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* [PATCH v3 1/4] syscalls: Use CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION for addr_limit_user_check
@ 2017-08-14 21:37 Thomas Garnier
  2017-08-14 21:37 ` [PATCH v3 2/4] Revert "arm/syscalls: Check address limit on user-mode return" Thomas Garnier
                   ` (2 more replies)
  0 siblings, 3 replies; 8+ messages in thread
From: Thomas Garnier @ 2017-08-14 21:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Al Viro, Dave Hansen, Arnd Bergmann, Thomas Gleixner,
	Thomas Garnier, Yonghong Song, David Howells, Russell King,
	Kees Cook, Andy Lutomirski, Will Drewry, Dave Martin,
	Catalin Marinas, Will Deacon
  Cc: linux-api, linux-kernel, linux-arm-kernel, kernel-hardening

Use CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION instead of BUG_ON to provide more flexibility
on address limit failures. By default, send a SIGKILL signal to kill the
current process preventing exploitation of a bad address limit.

Make the TIF_FSCHECK flag optional so ARM can use this function.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
---
 include/linux/syscalls.h | 12 ++++++++----
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h
index 88951b795ee3..65e273aadada 100644
--- a/include/linux/syscalls.h
+++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h
@@ -219,21 +219,25 @@ static inline int is_syscall_trace_event(struct trace_event_call *tp_event)
 	}								\
 	static inline long SYSC##name(__MAP(x,__SC_DECL,__VA_ARGS__))
 
-#ifdef TIF_FSCHECK
 /*
  * Called before coming back to user-mode. Returning to user-mode with an
  * address limit different than USER_DS can allow to overwrite kernel memory.
  */
 static inline void addr_limit_user_check(void)
 {
-
+#ifdef TIF_FSCHECK
 	if (!test_thread_flag(TIF_FSCHECK))
 		return;
+#endif
 
-	BUG_ON(!segment_eq(get_fs(), USER_DS));
+	if (CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(!segment_eq(get_fs(), USER_DS),
+				  "Invalid address limit on user-mode return"))
+		force_sig(SIGKILL, current);
+
+#ifdef TIF_FSCHECK
 	clear_thread_flag(TIF_FSCHECK);
-}
 #endif
+}
 
 asmlinkage long sys32_quotactl(unsigned int cmd, const char __user *special,
 			       qid_t id, void __user *addr);
-- 
2.14.1.480.gb18f417b89-goog

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2017-09-05 10:46 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2017-08-14 21:37 [PATCH v3 1/4] syscalls: Use CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION for addr_limit_user_check Thomas Garnier
2017-08-14 21:37 ` [PATCH v3 2/4] Revert "arm/syscalls: Check address limit on user-mode return" Thomas Garnier
2017-08-14 21:37 ` [PATCH v3 3/4] arm/syscalls: Optimize address limit check Thomas Garnier
2017-08-22 16:42   ` Thomas Garnier
     [not found]     ` <CAJcbSZG1b7ObJAv6Kmp-fR3vZRg7AdbcgqDceGB95r-72Yv0yg-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2017-08-29 14:32       ` Thomas Garnier
     [not found]         ` <CAJcbSZEd10fMp6OSgSYv_Wmt=wX5fw_Gu-_N=fM_QmP==wUMew-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2017-08-29 19:54           ` Kees Cook
2017-09-05 10:46             ` Leonard Crestez
2017-08-14 21:37 ` [PATCH v3 4/4] arm64/syscalls: Move address limit check in loop Thomas Garnier

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