque.
>
>I agree, I will improve it.
>
>>
>>         -hpa
>>

Easier for you, perhaps, but not for everyone else...
-- 
Sent from my Android device with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity.

[PATCH v6 4/4] arm64/syscalls: Specific usage of verify_pre_usermode_state

[Thomas Garnier]

Implement specific usage of verify_pre_usermode_state for user-mode
returns for arm64.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
---
Based on next-20170404
---
 arch/arm64/Kconfig        |  1 +
 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 15 +++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
index f2b0b528037d..0e86d87259f4 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ config ARM64
 	select ARCH_WANT_COMPAT_IPC_PARSE_VERSION
 	select ARCH_WANT_FRAME_POINTERS
 	select ARCH_HAS_UBSAN_SANITIZE_ALL
+	select ARCH_NO_SYSCALL_VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE
 	select ARM_AMBA
 	select ARM_ARCH_TIMER
 	select ARM_GIC
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
index 43512d4d7df2..6d598e7051c3 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
@@ -744,6 +744,10 @@ ENDPROC(cpu_switch_to)
 ret_fast_syscall:
 	disable_irq				// disable interrupts
 	str	x0, [sp, #S_X0]			// returned x0
+	ldr	x2, [tsk, #TSK_TI_ADDR_LIMIT]	// check addr limit change
+	mov	x1, #TASK_SIZE_64
+	cmp	x2, x1
+	b.ne	addr_limit_fail
 	ldr	x1, [tsk, #TSK_TI_FLAGS]	// re-check for syscall tracing
 	and	x2, x1, #_TIF_SYSCALL_WORK
 	cbnz	x2, ret_fast_syscall_trace
@@ -771,6 +775,11 @@ work_pending:
  */
 ret_to_user:
 	disable_irq				// disable interrupts
+	ldr	x2, [tsk, #TSK_TI_ADDR_LIMIT]	// check addr limit change
+	mov	x1, #TASK_SIZE_64
+	cmp	x2, x1
+	b.ne	addr_limit_fail
+
 	ldr	x1, [tsk, #TSK_TI_FLAGS]
 	and	x2, x1, #_TIF_WORK_MASK
 	cbnz	x2, work_pending
@@ -779,6 +788,12 @@ finish_ret_to_user:
 	kernel_exit 0
 ENDPROC(ret_to_user)
 
+addr_limit_fail:
+	stp	x0, lr, [sp,#-16]!
+	bl	asm_verify_pre_usermode_state
+	ldp	x0, lr, [sp],#16
+	ret	lr
+
 /*
  * This is how we return from a fork.
  */
-- 
2.12.2.715.g7642488e1d-goog

Re: [PATCH v6 4/4] arm64/syscalls: Specific usage of verify_pre_usermode_state

[Catalin Marinas]

On Tue, Apr 04, 2017 at 10:47:27AM -0700, Thomas Garnier wrote:
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
> index 43512d4d7df2..6d598e7051c3 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
> @@ -744,6 +744,10 @@ ENDPROC(cpu_switch_to)
>  ret_fast_syscall:
>  	disable_irq				// disable interrupts
>  	str	x0, [sp, #S_X0]			// returned x0
> +	ldr	x2, [tsk, #TSK_TI_ADDR_LIMIT]	// check addr limit change
> +	mov	x1, #TASK_SIZE_64
> +	cmp	x2, x1
> +	b.ne	addr_limit_fail

KERNEL_DS is set to the maximum address (-1UL), so it would be easier to
check against this here and avoid a "mov". Even simpler if you'd check
against bit 63 of the address for KERNEL_DS:

	ldr	x1, [tsk, TSK_TI_ADDR_LIMIT]	// check addr limit change
	tbnz	x1, #63, addr_limit_fail	// KERNEL_DS is -1UL

>  	ldr	x1, [tsk, #TSK_TI_FLAGS]	// re-check for syscall tracing
>  	and	x2, x1, #_TIF_SYSCALL_WORK
>  	cbnz	x2, ret_fast_syscall_trace
> @@ -771,6 +775,11 @@ work_pending:
>   */
>  ret_to_user:
>  	disable_irq				// disable interrupts
> +	ldr	x2, [tsk, #TSK_TI_ADDR_LIMIT]	// check addr limit change
> +	mov	x1, #TASK_SIZE_64
> +	cmp	x2, x1
> +	b.ne	addr_limit_fail

Same here.

> +
>  	ldr	x1, [tsk, #TSK_TI_FLAGS]
>  	and	x2, x1, #_TIF_WORK_MASK
>  	cbnz	x2, work_pending
> @@ -779,6 +788,12 @@ finish_ret_to_user:
>  	kernel_exit 0
>  ENDPROC(ret_to_user)
>  
> +addr_limit_fail:
> +	stp	x0, lr, [sp,#-16]!
> +	bl	asm_verify_pre_usermode_state
> +	ldp	x0, lr, [sp],#16
> +	ret	lr

Where is this supposed to return? What is the value of lr when branching
to addr_limit_fail?

-- 
Catalin

Re: [PATCH v6 4/4] arm64/syscalls: Specific usage of verify_pre_usermode_state

[Thomas Garnier]

On Wed, Apr 5, 2017 at 7:22 AM, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 04, 2017 at 10:47:27AM -0700, Thomas Garnier wrote:
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
>> index 43512d4d7df2..6d598e7051c3 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
>> @@ -744,6 +744,10 @@ ENDPROC(cpu_switch_to)
>>  ret_fast_syscall:
>>       disable_irq                             // disable interrupts
>>       str     x0, [sp, #S_X0]                 // returned x0
>> +     ldr     x2, [tsk, #TSK_TI_ADDR_LIMIT]   // check addr limit change
>> +     mov     x1, #TASK_SIZE_64
>> +     cmp     x2, x1
>> +     b.ne    addr_limit_fail
>
> KERNEL_DS is set to the maximum address (-1UL), so it would be easier to
> check against this here and avoid a "mov". Even simpler if you'd check
> against bit 63 of the address for KERNEL_DS:

We also want to catch corruption so checking the 63 bit make sense. I
will look for this change in the next iteration.

>
>         ldr     x1, [tsk, TSK_TI_ADDR_LIMIT]    // check addr limit change
>         tbnz    x1, #63, addr_limit_fail        // KERNEL_DS is -1UL
>
>>       ldr     x1, [tsk, #TSK_TI_FLAGS]        // re-check for syscall tracing
>>       and     x2, x1, #_TIF_SYSCALL_WORK
>>       cbnz    x2, ret_fast_syscall_trace
>> @@ -771,6 +775,11 @@ work_pending:
>>   */
>>  ret_to_user:
>>       disable_irq                             // disable interrupts
>> +     ldr     x2, [tsk, #TSK_TI_ADDR_LIMIT]   // check addr limit change
>> +     mov     x1, #TASK_SIZE_64
>> +     cmp     x2, x1
>> +     b.ne    addr_limit_fail
>
> Same here.
>
>> +
>>       ldr     x1, [tsk, #TSK_TI_FLAGS]
>>       and     x2, x1, #_TIF_WORK_MASK
>>       cbnz    x2, work_pending
>> @@ -779,6 +788,12 @@ finish_ret_to_user:
>>       kernel_exit 0
>>  ENDPROC(ret_to_user)
>>
>> +addr_limit_fail:
>> +     stp     x0, lr, [sp,#-16]!
>> +     bl      asm_verify_pre_usermode_state
>> +     ldp     x0, lr, [sp],#16
>> +     ret     lr
>
> Where is this supposed to return? What is the value of lr when branching
> to addr_limit_fail?

It is not supposed to return. Do you think I should remove stp, ldp,
ret and jut add a brk 0x100 or jmp/call a break/bug function?

>
> --
> Catalin



-- 
Thomas

Re: [PATCH v6 4/4] arm64/syscalls: Specific usage of verify_pre_usermode_state

[Catalin Marinas]

On Wed, Apr 05, 2017 at 07:36:17AM -0700, Thomas Garnier wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 5, 2017 at 7:22 AM, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> wrote:
> > On Tue, Apr 04, 2017 at 10:47:27AM -0700, Thomas Garnier wrote:
> >> +
> >>       ldr     x1, [tsk, #TSK_TI_FLAGS]
> >>       and     x2, x1, #_TIF_WORK_MASK
> >>       cbnz    x2, work_pending
> >> @@ -779,6 +788,12 @@ finish_ret_to_user:
> >>       kernel_exit 0
> >>  ENDPROC(ret_to_user)
> >>
> >> +addr_limit_fail:
> >> +     stp     x0, lr, [sp,#-16]!
> >> +     bl      asm_verify_pre_usermode_state
> >> +     ldp     x0, lr, [sp],#16
> >> +     ret     lr
> >
> > Where is this supposed to return? What is the value of lr when branching
> > to addr_limit_fail?
> 
> It is not supposed to return. Do you think I should remove stp, ldp,
> ret and jut add a brk 0x100 or jmp/call a break/bug function?

Can you not just make addr_limit_fail a C function which never returns
(similar to what we to with bad_mode() on arm64)? Since addr_limit_fail
is only called when the segment is not the right one, I don't really see
why you need another call to asm_verify_pre_usermode_state() to do a
similar check again. Just panic in addr_limit_fail (unless I
misunderstood what you are trying to achieve).

-- 
Catalin

Re: [PATCH v6 4/4] arm64/syscalls: Specific usage of verify_pre_usermode_state

[Thomas Garnier]

On Wed, Apr 5, 2017 at 10:49 AM, Catalin Marinas
<catalin.marinas@arm.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 05, 2017 at 07:36:17AM -0700, Thomas Garnier wrote:
>> On Wed, Apr 5, 2017 at 7:22 AM, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> wrote:
>> > On Tue, Apr 04, 2017 at 10:47:27AM -0700, Thomas Garnier wrote:
>> >> +
>> >>       ldr     x1, [tsk, #TSK_TI_FLAGS]
>> >>       and     x2, x1, #_TIF_WORK_MASK
>> >>       cbnz    x2, work_pending
>> >> @@ -779,6 +788,12 @@ finish_ret_to_user:
>> >>       kernel_exit 0
>> >>  ENDPROC(ret_to_user)
>> >>
>> >> +addr_limit_fail:
>> >> +     stp     x0, lr, [sp,#-16]!
>> >> +     bl      asm_verify_pre_usermode_state
>> >> +     ldp     x0, lr, [sp],#16
>> >> +     ret     lr
>> >
>> > Where is this supposed to return? What is the value of lr when branching
>> > to addr_limit_fail?
>>
>> It is not supposed to return. Do you think I should remove stp, ldp,
>> ret and jut add a brk 0x100 or jmp/call a break/bug function?
>
> Can you not just make addr_limit_fail a C function which never returns
> (similar to what we to with bad_mode() on arm64)? Since addr_limit_fail
> is only called when the segment is not the right one, I don't really see
> why you need another call to asm_verify_pre_usermode_state() to do a
> similar check again. Just panic in addr_limit_fail (unless I
> misunderstood what you are trying to achieve).

Calling asm_verify_pre_usermode_state has the advantage of having a
clear BUG_ON for the error (versus a panic description).

What do you think about replacing asm_verify_pre_usermode_state by a
"address_limit_fail" function that still calls
verify_pre_usermode_state but panic afterwards (because it should
never return)?

The assembly code would be easier to understand and in case of error
the BUG_ON is clear for the user.

>
> --
> Catalin



-- 
Thomas

Re: [PATCH v6 4/4] arm64/syscalls: Specific usage of verify_pre_usermode_state

[Catalin Marinas]

On Wed, Apr 05, 2017 at 11:14:34AM -0700, Thomas Garnier wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 5, 2017 at 10:49 AM, Catalin Marinas
> <catalin.marinas@arm.com> wrote:
> > On Wed, Apr 05, 2017 at 07:36:17AM -0700, Thomas Garnier wrote:
> >> On Wed, Apr 5, 2017 at 7:22 AM, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> wrote:
> >> > On Tue, Apr 04, 2017 at 10:47:27AM -0700, Thomas Garnier wrote:
> >> >> +
> >> >>       ldr     x1, [tsk, #TSK_TI_FLAGS]
> >> >>       and     x2, x1, #_TIF_WORK_MASK
> >> >>       cbnz    x2, work_pending
> >> >> @@ -779,6 +788,12 @@ finish_ret_to_user:
> >> >>       kernel_exit 0
> >> >>  ENDPROC(ret_to_user)
> >> >>
> >> >> +addr_limit_fail:
> >> >> +     stp     x0, lr, [sp,#-16]!
> >> >> +     bl      asm_verify_pre_usermode_state
> >> >> +     ldp     x0, lr, [sp],#16
> >> >> +     ret     lr
> >> >
> >> > Where is this supposed to return? What is the value of lr when branching
> >> > to addr_limit_fail?
> >>
> >> It is not supposed to return. Do you think I should remove stp, ldp,
> >> ret and jut add a brk 0x100 or jmp/call a break/bug function?
> >
> > Can you not just make addr_limit_fail a C function which never returns
> > (similar to what we to with bad_mode() on arm64)? Since addr_limit_fail
> > is only called when the segment is not the right one, I don't really see
> > why you need another call to asm_verify_pre_usermode_state() to do a
> > similar check again. Just panic in addr_limit_fail (unless I
> > misunderstood what you are trying to achieve).
> 
> Calling asm_verify_pre_usermode_state has the advantage of having a
> clear BUG_ON for the error (versus a panic description).
> 
> What do you think about replacing asm_verify_pre_usermode_state by a
> "address_limit_fail" function that still calls
> verify_pre_usermode_state but panic afterwards (because it should
> never return)?
> 
> The assembly code would be easier to understand and in case of error
> the BUG_ON is clear for the user.

It looks fine to me, though I'd have to see the patch.

-- 
Catalin

[PATCH v6 3/4] arm/syscalls: Specific usage of verify_pre_usermode_state

[Thomas Garnier]

Implement specific usage of verify_pre_usermode_state for user-mode
returns for arm.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
---
Based on next-20170404
---
 arch/arm/Kconfig               |  1 +
 arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S | 16 +++++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/Kconfig
index 2cec306c7390..e2ebc7d37742 100644
--- a/arch/arm/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm/Kconfig
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ config ARM
 	select ARCH_HAVE_CUSTOM_GPIO_H
 	select ARCH_HAS_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL
 	select ARCH_MIGHT_HAVE_PC_PARPORT
+	select ARCH_NO_SYSCALL_VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE
 	select ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX if ARCH_HAS_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX
 	select ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX_DEFAULT if CPU_V7
 	select ARCH_SUPPORTS_ATOMIC_RMW
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S
index eb5cd77bf1d8..88c72c4e44ad 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 #include <asm/unistd.h>
 #include <asm/ftrace.h>
 #include <asm/unwind.h>
+#include <asm/memory.h>
 #ifdef CONFIG_AEABI
 #include <asm/unistd-oabi.h>
 #endif
@@ -27,7 +28,6 @@
 
 #include "entry-header.S"
 
-
 	.align	5
 #if !(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CONTEXT_TRACKING))
 /*
@@ -40,9 +40,12 @@ ret_fast_syscall:
  UNWIND(.fnstart	)
  UNWIND(.cantunwind	)
 	disable_irq_notrace			@ disable interrupts
+	ldr	r2, [tsk, #TI_ADDR_LIMIT]
 	ldr	r1, [tsk, #TI_FLAGS]		@ re-check for syscall tracing
 	tst	r1, #_TIF_SYSCALL_WORK | _TIF_WORK_MASK
 	bne	fast_work_pending
+	cmp	r2, #TASK_SIZE
+	blne	addr_limit_fail
 
 	/* perform architecture specific actions before user return */
 	arch_ret_to_user r1, lr
@@ -66,6 +69,7 @@ ret_fast_syscall:
  UNWIND(.cantunwind	)
 	str	r0, [sp, #S_R0 + S_OFF]!	@ save returned r0
 	disable_irq_notrace			@ disable interrupts
+	ldr	r2, [tsk, #TI_ADDR_LIMIT]
 	ldr	r1, [tsk, #TI_FLAGS]		@ re-check for syscall tracing
 	tst	r1, #_TIF_SYSCALL_WORK | _TIF_WORK_MASK
 	beq	no_work_pending
@@ -82,6 +86,7 @@ slow_work_pending:
 	mov	r2, why				@ 'syscall'
 	bl	do_work_pending
 	cmp	r0, #0
+	ldreq   r2, [tsk, #TI_ADDR_LIMIT]
 	beq	no_work_pending
 	movlt	scno, #(__NR_restart_syscall - __NR_SYSCALL_BASE)
 	ldmia	sp, {r0 - r6}			@ have to reload r0 - r6
@@ -99,9 +104,12 @@ ret_slow_syscall:
 	disable_irq_notrace			@ disable interrupts
 ENTRY(ret_to_user_from_irq)
 	ldr	r1, [tsk, #TI_FLAGS]
+	ldr	r2, [tsk, #TI_ADDR_LIMIT]
 	tst	r1, #_TIF_WORK_MASK
 	bne	slow_work_pending
 no_work_pending:
+	cmp	r2, #TASK_SIZE
+	blne	addr_limit_fail
 	asm_trace_hardirqs_on save = 0
 
 	/* perform architecture specific actions before user return */
@@ -125,6 +133,12 @@ ENTRY(ret_from_fork)
 	b	ret_slow_syscall
 ENDPROC(ret_from_fork)
 
+addr_limit_fail:
+	stmfd	sp!, {r0, lr}
+	bl	asm_verify_pre_usermode_state
+	ldmfd	sp!, {r0, lr}
+	ret     lr
+
 /*=============================================================================
  * SWI handler
  *-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- 
2.12.2.715.g7642488e1d-goog